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This is the 11th Latvia Human Development Report to be published.  It was written by 
the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute of the University of Latvia (ASPRI) 
in partnership with the University of Latvia’s Faculty of Economics and Management, 
the Latvia University of Agriculture, and the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences.
The 2010/2011 report is part of the national research programme “National Identity.”  
The purpose of the report is to survey the content of individual national belonging in 
the context of human development. Particular attention has been devoted to the 
issue of emigration, because human development is weakened by the decline in 
Latvia’s population numbers. As people move to other countries, it becomes clear that 
there is constant competition among identities and a transformation of identities.  The 
report also reveals the palette of circumstances and techniques which facilitate an 
individual’s linkage to a place or a region.
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My childhood, my home, my family, my friends, my 
classmates, the place where I was born, my study mates 
and colleagues at work, Latvia and the Latvian language – 
all of these are not just memories, but also events which 
have shaped my national sense of belonging and identity 
and, perhaps, that of many others. These are factors which 
characterise personal experiences and memories about 
times gone by. They are also subjects which are brilliantly 
revealed and analysed in the current Human Development 
Report, «National Identity, Mobility and Capability.»
Processes of change today are based on economic 
development, the free flow of capital and products, 
as well as labour force mobility and migration. Here in 
Latvia, we encounter the benefits and negations of these 
processes every day. These are dimensions which are 
affected by our long presence under the rule of various 
totalitarian regimes, and in recent times, they have 
been exacerbated by political and economic instability. 
People adapt to shifting circumstances. Individual values 
become more attractive, and they replace social values 
such as a sense of community and mutual assistance. This 
vacuum is filled up with yet another round of lending at 
the state and the individual level. «Individual» decisions 
such as deciding to leave the country replace «collective» 
decisions, thus limiting manifestations of solidarity and 
influencing the morals of society and, indirectly, the very 
existence of the state. We all have a sharp sense of the 
economic realities of our country – the ones which affect 
the sense of national belonging that is so very important 
to the people of Latvia. Disgust and a sense of alienation 
serve as excuses for emigrating from the country, thus 
strengthening the importance of the search for national 
identity here and abroad. Émigrés, on average, are 
much younger than those who remain behind, and so 
Latvia’s society is far more aged than it could be, and it is 
continuing to age more swiftly than it would otherwise 
do so. It is also true that the proportion of students and 
economically active people is disproportionally high 
among the émigrés. This brain drain is a serious threat 
to the future of the Latvian state and its development, 
because in most cases, only a minority of those who have 
departed plan to return in the near or long-term future. 
Latvia’s wisest minds and most ambitious people are 
being bought up by those countries which can afford to 
pay competitive wages.
Latvia can be crossed in just a few hours by car. 
Therefore it is particularly important to attract people 
to rural territories and small towns. This is a Catch-22 
situation: The fewer residents, the higher the cost of 
maintaining the local infrastructure, and the worse the 
condition of the local infrastructure, the harder it is to keep 
people from moving away. Ambitious people leave, while 
those who remain behind have fewer opportunities. The 
provision of the educational and health care services that 
are of such great importance in terms of development is 
endangered, and people have less of an opportunity to 
simply earn a living.
And yet not all of our ambitious and energetic people 
are abandoning places that are seen as backward so as 
to join densely populated communities in urban centres 
or travel far abroad in search of a better life. Individuals 
and communities are seeking solutions to their social 
and economic needs. The overcoming of risks in Latvia’s 
regions helps employers to prove their survival abilities to 
improve productivity and competitiveness. The search for 
new strategies under conditions of an economic crisis is a 
prerequisite for the survival of the state and nation. Some 
of these solutions open up the path to new opportunities 
and are sustainable. Many people can find innovative 
solutions, break down age-old stereotypes, and create 
success stories so as to avoid the trap of deceptive welfare 
in which people make use of social subsidies and refrain 
from taking an active part in the labour market or in the 
lives of their communities. We very much appreciate those 
who do not fall into that trap.
National identity cannot compete against other 
identities that are available in this globalised world unless 
there are powerful social, economic and civic dimensions 
in that identity. People who have good lives and feel 
secure, stable and necessary in their communities want 
to belong to those communities and facilitate their 
growth. Yes, there are differences in the views of various 
communities about ethnic and cultural issues, as well as 
civic values such as obeying the law, opposing injustice 
and fighting against corruption. All in all, however, the 
positions which communities take on such matters are 
quite similar. This means that civic values must be as 
important as national values in terms of the integration of 
nations. They must help in establishing a set of ethnic and 
civic values that will facilitate the growth of the country.
The Latvian nation is still looking for the best models 
to govern the country, strengthen economy, and develop 
all of the talents. The dream about Latvia can be dreamed 
not just by sinking into the past or into the concerns of 
today. It is a dream about the future, about creative and 
ambitious people and about excellence and quality, as 
ensured by an educated and ambitious nation on the 
shores of the Baltic Sea.
Andris Bērziņš
President of the Republic of Latvia
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The unified 3rd Global Congress of Latvian Scientists 
and 4th Lettonica Congress last year was focused on 
aspects of national identity, and so it is only logical that 
the 2011 Report on Human Development is also focused 
on this important topic, analysing the concept of national 
identity and the factors which affect it.
Migration processes have had a great effect on 
national identity over the course of the 20th century and 
also during the last several decades. The latest national 
census and studies by scholars at the University of Latvia 
point to a series of important problems with respect to 
which we are still unable to forecast their effect on the 
long term development of the nation and the state. The 
Report on Human Development also offers an extensive 
analysis of the transformation of national identity under 
circumstances of migration.
Territorial belonging, historical memory, culture 
and language are all essential dimensions of national 
identity, but this concept cannot be imagined without 
a common national economy and politics which are of 
decisive importance during socially important changes 
at a time when commonly held values and goals facilitate 
the consolidation of the nation. For that reason, it is the 
job for any country to strengthen national identity and 
the sense of belonging to the nation among individuals. 
This requires policies which improve people’s lives and 
enhance the belief of citizens in the rule of law – one law 
and the same justice for everyone.
The development of the nation, however, is also 
closely linked to the ability of individual members of the 
nation to act responsibly, thinking not just about private 
benefits, but also about the common good. The basis for 
such thinking is one’s understanding of one’s belonging 
to the nation, knowledge about who we were and who 
we are, and a clear vision as to who we want to be. 
Education is the best instrument in strengthening 
the self-esteem of a nation, so it is the duty of the state to 
establish a national system of education and science which 
helps the nation to pursue its goals and to ensure welfare. 
That is exactly why the University of Latvia was established 
92 years ago  – the first national university in Latvia. Its 
mission has never changed  – to serve science and the 
fatherland and to facilitate the emergence of an educated 
nation which can facilitate the flourishing of the country.
Only an educated nation can understand its history 
and culture, nurture universal values, and look into the 
future with a sense of security. That is why this report is a 
good foundation for the country’s development of a long 
term developmental strategy, as well as for the taking 
and implementation of politically responsible decisions.
Professor Mārcis Auziņš, rector
University of Latvia
Education and Science:  
the Road toward  
Strengthening National identity
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Population
Number of residents 2.2 million
Natural growth, % -0.8
Population density/km2 34.8
Population of urban, rural areas, %
Rural 32.3
Urban 67.7
Gender distribution, %
Men 46.1
Women 53.9
age structure, % (beginning of year)
0-14 13.8
Working age  
(15-62 for men, 15-61.5 for women) 66.0
Above working age 20.2
Ethnic structure, % (beginning of year)
Latvians 59.4
Russians 27.6
Belarusians 3.6
Ukrainians 2.5
Poles 2.3
Lithuanians 1.3
Others 3.3
Ranking  
in human development indicators  48th 
Human Development Index 0.769
Adult literacy, % 99.8
Health
Expected lifespan, years 73.8
Men 68.8
Women 78.4
Infant mortality/1,000 newborns 5.7
Doctors per 1,000 residents 35.7
Economy
GDP, million LVL 12,735.9
GDP per capita, 2000 prices, LVL 3,039
GDP per capita, purchasing power 12,200
GDP decline, % -0.3
Unemployment rate, % 14.3
Employment by sector, %
Agriculture 9
Industry 24
Services 67
Government spending as % of GDP (2009)
TOTAL 44.2
Defence 1.2
Education 6.6
Health care 4.7
Social aid 14.0
Exchange rate of LvL per USD 1 (end of year) 0.5350
territory, km2 64,589
BASIC FACTS ABOUT LATVIA, 2010 
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The production of Human Development Reports in 
the world began in 1990, when the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) first invited a team of independent 
experts to prepare a report on the development of the 
global population in the context of the most important 
global processes. Twenty reports have been prepared 
so far on all kinds of subjects. The reports offer different 
views about the development of nations in the world. The 
basic goal is to look at the development of nations on the 
basis of a specific aspect. In 2009, for instance, the topic 
of the global report was migration, while in 2010 it was 
welfare.
Human Development Reports have been prepared in 
Latvia since 1995. For the first 10 years, this process was 
overseen by the Latvian office of the UNDP. Beginning in 
2004, responsibility for the reports was taken on by the 
Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia and 
its Institute for Social and Political Research.
Latvia’s Human Development Reports typically are 
focused on a specific subject, and the development of 
the nation is reviewed under a conceptual framework 
related to same. This makes it possible to ensure that the 
reports offer evidence of the nation’s development as 
part of a research project. Previous reports have looked 
at traditional developmental problems such as poverty, 
social integration and standards of living. Other reports 
have been distinguished by an innovative approach to 
dealing with developmental problems  – public policy 
processes, human security, and capabilities in the sense 
of human development (see Box 0.1 for a review of the 
subjects). Human Development Reports also include 
the main statistical indicators which reflect the trends of 
socio-economic processes in the country.
Major statistical indicators of human develop ment 
in Latvia in 2010/2001: Economics and demographics. 
Latvia’s economic indicators remain among the lowest in 
Europe under the influence of the global economic crisis. 
This applies to per capita GDP in terms of purchasing 
power parity  – 3,039, which is the second lowest 
indicator in Europe after Romania. GDP declined very 
little in 2009 in comparison to the previous year  – just 
by 0.3%, but in comparison to 2007, the decline was at a 
level of 22%. At present, GDP is just a bit above its level 
in 2006. The unemployment rate in Latvia declined to 
14% in 2010, or 2% less than in 2009. It must be added 
that unemployment declined to 12% at the end of the 
summer of 2011.
According to the initial results of a census that was 
conducted in the spring of 2011 in Latvia, the number 
of residents in the country has sunk below two million. 
The main reasons for this depopulation are emigration 
and a low fertility rate. Despite the fairly rapid processes 
of depopulation in Latvia, however, there are a few 
demographic indicators which speak to positive trends 
over the past 15 years. For instance, the number of infant 
deaths has visibly declined from 18.8 per 1,000 live births 
in 1995 to 5.7 in 2010. The expected lifespan of newborns 
has increased from 66.7 years in 1995 to 73.8 in 2010. At 
the same time, however, the overall number of residents 
in the country has been declining.
introduction
Topics in the Human Development Reports of Latvia
1995: A general evaluation of human development in Latvia; the effects of societal changes on local residents
1996: Poverty, social integration and regional differences
1997: Standards of living, education reforms and participation
1998: The state, individuals and the private sector; sustainable development, equal opportunities, the quality of 
interpersonal relationships, and the partnership between the public and the private sector;
1999: Manifestations of globalisation in Latvia, as well as related risks and opportunities
2000/2001:  Public policy process from the perspective of human development
2002/2003:  Human security as an important prerequisite for the development of society
2004/2005:  Capabilities in regions
2006/2007:  Human capital and its relationship with social capital and social institutes and networks
2008/2009:  Accountability
Box 
0.1
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National identity and human 
development
Latvia’s Human Development Reports typically 
offer not just analysis of social processes on the basis of 
statistical data, but also the results of studies focused 
on the values, views and beliefs of individuals and social 
groups. The authors of the 2008/2009 report, for instance, 
focused on the responsibility of individuals in terms of 
understanding the social consequences of their actions 
and their readiness to take responsibility for them. The 
authors argue that one of the fundamental dimensions of 
human development is expanding the choices which are 
available to people. Individual freedom of choice in terms 
of life plans, however, is just one side of the coin. The 
other side, no less important, speaks to an understanding 
of the consequences of individual choices in the broader 
social context. The authors of the 2008/2009 report insist 
that human development is closely linked to the ability of 
each individual to act responsibly.
Close links between individual and social aspects 
can also be found in the concept of «national identity.» 
On the one hand, an individual’s belonging to a national 
community is a subjective emotion. These are special 
links between individuals and their homeland. On the 
other hand, these are special relations in the sense 
that they bring together the individual and the state, 
establish invisible links with the state, and determine 
the individual’s personal responsibilities and rights while 
also ensuring a sense of security about the future. The 
strength of a national community is based on the sense 
of community among members of the nation, with 
mutual recognition, reliance, and civic involvement and 
responsibility. An understanding of common values and 
viewpoints holds the nation together, allows it to set out 
goals, to act in pursuit of those goals, and to feel secure.
The job for the state, in turn, is to strengthen 
national identity, to facilitate a sense of belonging to the 
nation among members of society, to strengthen civic 
belonging, to clearly define political and socioeconomic 
rights and obligations, and to establish an educational 
and media system which serves as an instrument for 
creating the nation’s image. It is the duty of the state to 
strengthen national culture and language, respect for 
the symbols of state, support for traditions and rituals, 
including state holidays, which form a sense of belonging 
to the nation, as well as to facilitate the emergence 
of new traditions and rituals which serve to unify all 
members of society irrespective of their ethnic status.
The 2010/2011 report was produced under the 
auspices of the national research programme «National 
Identity.» The job of the report is to survey the content 
of individual national belonging in the context of 
human development. The report particularly focuses 
on emigration issues, because human development is 
weakened by a reduction in the size of the country’s 
population. The fact that people are moving to other 
countries shows that there is an endless competition 
among identities, as well as a transformation of those 
identities. The report also reveals the set of circumstances 
and techniques (the ability to act) which facilitate links 
between an individual and a location or region. The first 
two sections of the report review national identity and 
emigration, focusing more on problems and missions. 
The third section, however, studies abilities to act, making 
it possible to identify the achievements which various 
communities have ensured in terms of strengthening 
their sense of belonging to a specific location.
National identity and related 
concepts
identity is a concept that has been used more 
and more frequently over the past several decades in 
science, the mass media, and everyday conversation. 
A collective identity speaks to belonging to a group. It 
is a subjective concept, because belonging to a group 
is based on individual choices. Such choices, however, 
can be implemented in society in line with existing 
structures and discursive practices. In explaining identity, 
one must emphasise the active role of the individual in 
shaping it. In this sense, identity can be seen as being 
in contradiction to a caste which speaks to a strict and 
unchangeable role for individuals in society. The position 
of the individual in establishing an identity is an active 
one. Individuals must choose the tools that are offered by 
society – education, employment, a place to live, parties 
and movements, ways of spending leisure time, music, 
apparel, friendships, diverse family models, and social 
networks. Individuals choose the elements which are 
most appropriate for them, and then they decide to what 
they feel a sense of belonging.
Nation. The concept of a «nation» is a very old one. 
It has been used in various languages and meanings 
in the antique world, during the Middle Ages and later. 
It has been used to describe various groups in terms 
of characteristics which differentiate them from other 
groups. The word can be used to describe a dynasty, 
students from a single country, or a group with common 
habits which differentiate it from its neighbours. 
Researchers usually point to the French Revolution as the 
event which attached new meaning to the concept of 
the «nation.» The new definition was established in the 
context of changes in traditional power structures. They 
change from ones in which the power of the monarch 
was based on the loyalty of his or her subjects to ones 
in which authority was based on a community which 
could act and express its will. The new understanding 
of the nation typically involves the belief that it is an 
active political agent and the initial bearer of the idea 
of sovereignty. When we speak of a nation today, we 
are usually referring to a group of people who have a 
common territory, history, culture, economy and laws.
National identity is an individual identity which 
speaks to the individual’s sense of belonging to a 
national and state community. National identity plays 
a particular role in a country, because it establishes a 
sense of community and belonging to the nation among 
residents thereof. National identity is both a national and 
a personal concept. A sense of belonging to a national 
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community is the link which allows the individual to 
feel that he or she is a member of the relevant national 
community.
Dimensions of national identity speak to the 
content of national belonging. Scholars usually identify 
the following dimensions of national identity: 1) The 
psychological dimension (pride, emotional links 
of belonging which need no rational explanation); 
2)  Culture (values, convictions, traditions, habits, 
language; culture helps one to see one’s community 
as being different than others; 3) Territorial belonging, 
which speaks to views about homes, natural resources 
and the landscape as a place which feeds people; 4) 
Historical memories, which allow one to be proud of 
one’s country and to gain inspiration and joy about 
one’s roots; 5) The political dimension, which shapes the 
individual’s civic links to the state and the community: 
obligations, rights, values, loyalty, an active civic 
position; 6) A joint economy (Box 0.2).
National identity is separate from ethnic identity. 
Ethnic identity speaks to one’s belonging to an ethnic 
group which is based on culture and language, as well 
as joint memories and myths about the origins, heroism, 
victories and uniqueness of the relevant community. 
Ethnic identity is of importance in societies in which 
various ethnic groups co-exist. If, for instance, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and representatives of other 
ethnic groups in Latvia speak about preserving their 
culture, then that is an issue related to ethnic identity. 
Ethnic and national identity do not exclude one another, 
they supplement each other in the sense that the ethnic 
identity of Latvians points to one’s belonging to the 
Latvian cultural community, while national identity 
speaks to belonging to the nation. Ethnic identity is 
usually the nucleus of national identity, and in Latvia, 
the nucleus of national identity is the Latvian identity. At 
the same time, however, it must be argued that national 
identity is a broader concept, and in addition to elements 
of ethnic identity it also speaks to a joint political and 
economic system.
There are few mono-ethnic countries in the world 
in which there is just one ethnic group. Migration 
has led most countries to become ever more diverse, 
and this means that the issue of how immigrants can 
preserve their ethnic identity becomes more and 
more important. This report, too, looks at how Latvian 
émigrés view their Latvian identity when they move to 
other countries.
A cultural nation is a concept which insists that at 
the forefront of a national community are joint culture 
and language, as well as protection and strengthening 
of same. The idea of a cultural nation in Latvia has been 
used since the latter half of the 19th century, when Latvia 
was not a state. The concept was used to describe the 
Latvian community, as joined together by the Latvian 
language and concept.
The civic nation is a concept which insists that at 
the forefront of explaining a national community are 
loyalty to the state, the citizen’s rights and obligations, 
the citizen’s active involvement in the implementation of 
the community’s goals, as well as in the strengthening of 
the community. The idea of the «civic nation» appears in 
Latvia in the late 19th century along with ideas about the 
right to self-determination of the nation.
Historical memory speaks to stories, legends and 
myths about a country’s past. This is very important in 
linking communities. There are emotionally saturated 
myths about how historical development could have 
occurred and how the process was influenced by various 
twists and turns in history.
The missions and major subjects of 
the report
The goal of the 2010/2011 Human Development 
Report in Latvia is to review national identity, its 
competition with other identities, its emergence, its 
content, and the circumstances which influence it. The 
mission for the report is to identify the role of national 
identity in the hierarchy of identities in various groups 
in society, also looking at how identity is transformed 
under circumstances of emigration. The report explains 
the concept of regional identity, looking at circumstances 
which link people to a specific location. There is also a 
Dimensions of national identity
Culture and language
 a joint economy Historical memory
 the political dimension  territorial belonging 
Psychological belonging (pride)
Box 
0.2
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consideration of models of capability which strengthen 
one’s sense of belonging to a place or a region.
Section 1 of the report is titled «What is National 
identity? How Can it be Explained?». The focus is on 
several issues which speak to the popularity of the 
concept of identity over the past decades. The section 
also looks at the content of the concept of national 
identity and shows the way in which it differs from other 
identities, as well as why it is so important for individuals 
and countries alike. The emergence of a national 
identity is explained via the thesis that identities are 
social constructs, pointing to the role of individuals and 
social agents in shaping a sense of national belonging. 
The dimensions which were analysed in this context 
are the ones which are shown in Box 0.2 above. The 
authors have taken a comparative look at how important 
these dimensions of national identity are in various 
groups in society. The authors have also analysed the 
interaction between civic and ethnic nationalism in 
the establishment of a sense of belonging to the state. 
Particular attention has been devoted to historical 
memory, comparing the historical memories of Latvians 
and Russian speakers in Latvia. The authors have made 
extensive use of data from the study «National Identity: NI 
Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.»
The second section of the report is titled «Migration 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries and today: Migration 
and transformations of National identity». Here the 
focus is on aspects of migration in Latvia from the 
historical perspective (major migration flows in the 19th 
and 20th  century) and from the perspective of current 
migration issues. The historical review of major flows of 
migration shows how this process influenced Latvia’s 
economic and social development, as well as the national 
identity of the country’s residents. In the context of the 
development of Latvia as a state and nation, of great 
importance are ideas expressed by Latvian émigrés 
in Ireland and England who were interviewed for the 
purposes of the report. These revealed the social and 
economic dimensions of national identity as components 
of national belonging  – something that stands in 
contradiction to a certain extent with Latvia’s political 
discourse in which an emphasis on the role of history, 
culture and language in the shaping of national identity 
means insufficient attention to the welfare of local 
residents as a component in national belonging. The 
study of Latvian immigrants in Ireland and England shows 
that the paths of emigration involve a dilemma between 
national belonging and a desire to achieve a new level of 
welfare more quickly. The report also offers correlative 
analysis of migration trends during the past decade, 
revealing the influence of economic growth and the 
economic growth on migration  – how the composition 
of émigrés changes, as well as how opportunities to use 
information technologies and social networks make it 
ever easier to take a decision on emigration. The report 
also looks at émigrés who have returned to Latvia and 
their plans, also considering policies which are aimed at 
resolving the problems of children whose parents have 
moved abroad to earn money while entrusting the care of 
their children to other relatives.
The third section of the report is titled «Regional 
identity. Links to Place. Capability». Here the report 
looks at issues related to a sense of regional belonging, 
revealing the factors which strengthen or weaken 
that sense. Much attention has been devoted to the 
way in which regional identity has been affected by 
administrative and territorial reforms in Latvia. After 
studying various strategies which strengthen regional 
identity, the authors have focused on policies which seek 
to enhance the welfare of local residents, on partnerships 
among local governments, and on the practices of local 
groups of activists. The authors have also discovered a 
phenomenon which can be called the trap of welfare – a 
phenomenon that has emerged during the past decade 
in reaction to the country’s social security policies in 
terms of people being inactive and relying on the state’s 
social guarantees. This section of the report also analyses 
the circumstances which are important to people in 
determining belonging to a specific location. Analysis of 
survey data shows that a sense of belonging to a location 
is characterised by the structure of opportunities for 
people in that location in terms of the availability of 
educational and work opportunities and the available 
range of services, but also, on the other hand, by human 
needs, demands and lifestyles.
In preparing the Report on National Identity, the 
authors hope that readers will think about how they feel 
their identities and about the place of these identities in 
the hierarchy of identities. Our goal is to call on readers 
to think about the strongest links which establish their 
sense of belonging to the state, also looking at the 
nucleus and the seemingly less important elements of 
this belonging. We have proposed a discussion about 
the importance of civic and Latvian dimensions in 
national belonging. We have marked out a framework 
for a discussion about the principles which shape the 
nation in Latvia, and here we are calling for a debate 
about the interaction which exists between ethnic and 
civic nationalism. Our analysis of migration processes, in 
turn, shows that when people emigrate so as to ensure 
the welfare of their families, that represents responsibility 
which they must undertake. How can this individual 
responsibility for oneself and one’s family be harmonised 
with responsibilities toward one’s fatherland? These 
are issues for discussion which were considered by the 
authors of the report to a considerable degree.
We talked to people from various groups in society – 
people of different nationalities, professional groups, 
social statuses, jobs and various regions in Latvia. We 
wish to argue that the national identity of an individual 
emerges in interaction with the rest of society. It happens 
at the level of the parish, district, city, country, and even 
the transnational level. National identity is based on the 
way in which we shape it with our actions and words on 
an everyday basis and during celebrations.
 1.1.  What Is natIonal IdentIty?  
hoW Is It explaIned?
 1.2.  dImensIons of natIonal IdentIty:  
a study of the VIeWs of loCal ResIdents
 1.3.  natIonal IdentIty, hIstoRy  
and soCIal memoRy
National identity:  
Content and Formation1
 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MOBILITY AND CAPABILITY 15
Identity is a concept which has been discussed 
more and more often in recent decades in everyday 
conversation, discussions and the scholarly literature. 
Why is this concept so popular? The probable cause is 
that the whole concept of identity fits in very well in 
today’s mutable world – one in which people have many 
new opportunities. These begin with a wide variety 
of choices in terms of interests and lifestyles, and end 
with opportunities to move to another country to study 
or work. Identity opens the path toward answering 
questions such as «Who am I?», as well as «To what do 
I  feel a sense of belonging?» These are questions which 
all of us have probably asked ourselves, particularly when 
we were young. Collective identity creates belonging 
to a group. It is subjective, because belonging to a 
group is a matter of individual choice. At the same time, 
however, this choice can be made under the framework 
of the structures and discursive practices which exist 
in the relevant society. In explaining identity, one must 
emphasise the active role of the individual in shaping it, 
and in this sense identity can be seen as in contrast to a 
system of castes, in which each person has a strict and 
unchangeable place in society. The individual’s position 
in shaping identity is active in terms of the arsenal of 
tools which society offers  – education, employment, 
a place and country in which to live, involvement in 
political parties and movements, ways of spending free 
time, music, apparel, diverse forms of friendship and 
family models, social networks, etc. In all of these areas, 
individuals select and choose that to which they feel a 
sense of belonging.
In explaining the origins of identity in terms of how 
individuals gain a sense of belonging, most researchers 
argue that identity is constructed in social terms. That 
means that language is a resource for the emergence 
of an individual’s identity. A hierarchy of an individual’s 
identity is based on discursive practices in society, on 
other words, on different statements about things 
and events, on knowledge, stories, myths, symbols 
and values. Of great importance in the emergence 
of discursive practices are traditional institutions 
of socialisation  – families, schools, the mass media, 
government institutions, as well as the social networks 
that are so popular in the Information Society. The very 
rapid spread of new information technologies makes it 
possible for new identities to emerge.
The emergence of new belonging can create 
competition among identities. For instance, the ability 
to work abroad competes with a sense of belonging 
to one’s country, birthplace and community. If a story 
about life in Ireland, England or Norway in terms of work 
conditions and the ability to provide for oneself and 
one’s family becomes attractive and leads others to wish 
to emigrate, as well, then it is a competing identity. We 
can see competing identities as competing stories. If 
we talk about life abroad and have no competing story 
about opportunities in Latvia, then that means calling on 
others to join the new community.
Researchers into social identities argue that a sense 
of belonging is important when the individual develops 
his or her social sense of self in society. In an interview 
about nationalism, the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin 
once said that just as people need to eat and drink, 
they also require security, freedom of movement, and 
a sense of belonging to a group. If not, then the person 
feels isolated and lonely: «Loneliness does not mean 
being alone; it means being among people who do not 
understand what you are saying.» (Gardels, 1991)
A sense of belonging to a group creates a sense 
of security, but it is interesting that this security is 
established on the basis of drawing border lines in 
relation to other groups and of emphasising the positive 
characteristics of one’s own group so as to establish a 
secure space for one’s own. It was several decades ago 
that the originators of research into identity, Oxford 
University Professor Henri Tajfel and Australian National 
University Professor John C. Turner argued that identity 
is constructed by emphasising one’s own group in 
comparison to other groups, as well as that this process 
is strengthened by the need for a positive identity 
that can be obtained by emphasising the negative 
characteristics of other groups (Tajfel, Turner, 1979) or 
by pointing to injustice that might be caused by other 
groups (Taylor, McKirnan, 1984). It is often the case that 
an ethnic or linguistic group that is alongside oneself 
serves as a stimulus for constructing one’s own identity. 
Comparative research conducted in post-Communist 
countries in the 1990s, for instance, shows that ethic 
identity is more strictly expressed in those countries 
where there are substantial ethnic minorities in addition 
to the main ethnic group. Residents of Latvia, Estonia, 
Ukraine and Belarus said that ethnic belonging is the 
most important thing, while respondents in Lithuania 
and Poland were more likely to say that the most 
important factor is the sense of belonging to one’s city 
or parish.
National identity
National identity is one of the identities of 
individuals, allowing the individual to feel a sense of 
belonging to his or her own national or state community. 
1.1. What is National identity? 
How is it Explained?
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National identity is of particular importance in a 
country, because it shapes a sense of community and of 
belonging to the nation among residents of the relevant 
state. National identity includes elements of state and 
elements of that which is personal. Feeling a sense 
of belonging to a national community is a link which 
allows the relevant individual to feel that he or she is a 
member thereof. Oxford University Professor David 
Miller has argued that national identity must be shaped 
from the inside by the subject of the creators of the 
nation, as opposed to from the outside. The foundation 
of a national community is that those who belong to it 
are convinced about the community and the view that 
nations exist when their members recognise each other 
as fellow citizens. National identity is cement which holds 
a society together and leads members of that society to 
work together (Miller, 1999).
National identity is one of the identities of an 
individual, it represents the sense of belonging of the 
individual to a national or state community. National 
identity is of particular importance in a country, because 
it ensures that residents feel a sense of community and 
belonging to the nation. National identity includes state 
and personal identity. A sense of belonging to a national 
community creates links which allow the individual to 
feel like a member of the state’s community. Oxford 
University Professor David Miller has argued that national 
identity must come from the inside, from the subject 
who is creating the nation, and not from the outside. 
The cornerstone for a national community is the belief 
and view of members therein that nations exist when 
their members recognise one another as fellow citizens. 
National identity is cement which holds society together 
and leads of members of society to do the same things 
(Miller, 1999).
The concept of the «nation» has been used for 
millennia in various languages and with different 
meanings, both in the antique world and in the Middle 
Ages. It is used to describe various groups and to speak 
to characteristics which make one group different from 
others. This applies to the designation of a family or 
students from a single country as a group with common 
characteristics which differentiate them from other 
neighbours. Researchers usually point to the French 
Revolution as an event which gave new meaning to the 
concept of the «nation.» New meaning emerged in the 
context of the replacement of a traditional structure of 
power in which the power of the monarch was based 
on the loyalty of his subjects with a system in which 
authority is based on a community which is able to act 
and to express its will. This new understanding of the 
nation typically argues that it is an active political agent 
and the initial bearer of the idea of sovereignty. As a 
source of political power and an active agent of political 
power, the nation creates a new understanding about 
politics; it is the idea that institutions and politicians 
express the will of the nation. When describing a nation, 
authors usually point to things which a specific group 
of residents have in common  – a territory, historical 
memories, myths, the common culture, laws, political 
processes and economics. A nation is a community 
of residents therein. The way in which nations have 
emerged as communities of residents is interesting. 
Various turning points in history have served to 
stimulate the emergence of nations  – civil revolutions, 
the collapse of empires, national liberation, etc. In many 
cases nations have emerged on the basis of a specific 
ethnic community, and the relevant ethnic group also 
determines the country’s name  – Germans in Germany, 
Swedes in Sweden, Danes in Denmark, etc. Latvia’s 
name, too, comes from the main group of residents – the 
Latvians. At the same time, however, we know that these 
countries are not mono-ethnic today. In other cases, 
a nation is based on the confluence of many different 
ethnic groups, and the result is that the name of the 
country is very different – the United States, for example, 
as well as Canada and Australia. Sometimes a nation 
emerges from a collapsing empire. Several countries in 
Eastern Europe, for instance, were established on the 
basis of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
A discussion in Latvia about the 
principles of establishing a nation
Explaining the way in which the Latvian nation was 
established is problematic because on the one hand, 
the composition of the national community has been 
influenced by radical shifts in history such as the two 
world wars, the Soviet occupation and the migration of 
residents, while on the other hand, Latvia has never been 
a mono-ethnic state, but there has been little discussion 
about the principles that are the foundation for the 
establishment of the nation in Latvia.
The first discussions about a nation in Latvia 
occurred back when the Latvian state did not yet exist. 
Deniss Hanovs has studied the newspaper Baltijas 
Vēstnesis (Baltic Messenger)  – one of the oldest and 
most important examples of the civic press of Latvians – 
finding that in the 1880s and 1890s, Latvian intellectuals 
were encouraging a debate about the content of 
the concept of the Latvian nation. This spoke to the 
things which create a sense of belonging to one’s own 
community, as well as to that which ensures or eliminates 
the opportunity to be a part of the national community 
(Hanovs, 2003, 193-201). The most active representatives 
of Latvian culture initially insisted on the right of Latvians 
to enjoy their own language and culture, thus defining 
the Latvian community as «acculturation,» in which 
identities are sought out in the uniqueness of culture, 
with efforts made to stand apart from other ethnic 
groups. Of interest here is the fact that the «New Current» 
movement of the 1890s had very different views under 
the influence of ideas that were current at that time, i.e., 
emphasising the nation as a community of individuals 
who accept the elements of a concrete ethnic culture 
willingly. Interestingly, the ideas of a political nation were 
also developed by Miķelis Valters – an outstanding public 
activist who helped to draft the Latvian Constitution 
and to establish the Republic of Latvia on November 18, 
1918. He emphasised the active nature of the nation, as 
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implemented via civic solidarity and participation, as 
well as openness to broader values. For Valters, national 
belonging was first and foremost a matter not of origin, 
but instead of cultural and democratic participation 
(Ijabs, 2007, 143).
Still, these ideas, which opened up the route toward 
a discourse about the emergence of the political nation 
did not win broader support, and the dominance of the 
ethnic nation retained its ruling position in the national 
discourse of Latvians. This was fully true after the coup 
that was organised by Kārlis Ulmanis in 1934, when 
particular attention was focused on the development 
of the Latvian nation, with the idea of an ethnically 
homogenous nation being presented as an ideal.
Discussions in the 1990s in Latvia and 
the world
During the 1990s, several conferences were held 
and papers and books were published in Latvia to take 
a theoretical look at concepts such as «nation state,» 
«nation,» «nationalism,» and «citizenship.» In 1998, a 
conference was organised to discuss the political nation 
and aspects of ethnic policies. At it, Justice Egils Levits 
from the European Court of Human Rights emphasised 
the presence of two dimensions when talking about 
traditions related to the emergence of nations. In 
France, he said, belonging to the nation is determined 
by identification with the democratic political system 
of the state, while in other European countries such 
as Germany, it has meant the self-understanding of 
German national culture. Levits posed this question: 
«Should Latvians continue to be a purely ethnically 
defined cultural nation, is a state of the Latvian nation 
desirable or possible? Or would it be more realistic and 
desirable to combine both characteristics of the nation?» 
(Levits, 1998).
Professor Rasma Kārkliņa from the University of Illinois 
and the University of Latvia (and a member of the 10th 
Saeima) delivered a paper at the conference in which she 
emphasised the importance of active and responsible 
citizens. Kārkliņa said that a democratic country requires 
not just the relevant institutions, but also citizens at a 
specific level of quality. Kārkliņa reviewed citizenship 
from the perspective of social citizenship, arguing that 
in America, citizens is more than just a matter of lawful 
status; it is a nation of «good citizenship» – one in which 
individuals are seen as being of importance only if they 
provide for their careers and families while also, at the 
same time, supporting their community and engaging 
in their civic duties. A democracy can exist only if a large 
segment of the citizenry satisfies that ideal, the professor 
said (Kārkliņa, 1998).
There is also Elmārs Vēbers, who organised several 
international conferences in the 1990s to discuss the 
kind of nation the Latvian nation should be. These events 
involved scholars from all around the world, and Vēbers 
concluded that broad discussions about these matters 
were suspended because the public was not prepared 
for them in terms of being unable to accept a situation 
in which the subject for debate relates to aspects of the 
national community and the principles for its emergence.
According to analysis of public integration policies, 
ethnic values take the upper hand over democratic civic 
values. Why are those values so deeply rooted that there 
is no room for civic values? George Schopflin (Schopflin, 
2000, 64-77) has argued that the root for ethnicisation is 
the fear of collective survival, humiliation and scorn. The 
driving force behind the survival of small nations is a strict 
conviction about the existence of their culture, because 
these are moral values which represent a unique story 
about how people should live, when they must laugh 
or cry, when they must tremble in fear or be joyful, and 
what is good and bad. Belonging to a specific culture or 
language, in turn, makes it possible to learn codes which 
offer an understanding of events and things without any 
questions.
Other authors have also written about why efforts 
toward ethnicisation increase during various periods 
in history. Professor Emeritus Paul Brass at Washington 
University is the author of many books about 
comparative politics, and he argues that the importance 
of ethnicity as a social construct increases when links 
among social groups are weak and ethnicity functions 
as an element in structuring society. If other institutional 
structures such as the civil society which can facilitate the 
development and functioning of various other resources 
in society are weakly developed, then ethnic belonging 
comes to the forefront with its advantages  – it is clearly 
perceived by the masses, and the elite manipulates with it 
very cleverly, indeed (Brass, 1985).
The American historian and political scientist Joseph 
Rothschild, in turn, has examined the way in which 
changes in society facilitate the importance of ethnicity. 
Rothschild argues that changes create a lot of confusion 
in all groups in society, and this, in turn, leads to collective 
ethnic fears (Rothschild, 1982). Ethnic groups in such 
situations feel threats against the future existence of their 
identity. Similarly, Professor Donald Horowitz at Duke 
University, who teaches law and political science, puts the 
focus on the role of group psychology and competition 
among groups (Horowitz, 1985). A rapid change in the 
status of a group is one factor which can stimulate the 
emergence of ethnic conflicts. In Latvia’s case, the change 
in the status of ethnic Latvians and Russians (Russian 
speakers) has been of importance – in the USSR, Russians 
could see themselves as a majority, while Latvians had a 
minority status. In independent Latvia, by contrast, it is 
the Russians who are the minority, with Latvians in the 
majority position. The way in which both groups see their 
new status will also be reviewed in the chapter of this 
report which speaks to various dimensions of national 
identity.
The conclusions of these authors encourage attempts 
to understand why it is the case that in Latvia, on the 
one hand, there are no ethnic conflicts in everyday lives 
and situations while, on the other hand, the ethnic factor 
is of great importance in parliamentary elections and 
elections of local governments in larger territories. There 
one can see strict polarisation in terms of party choices 
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on the basis of the ethnic principle  – Latvians vote for 
parties put together by Latvian politicians, while Russians 
vote for their own parties. These ideas also encourage 
thought about how this range of problems is echoed in 
national identity and how it influences the emergence of 
that identity in various groups in society.
Constructing national identity
Scholars of social identities agree that identity is a 
social construct, but there is still the question of how this 
social belonging emerges and how it can be studied.
There are two things which are important to 
understand with respect to the construction of national 
identity. First of all, a sense of belonging represents the 
reflection of subjects themselves as to who they are, 
which community they consider to be their own, and 
where subjects draw boundaries between comrades 
and aliens. On the other hand, there are also external 
agents and social structures which have a specific 
role in constructing an identity. Here we must refer to 
families, schools, mass media, friends, social networks, 
etc. The effects of all of these agencies opens up a very 
broad spectrum in terms of families with their social, 
economic and intellectual capital, various school-based 
communities, as well as, finally, the extremely diverse 
mass media and social networks. We see that social 
identity is constructed by individual choices and creative 
activities, as well as by interaction among specific social 
agents and structures. These are at the basis of a sense 
of belonging to a specific community. Individuals can 
have many different identities with specific hierarchies in 
which some identities are seen as more important, while 
others are seen as being less significant.
Researchers who focus on a theoretical examination 
of national identity speak of the importance of individual 
activities, but they also look at the efforts and arsenals of 
the state in shaping national identity.
An interesting view about how to study national 
identity comes from Professor Michael Billig at Lough bo-
rough University. In his book «Banal Nationalism» (Billig, 
1995, 61-62), he writes that «when it comes to nationalist 
thinking, the question is not ‘What is national identity?’, 
but instead it is ‘What does it mean if someone is talking 
about his or her own national identity’?» In writing about 
the concept and use of national identity, Billig argues that 
«it often explains less than might seem to be the case.» 
He believes that the concept often includes far too many 
aspects, although he also argues that it can be seen only 
as a discursive phenomenon  – the way in which people 
talk about themselves and their national belonging, 
about the nation, and about the separation between «us, 
the nation» and «them, the others.» Billig sees nationalism 
as an ideology which is expressed in discursive terms 
and national identity as a discursive construct in which 
of great importance are national governments and the 
media.
The third chapter of this report, in which émigrés talk 
about their sense of belonging to their motherland and 
their new country of residence offers a very good look 
at the way in which people talk about themselves, their 
national belonging, and conditions which strengthen or 
weaken that belonging.
At the same time, however, we must also recognise 
the role of structures and institutions which create the 
framework under which identities can be constructed. 
Of use here are the ideas of Manuel Castells, a Spanish 
scholar who has taught at a number of universities in 
the United States. He has written about the effects 
of power on the constructing of identities, speaking 
about identities which are in line with and march in 
step with the policies of the national regime, thus 
creating a «legitimating identity» in comparison to other 
identities which emerge in opposition to the first one. 
When people recognise that they are different and face 
stigmatising descriptions, a «protest identity» emerges  – 
one in which belonging is construed as a certain protest 
or opposition to a lawful identity. A «project identity,» 
in turn, is created by new initiatives and circumstances 
(Castells, 2004). If we apply Castells’ ideas to society in 
Latvia, then we can say that a «legitimising identity» very 
well describes the way in which the state-related identity 
of Latvians was constructed, as was the synergy which 
that identity ensures between the Latvian community 
and the country in which, on the one hand, the civic 
constructs national identity in an active and responsive 
way while, on the other hand, also rationalising and 
strengthening state power. The collective memories of 
Russians, as opposed to Latvians, are based on the 70 
years during which the Soviet Union existed. This is a 
period during which three generations grew up, and it 
is a sufficiently long period of time to make sure that in 
informal environments, too, there are stronger habits and 
desires to maintain the continuity of those memories. It is 
also true that the discourse of informal (family) historical 
memories coincides with the things which are said by 
formal communicators in Russia (the country’s mass 
media). This serves to construct a legitimate identity for 
Russian citizens. Russians who live in Latvia, by contrast, 
base their identity on collective memories which 
confront collective memories about Latvia’s «regained 
history» – the interwar period. What kinds of identities are 
constructed when these different historical memories are 
confronted? If we use Castells’ theory on how identities 
are constructed, then we see that this is a good point at 
which to make use of the concept of a «protest identity.»
The role of the state in the shaping 
of a national identity
The dynamic lives of people in the present day, the 
ability of people to move from one country to another, as 
well as processes of globalisation  – all of these promote 
greater heterogeneity in societies. States, by contrast, are 
interested in facilitating processes which facilitate greater 
homogeneity in the models of behaviour which exist in a 
society. For instance, states may want to ensure that only 
one language is dominant in the state so that culture and 
traditions do not create conflicts among various groups 
in society. The job for national educational systems and 
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the mass media is to support policies which facilitate the 
flourishing and stability of the relevant national culture 
and language, thus strengthening national identity 
among the country’s citizens. And yet, at the same time, a 
state is also responsible for creating legal foundations for 
minorities.
Professor Montserrat Guibernau at London University 
(Guibernau, 2007, 27) has written about things which 
states must do in the context of strengthening national 
identity: first, shape the image of the nation; second, 
create symbols and rituals to strengthen the sense of 
belonging among members of society to the nation; 
third, strengthen citizenship, clearly defining legal 
regulations, as well as political and socio-economic 
rights and obligations, while also helping individuals to 
join the national community and to increase their loyalty 
toward the state; fourth, create ideas about a common 
enemy; and, fifth, establish an educational and media 
system which serves as an instrument for establishing the 
relevant image of the nation.
The job for the state is to encourage public 
understanding about the mutual benefits of interaction 
between the state and the individual, emphasising the 
fact that the welfare of individuals in the country can only 
improve in the context of the nation’s development.
National identity: What people say 
about their country
A survey1 which focused on the attitude of Latvia’s 
residents toward various aspects of national identity 
began with this question: «What is the first thing that 
comes to mind when you hear the word ‘Latvia’?» The 
answers that were given offer an interesting picture. 
First of all, the things which respondents said speak to 
deeply personal links which bind them to the country. 
Second, these were very emotional answers irrespective 
of whether respondents had positive or negative things 
to say about Latvia. Third, the responses touched upon all 
kinds of areas of life – Latvia’s environment and territory, 
economics, politics, history, Latvian values, the diversity 
of cultures, etc. By mentioning individual aspects that are 
of importance to them, respondents gave answers which 
were within the framework of the national level, thus 
revealing their own story about national belonging.
It is interesting that researchers who focus on 
national identity and offer a detailed consideration of 
its elements, structures and dimensions, come up with 
similar explanations of national belonging. This confirms 
that one way of understanding what national identity is 
in today’s mutative reality in the here and now is asking 
this question: «What does it mean when someone talks 
about his or her national identity?» (Billig, 1995). That, 
again, means studying the way in which individuals 
talk about themselves, their national belonging, their 
1 This part of the chapter is based on a survey called «National 
Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory.» It was produced 
by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia 
under the auspices of the national research programme 
«National Identity» (2010).
nation, and the separation between «us, the nation» 
and «them, the others.» National identity represents 
the things which people say about their country, its 
successes, achievements and failures, its past and 
present, its residents and places, objects and landscapes. 
In other words, identity is a discursive construct, and its 
deconstruction means studying the text of what people 
have said (sort of like unwinding a film). That is one way of 
coming to an understanding about national identity.
The things which the people of Latvia had to say when 
asked about what the word «Latvia» makes them think 
about make it possible to set up groups of themes which 
cover a broad range of social phenomena. Most often the 
responses had to do with Latvia as a special place  – the 
place where ancestors were born, where people have 
their native homes, their native land, the motherland in 
which they were born and lived, etc. «I have lived here 
since the age of 2, and I love it now» – that is one example. 
Respondents speak of a second motherland, a place that 
is particularly attractive, a place to which they want to 
return, and a place with a lovely environment, landscape, 
cities and the sea. A few respondents also speak of Latvia 
as a Baltic country and a part of Europe – a Baltic state, the 
Baltic state in which I live, an EU member state, a European 
and civilised country.
The second most frequently mentioned topic relates 
to economic problems in Latvia and the subsequent 
social consequences  – a country with a disorderly and 
weak economy, a crisis, a country without management, 
debt, poverty, a country with stratification between the 
rich and the poor, high unemployment and emigration 
from the country. Typically, economic problems were 
discussed only in a negative sense and in terms of directly 
personal experiences: «My poor Latvia,» «our country has 
been robbed,» «chaos,» «our disorderly Latvia,» etc. Very 
seldom people mentioned traditional products or brands 
such as «Laima» confectionaries, «Latvijas Balzāms» 
alcoholic beverages, or «Dzintars» perfumery .
Quite a few responses from respondents related 
to political life, albeit, once again, mostly in negative 
terms  – political chaos, politicians and government 
officials who are not right for the job, the empty babbling 
of the government, a hard-working nation and a bad 
government, mendacious politicians, a corrupt country, 
inequality among ethnic groups, splits on the basis of 
national belonging, etc.
In comparison with criticisms about economic 
and political life, fewer statements from respondents 
involved first associations such as ethnic belonging, 
Latvianness, Latvian culture, traditions or symbols of 
state: «To me, Latvia is a country in which Latvians live»; 
«The only country which belongs to Latvians and in 
which the Latvian language is heard.» People spoke 
about the Latvian Song and Dance Festival, culture, 
cultural monuments, traditions, the country’s red-white-
red flag, the national anthem, the Freedom Monument, 
Independence Day on November 18, the Summer Solstice 
celebrations, etc.
It must be emphasised that most of the positive 
statements which were made by respondents had to do 
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with the establishment of the state and its independent 
statehood  – freedom, an independent Latvia, the 
barricades of 1991, as well as patriotism. Those are 
words and statements which speak to common historical 
memory  – something that is of key importance in the 
shaping of a sense of national community.
We must particularly look at statements in which 
respondents emphasise their emotional links with Latvia 
and their pride in the country: «I have warm feelings, 
I love Latvia»; «I am proud that I live in Latvia as my 
motherland»; «It is something very beautiful»; «It is 
something very familial»; «I am proud of our country’s ice-
hockey team,» etc. Negative feelings, too, were expressed 
very emotionally: «sadness, sorrow, anger and a bit of 
shame»; «I used to be proud of Latvia, but no more.»
If we correlate the aforementioned range of subjects, 
then we see that when asked about their associations 
with Latvia, respondents most often spoke of:
1)  The place and territory in which they live, starting 
with their home, their region, Latvia as a whole, and 
Latvia as a part of the Baltic States and Europe;
2)  Economic life in Latvia, which led to a wealth of 
emotions, mostly in a negative and critical sense;
3)  Political life in Latvia, which also created powerful 
associations among respondents  – positive ones 
about Latvia’s independent statehood and freedom, 
but mostly negative ones about ongoing issues;
4)  A wide range of aspects related to ethnic and 
cultural links with the country;
5)  Things which indicate common social memory, 
albeit less often; it is evident that these thoughts 
are overcome by negations related to economic 
and political life;
6)  A particularly emotional sense of national 
belonging with expressions of pride or shame 
about the country.
The main dimensions of national 
identity
Interestingly, groups of associative expressions based 
on the responses given by respondents directly correlate 
to the views of researchers about the most important 
manifestations of national identity. Scholars in various 
countries and at different universities have had fairly 
similar views about national identity. Thus, for instance, 
the aforementioned Professor Guibernau from London 
University, who is a well known political scientist, has 
written a book called «The Identity of Nations» (Guibernau, 
2007). In it, she argues that national identity represents a 
sense of belonging to a nation, and that it also supports 
the different things which describe on nation in 
comparison to others. In her research, Professor Guibernau 
has marked out five dimensions for a national identity:
1)  The psychological dimension (emotional links 
of belonging which do not require any rational 
explanation);
2)  Culture (values, beliefs, traditions, habits, language 
and practices; culture helps one to imagine one’s 
own community as different from others);
3)  The dimension of territorial belonging, which 
covers views about one’s home, natural resources, 
the landscape, and the place as one which provides 
food;
4)  Historical memories which allow one to feel proud 
of one’s country, gain inspiration and rise above 
one’s roots in an energetic way;
5)  The political dimension which, at the individual 
level, establishes civic links  – obligations, rights, 
values, and loyalty, while in the context of the state, 
this covers strategies which are aimed at cultural 
and linguistic homogeneity in society.
Professor David Miller, a British political scientist 
at Oxford, has written a book called «On Nationality» 
(Miller, 1999, 22-24), and in it he insists that first of 
all, a national community is made of the beliefs of 
its participants, mutual recognition as members of a 
specific community of compatriots, and the belief that 
all members of the community are joined together by 
common and obvious characteristics, views and trust. A 
second element in specifying national identity, according 
to Miller, is historical continuity. Historical events, 
individuals, victories and tragedies, and the blood that 
has been shed by one’s ancestors  – all of these serve as 
arguments on behalf of the idea that future generations 
can continue what the ancestors achieved. At the same 
time, it also marks out prospects for the future and the 
existence of the community therein. «Active identity» is 
a third sign which separates out national identity. As a 
community, a nation acts together, to put it in imagery, 
jointly taking decisions and jointly achieving results. In 
practice, there are specific people from various sectors – 
statesmen, athletes, etc. The national becomes what 
it is through activity. The fourth aspect of national 
identity is the belonging of the community to a specific 
location  – something which is usually described as a 
sense of territorial belonging. As the first dimension of 
national identity, Miller speaks about the human need for 
something that everyone holds in common – something 
which can be described as the nation’s culture. At the 
same time, however, the author also argues that it would 
be mistaken to believe that this national culture should 
be monolithic or all-encompassing.
Other scholars, too, have presented similar views on 
national identity. Professor Emeritus Anthony D. Smith 
at the London School of Economics, for instance, has 
written in «National Identity» (Smith, 1997, 22) that the 
components of a nation are a common territory, historical 
memories and myths, a unified culture, a common 
economy, and equal laws, rights and obligations.
It is evident that there is much which explanations 
of national identity in the work of various authors have 
in common. Here we are dealing with indications of the 
main dimensions of a sense of national belonging  – 
territory, historical memory, common culture, and civic 
belonging. It is also interesting to note the accents or 
different views which are seen in the work of some 
authors. Guibernau, for instance, emphasises culture as 
a force which unifies a community. Miller, for his part, 
stresses the active nature of a national community 
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as it emerges via processes that are based on mutual 
recognition and trust. Thus he particularly accents the 
role of the active position of citizens and the common 
goals of the nation. Smith, in turn, points to a common 
economy as a special sign of a nation.
It is interesting to compare what scholars and ordinary 
people have to say about national identity. In both cases, 
the most important elements of national identity are 
said to be a common territory, history, culture, economy 
and citizenship. It must be added, however, that local 
residents have pointed to another major element in a 
national community – ethnic belonging, Latvianness and 
Latvian culture. Western authors typically do not separate 
out elements of ethnic belonging as a separate dimension 
for analysis, instead placing these in a set of cultural 
characteristics. Miller links this to historical memory and 
a belief that the community has obvious characteristics 
which it holds in common. This, it must be added, is most 
characteristic of researchers in Western Europe.
Schopflin, for his part, is a scholar and politician who 
is of Hungarian origin, and he links traditions related to 
the study of nations in Europe to the historical context of 
various regions therein. He describes the different roles of 
the state, ethnicity and the civil society in the emergence 
of nations in Western Europe on the one hand and Central 
and Eastern Europe on the other. Schopflin argues that 
citizenship, the civil society and the active participation 
of citizens were at the foreground when nations were 
established in the West, while in Eastern Europe, of 
decisive importance in the emergence of states was 
the preservation of culture and language, along with 
recognition of the nation as such. Both Schopflin and 
Smith note that those Eastern European countries which 
have managed to break away from empires tend to 
struggle for the recognition of their identity, as well as 
for the recognition of the uniqueness of their culture and 
language and their right to maintain these. These ideas 
are usually articulated by representatives of national 
culture such as writers, folklorists and artists. Accordingly, 
the cultural dimension achieves dominance over other 
aspects which shape national communities. Countries in 
the Baltic region, too, have engaged in a struggle over the 
recognition and survival of their languages and cultures, 
and that helps to explain the importance of ethnic 
belonging as a fundamental principle when establishing 
a nation. At the same time, however, the arguments 
of the aforementioned British scholars typically do 
not emphasise or separate out ethnic belonging as an 
integrative dimension for a national community.
When comparing the statements of Western scholars 
and ordinary people in Latvia, it must be emphasised 
in general terms that there are similar elements in the 
scholarly texts about national identity and in the answers 
given by respondents when asked what the word «Latvia» 
means to them  – a common territory, history, culture, 
the economy and citizenship. And yet the statements 
from survey respondents also spoke to another essential 
element of a national community  – ethnic belonging, 
Latvianness and Latvian culture. Here, again, it is clear 
that the views of scholars in Western and Eastern Europe 
(Schopflin is a key representative of these views in the 
latter region) differ. Western authors usually do not 
separate out manifestations of ethnic belonging as a 
separate dimension for analysis, instead including these 
into other groups of elements which characterise national 
communities  – cultural elements or, perhaps, historical 
memory. Eastern European researchers, by contrast, 
accent the role of culture and language in the structuring 
of national identity.
Analysis of the associative statements of survey 
respondents, moreover, points to another important 
connection. It turns out that a very important dimension of 
national identity for the people of Latvia is their country’s 
economic development and the resulting welfare of the 
people. Under the influence of the economic crisis, the 
people of Latvia are quite harsh in their perceptions about 
the country’s economic weakness. Links to the state are 
determined by disgust and shame, and that provides an 
excuse for emigration from the country.
These data suggest that given Latvia’s socio-
economic situation, its membership in the EU and the 
global opportunities for moving from one place to 
another which are involved, belonging to a national 
culture on the one hand and the socio-economic 
security of residents on the other hand must be seen as 
competing dimensions in the area of national identity.
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Main conclusions. The most important missions
Main conclusions
Theoretical and empirical research leads to the conclusion that for the people of Latvia, national identity 
means:
a)  A place or territory in which to live – a home, a region, Latvia as such, and Latvia as a part of the Baltic 
States and Europe;
b)  Economic and political life in Latvia;
c) Ethnic and cultural links to the country, as well as the Latvian language;
d)  Common social memory, particularly in relation to Latvia’s independent statehood and freedom;
e)  An emotionally expressed sense of national belonging, along with pride or shame about their country.
A very important dimension of national identity for the people of Latvia is their country’s economic 
development and the resulting welfare of the people. Under the influence of the economic crisis, the people 
of Latvia are quite harsh in their perceptions about the country’s economic weakness. Links to the state are 
determined by disgust and shame, and that provides an excuse for emigration from the country.
the most important missions
The job for the state is to clearly define political, social and economic rights and obligations, as well as to 
establish educational and media systems which serve as instruments for shaping a sense of belonging to the 
nation, also taking into account the importance of the various dimensions therein – the cultural, psychological, 
territorial, historical memory, political and economic dimension.
There must be public understanding about the mutual benefits which are obtained when the state and the 
individual interact, emphasising the fact that the welfare of the individual in the country can only improve in the 
context of the nation’s development. 
Box 
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A territorial sense of belonging
A territorial sense of belonging is one element in 
national identity, and its contents are based on the 
specific links which individuals have to locations, regions, 
and the country in which they were born, grew up, and 
spent a part of their lives. In a survey1 that was conducted 
to study national identity, respondents were asked to 
describe the associations which they had when thinking 
about the word «Latvia.» Describing these associations, 
respondents most often spoke of Latvia as a special place 
because of its environmental landscape, the place where 
their families lived, and the place where people were 
born and spent their lives. Many respondents spoke of 
the special attractiveness of such places, as well as their 
deep links with some of them. 
Other questions were concretely formulated, the 
aim being to find out how much of a sense of belonging 
respondents felt in relation to a specific place or 
administrative territory  – their parish, neighbourhood, 
city, region, Latvia, Russia, the Baltic States, and Europe.
Respondents most often said that they feel a sense 
of belonging to their city and to Latvia (82% and 78% 
of all respondents respectively). Many respondents 
spoke of close links to their parish (74%) or an urban 
neighbourhood (67%). Far fewer people in Latvia identify 
themselves as residents of Europe (21%) or the Baltic 
States (20%), or consider themselves to have a sense of 
belonging to Russia (15%).
The data show that local identities – a sense of belong-
ing to one’s surroundings, city or region  – are stronger 
among older generations, while global identities seem 
1 The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical 
Memory», Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010.
more attractive to younger generations. Among those 
respondents who were older than 55, 81% expressed a 
sense of belonging to their surroundings, 70% said so 
about the local region, 84% pointed to a city, and 83% 
spoke of Latvia. A sense of belonging to Europe, in turn, 
was declared more often by younger respondents (18-24) – 
35% of them (Appendix 1).
The greatest differentiation in terms of the territorial 
sense of belonging among survey respondents was 
seen in relation to Europe. It turns out that a sense 
of belonging to Europe is influenced most by the 
respondent’s age and by the issue of whether the 
respondent is planning to move away from Latvia. More 
than one-third of young people aged 18-24, as well as 
those who plan to leave Latvia, feel themselves to be 
residents of Europe. In the group above 55, by contrast, 
only 15.5% expressed a sense of belonging to Europe, 
while among those who do not plan to leave Latvia, 17.5% 
did so (Box 1.2)
If we look at the sense of territorial belonging from 
the perspective of gender, we see that women are more 
likely to indicate close links to a region or the country, 
while among men, there are slightly more respondents 
who feel a sense of belonging to Europe. It is evident that 
women are more likely to represent the position of older 
people, and that can be attributed to the fact that there 
is a greater proportion of women than men in the cohort 
above 55 years of age.
If we compare the sense of territorial belonging 
among Latvians and Russians, then we see that the 
biggest difference exists in terms of attitudes toward 
Latvia and Russia. 83% of Latvians and 73% of Russians 
admitted to have close links to Latvia, while 34% of 
Russians and only a few percentage points of Latvians 
said that they feel a sense of belonging to Russia. Latvians 
1.2. Dimensions of National identity: 
a Study of the views of Local Residents 
Respondents’ plans to leave Latvia in the near future, as linked to a sense of territorial 
belonging
(% from each group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory; n = 1,004)
Plans Parish, neighbourhood City Region Latvia Russia
Baltic 
States Europe
Am planning to leave 63.4 70.9 65.4 65.6 14.8 24.6 36.4
I may leave 74.1 80.5 61.4 68.2 19.3 17.9 25.1
Am not planning to leave 76.4 85.7 70.5 8.38 14.2 20.8 18.0
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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are more likely to have a local sense of belonging  – 
their surrounding area, city or region. At the same time, 
however, it is interesting that there are no differences 
between Latvians and Russians when it comes to Baltic 
and European identity; in both cases, this identity is 
comparatively uncommon, with approximately 20% of 
Russians and Latvians saying that they feel a sense of 
belonging to the Baltic States or Europe (Box 1.3)
There is also an interesting link between the income 
level of respondents on the one hand and their sense of 
territorial belonging on the other. It turns out that a local 
identity is more distinct among people with medium 
levels of income (between LVL 120 and 200 per family 
member per month). Such people were more likely to 
speak of a sense of belonging to their surroundings, city, 
region and Latvia. Local senses of belonging are weaker 
among people with higher and lower levels of income, 
and it is also true that the sense of a European identity 
was cited most often by people with the highest level of 
income (above LVL 201 per month). These data suggest 
that a sense of belonging to one’s parish or city largely 
depends on one’s level of welfare  – if it is more or less 
satisfactory, then the individual feels closer links to the 
place where he or she lives (Box 1.4).
The civic and ethnic dimension of 
national belonging
When making associative statements about Latvia, 
respondents speak about it as a special place which 
relates to their homes and those of their ancestors. They 
also describe Latvia as a place where they can speak their 
native language and nurture their nation’s traditions and 
culture:
«It is the land of my birth. It is beautiful, and it is 
the only country in which I would want to live.»
«My motherland, my roots, people who are close 
to me.»
«Our own environment, the Latvian language.»
«Songs, dances, amber, the Song Festival.»
«A beautiful country with hard-working and loyal 
people.»
Alongside these responses, there were also quite a 
few in which the residents of Latvia expressed worries 
or dissatisfaction about the way in which economic and 
political life in Latvia is developing:
«It is a country that has been affected by the crisis, 
one in which the government does not think about its 
people.»
The sense of territorial belonging by nationality 
(% of each ethnic group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory; 
n = 1,004)
Nationality Parish, neighbourhood City Region Latvia Russia Baltic States Europe
all 74.0 81.9 66.8 78.3 14.8 20.2 20.6
Latvians 75.1 82.8 69.7 82.8 3.6 19.9 21.2
Russians 71.0 79.2 60.3 71.9 32.9 20.2 20.6
Others 78.1 87.0 64.7 73.3 21.9 21.9 17.1
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
The sense of territorial belonging by respondent’s family’s level of income 
(% of each ethnic group expressing a deep sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to a specific territory;  
n = 1,004)
Income* Parish, neighbourhood City Region Latvia Russia Baltic States Europe
all 74.0 81.9 66.8 78.3 14.8 20.2 20.6
< LVL 80 68.1 74.0 64.0 76.2 8.9 16.5 14.2
LVL 81-120 76.8 87.4 775. 82.0 15.1 15.0 21.5
LVL 121-150 76.0 85.3 74.3 86.2 17.6 20.6 20.1
LVL 151-200 82.2 91.3 86.5 86.2 16.7 17.2 15.2
> LVL 200 66.2 77.4 62.6 77.7 18.6 23.0 26.6
* Here and elsewhere, the level of income speaks to the relevant family’s monthly income per family member 
after taxes.
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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«A poor country with negative attitudes among 
bureaucrats toward the people of Latvia.»
«An impoverished and corrupt country.»
It must be emphasised that this dissatisfaction is 
mostly aimed at the national system of governance, 
without any sense of responsibility in terms of society 
or the specific individual. Here we see that when 
talking about their country, people find a sense of 
community to be important  – one that is based upon 
the nation’s traditions and culture. It also, however, 
creates the question of how individuals feel their sense 
of civic belonging to the national community, as well 
as of what they think about their civic involvement and 
responsibilities.
Here we can also ask about that which the residents 
of our country consider to serve as a principle aimed at 
consolidating the nation  – the common language and 
culture, or civic responsibility and involvement.
This is a theoretical issue which has been analysed 
by scholars in Western and in Eastern Europe, as well 
as in the United States. Professor Rogers Brubaker at 
the University of California (Brubaker, 1992, 23) argues 
that the establishment of a nation is determined by the 
principles which lead to unity in society. A society can be 
unified in political terms, with participation determined 
by citizenship; in that case, we are dealing with civic 
nationalism. In other cases, societies can be united on 
the basis of ethnicity, and that is an example of ethnic 
nationalism.
The British scholar Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1997, 21) 
has argued that of primary importance in a Western civic 
nation are laws and civic values, while in ethnic nations, 
the primary issue is the culture of the relevant ethnos, 
along with, in most cases, language and everyday habits. 
An explanation of the origins of these differences is also 
offered by the aforementioned George Schopflin, who is 
of Hungarian origin.
On the basis of these theoretical ideas, the 
questionnaire that was used in the Latvian survey 
included blocs of questions which were aimed to evaluate 
values related to civic and ethnic belonging among 
various groups of residents in Latvia. The questions were 
formulated in a normative way, thus establishing the 
ideal model of a citizen. This approach is rooted in the 
«good citizen» ideology, which speaks to the political 
orientation of facilitating the activity and responsibilities 
of a country’s citizens.
Data show that most people in Latvia think highly 
of the importance of civic values: 87% say that being a 
good citizen means observing laws and regulations, 77% 
say so about the payment of taxes, 76% believe that a 
good citizen is informed about what is happening in 
society, and 75% say that a good citizen votes in elections 
(Box 1.5).
There are also certain links when we compare 
attitudes toward civic values in various age, income and 
educational level groups. Young people feel that interest 
in what is happening in society is a bit less important, 
and their views are also more liberal when it comes to 
observing laws. Young and middle-aged people are far 
more liberal about leaving Latvia because of the crisis 
in comparison to those who are above 45. It must be 
stressed that the importance of social solidarity was 
emphasised to a greater degree by the youngest and 
oldest groups of respondents – i.e., those which are most 
likely to need assistance. Such help is less important to 
economically active residents who usually have greater 
resources at their disposal (Appendix 2).
It is characteristic that the highest level of under-
stand ing about civic duties can be found among the 
group of respondents with a higher education (Appendix 
3). Low income, in turn, does not encourage observance 
of the law, including the payment of taxes, nor does it 
stimulate social solidarity or the belief that people should 
stay in Latvia despite the crisis (Box 1.6).
These results show that views about civic values 
are influenced by the individual’s level of education 
and welfare. An understanding of civic obligations is 
facilitated by education, while low income levels are 
more likely to be seen as a threat to understanding of 
civil values and readiness to fulfil relevant obligations. 
It is particularly important to note that both Latvians 
and Russians attach an equal level of importance to civic 
values. This shows that civic values could be a principle 
to unify national communities, because they are equally 
important to Latvians and non-Latvians in the country.
Attitudes toward civic values by nationality 
(% of each group stating that they are «important» and «very important», n = 1,004)
Being a 
good citizen 
means...
Observing 
laws, 
regulations
Paying taxes
Being aware 
of events in 
society
Voting in 
elections
Actively 
opposing 
corruption
Helping 
those with 
worse lives
Staying Latvia 
despite the 
economic crisis
all 87.1 77.0 75.8 78.9 70.4 62.7 39.5
Latvians 87.7 76.6 77.6 79.3 73.5 63.7 40.1
Russians 86.6 76.7 71.6 79.6 64.8 61.4 39.2
Others 85.7 80.0 781. 74.4 70.5 60.0 39.0
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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Active civic values
Students of national communities argue that a 
nation is shaped from the inside and that it is based on 
the ability of members of the nation to understand the 
situation, become involved in it, and take responsibility 
within it. Common views and understandings of values 
hold a nation together, allowing it to set out goals and 
to act. If we look at our society, however, then we see 
a completely opposite situation  – people are unhappy 
with what is happening in the country, they are passive 
and alienated, and they want to leave the country. The 
research question here is about the circumstances 
which weaken the individual’s active civic position.
There were three statements in the survey quest-
ionnaire to measure people’s attitudes toward active 
citizenship: 1) «It is important for people in Latvia to be 
more active in expressing their views when they see 
injustice»; 2) «It is important for all the residents of Latvia 
to observe the law and to pay taxes»; and 3) «Latvian 
citizens who live abroad must vote in elections.»
Data from the study show that women are more 
likely to support values which relate to an active civic 
position than men and people with a higher education. 
Less importance is attached to these values by people 
aged 25-34 and those who did not state their family 
income level (there is a probability that at least some of 
these people receive wages from the shadow economy) 
(Appendices 4, 5, 6, Box 1.7). Latvians and Russians hold 
equal views about the importance of an active civic 
position. The only difference relates to the question 
of whether citizens abroad should vote in elections  – 
Latvians feel that this form of political participation is 
more important than Russians do (Box 1.8).
These results encourage conclusions about the deep 
links between individuals on the one hand and the 
country’s economic and civic relationships on the other. 
The data show that a socio-economic status that is at 
the medium-to-high level (a higher education, average 
or somewhat high levels of income) serve as a stimulus 
for fulfilling civic duties, including the payment of taxes. 
Second, the fact that people with the highest level of 
income (more than LVL 201 per month) are not among 
the most active defenders of laws and taxes indicates 
that a better economic situation in one’s family is not 
Active civic values by income level 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of income People must state more active views when facing injustice
All residents must observe 
the law, pay their taxes
Latvian citizens abroad 
must vote in elections
all 87.3 85.9 71.2
< LVL 80 92.4 83.8 79.5
LVL 81-120 92.3 88.8 72.4
LVL 121-150 92.6 94.8 77.3
LVL 151-200 90.1 93.0 74.5
> LVL 201 90.9 87.0 78.2
Hard to say 79.2 79.6 61.6
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.7
Attitudes toward civic values by income level 
(% of each group saying that they are important or very important, n = 1,004)
Being a 
good citizen 
means...
Observing 
laws, 
regulations
Paying taxes
Being aware 
of events in 
society
Voting in 
elections
Actively 
opposing 
corruption
Helping 
those with 
worse lives
Staying Latvia 
despite the 
economic crisis
all 87.1 77.0 75.8 78.9 70.4 62.7 39.5
< LVL 80 82.4 66.1 71.4 72.0 70.3 54.2 33.0
LVL 80-120 86.9 80.7 74.5 69.6 73.6 65.9 32.5
LVL 121-150 96.3 82.7 84.8 86.7 78.2 73.7 50.0
LVL 151-200 92.7 87.2 80.8 83.3 74.6 70.4 51.4
> LVL 201 88.8 85.1 83.3 78.9 75.1 62.9 49.6
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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Active civic values by nationality 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality People must state more active views when facing injustice
All residents must observe 
the law, pay their taxes
Latvian citizens abroad 
must vote in elections
all 87.3 85.9 71.2
Latvians 88.3 86.6 74.0
Russians 85.1 85.1 66.5
Others 88.9 84.5 70.0
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.8
a sufficient foundation for an active civic position. 
Presumably there are also other factors in the mix  – 
factors such as mutual trust between the state and the 
individual. Third, the fact that people work in the gray 
zone of the economy weakens their civic involvement 
(Box 1.6).
The ethnic and cultural values of 
national identity: View of residents
The Latvian language, Latvian culture, the Latvian 
flag and the country’s national anthem are the most 
important national symbols and Latvian values 
which include the uniqueness that allows Latvians 
to understand one another, to feel that they are part 
of a single community, and to feel special links to 
their country. These are the main Latvian values that 
consolidate the national community and are both close 
to and understandable among Latvians. The research 
question here focuses on how strongly these values 
serve as a force to integrate the national community in 
terms of different groups in society, including Russians 
and members of other nationalities.
The data show that national values such as Latvian 
language skills and the colours of the national flag 
are very much appreciated by all members of society 
irrespective of ethnicity. If we look at the attitudes of 
various groups of residents in detail, however, then 
we see that there are significant differences between 
Latvians and Russians. For instance, 93% of Latvians 
and 72% of Russians support the need to learn the 
Latvian language. It must be emphasised here that the 
amplitude of divergent attitudes toward this need is 
considerably smaller than is the case with one of the 
most important elements in Latvia’s integration policy – 
«The unity of Latvia’s society must be based on the 
Latvian language and culture» (the project «National 
Identity and Public Integration: Problems and Goals, 
Ministry of Culture, 2011). The results of the survey show 
that 89% of Latvians and only 46% of Russians support 
this idea (Box 1.9). It is significant that this important 
aspect of public integration policy leads to one of the 
greatest differences of opinion between Latvians, 
Russians and members of other ethnic groups. this 
leads to the question of whether efforts to base 
public integration only on these values will bear the 
necessary fruit of creating a strong and integrated 
national community. as noted before, there are many 
values related to civic nationalism which are very 
much supported by Latvians, Russians and members 
of other ethnic minorities – obeying the law, opposing 
injustice, fighting against corruption, etc. Presumably 
these issues, alongside the Latvian language and 
culture, could serve as equally important principles 
Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values by nationality 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality
All people in 
Latvia must 
speak Latvian 
language
I like colours of 
Latvian flag
Foundation for 
unity: Latvian 
language and 
culture
I am touched 
by the national 
anthem
People of other 
ethnicities 
cannot belong 
to Latvia
I would prefer 
a Latvia 
populated only 
by Latvians
all 84.7 80.9 71.8 58.5 29.8 28.8
Latvians 93.1 87.2 89.1 71.3 36.4 43.9
Russians 72.2 71.5 46.0 39.3 20.4 7.8
Others 76.0 74.5 54.5 46.3 22.3 9.1
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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for the integration of the nation, thus establishing a set 
of ethnic and civic nationalism values.
Many of Latvia’s residents, both Latvians and Russians, 
have positive feelings about the colours of the Latvian 
flag  – 87% of Latvians and 72% of Russians. There are 
more radical differences in terms of how people perceive 
the Latvian national anthem  – 71% of Latvians, but 
only 40% of Russians admit to being touched by the 
anthem. Emotional perceptions of national symbols 
are more often admitted by women and older people 
(Appendix 9, Box 1.10). The data also show that the sense 
of national belonging has to do with the economic 
capacities of individuals. For instance, those who did 
not state their family income were less likely to admit 
that national symbols touch them in emotional terms 
(Appendix 10). More likely to talk about this, in turn, are 
those respondents who are not planning to leave Latvia 
(Appendix 11).
A mono-national or multicultural 
society
Data from the 2011 national census in Latvia show 
that 62.1% of the country’s residents are Latvians, 26.9% 
are Russians, 3.3% are Belarusians, and 7.7% represent 
other ethnicities. This clearly shows that Latvia is a 
multinational society. At the same time, however, there 
are still different views about whether it would be 
better if Latvia were a mono-national or mono-ethnic 
country or if it would be better to have people of various 
nationalities living there.
A bit more than one-quarter of all respondents say 
that they would like to see a mono-national society in 
Latvia (those who agreed with the statement «I would 
like it better if only Latvians lived in Latvia»). At the same 
time, however, the statement was supported by 44% of 
Latvians, 7.8% of Russians and 9.1% of respondents from 
other ethnic groups. A certain explanation for the broad 
dissemination of such views among ethnic Latvians 
might be another statement in the study: «People of 
other nationalities and with different traditions and 
habits cannot truly belong to Latvia even if they have 
lived here for many years» (the statement was supported 
by 36% of Latvians and 20% of Russians). These data 
show that a substantial proportion of Latvians would 
be happy to draw boundaries between national 
communities on the basis of ethnicity. To put it another 
way, they would support the idea that the nation should 
be established on the basis of the ethnic principles. The 
idea was rejected by 42% of Latvians, while 14% could 
not answer the question. Supporters of an ethnically 
homogeneous nation were more likely to be young 
people in the 18-24 cohort (35% of young people from 
all ethnicities), as well as those with a lower level of 
education.
National identity and recognition of 
many cultures
Questions about recognising a number of different 
cultures in the country make it possible to determine 
how widespread in various groups in society are 
views which oppose those who call for a mono-ethnic 
community. It is no surprise that Russians and people 
of other ethnicities are more responsive toward the co-
existence of various cultures in Latvia and toward support 
for this situation in the country: 52% of Latvians support 
the statement «I like the fact that people of so many 
different ethnicities and with different cultures live in 
Latvia,» while 86% of Russians do. 65% of Latvians and 
88% of Russians agreed with the statement that «the 
state should support the preservation of the culture and 
habits of different nationalities in Latvia.» 73% of Latvians 
and 89% of Russians supported the statement that «it is 
very good that there are many different national cultural 
organisations in Latvia.»
If we compare differences in views o the basis of the 
respondents’ age, education or income level, we find that 
the results are not all that predictable. it turns out that 
young people aged 18 to 24 are less tolerant toward a 
Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values by age 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality
All people in 
Latvia must 
speak Latvian 
language
I like colours of 
Latvian flag
Foundation for 
unity: Latvian 
language and 
culture
I am touched 
by the national 
anthem
People of other 
ethnicities 
cannot belong 
to Latvia
I would prefer 
a Latvia 
populated only 
by Latvians
all 84.7 80.9 71.8 58.5 29.8 28.8
18-24 85.7 79.8 74.8 52.8 29.9 34.9
25-34 82.6 79.2 69.2 54.6 32.9 31.7
35-44 84.0 77.9 71.7 58.9 27.4 25.3
45-54 84.3 80.5 70.2 50.0 25.1 25.6
55-74 86.2 84.8 73.2 69.5 32.5 28.3
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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diversity of cultures, while among older people there are 
more who say that the presence of different cultures is 
more acceptable. People with a lower level of education 
tend to be less tolerant. The answers from young people 
were quite unexpected, because young people usually 
demonstrate greater tolerance toward the co-existence of 
multiple cultures (Box 1.11).
Women were more tolerant toward a diversity 
of cultures in society than men were, and people 
with higher levels of income were also more tolerant 
(Appendix 13, 14).
National identity and global citizenship
Under modern-day circumstances of globalisation, 
the responsibilities of individuals stretch beyond national 
borders, because the responsibility for the cleanliness of 
the environment and for climate change is closely linked. 
Socio-economic inequality in various regions of the world 
facilitates migration processes, political conflicts create 
human rights crises, and all of this has an effect on those 
people in the world who enjoy welfare and security.
The data show that Latvians are more concerned 
about the clean environment (82%) than are Russians 
(77%). Both Latvians and Russians pay considerably much 
less attention to environmental problems at the global 
level (60% and 58% respectively), as well as to help to 
those who have suffered from natural disasters in parts 
of the world which are distant from Latvia (during the 
course of the survey, this applied to the consequences of 
an earthquake in Haiti). It is also important that respect 
toward ethnic minorities seems to be more important to 
Russians and representatives of other ethnic groups than 
to Latvians (Box 1.12).
It is understandable that global civic values have 
received more support from people with a higher 
education (Appendix 15), but less predictable, it turns 
out, was the fact that people with medium levels of 
income, as opposed to those with higher levels of 
income, presented a higher level of understanding 
about the importance of global problems (Box 1.13).
National identity and historical 
memory
Historical memory is a very important element 
in bringing a community together in that it includes 
stories, legends and myths about the past of the relevant 
country. Here we also are dealing with emotionally 
saturated myths about different ways in which history 
Recognising multiple cultures by age 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Age group
It is very good that there are 
many different national cultural 
organisations in Latvia
The state should support the 
preservation of the culture and 
habits of different nationalities 
in Latvia
I like the fact that people from 
so many different nationalities 
and with different cultures live 
in Latvia
all 79.9 74.9 66.0
18-24 74.6 67.8 59.8
25-34 73.8 70.2 61.1
35-44 80.6 72.5 66.5
45-54 85.0 81.7 67.0
55-74 83.0 78.8 71.6
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Attitudes toward global civic values by nationality 
(% of each group saying that they are important or very important, n = 1,004)
Nationality
Care for clean 
environment in 
future
Respect for 
minorities
Helping to preserve 
clean environment 
in world
Supporting victims 
of natural disasters 
in world
Being interested 
in human rights 
in world
all 80.2 73.5 59.7 42.5 42.0
Latvians 82.0 67.4 59.8 41.2 37.0
Russians 77.0 81.3 57.8 44.6 49.2
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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might have developed and how various twists and turns 
in history might have affected the process. According 
to Schopflin, myths can have several functions. Those 
who accept the views that are encoded in a myth also 
accept the overall world view that is reflected therein. 
This means a sense of belonging to a group for which 
this myth is close, and the rules of the group are then 
accepted. Myths accentuate that which is different 
and help to draw boundaries between one group and 
another. Myths also offer content for the self-perception 
of the group (Schopflin, 2000, 83).
Respondents were asked to evaluate two myths 
about Latvia’s recent past. One related to how Latvia 
would have developed if, like Finland, it had retained 
its independence in 1940. The second has to do with 
the Soviet era, when the claim was that Latvia achieved 
a high level of economics and culture only thanks to 
the help of other Soviet nationalities. The data show 
that this is the area in which the views of Latvians and 
Russians diverge to the greatest degree. 60% of Latvians 
and 30% of Russians support the idea that Latvia would 
have had the same favourable scenario as Finland had it 
retained its independence. 22% of Latvians and 58% of 
Russians, in turn, accept the idea that the Soviet era was 
good for Latvia’s development (Box 1.14). These data 
clearly show that historical memory draws strict borders 
between the Latvian and the Russian community. For 
that reason, it is very important to know the extent to 
which these historical myths are reproduced in the 
relevant communities. To a certain extent, conclusions 
about this can be drawn by looking at how common 
the myths are in various age groups. The data show 
that there is much less support for the two options 
among younger people than among those who are 
middle aged or older (Box 1.15). Does this indicate 
that the role of historical memory as a boundary is 
diminishing between Latvians and Russians? Time will 
tell. Interestingly, the scenario of Finland’s history is 
supported more often by people with a higher level 
of education and income, while the version about the 
effects of the Soviet era received more support from 
people with an medium level of education and income 
(Appendix 16, 17). It is also interesting that data from 
a 2000 survey («On the Road to a Civic Society, Baltic 
Data House, 2000) show that 11 years ago, some 60% 
of Russians supported the idea that the Soviet era was 
a positive one. Clearly, these views have not changed 
very much. If the myths are less common among young 
people, then does that mean that we can talk about 
transformations in the version of the historical myth 
Attitudes toward global civic values by income levels 
(% of each group saying that they are important or very important, n = 1,004)
Nationality
Care for clean 
environment in 
future
Respect for 
minorities
Helping to preserve 
clean environment 
in world
Supporting victims 
of natural disasters 
in world
Being interested in 
human rights  
in world
all 80.2 73.5 59.7 42.5 42.0
< LVL 80 78.1 66.4 49.8 34.0 28.6
LVL 81-120 81.5 72.2 59.7 40.2 40.6
LVL 121-150 89.0 8.6 73.2 55.0 52.6
LVL 151-200 85.4 81.8 68.4 51.0 48.3
> LVL 200 79.2 73.4 65.3 51.0 41.9
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.13
Attitudes toward collective myths by nationality 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality
The standard of living in Latvia would 
be higher if the country had remained 
independent in 1940, as Finland did.
It was only thanks to help from other Soviet 
nations that Latvia achieved a high level of 
economics and culture.
all 47.5 36.8
Latvians 59.5 21.7
Russians 29.7 58.3
Others 34.6 55.4
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.14
NatioNal ideNtity: CoNteNt aNd FormatioN
 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MOBILITY AND CAPABILITY 31
about the Soviet era? Can we expect that ideological 
stories about the economic might of the USSR and the 
mutual aid of Soviet republics – stories which took deep 
root during the Soviet era – might be replaced with an 
adequate understanding of socio-economic processes? 
The real question here is whether the gap between 
the historical memories of Latvians and Russians might 
shrink in time.
Pride about being a resident of Latvia
The survey data show that despite the effects which 
the country’s economic crisis have had on the welfare 
of local residents and the dissatisfaction which people 
feel about the system of government, most (60%) of 
respondents claim to be proud of the fact that they are 
residents of Latvia. These data show that these are special 
links between people and their motherland – the country 
in which they were born.
The greatest difference in emotional links to Latvia is 
between Latvians and Russians. Where 71% of Latvians 
are proud to be residents of the country, only 44% 
of Russians say the same. More likely to be proud in 
this regard are people with a higher education (66%; 
Appendix 18) and those with medium or the highest level 
of income (64%, Box 1.15, 1.17).
The data also reveal a link between a sense of pride 
on the one hand and the fact that the respondents’ 
relatives have emigrated so as to improve the material 
situation of their families on the other hand. The results 
show that the level of welfare and the ability to provide 
for one’s own family are very important prerequisites 
for having a sense of belonging to one’s motherland 
our country. It has to be added that in comparison to 
the 2000 survey, the number of people who are proud 
of living in Latvia has declined substantially. In 2000, 
positive emotions about the country were expressed by 
85% of Latvians and 55% of Russians. Similar data were 
found in a survey that was conducted in 1994, as well  – 
86% of Latvians and 63% of Russians displayed positive 
emotions toward Latvia (Zepa, Šūpule, 2006). In June 
1990, by contrast, 97% of Latvians and 85% of Russians 
expressed pride in Latvia, and it is clear that this height of 
emotion could not have been preserved, because at that 
time people were simply excited about the restoration 
of Latvia’s independence (Zepa, Šūpule, 2006). Still, the 
mid-1990s and 2000 can be good points of reference in 
explaining the shift in attitudes, because it is clear that 
some residents have become disappointed about their 
true feelings toward their country.
For the purposes of comparison, we can look at 
the sense of emotional belonging to their state which 
Attitudes toward collective myths by age 
(% of each group saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Age
The standard of living in Latvia would 
be higher if the country had remained 
independent in 1940, as Finland did.
It was only thanks to help from other Soviet 
nations that Latvia achieved a high level of 
economics and culture.
all 47.5 36.8
18-24 43.6 29.9
25-34 42.9 30.4
35-44 51.8 38.0
45-54 44.8 39.4
55-74 52.4 41.3
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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Pride in being a resident of Latvia by nationality 
(% of relevant group, n = 1,004)
Nationality Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)
Not proud («not particularly 
proud» or «not proud at all») Difficult to say
all 59.9 30.7 9.4
Latvians 70.5 2.19 7.6
Russians 44.4 42.9 12.6
Others 48.2 42.3 9.5
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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Pride in being a resident of Latvia by age 
(% of relevant group, n = 1,004)
Age Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)
Not proud («not particularly 
proud» or «not proud at all») Difficult to say
all 59.9 30.7 9.4
18-24 61.1 26.9 12.0
25-34 56.6 35.9 7.5
35-44 58.1 29.3 12.6
45-54 51.3 39.7 9.0
55-74 68.5 23.9 7.6
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.18
Pride in being a resident of one’s country 
(the answers «very proud» and «mostly proud»)
Country European Values Study (EVS), 1999 European Values Study (EVS), 2008
Poland 95 96
Russia 67 92
Denmark 87 91
France 84 90
Austria 86 89
Sweden 81 87
Czech Republic 78 84
Estonia 52 81
Latvia 81 (n = 1,000) 79 (n = 1,506)
Lithuania 55 72
Source: EVS 1999, EVS 2008
Note: In Latvia, the question was only posed to citizens; EVS 2008 data
Box 
1.19
Pride in being a resident of Latvia by income level 
(% of relevant group, n = 1,004)
Income Proud («very proud» or «mostly proud»)
Not proud («not particularly 
proud» or «not proud at all») Difficult to say
< LVL 80 56.8 35.0 8.2
LVL 81-120 58.0 29.9 12.0
LVL 121-150 63.8 28.1 8.1
LVL 151-200 63.6 25.5 10.9
> LVL 201 64.4 25.7 9.9
Don’t know 57.3 34.4 8.3
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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Pride in one’s country by citizenship 
(% of relevant group, n = 1,004)
Citizenship Proud («very proud»,  «mostly proud»)
Not proud («not particularly 
proud, not at all proud» Hard to say
Latvian citizens 63.7% 27.6% 8.7%
Non-citizens 41.4% 45.8% 12.8%
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
1.20
people in several European and former Soviet countries 
had in 1999 and 2008, when two separate surveys were 
conducted (Box 1.19.). As can be seen, the level of pride 
in their country among citizens in a series of countries in 
different European regions (Denmark, Sweden, France, 
Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic) either remained 
at the same level or increased a bit. These are countries 
in which the national economy developed in a more or 
less even way during the stated time period. In countries 
where the decade related to economic growth and 
other achievements (Russia, Estonia, Lithuania), the 
proportion of citizens who are proud of being a citizen in 
the relevant country increased substantially. It has to be 
recalled here that the data from Latvia did not include 
the views of non-citizens. All in all, we can conclude 
that the economic and social security of local residents 
goes hand in hand with the spread of a national sense of 
belonging in society. This is confirmed by a survey that 
was conducted in Latvia in 2010  – only 64% of citizens 
still said that they were proud of being residents of the 
country (Box 1.20).
A sense of endangerment to one’s 
identity
A sense of threat or endangerment to one’s identity 
is facilitated by the caution of those who belong to the 
relevant group, as well as by stricter boundaries between 
one group and others. Survey data show that fears of the 
survival of one’s language and culture lead to a symmetry 
of views between Latvians and Russians: 56% of Latvians 
and 34% of Russians feel that their language and culture 
are endangered in Latvia. A similar symmetry of views 
emerges in relation to threats against the existence of 
the other group’s language and culture: Only 17% of 
Russians feel that the existence of the Latvian language 
and culture in Latvia is under threat, while 11% of Latvians 
think the same about the future of the Russian language 
and culture in the country (Box 1.21). The threat to the 
Latvian language and culture is more often seen by 
Latvians with a secondary or higher education, while 
among Russians, it is precisely people with a higher 
education who were less likely to express concern about 
the survival of the Russian language in Latvia (Box 1.22). 
As noted, a sense of endangerment in relation to one’s 
language and culture promotes a lack of security about 
one’s identity, but on the other hand, it strengthens the 
belief that boundaries have to be created among groups.
Estonian sociologists have found similar data about 
the views of Estonians and the country’s Russians with 
respect to dangers against language and culture. There, 
again, Estonians were more likely than Russians to express 
concern about the survival of their language and culture 
in their country. On the basis of these data, Estonian 
researchers have concluded that Estonians feel that they 
are an endangered minority (Kalmus, 2003). Analysing the 
specifics of Latvian attitudes and identities, we can see 
that Latvian attitudes, in comparison to those residents 
The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence  
of the Latvian/Russian language and culture in Latvia by nationality 
(% of the relevant group, n = 1,004)
Nationality
Existence of Latvian language, culture 
endangered («very endangered», «more 
likely to be endangered than not»)
Existence of Russian language, culture, 
endangered («very endangered», «more 
likely to be endangered than not»)
All 39.8 20.0
Latvians 55.9 11.1
Russians 16.6 34.2
Others 21.7 26.0
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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who speak Russian, is often more similar to the position 
taken by a minority, not a majority. Fear about collective 
survival, in turn, strengthens the belief that there must be 
ethnicisation with a lack of trust in competing identities.
Identities and their boundaries
Identity makes it possible to answer the question 
of where one can feel a sense of belonging  – what is 
the common «we» which makes it possible to draw 
boundaries between «us» and «them.» Belonging 
to a group allows individuals to have a common 
understanding of issues, security, the sense of solidarity 
in the community, and a limited world in which to live 
and find oneself (Schopflin, 2000, 10). Thus identity 
serves individual efforts to receive public support for 
the relevant choices and to avoid a sense of insecurity  – 
something that is so very important in today’s mutative 
social world. Identity is a social construct. As Benedict 
Anderson (1991, 6) has argued, a nation is an imagined 
community and its participants often really know only 
those who are closest to them. This means that the rest 
of the nation can only be imagined, and other identities, 
too, can be seen as imagined communities.
In the Latvian survey, respondents were presented 
with a list of 23 different groups of people and asked to 
choose those about which they could feel a certain sense 
of belonging and in the context of which they could use 
the word «us.» Statistical analysis based on factor analysis 
made it possible to determine communities which have 
gathered together and are groups of people which can 
speak about «us.» If we look at the matrix of four factors, 
we see that the following communities have emerged:
•	 The community of Slavic nations in Latvia and the 
world, including Latvia’s non-citizens;
•	 The community of active citizens which includes 
«cultural people all around the world,» Europeans, 
«people who know how to defend their interests,» 
and «people who are responsible toward the 
country»;
•	 The community of Latvians in Latvia and the world, 
including Latvia’s citizens;
•	 The community of friends, family members, 
schoolmates and colleagues.
Of these communities, we see that two are linked to 
nationality  – the first is made up of Slavic nationalities, 
while the other is made up of Latvians. It is interesting 
that the other two groups are based on other principles. 
One brings together people with a broader scope and 
an active civic position. They feel a sense of belonging to 
people culture throughout the world, Europeans, people 
who know how to defend their interests, and those who 
are responsible for the state. The second brings together 
people who have or have had direct links  – friends, 
relatives, colleagues, schoolmates and fellow university 
students. This could be seen as a community of social 
networks.
These data suggest that there are more than just 
ethnicity-based sense of belonging and the drawing 
of relevant boundaries among ethnic groups. It can be 
said with certainty that people of different nationalities 
see themselves as being among the world’s cultural and 
active people, and it is also true that communities of 
friends, relatives and colleagues are also multinational. 
The data show that 9% of Latvians and 9% of Russians 
count themselves among cultural people in the world, 
19% of Latvians and 16% of Russians see themselves as 
being responsible toward the state, and 20% of Latvians 
and 20% of Russians feel that they are linked to those who 
know how to defend their interests. 11% of Latvians and 
16% of Russians feel themselves to be Europeans.
It is interesting that many groups of people which 
were included on the list did not form closer links with 
other groups, and people in those groups did not state 
links with those who belong to other groups. Such 
groups include «poor people facing financial difficulties,» 
«ordinary working people», «wealthy people», «people of 
my generation», «people with my culture and traditions», 
and «people of my faith.» In quite a few cases, a sense of 
belonging to these groups was expressed by a considerable 
The views of the residents of Latvia about threats to the existence of the Latvian/
Russian language and culture in Latvia by education level 
(% of the relevant group, n = 1,004)
Education
Existence of Latvian language, culture 
endangered («very endangered», «more 
likely to be endangered than not»)
Existence of Russian language, culture, 
endangered («very endangered», «more 
likely to be endangered than not»)
all 39.8 20.0
Primary or unfinished 
secondary 29.9 16.9
Secondary 44.7 22.0
Specialised secondary 37.5 22.4
Higher 43.0 14.8
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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proportion of respondents. 39% said that they feel a 
sense of belonging to people of their own generation, 
28% did so in relation to ordinary working people, 25% 
felt links to people with the same culture and traditions, 
and 19% felt this to be true in relation to people with the 
same faith. A sense of belonging to wealthy people was 
named by only 5% of respondents. It is significant that 
people in these groups were not part of the «us» group 
in the aforementioned broader communities  – ethnic or 
social networks or people who are cultural and active 
in the world. This might be attributed to the fact that 
words such as «poor person», «ordinary working person», 
«person of my generation, faith or culture», etc., do not 
serve as objects of attraction for others who are outside 
the boundaries of the group and cannot, therefore, form a 
sense of belong to the group.
Belonging to the Latvian nation
Students of national identity argue that a national 
community is based on the beliefs and views of people 
who are a part thereof. Nations exist when members 
recognise one another as fellow citizens. National 
identity is glue which holds society together and allows 
it to pursue common aims (Miller, 1999). The Latvian 
constitution states that «sovereign authority in the 
Latvian state belongs to the people of Latvia.» Asked 
about who makes up the Latvian nation, residents of the 
country defined principles related to national belonging 
in Latvia, discussing those people with whom they feel a 
sense of national community.
The data show that there are certain differences 
between Latvians and Russians when it comes to the 
foundation for national belonging in Latvia. 98% of 
Latvians feel that the Latvian nation is made up of 
Latvians, while an almost equal number of Russians 
(94%) argue that a principle for establishing the 
nation is also citizenship. An even greater gap exists in 
relation to «those Latvian residents who feel a sense of 
belonging to the country» – 73% of Latvians and 91% of 
Russians consider such people to be part of the national 
community. It must be stressed that Latvian language 
knowledge as a principle related to national belonging 
is equally important to Latvians and to Russians. More 
than two-thirds of respondents in both groups support 
the view that «everyone who speaks Latvian and lives 
in Latvia» belongs to the national community. A more 
radical difference in the views of Latvians and Russians 
relates to «everyone who was born in Latvia» and 
«everyone who has at least one parent who is a Latvian.» 
This position was supported by more than 80% of 
Russians and more than 65% of Latvians. Approximately 
one-half of Latvians and fewer than 90% of Russians feel 
that all of the residents of Latvia belong to the Latvian 
nation. The views of people of other nationalities are 
closer to those of Russians, not Latvians (Box 1.24).
Communities identified as the result of factor analysis 
(co-efficient of element)
the community of Slavic nations in Latvia and the 
world, including Latvia’s non-citizens
the community of active citizens, which includes 
«cultural people all around the world», Europeans, 
«people who know how to defend their interests», and 
«people who are responsible toward their country
Latvia’s Russians, 742
Russia’s Russians, 726
Latvia’s non-citizens, 684
Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, etc., 668
Ethnic groups living in Latvia, 668
Russian speakers around the world, 601
Cultural people in the world, 624
Europeans, 594
People who know how to defend their interests, 574
People who are responsible toward their country, 532
the Latvian community in Latvia and the world, 
including Latvia’s citizens
the community of friends, family members, 
schoolmates and colleagues
Latvians, 673
All Latvian citizens, 647
Latvian speakers all around the world, 544
Friends, 812
Relatives/family, 760
Classmates, 625
Colleagues, people from my profession, 547
Groups of people which did not establish closer links to other groups and with respect to which other 
groups did not see links
Poor people facing financial difficulties
People with my culture and traditions
People of my generation
People of my faith
Wealthy people
Simple working people
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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It is understandable that Latvians, as the nucleus of 
their nation, are stricter in drawing borderlines when 
asked about those groups of residents who should 
be seen as belonging to the Latvian nation. It must 
be stressed, however, that not just ethnic belonging 
(Latvians), but also citizenship, a sense of belonging 
to the country, and Latvian language skills are among 
the most important principles related to national 
belonging insofar as Latvians are concerned.
Boundaries related to Latvian 
citizenship
Another question that was posed to survey 
respondents was this: «What types of people should be 
banned from becoming citizens of Latvia?» This made 
it possible to identify the boundaries which people in 
different social groups set in this regard. We can see that 
Latvians hold stricter positions than other groups do 
when it comes to who should and should not be allowed 
to become a citizen of Latvia. If we look at the criteria 
which limit citizenship and are mentioned most often 
by Latvians, then we must see that this is an active civic 
position  – the national community must reject those to 
whom Latvia’s interests are not important (74%), as well 
as those who ignore Latvian law (don’t pay taxes, etc.; 
72%). A similar approach is taken toward former members 
of repressive and anti-national organisations (KGB agents, 
members of the Soviet military, etc.; 71%). Considerably 
fewer Latvians denied the right of citizenship in relation 
to other groups  – immigrants (36%), or people of other 
nationalities (22%). 19% of Latvians and 7% of Russians 
believe that Latvian citizenship should be denied to those 
who want to preserve their own traditions and culture. It 
has to be said that responses about the presentation of 
traditions and culture can be interpreted very broadly, 
because it may be that respondents were thinking about 
attitudes toward the traditions of different religions, 
including Islam (Box 1.25).
It has to be added here that the views of Russians 
and members of other ethnic groups are fairly similar 
to those of Latvians when it comes to limitations on 
citizenship, the only difference being that these views are 
less common among Russians and other minorities than is 
the case with Latvians. This is a very important result for 
the research, because it shows that the views of Latvians 
Views of Latvians and members of other nationalities about who makes up the people 
of Latvia 
(% of each nationality, the answer «yes», n = 1,004)
Nationality Latvians All Latvian citizens
All Latvian 
residents with 
sense of belonging 
to country
All who 
speak 
Latvian and 
live in Latvia
All who 
were born 
in Latvia
All who have 
at least one 
parent who is 
a Latvian
All residents 
of Latvia
all 95.8 86.5 80.5 77.5 76.3 72.4 66.0
Latvians 97.9 81.1 72.9 75.6 67.7 65.1 52.7
Russians 93.7 94.4 90.6 79.9 89.6 83.9 85.9
Others 90.9 92.1 91.5 80.7 83.2 78.3 78.7
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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The views of Latvia’s residents on who should not be allowed to become a citizen of the 
country by nationality and citizenship 
(% of relevant group; the answer «should be banned», n = 1,004)
Nationality, 
citizenship
Those who wish 
to preserve 
their traditions, 
culture
Non-Latvians
People 
from other 
countries
Members of 
former repressive 
organisations (KGB, 
Soviet militarists)
Those to 
whom Latvia’s 
interests are 
unimportant
Those who 
ignore Latvian 
law (paying 
taxes, etc.)
all 13.6 15.6 27.1 55.3 63.4 63.9
Latvians 18.5 21.9 35.9 70.7 76.3 71.4
Russians 7.0 8.1 14.5 32.0 44.1 54.7
Others 6.5 3.7 15.9 40.7 50.6 50.1
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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and ethnic minorities are not polarised in relation to such 
an important issue as criteria related to citizenship. Even 
though sometimes such polarisation is discussed in the 
mass media, the truth is the opposite – both groups name 
similar criteria as being the most important ones, and it 
is even more important that this represents a position of 
active citizenship.
Immigrants: A Threat or a Benefit?
Latvia is undergoing a serious demographic crisis. 
It is among the 10 or 15 countries in the world which 
are aging most rapidly. The community of Latvia has 
experienced rapid depopulation in terms of fewer 
children and more elderly people. The situation is 
exacerbated even further by the fact that economically 
active residents have moved away from the country 
during the economic crisis. It can be expected that 
economic growth in the country will create a labour force 
deficit in the country, and immigrants will be needed in 
that case. At the same time, however, Latvian immigration 
policies include strict limits on the inflow of workers.
Our researchers asked people about the effects of 
immigrants on the national economy, culture and labour 
market. The answers are quite interesting. It turns out 
that attitudes toward immigrants mostly depend on the 
respondent’s nationality. Latvians are considerably more 
likely than people of other nationalities to insist that 
immigrants would have a negative effect, while Russians 
and people of other ethnic minorities are more likely 
to point to the positive consequences of the process. 
Thus, for instance, 48% of Latvians and 28% of Russians 
believe that immigrants increase the crime rate, and 66% 
of Latvians and 28% of Russians think that immigrants 
take away the jobs of people who were born in Latvia. 
When it comes to positive effects, 21% of Latvians and 
45% of Russians say that immigrants serve the interests 
of Latvia’s economy, while 33% of Latvians and 45% of 
Russians say that they make Latvia open to new ideas 
(Box 1.26).
It is interesting that women are less likely than men 
to see threats related to immigration and more likely to 
think that immigrants are a good thing (Box 1.27). The 
effects of educational levels cannot be evaluated in the 
same way  – people with a higher education think that 
immigrants may increase the crime rate, but they also 
believe that immigrants provide benefit to the economy 
and open up the road for innovations. People with a 
lower education level think that immigrants create the 
threat of unemployment (Box 1.28).
Conclusions
When it comes to civic nationalism, people understand 
that they belong to a single community and are subject to 
the same laws. In the field of civic nationalism, the choice 
Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by nationality 
(% of each group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality Immigrants increase crime
Immigrants give 
benefit to the Latvian 
economy
Immigrants take away 
the jobs of people 
born in Latvia
Immigrants make 
Latvia open to new 
ideas and cultures
all 40.1 28.7 61.3 39.6
Latvians 47.7 21.1 65.6 33.4
Russians 28.9 40.7 54.9 49.3
Others 32.7 34.2 57.1 44.8
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by gender 
(% of group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Gender Immigrants increase crime
Immigrants give 
benefit to the Latvian 
economy
Immigrants take away 
the jobs of people born 
in Latvia
Immigrants make 
Latvia open to new 
ideas and cultures
all 40.1 28.7 61.3 39.6
Men 41.7 28.9 63.4 36.5
Women 38.7 28.5 59.5 42.3
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
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of citizenship and the choice to join a specific community 
are individual choices. In the case of ethnic nationalism, 
by contrast, belonging to a nation is more collective in 
that it is based on ethnic origins, as well as the culture and 
history of the relevant group.
National policies, particularly in terms of public 
integration, should examine the principles and values which 
are at the foundation of establishing a nation. It would be 
useful to discuss the fact that the civic community should 
not just care about Latvian values which can only be 
implemented in Latvia, but also emphasise the rights and 
obligations, political participation and social solidarity of 
citizens, without which neither the state nor democracy 
can survive. 
Attitudes toward the effects of immigrants on social and economic processes by 
education level 
(% of group, the answers «fully agree» and «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Education level Immigrants increase crime
Immigrants give 
benefit to the 
Latvian economy
Immigrants take 
away the jobs of 
people born in Latvia
Immigrants make 
Latvia open to new 
ideas and cultures
all 40.1 28.7 61.3 39.6
Primary or incomplete secondary 38.3 25.7 66.6 31.7
Secondary 36.4 30.1 57.5 38.7
Specialised secondary 39.6 25.7 63.4 39.3
Higher 47.5 33.7 60.0 46.2
Source: «National Identity. NI Dimensions,» Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010
Box 
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Main conclusions. The most important missions
Main conclusions
There are considerable differences among Latvians, Russians and other ethnic groups when it comes to 
views about important aspects of public integration policies – the idea that «the unity of Latvian society must 
be based on Latvian language and culture,» for instance. At the same time, however, positions taken by Latvians, 
Russians and others are similar when it comes to civic values such as obeying the law, opposing injustice, battling 
corruption, etc. Presumably, civic values alongside national ones could serve as equally important principles for 
the integration of the nation, thus establishing a set of values related to ethnic and civic nationalism.
Examining the views of people from various groups in society about principles that unify society in the 
context of the nation’s development, we can conclude that polarised positions among Latvians, Russians and 
other ethnic groups hinder the nation’s development.
the most important missions
National policies, particularly in terms of integration of society, should examine the principles and values which 
are at the foundation of establishing a nation. It would be useful to discuss the fact that the civic community 
should not just care about Latvian values which can only be implemented in Latvia, but also emphasise the 
rights and obligations, political participation and social solidarity of citizens, without which neither the state nor 
democracy can survive. Civic values can serve as a principle to unify the national community, because such 
values are equally important to Latvians and to other nationalities resident in the country.
It is the duty of the state to facilitate the emergence of new traditions and rituals which would serve to unify 
all members of society irrespective of their ethnic belonging.
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Those who belong to a nation tend to be proud 
about the history of their ancestors, creating stories 
about the nation’s strength, vitality and even superiority 
in comparison to other nations. National identity 
researcher Montserrat Guibernau has written that 
Greeks are proud of their ancient cultural heritage, 
Castilians are proud of Columbus, who discovered 
America, and Italians are proud of the Roman Empire. 
Nations recall not just periods of glory, but also ages 
of terror and suffering. Catalonians remember the 
French and Spanish occupation of Barcelona in 1714, 
Jews recall the tragedy of the Holocaust, and Americans 
commemorate the terrorist attack against the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2011. 
The selection and use of those aspects of history in which 
victories interweave with other experiences  – that is 
what shapes the collective memory of the nation. These 
transcendental moments from the past allow members 
of the community to increase their self-value, convincing 
them that they are outstanding in specific areas and that 
they are unique. History takes part in creating a nation’s 
image; in fact, it is a forge at which the characteristics of 
the nation are cast (Guibernau, 20). The duty of history 
is to tell us who we are. The suffering, survival, resistance 
and heroism of our ancestors serve to strengthen living 
solidarity today. The past is an inviolable component in 
social identification, and it plays a critical role in inter-
group relationships and mutual recognition (Tosh, 14). 
Memory, in turn, is an inviolable element of identity, 
facilitating the ability of people to feel a sense of 
belonging to their community, their motherland and their 
country. It is one of the most decisive prerequisites for 
establishing social roots.
History was one of the main ways of ensuring 
political mobilisation among people in Eastern Europe, 
including Latvia, when a battle was waged to escape 
the bloc of Socialist countries that were governed by the 
Soviet Union. People in these territories remembered 
the time before World War II, when life was different 
(i.e., not Soviet). Memories of the offences caused by 
the Communist regimes were even clearer and more 
alive. After decades of silence, these offences burst into 
the public arena in the late 1980s. Memories once kept 
privately by families and small groups melded into a 
powerful torrent which ended up destroying the Soviet 
version of history (Judt, 2002, 173). The national identity 
of Eastern Europeans was related to national sentiment, 
as well as to a sense of injustice about 20th century history. 
«.. the official myths of Soviet rule had been publicly 
discredited throughout the Soviet Union and replaced 
by deep-seated historical grievances and new, nationalist 
myths» (Sherlock, 148). According to the historian Tony 
Judt, «if the problem in Western Europe has been a 
shortage of memory, in the continent’s other half the 
problem is reversed. Here there is too much memory, 
too many pasts on which people can draw, usually as a 
weapon against the past of someone else» (Judt, 2002, 
172). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, interest in 
history flourished in Eastern Europe. People wanted to 
learn about the blank pages in history. They wanted 
to learn about the events which Communist regimes 
had hushed up, as well as about heroes and villains. 
People hoped to reassess events from the past. This was 
basically an upheaval in history. Nearly all of the events 
and heroes who had been praised by the Communist 
regimes were denounced. Many of the phenomena 
and individuals that were seen as negative during the 
Soviet era were now praised. Belonging to one group of 
memories or another turned Eastern European countries 
and individuals into friends and/or enemies in terms of 
understanding the past and the realities of the present 
day. The restored past strengthened national identity. In 
politics and everyday life, it echoed with the present and 
created a vast wave of commemoration with new space 
and time for commemorations. Monuments and street 
names were replaced, new calendars of official holidays 
and dates of commemoration were established, historical 
narratives were reconstructed in historical, scholarly 
and popular books, biographies, memoirs, literature, 
cinema, television broadcasts and audio materials, and 
people engaged in many other activities, as well (see 
Esbenshade; Smith; Zelče, 2007).
The way in which social memory was established 
and functioned in post-Soviet Latvia involved many 
similarities with the same processes in other Eastern 
European countries, but there were also substantial 
differences because of the long-lasting presence of two 
different groups of social memories in Latvia  – those of 
Latvians and those of Russian speakers (most of whom 
are people from other Soviet republics who moved to 
Latvia during the years of the Soviet occupation). These 
two groups have different views about key events in 
Latvia’s past, as well as about the role of these views in 
the area of identity.
Victims and heroes
The restoration of Latvia’s independent statehood 
occurred in lockstep with a public auditing of history. 
Soviet Latvia lost its historical legitimacy in June 1988, 
when the fact of the Soviet occupation was first discussed 
in public (at a plenary meeting of the Creative Unions 
1.3. National identity, History 
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of the Latvian SSR). There were also events held to 
commemorate the victims of Stalinist deportations (see 
Zelče, 2009, 43-46).
Beginning in 1987, one of the most important items on 
Latvia’s agenda was to identify and commemorate Soviet 
offenses. This essentially turned into a mass movement. 
Flowers were laid down and candles were lit at the foot 
of the Freedom Monument and at the Cemetery of the 
Brethren in Riga. The same was true all over Latvia in terms 
of national monuments or symbolic replacements for 
same – train stations from which people were deported to 
Siberia, places where national partisans waged battle, at 
rivers and lakes, at the foot of massive trees and at other 
ancient sacred locations. People gathered to honour 
the victims, and they organised marches. New places of 
commemoration were established, pre-war organisations 
were re-established, and people began to visit places 
where others had been imprisoned or deported. The 
public arena was filled with stories from those who had 
been repressed in all kinds of mediated formats and 
genres (see Kaprāns, et al.). The first press publications 
about the repressions and the voices of those who had 
been repressed on television and radio broadcasts turned 
into important cultural and social events with much 
resonance. They helped to form a collective viewpoint 
about the Soviet occupation, the repressive system, 
deportations and the things which people did in relation 
to them, the struggle for life, and the system of values 
which prevailed. Among such publications, of particular 
importance were the first collection of memoirs and 
poems about Stalinist repressions, «Via dolorosa» (1990), 
Anita Liepa’s «Exhumation» (1990), Roberts Gabris’ 
«Latvian Officer No. 35473» (1990), and Melānija Vanaga’s 
«On the Banks of the River of Souls» (1991). Later this list 
Poet Anda Līce, editor of a collection of memoirs by victims of Stalinist repressions,  
«Via dolorosa,» in 1991
«Now our nation has another set of scriptures. We are placing the testimony of Stalinist victims alongside our 
Folk Songs and the Bible. This handwritten literature speaks to hell on Earth, and essentially it speaks to heaven 
in people and the nation. [..] This handwritten literature provides devastating facts to fill in the blank pages in 
the historical memory of the nation. With unique emotional directness, it scrubs the calcification off of our souls. 
Thousands of people who did not have time to tell the truth are speaking through the mouths of these witnesses. 
The same is true of those whose pain is so deep and great that they cannot touch it again. While people are still 
only thinking about where and how to erect a monument to the victims, these witnesses are already building 
it with words. Testimony published in books and periodicals offers moral satisfaction to everyone who suffered 
from the plague of the 20th century. It represents a knock on the door of conscience of those whose hands are 
bloody. Even if they do not face a trial in this life, their conscience will never be at rest. This means urging these 
people to regret their sins and to pay penance in relation to the only thing that can wash away the blood. If 
only one in a thousand can do so, then the memoirs will have done their sacred work. You will say ‘They will not 
read the testimony.’ Perhaps, but there is no peace for them. \ It is important for each of them to hold a second 
Nuremberg trial. [..]
It is premature to judge the importance of testimony about Stalinism in terms of our nation’s spiritual life and 
culture. Only some of the testimony has been published. And yet I dare say that this is exactly what addresses us 
most harshly and most directly among all genres. Is the reader prepared for this? People who spent many years 
in a system of informational famine and infantile training are often stupefying themselves with erotic and trashy 
literature. They are afraid of losing the seeming comfort of their souls. The truth about the era and the destiny 
of the nation is put aside. Nothing in terms of these memories is available to those residents of the republic who 
read in Russian. A failure to understand Latvia’s history creates incomprehension and national intolerance. This 
layer of literature is hardly ever used in the theatre and cinema. Professional authors, too, are mostly inspired by 
the present, which is so rich in events. Perhaps an entirely new genre of literature will eventually emerge on the 
basis of this layer. For future generations of writers, artists, historians and philosophers, this will be unprecedented 
experience. The scope at which memories have been disseminated remains narrow – Latvia and Latvians abroad. 
Thought must be given to translating these texts into the languages of the world. That is the only way in which 
we can warn the world. [..]
Reading this testimony means overcoming a great deal in oneself, not least in terms of concepts such as crime, 
punishment and forgiveness. In the battle for the truth, we must not allow evil to cloud or eyes, because then 
we will lose the road that is under our feet and the sky that is above us. Forgiveness is an individual matter, even 
though the offences have affected the entire nation. Without true repentance of sins, forgiveness is not possible 
on Earth or in heaven.»
Source: Līce, A. (1992). «Staļinisma upuru liecības» (The Testimony of Victims of Stalinism) In Šneidere, I. (ed.). Komunistiskā totali-
tārisma un genocīda prakse Latvijā (The Practice of Communist Totalitarianism and Genocide in Latvia). Riga: Zinātne, pp. 169-171.
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was joined by Sandra Kalniete’s «With Dancing Shoes 
in the Snows of Siberia» (2001) and Anda Manfelde’s 
«Children of the Dugout» (2010).
In looking back at the 1990s, anthropologist Vieda 
Skultāne has concluded that for Latvians, commemo-
ration of Soviet repressions was the main characteristic 
in identity, just like the commemoration of the Holocaust 
is the main characteristic of identity for Jews (Skultāne, 
765). When defining their identity, Latvians were happy 
to accept a description proposed by the playwright Māra 
Zālīte  – «nation of orphans.» Self-victimisation solidified 
the community, served as an instrument which made 
it possible to draw a line between «us» and «them,» 
and made it possible to establish a concept about the 
existence of the restored nation state. The Soviet period 
took on the discourse of an era of «alien power,» and 
Latvians were a «nation of sufferers»  – good people 
whose land and homes had been stolen and who were 
forced to submit before an alien regime and ideology. In 
this discourse, the heroes of history were all of the people 
who struggled against the Soviet regime. At the front of 
the stage in this regard were members of the World War 
II era Latvian Legion and all of the national partisans who 
took weapons in hand and made it possible to create a 
story about heroism in Latvian history – one that was not 
in contradiction to the historical identity of «sufferers,» 
but instead supplemented it in the sense that all of those 
who fought against the Soviet regime (as long as the 
Soviet Union’s repressive structures could physically reach 
them) were killed or sent to Soviet prisons or camps. 
In speaking about the heroes of history  – Legionnaires 
and national partisans  – the then commander of the 
National Armed Forces, Juris Dalbiņš, had this to say in 
1995: «The spirit of these people could not be broken by 
any regime, because they were the sons and daughters 
of independent Latvia. They experienced the flourishing 
of the country and then violence and humiliation at the 
hands of the occupants. The love of the motherland which 
these people held in their hearts could not be measured 
in lats, roubles, dollars or marks. This was inalienable 
treasure in their hearts. It was a matter of honour and 
duty for every one of them. [..] Our old freedom fighters 
have a strength of spirit and lives which set an example 
for younger generations in terms of how one must serve 
one’s Mother Latvia. [..] Only that nation which honours 
its heroes and remembers its true history will survive» 
(Dalbiņš, 403-404). The Legionnaires and national 
partisans became heroes of history just because they 
fought against the Soviet regime while ignoring collective 
or individual collaborationism with the Nazi regime and 
the involvement of such people in Nazi crimes. Among 
the heroes of Latvian history were also heroes from 
Latvian history in the 1920s and 1930s  – participants in 
the liberation battles and politicians, as well as, separately, 
Soviet-era dissidents, but in general terms they remained 
in the shadow of the Legionnaires and national partisans.
By the mid-1990s, resistance against the Soviet 
regime and an emphasis on heroism and revenge for 
suffering were a part of the historical stories that were 
told in the public arena in Latvia. In these stories, the 
Latvian Legion, which fought against the USSR as part of 
the Nazi military, was cited as a positive (or, sometimes, 
the most positive) page in Latvian history. The same was 
true when it came to statements from politicians. The 
role of the Legionnaires in the gallery of national heroes 
was confirmed by a ceremony in which the general 
inspector of the Latvian Legion, Rūdolfs Bangerskis, 
and other senior officers of the Legion were disinterred 
and reburied at a place of honour at the Cemetery of 
the Brethren in Riga. A memorial to the Legionnaires in 
Lestene also took on the status of national holy ground. 
Honouring the Latvian Legion also became a part of the 
thinking of radically nationalist parties (see Zelče, 2010). 
On June 17, 1998, Parliament added to the list of national 
holidays and commemorative days March 16, which had 
been identified by the Latvian Welfare Fund («Hawks 
of the Daugava») veterans’ organisation to honour the 
Latvian Legion. Commemoration of March 16 in 1998 and 
1999 attracted a great deal of international attention and 
confirmed that the identity that was based on anti-Soviet 
heroism was in conflict with a European identity and 
various other historical identities at the local level.
When the Legionnaires experienced a discursive 
transformation from victims of history to major heroes 
of history, it illustrated the deep nature of cultural 
traumas from the past, particularly in terms of the 
Soviet occupation. It also created social demand for 
the historical pride that is so very much necessary for a 
collective identity.
The identity of European history and 
the Holocaust
The basic element in the memories and identities 
of the Western world in the late 20th century was the 
Holocaust. As Judt has argued, European history was 
based on the «crematoria of Auschwitz.» This, the author 
added, it was a moral lesson in terms of never allowing 
such a crime to be committed again: «If Europeans are to 
maintain this vital link – if Europe’s past is to continue to 
furnish Europe’s present with admonitory meaning and 
moral purpose – then it will have to be taught afresh with 
each passing generation» (Judt, 2005, 831).
The history of the Holocaust has attracted vast 
interest in the Western world during the last several 
decades. The Sho’ah was the topic of films, television 
broadcasts, literary works, artworks, museums, memorials 
and commemorative rituals not just at places where the 
Holocaust occurred, but also in very distant parts of the 
world. Western understandings of values and morals are 
based on the idea that that Nazism was the greatest evil 
in the history of the world, as well as on commemorations 
of the Holocaust. Denunciation of the Sho’ah is the 
dominant discourse in Western culture today, and those 
who fail to know about or be aware of this history are 
seen as denying this culture or as standing outside of 
civilised society (see Bērziņš).
In writing about the memory of Eastern Europe after 
the end of Communist regimes, Judt has written that «To 
east Europeans, belatedly released after 1989 from the 
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burden of officially mandated Communist interpretations 
of World War Two, the fin-de-siècle Western preoccupation 
with the Holocaust of the Jews carries disruptive 
implications. On the one hand, eastern Europe after 1945 
had to much more then western Europe to remember  – 
and to forget. There were more Jews in the eastern half of 
Europe and more of them were killed; most of the killing 
took place in this region and many more locals took an 
active part in it. But on the other hand, far greater care 
was taken by the post-war authorities in eastern Europe 
to erase all public memory of the Holocaust. It is not that 
the horrors and crimes of the war in the east were played 
down  – on the contrary, they were repeatedly rehearsed 
in official rhetoric and enshrined in memorials and 
textbooks everywhere. It is just that Jews were not part 
of the story» (Judt, 2005, 821–822). Far more important 
than the victims of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe were 
the national victims who had, for many decades, faced 
the mockery, denial or silence of Communist regimes. For 
this part of the world, the initial sense of the Holocaust 
which emerged in the 1990s and the early part of the 
21st century, taken along with an understanding of the 
moral responsibilities of the relevant nations, initially 
increased the total of bitter memories, sometimes 
established a confrontation in terms of the importance 
of commemorating «our» victims and «their» victims, 
and also represented bitterness about the idea that the 
West simply did not care about the historical sufferings 
of Eastern Europeans. At the same time, however, 
recognition of the Sho’ah was an «entry ticket» to Europe, 
its culture and its identity (Judt, 2005, 803).
National victims also took the main role in historical 
stories in the Baltic States after their independent 
statehood was restored. It was the fundamental trauma 
of the past, and during the entire Soviet period, people 
were not allowed to talk about it. The scope of this 
trauma made the Holocaust peripheral in comparison 
to national suffering, the war, and the Soviet and Nazi 
occupations (Kattago, 382). Integration into Europe, 
however, led Latvia to take a different look at the Nazi 
occupation, participation in war, and national heroes 
and victims. In 1998, the Latvian government began to 
implement policies related to history so as to make easier 
the country’s inclusion in the European cultural space 
and to encourage people to accept a European identity. 
In February 1998, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis visited 
Israel and apologised for the participation of Latvians 
in the Sho’ah. A commission of Latvian historians was 
established, and support was given to research into the 
Holocaust and the inclusion of this topic in history lessons 
in schools (see Zelče, 2009, 46-51).
It would be wrong to claim that the people of 
Latvia knew nothing about the Holocaust and related 
memories during the Soviet period. There was a publicly 
unarticulated sense of guilt at the personal and the 
community level (Ezergailis, 44). The concept of the 
Sho’ah was not discussed publicly during the Soviet era, 
but the tragic fate of the Jews and the participation of 
Latvians in their demise were reflected in culture, often 
in a vividly emotional way. This was true in the prose of 
Vilis Lācis (see Bērziņš, 2011a), Ēvalds Vilks, Miervaldis 
Birze, Dagnija Zigmonte, Mirdza Kļava, etc., in the poetry 
of Ojārs Vācietis, and in the memoirs of Gunārs Cīrulis. The 
tragedy of the Holocaust was a key element in the multi-
series film «Long Road Into the Dunes» (1981), while the 
brutal destruction of the Roma people was the topic of 
the film «Klāvs, Son of Mārtiņš» (1970). During the 1960s, 
young Jews in Riga cleaned up the places where Jews 
had been murdered at Rumbula and Biķernieki, and 
they also started to organise commemorative events 
(Dribins, 2002a, 143). All in all, however, this infamous 
aspect of Latvian history was covered up with a lack of 
knowledge, bemusement, and an absence of facts and 
moral criteria in explaining the evil that occurred. The 
tradition of commemorating the victims of the Holocaust 
in public gained traction only after the restoration of 
Latvia’s statehood, when it was also institutionalised 
at the national level. July 4 (the date when a synagogue 
in Riga that was full of people who were locked in was 
burned down in 1941) was declared to be the date to 
commemorate the Jewish victims of genocide. Top 
government officials and representatives of foreign 
embassies take part in the relevant rituals each year.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Jewish 
community in Latvia also audited its history, and the 
Holocaust became the main component of its identity. 
Relations with other ethnic communities were dictated 
by their attitude toward the Sho’ah. Of essential 
importance in the attitude of the Jewish community 
toward Latvia was a declaration approved by the Soviet 
Latvian Supreme Council on September 19, 1990, «On 
Denouncing and Banning Genocide and Anti-Semitism in 
Latvia.» The 1990s were a period during which relations 
between the history of Latvians and Jews were first 
developed. There were attempts to deal with discussions 
and myths about the tangled past  – the position and 
role of Jews during the start of the Soviet occupation in 
1940 and 1941, the level of anti-Semitism among Latvians, 
as well as the Holocaust, which was the focus on many 
important historical studies and scholarly conferences. 
Public debate and denunciation of those who were still 
anti-Semitic were also of importance (Dribins, 2002, 111, 
120-128; 2002a, 148-159).
Denouncing the Holocaust and expressing 
compassion for its victims helped Latvia to join the 
European identity. The relevant memories are also 
maintained by the «Jews in Latvia» museum, which 
was opened in 1989. There is an exhibition about the 
Holocaust at the Latvian Occupation Museum, and new 
monuments have been established  – one at Biķernieki 
commemorating the victims of World War II, including 
Jews, Soviet prisoners of war and civilians (2001), a 
memorial to the victims of Nazism at Rumbula (2002), a 
monument in the dunes of Šķēde (2005), a monument 
to Žanis Lipke in Riga (2007), and many other places 
of commemoration throughout Latvia (Melers). There 
was also a project aimed at enshrining the memory of 
Jews who perished during World War II, «Jews in Latvia: 
1941-1945. Names and Destinies» (see http://names.lu.lv). 
Also of importance in ensuring that local communities 
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remembered the Holocaust was the «Heart to Heart» 
project which was implemented in 2006 by the Latvian 
Jewish community in partnership with the EU and the 
Latvian Public Integration Fund. The purpose was to 
encourage schoolchildren to learn about the history of 
Jews in their region and about the Holocaust, helping 
children to understand that it was a tragedy not just for 
Jews, but for all of Latvia (Dribins, 2007, 231). Holocaust 
researcher Meijers Melers was right when in writing 
about Holocaust memorials he argued that «all of 
the locations must not only be put in order, but also 
visited. Stories must be told about the people who were 
murdered, about their lives, about how they raised their 
children, about how they got along with the neighbours, 
and about why they were murdered. Children must 
understand that they were killed just because they were 
Jews. If students plant flowers at a monument, then they 
will never vandalise the relevant location» (Melers, 264).
Recovered memories during the post-Soviet era 
in part relate to the history of rescuing Jews. This was 
a process which was rich with nobleness, daring and 
heroism. There are some 500 incidents in which the 
lives of Jews were saved about which we know, but 
we do not know the names of all of those who helped 
(Vestermanis, 247). The heroism of Žanis Lipke and his 
family has increasingly become a matter of national pride. 
Confirmation of this is seen in the memorial that was 
established in memory of the family at Ķīpsala in Rīga, 
as well as a movement set up to support the monument 
(http://www.lipke.lv).
Integration of the Holocaust and the history of 
Latvian Jews into Latvia’s social memory and identity has 
become more intense during recent years. Of particular 
importance here is the publication of the memoirs of 
two Jewish intellectuals from Latvia – Valentīna Freimane 
(2010) and Eduards Anderss (2011). Written in Latvian, 
these memoirs offer an evaluation of the relationship 
between Latvians and Jews, as well as of the Holocaust. 
These books received much attention and were highly 
praised in Latvia’s cultural world.
The social memory and identity of 
Russian speakers
After Latvia restored its statehood, people who had 
arrived in the republic during the Soviet years found 
themselves facing a serious identity crisis. Their legal, 
political and social status changed very rapidly (Apine, 
2008, 45). The fact is that all of the sources of identity and 
national pride which functioned during the Soviet era 
were gone. Sociologist Lev Gudkov argued at one time 
that the unmasking of the history of the Soviet regime in 
the early 1990s led most Russians to admit that the Soviet 
state, which had been seen as being extremely noble in 
the past, and the history of that state actually brought 
along poverty, suffering and mass terror. The positive 
and self-praising interpretation of the past was reversed, 
and mass thought started to suffer from low self-esteem, 
collective disorientation, and even masochism and 
wounded feelings (Gudkov, 2004, 147). Ethnologist Ilga 
Apine, in turn, has written that during the Soviet era, 
the consciousness of Russians was melded together 
with Soviet ideology: «The pressure which Soviet people 
faced in relation to Communist ideology was massive. 
Eventually it became more refined and linked to 
mythology, and that made it more effective. For instance, 
there have been various myths about Russian history and 
the great heroism of the Russian people which benefitted 
Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga at the unveiling of a monument to the victims 
and prisoners of the «Riga-Kaiserwald» concentration camp on June 29, 2005
«Although 60 years have passed since the destruction of Nazism, people still vividly remember the terrible 
crimes that were committed during its existence. The greatest suffering in the hands of the Nazi regime was 
that of the Jewish people, who were subject to complete destruction  – the Holocaust. In occupied Latvia, too, 
the Nazis and their henchmen committed terrible crimes by destroying local Jews and Jews brought from other 
countries. The mass graves of Jewish victims at Rumbula, Biķernieki, Šķēde and many other locations offer vivid 
evidence about this. [..]
As we unveil this monument today, we should all not just remember the victims who perished, but also 
understand what happens when people reject humanism, equality and morality. We must all understand how 
and why this evil, this utter lack of humanity emerged. In understanding this, we must do everything that we can 
to make sure that such crimes are never again possible in Latvia or anywhere else in the world. Only by working 
together will we be able to protect humanity from the possibility of new evil.
I think that since the restoration of Latvia’s independence, there has been a serious evaluation of our recent 
and tragic past. School curricula and history textbooks include issues about the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied 
Latvia. Laws have been passed to ensure that anyone who took part in crimes against humanity is brought to 
justice. As a democratic country, Latvia must not hush up or hide the dark pages of its history. The Holocaust 
which occurred during the Nazi regime was a major tragedy for the Jewish people and for all of Latvia.»
Source: Vīķe-Freiberga, V. 2007. V.V.-F. 4plus4∞. Runas, 1999-2007. Rīga: Pētergailis, pp. 437-438.
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other nations. This flattered Russians and took deep root 
in their thinking, thus casting a shadow over the truth 
about the evil which the empire caused for other nations» 
(Apine, 2008, 46-47). During the Soviet period, Russians 
in Latvia became the dominant ethnos and served as 
an instrument for the Russification of cities. The Russian 
language was used in the infrastructure of government, 
the economy, services, education and the media, as well 
as in the commemorative culture and mythology of the 
Soviet Union. The Russian environment was self-sufficient 
and ensured psychological comfort. Latvia’s culture and 
history remained alien to Russians in the country even 
after the collapse of the USSR, and they shaped their 
identity on the basis of the Soviet and Russian system of 
values (Apine, 2007, 48-56).
Because of this alienation from the cultural environ-
ment of Latvians (including in the sense of history), the 
main instrument related to the social memory of Latvia’s 
Russians in the 1990s was still Soviet history, which falsified 
Latvia’s past, encoded distrust against the Baltic peoples as 
nationalists and «fascists,» and allowed people to ignore 
the offences that were committed by the Soviet regime. 
Of essential importance here are historical narratives 
from Russia which are dominated by the reconstruction 
of the tsarist empire in the past and by an exposition of 
Stalinist repressions (Sherlock, 158-161; Zelče, 2001, 36-43). 
This interpretation of history facilitated nostalgia among 
Latvia’s Russians for the lost empire (both in the tsarist 
and the Soviet format), also allowing them to see Russians 
as the greatest victims of Stalinist repressions. This has 
led to the reconstruction of memorials to the tsarist 
empire, a series of publications dedicated to «Russian 
Riga,» the work of clubs focused on military history, and 
reminders that Russians fell victim to Soviet repressions 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and not just (as the Baltic people 
did) in the 1940s and 1950s. These, then, were reasons for 
people to distance themselves from the Latvian culture 
of commemorating deportations, also allowing people to 
reject any sense of responsibility for the crimes which were 
committed by the Soviet Union and for the blame of Russia 
in relation to the existence of Stalinism as such.
The identity crisis of Russians was deepened during 
the 1990s because of weak links between their social 
memories and Latvia and its past, as well as due to a lack 
of their own history. Only 8-9% of Russians in the Baltic 
States came from families which lived there between the 
wars, 1.5-2% represented the humanitarian intelligentsia 
which had closer links to Baltic culture, but at least 80% 
of those who arrived during the Soviet period were blue 
collar workers and military personnel at various ranks. 
These were not people who were likely to integrate into 
the local societies (Simoyan, 111-117; Apine, 2007, 49-50). 
This meant that the memories of the Russian community 
differed from those of the Latvian community in that 
Russian memories had weak links to the values of the 
interwar period. Simoyan has argued that the solidarity 
of the community has been based on the loss of its 
motherland and the fact that members of the community 
now found themselves living in a foreign country 
(Simoyan, 149-150).
The differences between Latvian and Russian values 
in terms of the past were exacerbated by state policies, 
laws and integration failures which related to ethno-
nationalism. In February 2011, Russia’s parliament 
approved a programme on the patriotic rearing of the 
citizens of the Russian Federation, and the mass media 
were actively used to bring that programme to life. 
The historical policies of the government of Vladimir 
Putin essentially meant a reassessment of the Soviet 
period, complete with relativisation of Soviet terror, 
rehabilitation of Stalin and other Soviet statesmen, 
and the restoration of a positive image for the KGB 
and its agents (Koposov, 147-152). The Russian regime 
cultivated a positive evaluation of the Soviet period, 
particularly in terms of praising the Russian victory in 
World War II and of assigning secondary importance 
to Stalinist repressions (see Zelče, 2011, 42-46). This 
was compensation for the official historical story of 
Latvia and the psychological discomfort caused among 
Russian speakers by the publicly dominant culture of 
commemoration. Most Russian speakers, therefore, 
accepted the Russian inter pretation of history. Leo 
Dribins, who studies ethnic processes, has argued that 
the thinking of Russian speakers in Latvia is influenced 
by the rebirth of nationalism in Russia, as well as by the 
historical concept that is centred on pride about the 
role of Russia and Russians in the history of humankind, 
as well as about the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great 
War of the Fatherland. The myth about Russia liberating 
Europe from fascism and the intensive cultivation of that 
myth has made it possible for people to ignore the fact 
of the Soviet occupation of Latvia, as well as the harm 
that was done to Latvians by that occupation (Dribins, 
2007, 45).
This position initiated an even greater distance 
from the social memory of the Latvian community, also 
facilitating national pride in the rapid development 
of Russia during the 20th century  – something which 
became the foundation of identity. In 1995, a survey was 
conducted to learn the views of people about national 
pride in Latvia’s history, with the scale being from 1 
(«very proud») to 0 («not proud at all»). The average for 
Russians was 0.59. In 2003, the average was only 0.40 
(Tabuns, 2007, 109). Another question was this: «Which 
elements of Latvia’s 20th century history make you most 
proud?» 23.8% of Russian respondents said that they 
were not proud of any aspect of that history, and another 
20.8% could not answer the question at all. The greatest 
amount of pride related to «the Latvian SSR as part of the 
USSR» (19.9%), and the battle waged by Latvian Red Army 
soldiers against the Nazis (19.4%) (see Rozenvalds and 
Ijabs, 187). When the same question was posed one year 
later, 35.2% of Russian speakers had no answer.
According to Apine, the main elements in Russian 
identity are ethnic origins and the Russian language 
(Apine, 2008, 50), but the fact is that social memory is 
also of importance here. During the first decade of the 
21st century, there were major celebrations each year in 
Riga and in other cities to commemorate Victory Day 
on May 9. This promoted ethnic consolidation among 
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Latvia’s Russians while, at the same time, ensuring that 
the Soviet/Russian victory in the war became the main 
cornerstone of social memory. When, at the end of 2010, 
respondents were once again asked1 to name the best 
event in 20th-century Latvian history, 30.5% of Russian 
speakers plumped for the Soviet victory in World War  II. 
1 The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical Memory 
LU SZF, 2010.»
Other events from Latvia’s past did not compete with 
the victory insofar as these respondents were concerned 
(see Chart 1.32). The event on May 9 each year includes 
speechifying, petition drives and resolutions which 
speak to the issues of the Russian speaking community 
which are on the agenda and/or have been a problem 
for a longer period of time. A day that is full of Russia’s 
historical accomplishments allows celebrants to create or 
transfer historical solidarity to their current views about 
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Latvia as a country which discriminates against them or 
unfairly breaks down the Soviet Union’s commemorative 
traditions and heritage (see Ločmele, et al., 123-127). 
Creating pride in the historical achievements of Russia/the 
USSR, particularly in terms of the victory in the war, was 
one of the most effective ways of addressing the identity 
crisis of Russian speakers, and this also facilitated the 
consolidation, solidarity and activities of that community.
Sociologist Boris Dubin, in writing about the 
commemorative policies of Russia during the first decade 
of the 21st century, has argued that heroification of World 
War  II, monumentalisation of its collective image, and 
amnesia about the vast damage that was caused by 
the war have all indicated that a «monument» has been 
chosen in place of actual memory. This means that Russia 
has not yet overcome the traumatic nature of World War 
II, and it has not understood the causes, driving forces, 
developments and consequences of the war. Thus World 
War II has not been transformed into historical experience 
which would never again allow society to go down the 
same path which led it to war in the past. Russia’s people, 
including the regime and the Russian elite, are not 
immune against totalitarianism, autocracy, xenophobia, 
social passiveness and isolationism, jealousy and 
infantilism. All of these are phenomena which are always 
at the foundation of undemocratic regimes (Dubin, 63-64).
Gudkov, for his part, argues that victory in the war is 
the only positive element in the national self-confidence 
of post-Soviet Russians. The increase in the symbolic 
meaning of that victory, however, essentially legitimates 
the totalitarian Soviet regime, complete with repressions, 
famine, poverty, and countless people who perished 
during the war. The symbolic praise of the victory has 
all but completely eliminated any elements in Russia’s 
historical awareness with respect to: 1) The aggressive 
nature, militarism and expansionism of the Soviet 
regime; 2) the regime’s partnership with Nazi Germany in 
launching the war and destroying Poland; 3) the human, 
social, economic and metaphysical cost of the war; 4) the 
responsibility of the regime for causing and continuing 
the war; and 5) the consequences of the war in other 
countries. At the same time, the praise has increased the 
authority of Stalin, and it has expanded the belief that 
the Soviet Union would have won the war all by itself 
and without any allies. The status of the victory as the 
main symbol of history prohibits any moral, intellectual, 
political or other rationalisation of the negative aspects 
of the war. There can be no analysis of cause and effect, 
and the status also makes it possible to uphold the 
concept of the «single» truth which can be used to 
divide people up between «compatriots» and «others.» 
Gudkov argues that this means that a moral evaluation 
of the totalitarian Soviet regime has fallen into «collective 
unconsciousness» (Gudkov, 2011, 529-539).
The conclusions of Dubin and Gudkov about the 
historical consciousness of the masses of Russians are 
also in line with the dominant ideas which exist among 
members of the Russian speaking community in Latvia, 
once again including the aforementioned risks related 
to the values of morals, tolerance and democracy. 
This attitude toward Russia’s role in the war makes it 
impossible to have empathy for the sufferings of other 
peoples and nations, as well as for their right to have 
truth and justice in relation to the past. Russia’s policies 
vis-à-vis history cultivate a situation in which the harm 
that was inflicted by the war upon Russia’s own people 
and others, the responsibility of the Soviet regime for 
unleashing the war, the aggressive foreign policy of the 
USSR and the repressions that occurred in the Soviet 
Union are all excused in the name of the victory itself. 
This creates an eternal gap between Russian speakers and 
Latvians when it comes to evaluating the experience of 
the past and maintaining social memories.
Failing to remember/Keeping quiet
The monumentalisation of the Soviet victory 
and the resulting public aggressiveness of the social 
memory of Russian speakers have also had an effect 
on the collective memory and historical consciousness 
of Latvians and on the ability of Latvians to heal their 
festering cultural traumas (see Kaprāns and Zelče). The 
basic problem is that there are issues which have not 
been discussed in public or individually or have been 
kept under wraps. These include those Latvians who 
collaborated with the totalitarian Soviet regime and its 
repressive structures, as well as the complete collapse 
of universal moral norms during the Soviet and the Nazi 
occupation. Judt has studied the relationship which 
Eastern European countries have with their past in terms 
of the collapse of the Communist system, and he argues 
that people in those countries have experienced a sense 
of shame about the fact that they had to live under that 
regime, engage in everyday lies, and accept endless 
petty compromises. The format of living/surviving 
meant that sooner or later, nearly everyone engaged 
in greater or lesser collaboration with the regime (Judt, 
2002, 173). During the first decade of the post-Soviet 
period, this experience was transformed into a collective 
secret about which it was best to keep silent, lest there 
be a sense of loss, dissatisfaction and regret about the 
incorrectly or uselessly spent lives of Soviet people and 
about the contribution which people made toward the 
maintenance and reproduction of the Soviet system 
with their work, their votes in Soviet elections, their 
involvement in the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the 
Pioneers, etc., and their participation in various everyday 
forms of life in the Soviet Union.
In the public arena of Latvia and other Eastern 
European countries, history after 1939 «was exclusively 
the work of others, then the whole era became a sort 
of parenthesis in the national story» (Judt, 2005, 825). 
This attitude toward the past can be compared to the 
Vichy syndrome which Western Europe suffered for 
several decades after World War II and up until Western 
Europeans could take on responsibility for their own 
history. Soviet Latvia did not exist without the presence 
of Latvians and their greater or lesser involvement in 
shaping it. An evaluation of what Latvians did is the key 
for moral purification in terms of clearly stating what was 
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bad and what was good. This helps to bring greater order 
to the contemporary moral system as well.
One of the reactions toward a failure to remember 
history is nostalgia for the Soviet period or, more 
precisely, for the economic stability and social security 
which existed, particularly after the Brezhnev years, 
when the terrors of Stalinism were fading from memory. 
Central European countries have been cured of post-
Socialism nostalgia, but the syndrome is at its apex in 
Russia. Sociological surveys conducted in Russia over 
the past decade show that 55-75% of Russians regret the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Levada Centre, 11.04.2011). 
At the very end of 2010, 60% of respondents in another 
survey said that perestroika was a bad thing for Russia, 
and 44% said that the Brezhnev years were a period of 
«welfare for the country» (others said that stagnation 
began when those years were over) (Levada Centre, 
26.01.2011). A study conducted in Latvia in November 
2008 found that 9.2% of residents were proud of Soviet 
Latvia (1.1% of Latvians, 19.9% of Russians and 19.6% of 
others) (Rozenvalds and Ijabs, 187). Another survey1 was 
conducted at the end of 2010, when the effects of the 
global economic crisis were most evident, and this time 
54.5% of the people of Latvia said that the Soviet era 
(1945-1990) was good, 29.4% said that it was bad, and 
16.1% had no view on the matter. There are differences 
among the various ethnic groups when it comes to 
answers given to such questions. 42.2% of Latvians, 71.2% 
of Russians and 68.0% of members of other nationalities 
believe now that the Soviet period was a good one. 43.4% 
of Latvians, 10.4% of Russians and 15% of others feel that 
it was a bad thing. That once again shows the splits which 
exist in social memory.
Nostalgia in Eastern Europe, and particularly the 
«Ostalgie» that is seen in Eastern Germany (Cooke; Pence 
and Betts; Bedrahl) indicate that the unclear nature of the 
past and the economic problems of the present day lead 
people to replace a denunciation of totalitarianism with 
delight about everyday life, fashion and design, and the 
standard of living which existed during the Soviet era. 
This is a selective approach to history which encourages 
people to yearn for the recent past and allows them to 
push aside unresolved aspects of collaborationism and 
moral problems. Indications to show that nostalgia for 
Soviet Latvia is becoming stronger in Latvia include 
the return of March 8 (Women’s Day) to the Latvian 
calendar of celebrations, as well as extensive interest in 
an exhibition which was staged by the Latvian National 
History Museum in 2011  – «Soviet Everyday Design.» 
People have increasingly been remembering the Soviet 
years as ones during which agriculture and fishing in 
the country flourished, and so on. There has also been 
a reanimation of Soviet brands. A most vivid example of 
this is the Dinamo hockey team, which was established in 
2008 and competes in the Russian Hockey League. Soviet 
nostalgia can also be seen in the format of the annual 
«New Wave» vocalist competition and in the related 
1 The survey «National Identity. NI Dimensions. Historical 
Memory LU SZF, 2010.»
appearances of Russian show business stars and tourists 
in the town of Jūrmala, which they can once again see as 
a «western Soviet spa town.»
One problem in terms of failing to talk about the Soviet 
period relates to the science of history in Latvia. Post-
Soviet historians have absorbed a vast amount of fact-
based materials, but they have not always had sufficient 
professional skills or civic positions in interpreting the 
data. The crimes of the Soviet and Nazi regimes have been 
well documented, but the same cannot be said of the 
history of Latvian collaborationism and liability. The only 
exception here is the history of the Holocaust, which has 
been studied and described in great depth. In other areas, 
however, Latvian historians have avoided frightening 
truths about Latvian collaborationism with the Soviet 
regime, and in ideological terms, they have chosen to write 
about history as a set of hidden and targeted resistance 
against the regime (Rizhakova, 437).
People have two roles when it comes to their 
participation in history. They shape history and talk 
about it. There is always a difference between that which 
happened and that which is said about it later. Like other 
areas of academia, the science of history has traditionally 
been based on the tradition of positivism, seeking that 
which is impossible  – the creation of absolutely true 
knowledge. History always and inevitably emerges in the 
social context of the relevant period of time and in the 
context of relations with the existing regime. This means 
that a positivist approach to this at best tells the story of 
regimes or of those who were victories (Trouillot, 1-30). 
History presented by Latvian historians is mostly written 
from the perspective of Latvia as a victor in terms of the 
collapse of the USSR, which means complete or partial 
silence about those aspects of the past which do not 
fit in with this idea. The achievements of professional 
historians insofar as intellectual resources are concerned 
ensure the shaping of public history, and this actively 
takes part in the enrichment of collective memory. 
Explanations of history are a component of identity.
Culture and social memory
A fundamental challenge for nation states is creating 
national identity and loyalty. This is a long-lasting and 
endless process which demands effort and undergoes 
many phases of development. «Identity politics» 
(Wertsch, 69) are created or restored from time to time, 
particularly during periods of instability and a lack of 
clarity. The national identity of European countries 
emerged from a process of national mobilisation. The 
national identity of Australia and the United States, by 
comparison, is essentially the result of innovations and 
diffusion of culture. Culture formulates national identity 
and brings it to life (Spillman, 19-20). Latvia is similar to 
Australia and the United States in that many residents 
are immigrants, and so there are large and diverse 
communities of social memory. The role of government 
institutions and culture in terms of creating identity-
related values also differs. In the 1990s, cultural activists 
were calling on the government to formulate «those 
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things which keep the people together» (Ziedonis, 468). 
The idea was that this was necessary for the successful 
growth and spirituality of the country. In reality, however, 
Latvia, like all of post-Communist Europe, underwent the 
unattractive transition from «repressive egalitarianism to 
unconstrained greed» (Judt, 2010, 146). The «quality of 
self-confidence» was lost, and a «price» replaced identity 
values (Ziedonis, 491, 505).
It cannot be said that culture over the past 20 years 
has not participated in creating the values about the 
past which are seminal for identity. It has, but only in 
fragmentary ways. It is also true that the expansion of 
communications at the end of the last century has had 
a fundamental effect on these processes. Until the last 
decades of the 20th century, most people in the world 
had limited access to information, and this meant that 
in every country, nation and/or community, people had 
similar knowledge about one and the same things. This 
was due to national education systems, state-controlled 
radio and television, and the culture of publications, 
and it was a matter of social unification. The situation 
today is quite the opposite – there is a lack of a common 
culture, and in its place there is a vast diversity in values, 
tastes and interests. Many things which seemed to be 
close and permanent for decades and even centuries 
are now quickly being forgotten (Judt, 2008, 5). For 
that reason, the media have an increasingly essential 
role to play. The media have become a very influential 
communicator about the past, forming the basic ideas 
about common history and helping to ensure that 
specific representations of the past take root in collective 
memory. The media, in the broadest sense of the word, 
attach value to episodes of history or, on the contrary, 
eliminate the point of those episodes. The electronic 
media have become the most important «storehouse» 
for historical knowledge in Latvia, as in other countries. 
Various TV and radio broadcasts tell stories about the 
past every day, also offering arguments to the audience 
which can be used to defend specific ideas about Latvia’s 
history during the 20th century. Television broadcasts are 
basically the main source of information in all age groups. 
Latvian television stations such as LTV, LNT and TV3 have 
been more or less successful with broadcasts that are 
dedicated to history. LTV1 has presented documentaries 
about outstanding cultural figures such as the actors 
Lilita Bērziņa, Voldemārs Zandbergs and Vija Artmane, 
the opera singer Jānis Zābers, the writers Vizma Belševica, 
Ārija Elksne and Vilis Lācis, and others. The same 
television station features the programme «Along the 
Length of the Street,» and it has offered detailed analysis 
of the history of Riga. TV3 has presented the broadcasts 
«20th Century: Post Scriptum» (2001), «Latvia: The Ulmanis 
Era» (2002), and «Returning to Europe: Latvia 1988-2008» 
(2008). Latvian television broadcasts about history are like 
bright flashes of light, but they are quickly extinguished 
by the wealth of visual stories about the past that are 
offered by Western and Russian television channels.
It is an axiomatic belief in Latvia that there are two 
separate information spaces in the country. This echoes in 
media attitudes toward 20th century history. The Latvian 
media are dominated by the official interpretation of 
history: Proclamation of the Republic of Latvia, three 
occupations during the 1940s, and the restoration of 
independence in 1991. The Russian language media 
in Latvia largely reproduce or localise the discourse of 
history which dominates in Russia (Skudra, 2011 and 2006; 
Zelče, 2011). The media of the two linguistic communities 
also tend to confront differing explanations of history, 
demonstrating intolerance for opposing views (Dribins, 
2007a, 50-52; Skudra, 2005). Thus the media establish 
and strengthen obstacles against the democratisation of 
historical interpretations which are difficult to overcome. 
The most vivid illustration of these symbolic conflicts are 
the dates of March 16 and May 9 in Riga each year. In the 
context of these dates, the Russian language and Latvian 
language media actualise and defend a negative or a 
positive representation of the Soviet era (Zajančkauska, 
2011; Ločmele, et al., 2011; Ločmele, 2010; Procevska, 
2010). Both dates have become inalienable aspects of 
commemorative culture, and it is significant that they 
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have attracted increased media attention specifically 
during the past decade – the period during which Russia 
has activated its policies of memory.
Confronting versions about Latvian history are 
exacerbated by a situation in which there is a lack of 
cognitive and ethical clarity. Many people find it hard to 
assess the past and its individuals in an adequate way. 
This is most powerfully true when it comes to the Ulmanis 
era and World War II. In a broader sense, however, there 
is also amnesia about the historical period which existed 
before the 20th century (the age of ancient Latvians, the 
Swedish era, etc.). The more distant the period in history, 
the vaguer are people’s ideas about it. These blank pages 
can also be seen in media content – television broadcasts 
and documentaries dedicated to history, as well as 
popular and academic historical literature since 1991 
have mostly dealt with the 20th century, and particularly 
the events of the 1940s (loss of independence, Stalinist 
deportations, World War II) and the period of the 
Latvian National Awakening. The result of this is that the 
mediated history of the 20th century inevitably has the 
greatest impression on the nation’s self-image.
The dominance of the 20th century in public thinking 
is strengthened by biographic messages which are 
preferred by many residents of Latvia as a source of 
historical information. Biographic communications 
were of importance in the democratisation of history 
which occurred during the National Renaissance. There 
was a torrent of life stories from people who had been 
repressed by the Soviet Union. Since the restoration 
of Latvia’s independence, the genre of memoirs has 
developed in waves, but during the past decade there 
has been a constant increase in the number of (auto)
biographies. In most cases these are written by Latvians. 
Memoirs published by Russian speakers in Latvia are 
a fairly marginal phenomenon, and that is not a good 
thing because the (auto)biographies from the Russian 
speaking community essentially do not take part in the 
shaping of social memory. At the same time, though, 
biographic communications do not necessarily have to be 
a mediated process. Direct experience is also recognised 
by the people of Latvia as an equally important source 
of knowledge. A study conducted in the autumn of 2010 
shows that 30% of respondents received most of their 
information about 20th century history from stories that 
are told by older people. These can be family stories, or 
they can involve the memories of broader communities 
(residents of the relevant apartment building or 
neighbourhood). Life stories as sources of information 
are most commonly cited by people in small towns and 
rural areas, where personal contacts are much more 
important. Local newspapers, too, have actively engaged 
in biographic communications since 1999, publishing 
biographic messages from representatives of the local 
community (Kaprāns, 2009).
Another part of the infrastructure of social memory 
which helps people at various levels of society to develop 
ideas about 20th century Latvian history is the cinema and 
the theatre, as these are no less influential in mediating 
history. Unlike journalists or authors of autobiographies, 
cinematic and theatrical directors have a chance to use 
their imagination to a much greater degree in dealing 
with past characters and events which impassion modern 
society. When the past is emancipated, collective identity 
is also set free, and history eventually increases, as 
opposed to oppresses the capabilities of individuals.
Only a few feature films that have been produced in 
Latvia since the restoration of the country’s independence 
have dealt with history, but they have attracted much 
attention, and that confirms the need for this kind of 
source of information. The most popular feature films 
from the past decade in terms of the interaction between 
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Cinema historian and theorist Valentīna Freimane about herself and the relationship 
between Latvians and the pat in late 2010 or early 2011
«I feel fine in Berlin. Nothing is swept under the rug there, everything has been discussed, and the Germans 
have taken responsibility for the past. That is something which, for some reason, we have not been able to achieve 
in Latvia in looking back at two totalitarian regimes and their supporters. People have asked me about how the 
Germans could humiliate themselves by admitting to the fact that they were fools and criminals. The truth is that 
it is not humiliation, it is a matter of dignity.»
When I am in Latvia, I am tormented by the fact that people fool themselves in terms of political views and 
relations in society, and then they are surprised about the fact that the results are other than that which they had 
expected. People cannot analyse their past in a businesslike and composed way, even though, at the end of the 
day, that represents liberation. Here I can point to the rebirth of old-fashioned nationalism or the peculiar desire 
of Latvians to debase themselves by playing the role of a group of sorrowful orphans. Ours is a small, but very 
capable nation – one which has survived many difficulties and has proven its ability to do so on more than one 
occasion, but at the same time, it is simply unable to look at itself clearly. No matter what, but I am not thinking 
about the proposal to become a citizen of Germany. I was born a citizen of Latvia, and I will remain a citizen of 
Latvia until the end of my life.»
Source: Grūbe, G. 2011. «Bet es neesmu folklora» (But I am not Folklore), Ir, No. 2, pp. 36-37.
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popular culture and history have been «Summer of Terror» 
(2000, dir. Aigars Grauba), «Guards of Riga» (2007, Aigars 
Grauba), «Rūdolfs’ Heritage» (2010, Jānis Streičs), and 
«Threesome Dance» (2011, Arvīds Krievs). Much viewer 
response was received by the LTV serial «Clearers of 
Destiny» (dir. Virdžīnija Lejiņa). The serial dealt with the 
events of 20th century Latvian history.
Theatres in Latvia have also been involved in 
mediating history. The best examples are the musical 
«Kaupēns, My Dear» at the Liepāja Theatre (1999, dir. 
Valdis Lūriņš), the Latvian National Theatre musicals 
«Sphinx» (2001, Edmunds Freibergs) and «Leader» 
(2010, Edmunds Freibergs), the Latvian National Theatre 
drama «[Vilis] Lācis» (2009, Edmunds Freibergs), the 
New Riga theatre performances «Marta of Blue Hill» 
(2009, Alvis Hermanis) and «Grandfather» (2009, Alvis 
Hermanis), and the Valmiera Drama Theatre performance 
«Whirlpools» (2008, Varis Brasla). The creators of these 
and other cultural products often resort to populist 
interpretations of history, but it is a positive thing that 
there have been efforts in recent years to avoid any 
black-and-white judgments about history. All in all, the 
role of popular culture in mediating Latvian history 
has been fairly inexpressive, and the potential of this 
resource in strengthening national identity has not been 
used in a sufficiently systematic way. At the same time, 
however, popular culture is closest to the everyday lives 
of individuals, and this has everything to do with identity 
and the establishment or loss of meanings which create it 
(Edensor, 17-23).
Conclusion
Identity is rooted in a set of moral values which 
regulate values and behaviours. This is based on 
definitions of good and bad, attractive and ugly, moral 
and amoral, etc. These norms are never absolute or 
eternal, they are adjusted and even changed. And yet 
moral rules are of decisive importance in collective 
existence. An absence of such rules represents anomalies, 
fragmentation and destruction (Schöpflin, 53). The 
confusion about values which exists to a greater or 
lesser extent in among Latvians weakens their identity, 
thus becoming an obstacle against the successful 
development of the Latvian nation.
Latvia needs a history that is of political and 
moral use  – one in which the achievements and 
sufferings of the past have not been forgotten. All 
human communities use the past as an instrument to 
structure and interpret the present. It is also true that 
ideas about the modern world are shaped by concrete 
processes of a technical, institutional or material 
nature, but also by the symbolic sphere. Individuals 
require collective meanings if they are to understand 
the world in which they live. Otherwise they feel lost 
and isolated. Collective meanings make communities 
and belonging to communities possible. The past in 
this sense is a confirmation of the security of living and 
surviving. Collective meanings are most often based on 
conclusions about things which once made us richer, 
stronger and better, as a result of which it is right to do 
those things again (Schöpflin, 89-91).
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There are many moral values and denial of same 
in Latvia’s past, and that makes it possible to establish 
collective meanings which are important for one’s 
identity  – ones which can ensure that people are more 
convinced of themselves, more capable and more 
focused on the future. One way to shape social memories 
which strengthen identity is to engage in a rational 
audit of history while honouring moral values, creating 
understanding and forgiveness, and not being afraid of 
the shadows of totalitarianism.
Main conclusions. Main missions
Main conclusions
Social memory in Latvia has, over the past two decades, been based on the tragic events of the 20th century 
and the consequences of those events, which have caused deep cultural trauma and reduced the value of the 
national identity of individuals and ethnic groups.
Main missions
Social memory is not something that goes without saying. It must constantly be developed so as to 
consolidate society. Latvia must implement memory-related policies at the national level so as to narrow the gap 
between ethnic groups and to expand people’s understanding of the historic nature of national identity while 
also encouraging them to identify themselves with their European heritage.
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Identity is based on a sense of belonging. Here we 
can ask the question of Hamlet: To be or not to be? To 
belong or not to belong? This dimension of identity is 
clearly related to migration  – the relationship which 
those who have departed have with their motherland, 
their behaviour in their new country of residence, 
and the relationship between those who have arrived 
in the country with their new place of residence. In 
understanding identity, it is important that the border 
between «us» and «them» is established both by those 
who have lived in the country for a long time and by 
those who have newly arrived in it (Kroders; Stråth).
Latvia has experienced intensive population move-
ments over the past several centuries. Many people have 
emigrated and immigrated, there have been masses of 
refugees, Soviet-era deportees have returned home, 
and there have been emigrants who do not want to do 
the same. Migration has had a serious effect on Latvia’s 
economic and social development, as well as its social 
identity. Understanding the flows of migration and 
correlating experiences from the past are of importance 
in learning about and planning the development of the 
nation.
This chapter is devoted to migration in Latvia since 
the beginning of modernisation in the 19th century and 
up to the restoration of Latvia’s independence in 1991. 
The author has sought to describe the most important 
population flows, as well as the Latvian diasporas which 
exist outside of Latvia.
Global migration
Global migration was a socio-economic phenomenon 
which appeared in the world in the 19th century. There are 
four major migration systems in this process – the Atlantic 
migration system, the African-Atlantic migration system 
of slaves and indentured servants, the migration system 
of Asian contractual workers, and the diverse continental 
migration system which covered Eurasia from Western 
Europe to the distant regions of Russian Siberia (Harzig 
and Hoerder, 35-41). The cause for global migration was 
an unprecedented demographic revolution in Europe, 
along with modernisation and changes in the social and 
cultural space of the continent. Historian Norman Davies 
has stated: «Industrialization brought wave after wave of 
migration: first on a local or seasonal basis from village 
to factory; next on a regional basis from the countryside 
to the towns; and, [..] on an international and an 
intercontinental basis to all the industrial cities of Europe 
and the USA» (Davies, 787-788). At the beginning of the 
19th century, emigration from Europe could be compared 
to a small stream, but by the end of the century it was a 
torrent. Between 1801 and 1820, there were 0.08 émigrés 
per 1,000 Europeans, but by 1906 that number had 
increased to 4.02. Only the beginning of World War I 
interrupted the rapidly expanding process of emigration 
from Europe. Most of those who departed moved to 
the United States. On the eve of the war, the destination 
of 56% of émigrés was the United States, while others 
travelled to the Asian part of Russia (15%), Argentina 
(11%), Canada (6%), Australia (4%), Brazil (4%) and New 
Zealand (1%). The greatest number of émigrés during 
the 19th century came from the United Kingdom and 
Germany, while during the early part of the 20th century, 
there was a substantially larger number of émigrés from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. The result of 
emigration meant not only that millions of «unnecessary» 
people left the Old World, but also that some of them 
came back home eventually (some 5% in the early 19th 
century and 39% at the beginning of the 20th century). 
This ensured the dissemination of values and worldviews 
from the New World in Europe (Hamerow, 59-88).
The involvement of Latvia’s residents 
in global migration
Delayed migration
Migration in the Baltic States and Latvia is the least 
understood phenomenon among all demographic 
processes in the 19th century. Movement of residents was 
first seen at the beginning of the century. Traditionally, 
farmhands moved from one place to another on St. 
George’s Day. Formerly indentured servants sought 
earning opportunities in cities, craftsmen sought work, 
urban residents moved elsewhere, and students moved 
to cities where there were universities. And yet migration 
to a distant location with the purpose of settling there 
permanently was not a part of everyday lives. This was 
first and foremost because most people in Latvia in 
the early 19th century were indentured servants with 
limited legal rights to move from one place to another. 
After the end of indentured servitude in Kurzeme (1817), 
Vidzeme (1819) and Latgale (1861), the government of 
the Russian Empire and the local aristocratic nobility set 
many limitations on movement. For that reason, very few 
people moved outside the Baltic and Vitebsk provinces 
(Plakans, 2000, 59-60).
An exception to the rule was seen in the 1840s, when 
farmers from Vidzeme tried to move to «warmer climes» – 
the southern provinces of Russia. In part this was because 
2.1. Major Flows of Migration 
Early 19th Century to 1991
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farmers had experienced several crop failures and wanted 
to get rid of that process, but also because moving away 
was a social protest in response to increasing amounts 
of forced labour on the estates of the nobility. The 
emigration movement turned into unrest among farmers 
such as the so-called potato riot of Jaunbebri, which was 
put down by the Russian army (Mieriņa, 78-79). There 
was another wave of migration in 1853 and 1845 when 
transformation of the system of forced labour led to 
poverty and a lack of work among servants. Even though 
their departure was legal under the auspices of a law on 
farmers that was adopted in 1849, the regime put up all 
kinds of obstacles against those who wanted to leave. 
During the mid-1850s, farmers departed from Latgale, 
and in 1859 and 1860, many farmers in Vidzeme started 
to prepare for departure to the Samara and Saratov 
provinces. The nobility and the regime tried to convince 
people to stay, and they used legal and economic 
resources to keep them from departing. There were only 
five Latvian colonies in Russia in 1850s (Strods, 1996, 
25-28). The attitude of the government toward people 
moving from place to place only changed during the 
latter half of the 19th century.
Migration as a necessity and a resource  
for a better life
Rapid modernisation during the latter half of the 
19th century encouraged people in the Baltic provinces 
to move to other locations therein or beyond their 
borders. This was most directly influenced by rising 
population numbers, the development of industry, urban 
construction and transportation, as well as laws which 
allowed farmers to buy out their land and to move from 
place to place freely. Increasing numbers of people left 
their birthplaces. Riga became a regional metropolis 
and a «sponge» for people, and it continued to fulfil that 
function during the next century (see Box 2.1). In 1867, 
two-thirds of the city’s residents had been born there, 
less than one-quarter had arrived from other parts of 
the Baltic provinces, and some 8% came from other 
provinces in Russia. By 1913, the percentage of native 
born residents of Riga was down to one-third, with 
another third coming from the Baltic provinces and an 
equal percentage coming from other Russian provinces. 
Riga became a distinctly multi-ethnic city of immigrants. 
Ethnic communities kept apart in terms of their social 
and cultural life, as well as their everyday lives. This was 
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facilitated by the fact that national ideology was all the 
rage at that time, and there were national movements 
which strengthened the sense of identity among ethnic 
groups (Oberlenders, 28-30).
There were four major linguistic groups in Latvia 
in the latter half of the 19th century. In the 1860s, there 
were Germans (42.9%), Russians (25.1%), Latvians (23.6%) 
and Jews (5.1%). By 1913, the situation was different  – 
Latvians (39.6%), Russians (21.2%), Germans (16.7%), and 
Jews (4.5%). There were also two new linguistic groups – 
Lithuanians (5.5%) and Poles (5.5%). The Baltic provinces 
were attractive to migrants in the late 19th and early 20th 
century for economic reasons. Immigrants came not just 
from the Russian Empire, but also from Central Europe, 
particularly Germany (Plakans, 2000, 62-63). Only 7.3% of 
the residents of Latvia were urban residents in the early 
19th century, but on the eve of World War I and mostly 
because of migration, 40.3% of all residents lived in cities 
(Skujenieks, 211).1
More rapid emigration of people from the Baltic 
provinces began during the latter half of the 19th century. 
This was primarily based on the agrarian policies of the 
Baltic nobility. Few Latvian farmers had an opportunity 
to own land and just to ensure economic independence 
and wealth. Social tensions were maintained by short-
term agreements between aristocrats (as landowners) 
and farmers (renters of land). Leasing fees for land 
were increased several times, and that did not allow 
farmers to modernise their operations because of a lack 
of money. Farmers who emigrated from Kurzeme and 
Vidzeme were also thinking about the end to indentured 
servitude in Russia, as the result of which farmers 
(including the ones in Latgale) received ownership rights 
to small plots of land (Mieriņa, 90-125; Skujenieks, 371). 
During the 19th century, the cornerstone for a farmer’s 
identity was «my own land.» If a farmer could not buy 
land in the motherland, then land, together with welfare 
and a true purpose of life, were sought out beyond its 
borders.
The first major flow of émigré farmers occurred 
in 1863, when farmers first received the passports 
which they needed to travel elsewhere. Of provocative 
importance here were ads in the Pēterburgas Avīzes 
newspaper, which was edited by the early Latvian activist 
Krišjānis Valdemārs, to say that land was being sold in 
the Novgorod Province. Some 3,000 farmers took to 
the roads, and approximately one-half of them settled 
in or around Novgorod or elsewhere in Russia (Strods, 
1996, 27; Zelče, 1999, 79-81). During the 1860s, Latvian 
farmers mostly moved to nearby provinces  – the Pskov, 
Vitebsk, Kaunas, Novgorod and St. Petersburg provinces. 
During the next decade, farmers were travelling 
further to purchase land  – to the Ufa, Orenburg and 
Simbirsk provinces. Emigration to Siberia began in the 
1880s because the Russian government was seeking 
1 For comparison’s sake, we can note that in advance of World 
War I, the percentage of urban residents was 78% in England, 
56.1% in Germany, 41.2% in France, 38.2% in Denmark, 24.7% 
in Poland, 21.1% in Sweden, 14.4% in the Russian Empire, and 
15.5% in Finland (Skujenieks, 211-212).
to colonise the region. Land was given to immigrants 
for life, there were subsidies to set up farms, there was 
tax relief, easier rules on military services, as well as 
establishment of schools in the newly settled areas. Also 
of importance was the installation of a railroad network 
in Russia, because that allowed people to reach the more 
peripheral areas of the empire in a comparatively rapid 
and comfortable way. Toward the end of the century, 
many Latvians travelled to the Tobolsk and Yeniseisk 
provinces. Lettigalian migration to Siberia and other areas 
of Russia began around 1895. According to Fr. Kazimirs 
Skrinda, there were more than 20,000 Lettigalians in 
Siberia on the eve of World War I. A national census 
conducted in 1897 in the Russian Empire showed that 
some 112,300 Latvians were living outside of their own 
territory – 7.8% of all Latvians in the empire. The greatest 
numbers of Latvians were found in the Kaunas Province 
(35,188), Pskov Province (11,127), Vitebsk Province (not 
counting Latgale; 10,270), the St Petersburg Province 
(10,251), and the Mogilev Province (7,027). More than 
1,000 Latvians were registered in the Novgorod Province, 
the Estonian part of the Vidzeme Province, the Ufa 
Province, the Smolensk Province and the Minsk Province. 
There were 71 colonies of Latvia farmers in the Russian 
Empire (Skujenieks, 371-373; Veigners 2009a, 114-15). 
Emigration continued during the early part of the 20th 
century. It is presumed that in advance of World War I, 
between 215,000 and 225,000 Latvians, or approximately 
15% of all Latvians lived outside of their own territory 
(Veigners, 2009a, 115).
Farmers represented the majority of émigrés, but 
educated Latvians, blue collar workers, sailors and 
specialists in various jobs who could not find a job at 
home or thought that there were better opportunities for 
a professional career elsewhere in the empire followed 
suit. Many émigrés found jobs at Russian schools, 
medical institutions, pharmacies, shops, restaurants and 
cafeterias, as servants in people’s homes, etc. (Bērziņš, 
2000, 125-126; Veigners, 2009a, 542-547).
During the third quarter of the 19th century, most 
Latvian university students were at the University 
of Tartu, but by the end of the century, increasing 
numbers were seeking opportunities at universities in 
St Petersburg and Moscow (the distinguished linguist 
Kārlis Mīlenbahs was among them). Many young men 
took the opportunity of getting a free education at 
Russia’s military training institutions. Many of those who 
completed their education in Russia never returned to 
Latvia. In 1908, there were 93 people in St Petersburg 
and 43 in Moscow who had been educated in Russia 
and were working in those cities (Bērziņš, 2000, 211-213). 
Several of these émigrés put together very commendable 
professional careers for themselves. Krišjānis Valdemārs 
was a civil servant at the Maritime Affairs Ministry and 
Education Ministry of the Russian Empire, and he was 
also secretary of the Russian Imperial Trade Shipping 
Association. He made a major contribution toward the 
development of the country’s trading fleet and the 
education of maritime specialists. Kārlis Hūns became 
a professor at the St Petersburg Academy of Art. Several 
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Latvians became instructors or professors at Russian 
universities in the early 20th century – medic Mārtiņš Zīle 
at the University of Odessa, sinologist Pēteris Šmits at 
the Institute of the Far East in Vladivostok, medic Pēteris 
Sniķeris at the St Petersburg Academy of War Medicine, 
the medics Roberts Krimbergs, Jānis Dzirne and Augusts 
Pētersons at the University of Moscow, theologian 
Kazimirs Skrinda at the St Petersburg Theological 
Seminary, medic Jānis Ruberts at the University of Kyiv, 
Jāzeps Vītols at the St Petersburg Conservatory of Music, 
linguist Jānis Endzelīns at the University of Kharkov, and 
Francis Balodis at the Moscow Institute of Archaeology. 
Among those who developed an academic career at the 
University of Tartu were Jēkabs Osis, Jēkabs Lautenbahs, 
Ernests Felsbergs and others. Eižens Zemmers, Ludvigs 
Kundziņš and Ernests Paukuls did the same at the Tartu 
Veterinary Institute. Jēkabs Plūme, Aleksandrs Kambergs 
and Benedikts Zazerskis attained the rank of major-
general in the Russian Empire’s Army. Among those to do 
very well in sports were the wrestler Klemenss Buls, the 
weightlifter Jānis Krauze, and the boxer and weightlifter 
Jānis Grāve. Graphic artist Rihards Zariņš served as 
technical director for the Russian State Paper Printing 
House in St Petersburg, pharmacist Kārlis Krēsliņš was 
president of the St Petersburg Association of Pharmacists, 
and Jānis Doreds was a cameraman for the Russian 
government.
There were also émigrés who headed West from 
Latvia, though their numbers were fewer. It is thought 
that some 35,000 Latvians lived in the West at the turn 
of the 19th century, with that number increasing to 
around 45,000 on the eve of World War I (Veigners, 2009, 
56). Most émigrés settled in the United States. The first 
Latvians arrived there in the 1880s, and they did heavy 
work as railroad builders, coal miners, brick makers, port 
employees, forestry workers, sawmill employees and 
workers in industries and in the construction industry. 
They worked together with other émigrés  – mostly 
Italians, Poles, Irishmen and Lithuanians. Eventually 
some Latvians opened stores, bakeries, gardening 
operations and workshops. Others opened their own 
construction companies, while still others became 
directors at factories and other new buildings. Some 
Latvians bought land and became farmers, and a very 
small number joined the field of innovations that was in 
such great demand at that time, offering new solutions 
for construction and machinery building (Akmentiņš, 
243-264). The next generations of immigrants in America, 
in turn, proved able to integrate into that country’s 
society quite easily.
Quite a few Latvians ended up in Brazil after 
economist Kārlis Balodis encouraged them to do so. 
Most of the émigrés were Baptists who were persecuted 
for religious reasons back home. Most became farmers. 
There were some 3,000 Latvians in Brazil in advance of 
World War I (Veigners, 2009b, 100-101).
Mass emigration among Jews began in the Russian 
Empire during the 1880s because of the government’s 
official anti-Semitism. This began after the assassination 
of Tsar Alexander II by a member of the so-called 
Narodnaya Volya («People’s Will») movement in 1881. 
The response was increased anti-Semitism and rioting 
against Jews in the Russian Empire. Many Jews from 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland moved to the Baltic 
provinces. The number of Jews in Latvia increased 
rapidly to nearly 190,000 in advance of World War I. Many 
emigrated on to the United States, Palestine and other 
countries. This was not just because of the increasing 
Osvalds Akmentiņš, a documenter of the history of American Latvians, on the first 
generation of Latvian immigrants – the so-called «Old Latvians»
«The Old Latvians have their own homes and automobiles, which the average standard of living in America 
allows. They are neither rich nor poor. They have bank accounts for their old age, or else they have life insurance 
policies. Latvians obviously do not want to burden anyone else, so they have no debt, and they rarely ask for social 
aid from local governments. It is often the case that when someone dies, there are no heirs, and then the bank 
deposits are taken over by the government. Those who have held on to communities of church congregations or 
associations have not been particularly successful, while those who have wandered off to distant places where 
they can work on their own have been lucky and have done better. The economic knowledge which servants in 
pre-World War I Latvia had, did not allow them to achieve anything here. None of them spoke English, and none 
had much money – the first stable pillars in America’s economy. And yet America has gained a great deal thanks 
to the Latvian immigrants. Latvians are good, careful and responsible craftspeople and workers. A Latvian from 
the countryside has had a fairly stormy life, but if he works very hard in the choking machineries of big cities, 
then he can save up one cent after another, break out of the fortress, and buy a home further away from the city, 
where there are still green areas with trees and grass. He becomes lonely there, he thinks about his tragic life. He 
is not yet a true American, and he is no longer a true Latvian; he is somewhere between the two statuses. Over 
the long years, he has forgotten about Latvian culture, history and the efforts of his nation. Americanism seems 
equally pointless to him.»
Source:  Akmentiņš, O. 1958. Amerikas latvieši. 1888–1948. Fakti un apceres. [Lincoln]: Vaidava, p. 262.
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anti-Semitism and number of pogroms in the Russian 
Empire, but also because of economic factors (Stranga, 
326-329). Among those who emigrated were the family 
of the distinguished painter Mark Rothko, who was born 
in Daugavpils, as well as the family of the Jelgava-born 
financier and art collector Joseph Hirshhorn, after whom 
a contemporary art museum in Washington, D.C., is 
named. Riga-born Herman Jadlowker became a global 
opera star, performing in Germany, the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, the United States, and elsewhere.
The «Motherland» in new countries of residence 
When Latvians emigrated to other countries, they set 
up their own organisations and cultural environment. The 
first Latvian centre in the United States was in Boston, 
where, under the leadership of Jēkabs Zībergs, Latvians 
established the Latvian Aid Association in 1889. Two years 
later, they established a Lutheran congregation with 
the Rev. Ansis Rebānis as its pastor. Zībergs published 
the newspaper Amerikas Vēstnesis (American Herald) 
and a series of Latvian calendars. Other organisations 
and congregations were established in future years. 
Organisations worked to support new immigrants, 
organised various holiday events, had choirs and 
theatrical troupes, and established libraries. Eventually 
some of the organisations bought their own buildings 
(Akmentiņš, 29-46).
Émigré Jews also established organisations which 
were based on the motherland. The association «Bne 
Rezitza-Režicas» («Children of Rēzekne») was established 
in New York in 1893. By 1905, former residents of Rēzekne 
had established four organisations in New York, one of 
them together with immigrants from Ludza. They offered 
mutual assistance, organised religious life, and buried the 
dead (Stranga, 329).
Many Latvian organisations were established in 
Russia, where there were larger numbers of Latvian 
immigrants. The St Petersburg Latvian Reading 
Association was established in that city in 1863. Later, all 
major Latvian centres had organisations and Lutheran or 
Catholic Church congregations. Organisations opened 
libraries which received the latest Latvian literature 
and press. Choirs were established, as were schools in 
the larger colonies of Latvians. There were 14 schools 
in 1897 and 52 in 1914 (Veigners, 2009a, 188; Bērziņš, 
125-126). Immigrants in Russia also maintained regular 
contacts with their motherland. Latvian newspapers and 
magazines wrote quite a lot about emigration, offered 
advice, and published information about the activities 
of Latvian colonies and organisations. Some of these 
publications were critical of émigrés, but all in all the 
tone was one of understanding. There was an acceptance 
of economic emigration as a way of achieving welfare, 
professional achievements and a better life.
Political emigration and forced displacement
There was also emigration from Latvia in the latter 
half of the 19th century which was based on political 
factors. Leaders of the Latvian national movement chose 
St Petersburg and Moscow as their place of residence in 
the 1860s, because they saw no opportunities in Latvia 
to establish a successful career or to pursue their political 
aims. At the end of the century, when activists from 
the Social Democratic «New Current» movement were 
arrested, several activists fled to the West  – the United 
States, Great Britain and Switzerland. Latvians in Boston 
established the Latvian Social Democratic Association, 
compatriots in London set up the Western European 
Latvian Social Democratic Association, and Latvians 
in Switzerland organised their own Latvian Social 
Democratic Association (Dūma and Paeglīte, 21-68).
The first major torrent of political refugees began 
after the 1905 Revolution. Some 5,000 people emigrated 
to escape repression (Bērziņš, 2000, 399). Many spent 
time in the West, where they learned a lot about 
democratic values. Among the émigrés were future 
Latvian President Kārlis Ulmanis, the writers Rainis, 
Aspazija and Kārlis Skalbe, and future politicians Miķelis 
Valters and Fēlikss Cielēns. Amnesty was proclaimed 
in 1913, and some of the political refugees plucked up 
enough courage to go back home. At the same time, 
however, trials were held in several Western countries 
to deal with participants in the revolution who had 
been arrested there. Ferdinands Grīniņš and Jēkabs 
Kovaļevskis were tried in Brussels, while Jānis Purens 
and Krišjānis Rudevics faced a court in New York. These 
cases attracted a great deal of attention. Western Social 
Democratic organizations, members of society and 
cultural activists defended the arrestees and achieved 
their liberation. In advance of World War I, there 
were many political organisations in the West, and 
many published their own newsletters (Stradiņš, 426; 
Akmentiņš, 133-242).
Among the émigrés were Social Democratic and 
anarchistic warriors who on several occasions engaged 
in audacious attacks against banks and post offices to 
get money for their revolution. Some of them continued 
to engage in robbery after emigrating. Much attention in 
Great Britain and Australia was attracted by a participant 
in the 1905 Revolution who was called Jānis Žākle, but 
went under the pseudonym of Peter the Painter. He 
and his comrades engaged in several robberies during 
which police officers were killed. These men became the 
object of a massive manhunt, and they were a symbol of 
criminals who could not be found. This led the prolific 
Belgian detective story author Georges Simenon to title 
the first novel which featured Commissioner Maigret 
«The Strange Case of Peter the Lett» in 1931 (Bankovskis; 
Clarke).
There were also those who were forced to leave their 
motherland because the authorities of the Russian Empire 
deported them, mostly to Siberia. The leaders of the 
potato riot of Jaunbebri were deported in 1841, and 2,652 
people were deported on an administrative basis after 
the events of 1905 (Bērziņš, 2000, 399). Many deportees 
and political refugees returned to Latvia after amnesty 
was proclaimed and/or the Russian Empire collapse, but a 
significant number did not.
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***
During the late 19th and early 20th century, people 
from Latvia were part of the process of global migration. 
Many moved to a new location permanently or for a 
specific period of time. For material reasons, people 
moved from the countryside to larger or smaller cities or 
from one city to another in pursuit of a job and a better 
and different life. Many thousands moved abroad in 
search of a better life. Approximately 17% were part of 
the global Atlantic Ocean migration system, while some 
83% were part of the continental migration system. 
There were radical differences, however, between the 
emigration of Latvians and Estonians and the emigration 
of Lithuanians. The absolute majority of Lithuanians who 
left their country chose to move to the United States. 
Some 300,000 Lithuanians arrived in America between 
the 1860s and 1914 (Plakans 2011, 253-254).
The goal of most émigrés from Latvia was to buy 
land. The sense of belonging to land which one owned 
was in many cases stronger than a sense of motherland. 
Many of the people who moved elsewhere successfully 
merged their sense of belonging to the new country of 
residence with a long-distance sense of belonging to 
Latvia. This bridge was built by the activities of national 
communities (organisations, choirs, theatrical troupes, 
schools, newspapers, etc.) and the ability of people to 
become involved in Latvian culture, primarily by reading 
literature and the press.
At the same time, however, the number of people 
who immigrated into Latvia prior to World War II was 
higher than the number who departed. Between 1863 
and 1913, the Latvian population increased by 1,287,000 
people  – 983,000 (76%) were born, while 304,000 (24%) 
immigrated (Mežgailis and Zvidriņš, 34). Latvia (or, more 
precisely, Riga) was a land of immigration prior to the 
war. Presumably, the immigrants did not establish a 
strong sense of belonging to Latvia. Where such a sense 
did emerge, it was interrupted by the mobilisation, 
evacuations, deportations and flows of refugees which 
related to the war.
The era of refugees and forced 
displacement
The history of European migration between 1914 and 
the latter half of the 1940s is seen as a period of refugees 
and forced displacement of individuals. Historical 
literature describes this phase as a period of madness 
and catastrophes in Europe  – wars, totalitarian regimes 
sowing death all around, and damage and degradation 
in unprecedented volumes (Davies, 910-914; Hobsbawm, 
24). There were three types of migration during the first 
half of the 20th century. The first was dictated by the 
dominant ideology of nationalism in Europe, as well as 
by the values of nation states. People who were not part 
of the titular nation were seen as unnecessary and not 
comprise a part of the nation itself, and this led many 
people to emigrate, primarily to the United States and 
Latin America. The second type related to totalitarian 
regimes which replaced the voluntary migration of 
workers in the 1920s with forced displacement. The third 
type was dictated by wars and violence which created 
streams of refugees who left their homes to save their 
lives (Harzig and Hoerder, 44).
All three types of migration have been seen in the 
history of migration in Latvia, and very vividly, as well. 
This was due first and foremost to the two world wars, the 
successful establishment of Latvia as a nation state during 
the interwar period, and the policies of destruction 
and forced displacement of residents which were 
implemented by the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany 
and the Communist USSR.
The first era of refugees
An unprecedented amount of migration in Latvia 
occurred during World War I. The imperial government of 
Russia, in preparing for an attack by Germany, deported 
lots of people to the more distant regions of the empire – 
Germans who supported Germany, as well as people 
who were seen as undesirable along the front lines  – 
prostitutes, for instance (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 64; Zelče, 
2004, 34). In April 1915, the imperial government ordered 
that Jews from Kurzeme be deported to provinces on the 
right back of the Dnieper River in Russia. This involved the 
deportation of more than 30,000 Jews, albeit not in the 
towns of Liepāja and Kuldīga, which were already in the 
hands of the Germans. Those who were deported were 
treated with hostility at the locations where they were 
settled, because they were suspected of working with 
the enemy. This meant that many people could not lead 
normal lives in their new places of residence (Stranga, 
2008, 370-374).
When the war began, there were forced refugees, 
voluntary refugees, and people of various ethnic groups 
in Latvia who became refugees because of confusion 
and incomprehension. This was particularly true among 
ethnic Latvians. The commanders of the Russian Army 
tried to ravage the Kurzeme countryside and to empty it 
of civilians as the enemy approached. An evacuation was 
ordered, and there were various attempts to convince 
or force the people of Kurzeme into leaving the region 
during the summer of 1915. The mass displacement of 
people, mostly farmers, was rather complicated because 
people brought along their carts, livestock and other 
everyday objects. Vidzeme was not prepared to absorb 
such a large number of people. There were shortages of 
food and homes, and diseases were rife. Contemporaries 
of the events of 1915 described the period as being one of 
«dark horrors» and of the destruction of Kurzeme. People 
were pawns in the game of major politics. In the Latvian 
cultural discourse, refugees were seen as tragic and 
suffering victims who were helpless in the face of major 
events and destiny which they were forced to experience 
(see Zelče, Sprugaine, 17-19).
Industrial companies in Riga were evacuated in 1915, 
and many workers moved to Russia because of this. As 
the front line approached Riga and Vidzeme, people 
from those regions hit the road, as well. There have been 
various and sometimes contradictory reports about the 
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number of refugees. In the spring of 1917, for instance, 
170,543 refugees were registered in Vidzeme (Bērziņš, 
2000, 555-561). Another report said that 349,988 people 
left their homes in Kurzeme and Vidzeme. Statistician 
Marģers Skujenieks has calculated that 850,000 people 
became refugees or were evacuated from Latvia (this 
number includes those who were mobilised into the 
armed forces). Other calculations suggest that more than 
one million people, or 40% of the pre-war population, 
left Latvia during the war (Šalda, 2007, 80-83). Refugees 
settled in Petrograd, Moscow, Archangelsk, Rzhev, Orla, 
Yaroslavl, Penza, Yekaterinoslav, Kazan, Voronezh, Rostov 
on the Don, Saratov, Velyikiye Luki, Nizhny Novgorod, Kyiv, 
Kharkov and other cities. Others found homes in Siberia 
and the Far East. Many organisations which took care of 
the refugees reduced their sense of departure from their 
motherland, also offering social support to the refugees.
Refugees from Kurzeme gradually began to return 
to their homes after the German military took over all 
of Vidzeme, but mass return to Latvia happened only 
after Latvia and Russia concluded a peace treaty. The 
repatriation was not a smooth process, because the 
government institutions of Soviet Russia tried to hinder 
it. There were also problems because of chaos in the 
railroad system, corruption, and the arbitrary decisions of 
repressive organs (Šalda, 278-353).
Nearly 300,000 people returned to Latvia between 
1918 and 1928. The historian Vitālijs Šalda writes as 
follows: «Sadly, only a minority of people who had fled 
Latvia returned home. Even fewer remained in Soviet 
Russia. Approximately one-half of the Latvian refugees 
can be listed among the victims of World War I and the 
Russian civil war» (Šalda, 364). Latvia lost nearly 1,000,000 
people during the war, or 37% of the pre-war population 
(Bērziņš, 2003, 291, 296).
Migration and the Latvian state 
The Latvian state which was established in 1918 was 
tolerant toward immigrants. Many thousands of people 
joined wartime refugees in moving to Latvia from Soviet 
Russia  – people who had never lived in Latvia before. In 
1922, for instance, more than 15,000 so-called Mensheviks 
or «white Russians» who were fleeing the Soviet regime 
found refuge in the new country. Many Russian Jews did 
the same (Stranga, 431-432).
Agrarian reforms which were implemented in Latvia 
between 1920 and 1937 resolved the main social and 
economic problem which existed at that time and was 
also a cause for emigration. Many thousands of people 
could buy their own land. 54,436 new farms were 
established, and only 18% of Latvia’s residents in the 
latter half of the 1930s did not own land (as opposed to 
61.2% in 1920) (Bleiere, 175). The small farms which were 
established as a result of the agrarian reforms became 
the economic and social backbone of Latvia. This created 
a foundation for the welfare of a large segment of the 
population, and it also satisfied the social and emotional 
yearnings of people who for decades had wanted to 
own their own land. Ownership created a sense of 
belonging and trust in relation to the Latvian state. Very 
few Latvians emigrated to other countries for economic 
reasons. Between 1920 and 1939, 4,700 Latvians moved 
to the United States, while another 2,300 moved to Brazil 
during the 1920s. In advance of World War II, there were 
some 50,000 Latvians in the West, and most of them were 
assimilated into the societies of the relevant countries. 
Some 15,000 to 20,000 people were actively involved in 
Latvian communities abroad (Veigners, 2009, 56, 100).
Most of the people who left Latvia did not feel a 
sense of belonging in the country and hoped that they 
could quickly improve their standard of living in the 
The author Andrejs Upīts about the refugees of Kurzeme
«Through Bauska and Jelgava, across the Venta River from the side of Tukums, all of the large and small roads 
toward the Daugava are full of refugees. One cart, two carts, three carts – they ride down the rutted countryside 
roads. In the carts are old men, wives who have just given birth and have wrapped the baby in scarves, perhaps 
a little boy who is holding the reins of a cart for the first time in his life. Adults deal with the livestock. There are 
animals following every cart. Cows are used to the pasture, they walk slowly while eating grass. Sometimes they 
are fussy and trample into fields of rye. Smaller animals can hardly be controlled. Sheep stubbornly want to go 
to their usual grazing areas. Lambs wander around amidst the cows and bleat in nervous little voices. Fattened 
pigs make angry noises and are constantly trying to go back home. The whip does not scare them much. Younger 
sows run into rye fields and trample the summer grain. Those who seek to control them are hot and tired. Men 
yell angrily, women run and weep, and they have no time to wipe the tears from their sweaty faces. Whips can be 
heard. Children whinge. Dogs run after animals which are trying to flee, they are everywhere and do not know 
what is happening. Horses trample the rye to the point where sometimes you can only see their ears. Fillies neigh 
in desperation and without any pause.
These carts are like balls of yarn which roll along the hundreds of local roads and pathways to get to the 
highway which leads to the Daugava. The line of riders, walkers and animals large and small is an endless torrent 
on the highway, and it is so very, very long.»
Source: Upīts, A. 1950. Pērkona pievārtē. In: Upīts, A. Kopoti raksti. Rīga: Latvijas Valsts izdevniecība. P. 15.
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West. Those who were disloyal or hostile to the Latvian 
state mostly moved to Soviet Russia (and later the USSR). 
During the first years of the country’s independence, 
some 10,100 people moved to Soviet Russia or were 
expelled for engaging in anti-state activities (Bērziņš, 
2003, 297; Kabuzan, 133). Many Jews left Latvia, as was the 
case in other European countries, as well. Riga became 
a transit point for Jews from Russia who were on their 
way to the United States, Canada, and other countries 
(Stranga, 453). 4,500 Jews departed from Latvia to 
Palestine by 1939, and they established a Latvian Jewish 
community there (Dribins, 219).
Once the torrent of returning refugees ended during 
the interwar period, few people immigrated into Latvia, 
mostly because there were few jobs in cities. Most of the 
flow of workers related to seasonal work done on farms. 
The first farm workers arrived from Lithuania in 1925, 
joined by several thousand people from Estonia and a 
few hundred individuals from other countries. During 
the 1930s, the number of foreign farm workers (most of 
them from Lithuania and Poland) ranged from 12,000 
to 40,000 people (Bērziņš, 297). In the 1930s, after the 
Nazis took power in Germany and occupied Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, several hundred Jewish refugees found 
shelter in Latvia (Stranga, 2001). In the autumn of 1939, 
when World War II had already begun, 1,500 soldiers from 
the Polish army and 300 to 400 civilian refugees arrived in 
the country (Jēkabsons, 171).
External migration during the interwar period did not 
have much of an effect on Latvia’s demographic situation 
and economy. There was internal migration within Latvia, 
but it was not an intensive process. Latvia’s cities had lost 
large numbers of people during World War I, but in during 
the 1920s and 1930s, the population of cities swelled 
again as rural people came to work for government 
institutions, the service industry and manufacturing, but 
this was a process which only developed in a gradual way. 
The population of Riga in particular increased, doubling 
to 385,000 people between 1920 and 1935 (Bērziņš, 2003, 
293-294). Economic development, increased welfare 
and social stability in Latvia did not encourage many 
people to leave, and, indeed, employers started to look 
for additional workers from other European countries. 
Of great importance, too, was the idea that people 
were helping to build the nation state, and that meant 
that most of those who emigrated felt that they were 
unnecessary in the country.
The Latvian community in the Soviet Union
There was a large Latvian community in the Soviet 
Union in the 1920s and 1930s  – 151,400 people in all, 
according to a census in 1926. 35,100 Latvians were in 
Siberia, 18,300 were the Leningrad Province, 14,000 
resided in Belarus, 12,900 were in Leningrad, 10,600 
were in the Pskov Province, 8,100 lived in the Novgorod 
Province, 7,600 resided in the Smolensk Province, and 
7,000 Latvians were in Bashkiria. Most Latvians lived in 
the countryside and were engaged in agriculture. There 
were 372 Latvian colonies with a total of 12,000 farms in 
the Soviet Union, and Latvians made up 0.1% of the Soviet 
population. During the aforementioned census, 78.3% of 
Latvians and 81.4% of Lettigalians cited Latvian as their 
native language (Bērziņš, 2003, 325).
Kolkhozes were established at the Latvian colonies 
in the late 1920s, and this was a process which involved 
deportations, death sentences and removal of voting 
rights. In 1935, there were more than 150 so-called 
Writer Vilis Lācis on returning to Latvia (1935-1937) after being a refugee in the Altai Province
«It was 11:00 AM when they crossed the border and saw the first Latvian soldier. The train proceeded slowly. 
Red Army soldiers who were part of the convoy jumped off the train at the border, and this eliminated the last 
threat from the alien and fierce land. They travelled to this place and no further! All that was harsh and terrible 
immediately disappeared into the past like a terrible nightmare, and people no longer had to tremble about their 
own lives. Mountains of concern fell off of the tired shoulders of people who felt secure about their existence and 
knew that they had crossed the desert and finally reached a green oasis at which they would once again enjoy all 
human rights and a new future.
It was a grand and ceremonial moment, it represented awakening to a new day after the terrible darkness 
of nightmares. The contrast between the past and the present was too severe to allow people to experience it 
calmly. This contrast existed everywhere  – in the hearts of refugees, in the environment and in everyone. On 
the other side of the border there were dirty villages, a cold and wintry dusk and a tattered Red Army soldier 
in shoddy boots. On this side of the border stood a Latvian soldier in a nice uniform. Homes were clean, the 
world was bright, and people could breathe freely. They knew that no one would harm them, and they could 
gaze into the eyes of the world with a sense of security. Even so, they bowed their heads because of the curse of 
arbitrariness and destruction. Those who came home knew what they had gained, and they were thankful when 
viewing the country that had called them home and greeted them like a relative who was prepared to hug them. 
Your land rejoices every time that one of its children comes back home.»
Source: Lācis, V. 2001. Vecā jūrnieku ligzda. Rīga: Jaunā Daugava. P. 706-707.
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Latvian national kolkhozes in the Soviet Union (Riekstiņš, 
2009, 9-11).
Many diaspora organisations preserved the ethnic 
and cultural lives of Latvians in the Soviet Union. An 
educational organisation, «Prometheus,» was established 
in Moscow in 1923, and it had a printing plant, publishing 
house and bookstores in Moscow and Leningrad. A 
Latvian theatrical troupe called «Stage» was active 
in Moscow, and there were also theatrical troupes in 
Smolensk and Leningrad. Novosibirsk was home to a 
travelling theatrical troupe of Lettigalians. There were 
many Latvian organisations, clubs, libraries, reading 
rooms, choirs and schools in the Soviet Union. Among 
the most important educational institutions were the 
Latvian Pedagogical Technical School (1921-1937), the 
Lettigalian Pedagogical Technical School (1930-1937), the 
Latvian Division of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute 
(1927-1937), and the Faculty of Latvian Workers (1920-
1937). Many periodicals were published, among which the 
most influential ones were the newspapers Russian Battle 
(1918-1930), Communard Battle (1931-1937), and Siberian 
Battle (1918-1937), as well as the magazine Building (1929-
1937). People published calendars and books  – classics 
from Latvian literature, as well as works by Soviet and 
pro-Soviet authors (Veigners, 2009, 205-232). Latvian 
communities were not just national collectives, but also 
a web established by various organisations with many 
informal links that were rooted in language, the cultural 
environment, memories of the motherland, and contacts 
with relatives back in Latvia (Šalda, 2010, 15).
The Latvian ethnic community was devastated by 
mass repressions during the latter half of the 1930s. Many 
high-ranking representatives of the Soviet government, 
the nomenclature of the Communist Party and the 
Soviet military were killed in 1936 and 1937. On July 2, 
1937, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
(Bolshevik) Party approved a decision on «anti-Soviet 
elements,» which included attacks against so-called 
national operations. The «Latvian operation» began in 
the autumn of 1937, and most of those who were hauled 
into court were accused of «spying and diversions.» 
Latvian organisations and cultural and educational 
institutions were all shut down. Nationality became 
a security threat, and many people hid their identity, 
Russified their names, migrated and abandoned Latvian 
colonies (Riekstiņš, 2009, 40-63; Šalda, 2010, 414-491; 
Denningzhayz, 606-609).
A 1939 census in the Soviet Union counted up 127,000 
Latvians (24,000 fewer than in 1926). It is thought that the 
results of the census were falsified so as to hid the true 
scope of repressions, famine an victims of collectivisation 
(Blyum, 113-130), and the number of Latvians listed in 
the census is probably imprecise, as well (Veigners, 564). 
Mass Stalinist repressions against minority nationalities 
destroyed the Latvian community in the USSR and led to 
the assimilation of those who remained alive.
Latvian communities in Western countries and 
neighbouring countries
During the 1920s, some 30,000 Latvians lived in 
Lithuania, and 12,300 lived in Estonia, where there were 
Latvian organisations, schools, libraries and choirs. Some 
3,000 Latvian citizens, most of them Jews, were registered 
in Germany. Several hundred people from Latvia 
settled in Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Great Britain and other European 
countries, but in very few of those nations were there 
Latvian organisations. People maintained their cultural 
environment and links to the motherland mostly with the 
involvement of Latvian diplomatic institutions (Bērziņš, 
2003, 328-230).
During the 1930s, the largest number of Latvian-
born émigrés, 38,000 people in all, was found in the 
United States. Major communities of Latvians existed in 
New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. 
The memories of journalist Hugo Rukšāns and lawyer Arvīds Auns-Urālietis about their 
motherland and the Latvian colony in Bashkiria
«To be honest, we were quite wealthy as long as there were no disasters [..], but the land provided you with a 
living if you were not lazy or a drunk. It was said that if you planted a shaft in the ground in the spring, a carriage 
would grow by the autumn, and if the growing season was particularly good, a horse would appear, as well. [..] 
We were far away from most Latvians, but we maintained our work and everyday morals very carefully. We did 
the same with the culture that we brought from our motherland, though there were those for whom it was not 
too deep or broad. [..]
The people’s teachers. In Latvian colonies in Russia, these words created the same bright thoughts as was the 
case during the Latvian National Awakening. Far away from their motherland, Latvians especially thought about 
educating their minds, at least that was true where we were. That’s why Latvians did not build saloons, instead 
erecting schools – larger or smaller ones, but they were there. There were one or more teachers, and they were 
always welcome at people’s homes. The people’s teacher knew how to conduct a choir and play the violin, piano 
or organ with foot pedals.»
Source: Rukšāns, H., Auns-Urālietis, A. 1996. Vēstules no bērnības zemes. 2nd ed. Riga, pp. 170 and 174-175.
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Latvians worked for the construction industry, at 
various workshops, as well as in fishing and agriculture. 
A few were entrepreneurs or retailers. Latvians set up 
organisations and published newspapers, magazines 
and books. Former political refuges set up active left-
wing organisations (Bērziņš, 2003, 330; Veigners, 2009, 
63-64). 7,000 Latvians lived in Brazil during the 1920s 
and 1930s. Some 2,000 arrived in that country in 1921 
and 1922 at the suggestion of Baptist preachers. A large 
Latvian colony was established in Sao Paolo. Most of 
the immigrants bred cattle, engaged in agriculture or 
were craftspeople. Several thousand Latvians lived in 
Argentina, Canada and Manchuria, several hundred made 
homes for themselves in Australia, and just a few lived in 
Cuba, Mexico, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa 
(Bērziņš, 2003, 331-332).
Migration from Latvia to the West was negligible 
during the interwar period, and the main reason for 
migration among those who did leave the country was 
economic considerations.
The era of displaced persons and 
refugees
Once the Communist USSR and Nazi Germany set up 
their partnership in 1939, an era of displaced persons and 
refugees began in Latvia, and this created a radical drop 
in population numbers along with physical and moral 
degradation and a loss of human dignity.
The departure of Baltic Germans
On September 28, 1939, Nazi German Foreign Minister 
Joachim von Ribbentrop visited Moscow to sign a special 
protocol between Germany and the USSR on emigration. 
The text said that the Soviet Union would not put up any 
obstacles against the emigration of German citizens or 
persons of German origin who lived in the Soviet Union’s 
sphere of interests if they wished to move to Germany 
(Bleiere, 2008, 1934). This was the foreign policy basis for 
the emigration of Germans from Latvia. The fact is that 
two countries – the USSR and Germany – took a decision 
about the inhabitants of a third country  – Latvia  – thus 
violating its sovereignty (Loeber, 31). On October 6, Adolf 
Hitler appeared before the Reichstag and called on Baltic 
Germans to return to the Reich or, more precisely, the 
area around the Warthe River. This was the first public 
statement about the emigration issue, and it launched 
the relevant process. Germany and Latvia concluded an 
agreement on October 30 about the transfer of German 
residents of Latvia to Germany (Feldmanis, 1994, 37). 
There was a vast propaganda campaign waged by Baltic 
German organisations and the press to ensure that Baltic 
Germans understood the idea of repatriation and of 
Germany as their true fatherland (see Ziemele).
The emigration began in mid-October 1939, when 
ships were sent from Germany to bring people back to 
that country. The first ship carrying Germans who were 
citizens of Latvia sailed from Riga on November 7, 1939. 
Prior to that, in October, there had been two ships to 
transport Germans who lived in Latvia but were citizens 
of Germany. The last ship departed on December 15. 
This meant the closure of many German organisations, 
schools, church congregations and newspapers. The 
migration continued in the spring of 1940 until 51,000 
Baltic Germans were gone. After Latvia was incorporated 
into the USSR, another 10,500 Germans departed during 
the winter of 1941, and only 1,500 ethnic Germans 
remained in the country (Dribins, 156, Feldmanis, 38-39). 
The departure of the Baltic Germans meant a loss of 
approximately 2.5% of the Latvian population. At the 
end of World War II, moreover, Baltic Germans who were 
still in Latvia fled to Germany, while some 8,000 died 
during the war (Dribins, 156, Dunsdorfs, 62-64). The 
Baltic German community was gone, and Latvia lost an 
important ethnic group.
Forced displacement organised by the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany and migration dictated by war
Between 1933 and 1945, the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany killed 14 million people in Eastern Europe. 
Historian Timothy Snyder has described the territory 
in which both regimes committed terrible crimes as 
A farewell address by schoolteacher Roderich Walther at the Classical Gymnasium, 
October 18, 1939
«We are also saying farewell to the environment in which we have lived – the untouched nature, the place, the 
things and the conditions under which we have lived and which established the community to which we were 
so very much accustomed. This farewell means a long separation. It seems that we will never be able to return to 
our accustomed environment. Even if some of us are destined to return, the circumstances and the environment 
will have changed at their very foundation. The past can never return. We are saying goodbye to our past and 
our history. This means more than just a separation. It means completely breaking off links with the past. We 
are interrupting succession, and our traditions are disappearing. [..] We will no longer be Baltic Germans. We are 
moving to a completely different environment, and we will have to join it and adapt to it.»
Source: Adolfi, R. et al. (ed.) 2001. 800 gadi. Mūsu kopējā Rīga. Rīga: Karla Širrena biedrība. P. 319-320.
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«bloodlands» (Snyder, vii-xix). Between 1939 and 1943, the 
Communists and Nazis deported, displaced or scattered 
as many as 30 million people (Judt, 39). Latvia lost many 
people because of the displacement and repression of 
people which occurred at the hands of the totalitarian 
regimes.
There were two rounds of mass deportation in Latvia 
during the Soviet occupation. 15,424 people, or 0.78% 
of the country’s residents were deported on June 14, 
1941.1 The citizens of Latvia who were arrested were sent 
to camps in Vyatka, Norilsk, the northern Urals, Usolye 
and others. Those who were administrative deportees 
were settled in the Krasnoyarsk District, the Novosibirsk 
District, the Kazakh District and elsewhere. During the 
winter of 1941 and 1942, many were sent to the far North 
of Siberia. According to incomplete information, 700 
Latvian citizens were shot in the Soviet Union, more than 
3,440 died in prison, and 1,940 perished at settlements. Of 
those who were deported on June 14, 1941, 6,081 (39.43%) 
died (Riekstiņš, 2001, 9-25; Zālīte and Eglīte, 46-47).
The second mass deportation occurred on March 25, 
1949, and 42,125 people (2.2% of the population were 
deported. They were sent to the Amur, Omsk and 
Tomsk districts, and 12% of them died while there 
(Riekstiņš, 2007, 23; Zvidriņš and Vītoliņš, 253). The forced 
displacement, labour camps and settlements were key 
elements in the Soviet economy during the 1930s and 
1940s. Deportees were a free labour force for important 
economic sectors in the USSR, thus creating foundations 
for the country’s industrial and military development (see 
Appelbaum).
Those people who were sent to Russia during the 
mass deportations were not the only ones to face forced 
displacement at the hands of the Soviet regime. Both in 
1940 and 1941 and after World War II, many individuals 
were arrested. During the first year of the occupation, 
between 22,000 and 23,000 people in Latvia were 
arrested, administratively deported or executed (Bleiere, 
et  al., 2008, 201). Between 1944 and 1953, some 120,000 
people fell victim to Soviet terror. Of these, more than 
70,000 were sent to camps in the Gulag, more than 
40,000 were deported, and some 2,500 were shot 
(Riekstiņš, 2007, 12). Liberation of prisoners and deportees 
began in 1954 and gradually developed over the next 
several years. Not all deportees and prisoners returned 
to Latvia. In some places local governments refused to 
allow people to leave or else did everything possible to 
hinder the process. In other cases, people simply decided 
to stay where they were. Some had established families 
with local residents, built homes or found good jobs. 
Many deportees did not want to return to Latvia because 
1 The Soviet Union also conducted mass deportations in 
other territories which it had occupied in accordance with 
agreements with Nazi Germany. Deportations in Lithuania 
and Estonia occurred at the same time as in Latvia  – on the 
night from June 13 to June 14. Deportations in Western 
Ukraine occurred on May 22, in Moldova on the night from 
June 12 to June 13, and in Belarus on the night from June 19 
to 20 (Riekstiņš, 2001, 13). Between 1939 and 1941, more than 
one million people were deported from Soviet-occupied 
Poland, Western Ukraine and the Baltic States (Judt, 39).
they did not want to face those who had betrayed and 
denounced them, nor did they want to see their ravaged 
homes or the Sovietisation of their beloved country. Lots 
of people were also convinced that the deportations 
would continue and that if they went home, they would 
probably be shipped back to Siberia anyway. It is thought 
that 80% of those who were deported in 1949 returned 
home (Zvidriņš and Vītoliņš, 253). The repressions 
organised by the Soviet regime and the violent 
displacement of local residents have had a long-lasting 
and traumatic effect on the people of Latvia and on the 
collective memories of Latvians.
When the war between Nazi Germany and the USSR 
began in 1941, many members of the Soviet Latvian 
government and the Latvian Communist Party left the 
country along with their families. The same was true of 
others who did not wish to live in a country occupied 
by the Nazis. Soviet institutions were unable to provide 
for any orderly evacuation, and so those who left the 
country did so in a fairly chaotic and panicked way. Many 
who wanted to withdraw with the Red Army failed to do 
so. They died in battles between Latvian self-defence 
organisations, the Red Army and the Soviet secret police 
(NKVD). Others were killed during punitive activities or 
bombardment by Nazi aircraft. The NKVD posted men 
on the border between Latvia and Russia and ordered 
many would-be refugees (including Jews) to turn back, 
thus dooming many of them to destruction. It is thought 
that 53,000 people from Latvia moved behind the front 
lines in the Soviet Union, but many of them, particularly 
children, died because of poor living conditions and food 
shortages (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 385-388, 396).
Nazi Germany also implemented repressions in 
occupied Latvia. Between 66,000 and 68,000 Latvian 
Jews perished in the Holocaust (Stranga, 532).
The Nazis used Latvia’s economic and labour 
resources for war purposes. Many people were sent 
to Germany to engage in forced labour. Initially this 
was a voluntary principle, but local residents soon 
learned about the harsh working conditions of those 
who were sent to Germany and about the fact that the 
Germans were breaking all of their promises in this 
regard. The number of willing workers collapsed, and 
forcible methods were used instead. Quite soon, Latvia’s 
institutions of governance opposed the transfer of people 
to work in Germany, because Latvia itself had a distinct 
lack of workers in agriculture and industry. All in all, it 
is through that 16,800 people were sent to do work in 
Germany by 1944 (Kangeris, 47).
When the Nazis withdrew from Latvia, they successfully 
implemented the «scorched earth» policy which meant 
the evacuation or destruction of everything that was 
valuable  – industrial equipment, agricultural products, 
law materials and cultural values. The Nazis also organised 
a programme to transfer people to Germany. The process 
began in the summer of 1944. From October 5 to 9 of 
that year, the authorities organised a dragnet to capture 
people on the street and deliver them directly to ships 
(Bleiere, et  al, 2008, 470). As the Red Army approached, 
the number of voluntary refugees skyrocketed. Data show 
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that between 265,000 and 285,000 people left Latvia in 
all. Some 25,000 had moved to Germany previously, while 
another 20,000 or so were deported against their own will 
(Strods, 1994, 129-134).
There were several other forced displacements 
of civilians during the war. Nazi Germany’s regime 
established several prisons in Latvia to house people 
from other countries. Several thousand Jews from 
Western Europe ended their lives in the Riga ghetto and 
then the concentration camps of Mežaparks, Salaspils and 
Jumpravmuiža. Other prisoners came from Russia and 
Belarus. There were several camps for Soviet prisoners of 
war in Latvia, as well. As the Red Army approached, the 
Nazis moved the prisoners of war westward (Bleiere, et al., 
2008, 263-267).
The mobility of Latvia’s residents also involved the 
mobilisation of people by Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union. There were 110,000 Latvians in the ranks of the 
Nazi armed forces, 52,000 of them in the Latvian SS 
Legion (Bleiere, et  al, 2008, 354). Some 50,000 Latvians 
who wore the military uniforms of Nazi Germany perished 
on the battlefield (Vilciņš, 32), and some 25,400 members 
of the Latvian Legion were captured by the Western allies 
toward the close of World War II (Bleiere, et al., 2008, 472). 
Some 50,000 legionnaires were captured by the Soviet 
military, and most of them were sent to Soviet prisons 
for longer or shorter periods of time (Vilciņš, 32). When 
it comes to the Red Army, there was a Latvian division of 
riflemen in it from the very beginning of the war in 1941. 
It was made up of Latvians who found themselves in the 
Soviet Union at the start of the war as well as Latvians 
who had lived in the USSR for a longer period of time. 
When the Red Army returned to Latvia in July 1944, it 
began to mobilise local residents  – 57,422 in all by the 
end of the war (Riekstiņš, 2005, 428). Some 36,000 soldiers 
from the Latvian units of the Red Army fell in battle 
during the war (Bleiere, et al., 2005, 3000).
Soviet statistics tell us that on June 1, 1945, there were 
1,500,730 people in Latvia, or a decline of 403,800 people 
(21.2%) since January 1, 1940 (in other words, during four 
years and five months) (State Archives of Latvia, 277/14/5, 
p. 41). The size of the population began to increase after 
the war as refugees and military personnel returned 
home. The Soviet regime organised an extensive 
campaign to get people who had been displaced during 
the war to go back home. 77,368 refugees returned 
to Latvia between 1945 and 1952, though some were 
subject to further repression and ended up at places 
of imprisonment and deportation outside of Latvia 
(Riekstiņš, 1994, 58). It is also true that as soon as the 
war was over, people from other Soviet republics flowed 
into Latvia, particularly from those regions which had 
been devastated by the war. This created sanitary and 
epidemiological problems, particularly in those towns 
in which there were railroad hubs. Various types of 
typhoid fever, malaria, scarlet fever, diphtheria and other 
infectious diseases appeared (State Archives of Latvia, 
1022/11/997).
The forced displacement of people in Latvia which 
was organised by the totalitarian regimes led to the loss 
of a substantial proportion of the country’s population – 
one-third in all, according to demographers (Eglīte and 
Mežs, 415). Latvia’s ethnic composition also changed 
radically. The Germans and Jews were gone altogether, 
and the number of Latvians was much lower because of 
the war, repressions and emigration (Bleiere, et  al, 2008, 
414). There were also important and long-lasting indirect 
consequences  – changes in life views and perceptions, 
extensive fear and hatred, and a lack of initiative, 
capability and self-esteem. The deficit in stability reduced 
the willingness of people to work, to feel a sense of 
belonging to their motherland, and to observe norms of 
morality.
Displacedpersons and émigrés in the West
A large Latvian diaspora was established in the West 
after World War II. The Red Cross has said that a total of 
some 130,000 Latvians migrated in this process, but 
there are no precise data about this. Initially most of the 
refugees lived in so-called displaced persons camps 
in Germany, while some found themselves in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden (Bleiere, et al, 2005, 383). 
Historian Modris Eksteins has written that in post-war 
Europe, «refugees were looked on as part of the rubble of 
war. Like the debris in the streets, the authorities wanted 
to get rid of this «human rubble» as quickly as possible» 
(Eksteins, 112). The Western allies did not recognise the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR, and so 
the residents of displaced person camps from Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania were given the choice of going 
home or remaining in the West. Most chose to stay 
because they feared Soviet repressions and punishment 
for collaborating with the Nazis. They also hoped to have 
a better life in the West (Judt, 47).
Work to close down the displaced persons camps 
began in 1947, and Latvians began to emigrate to Great 
Britain (17,000, the United States (45,000), Australia 
(20,000), Canada (19,000), South American countries 
(5,000), etc. Some 4,000 Latvians settled in Sweden, and 
15,000 remained in Germany. Western countries which 
were facing labour shortages welcomed stateless people 
if they agreed to do physical work (Bleiere, et  al., 2005, 
383). In Britain, for instance, women were offered jobs 
at hospitals, homes, textile plants and viscose plants, 
while men found jobs in agriculture, mines, brick making 
facilities, factories and other places where heavy physical 
labour was necessary (McDowell, 104-105). During the 
first years of emigration, Latvians believed that the Soviet 
occupation would soon end and the Western countries 
would achieve their nation’s liberation. These illusions, 
however, soon dissipated. As refugees moved to all parts 
of the world, their lifestyles changed, and new goals 
and everyday routine of life were established. Life in 
the West meant cardinal changes in lifestyles  – changes 
in social and material status, use of foreign languages 
in social contacts and employment, and changes in 
profession (especially for those who had an education in 
the humanities, arts and social sectors, as well as those 
who had once worked for government institutions or 
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as lawyers). Many Latvian refugees became economic 
migrants, and they gradually adapted to the consumer 
lifestyle of the Western developed countries. People 
established homes in their new countries of residence, 
and that which they lost was replaced by that which they 
gained in terms of homes, work, education, Western 
welfare and everyday routines.
The Latvian diaspora in Western countries created 
a broad network of political and other organisations 
(churches, educational and cultural institutions, youth 
organisations, professional associations, student frater ni-
ties, etc.). These provided mutual support, opportu nities 
to amortise social and cultural traumas, socialisation, 
the ability to establish a national identity, as well as 
the function of leisure. One of the most influential 
organisations was the Latvian Welfare Fund, which was 
established by prisoners of war in a camp in December 
1945. Known as the «Hawks of the Daugava,» the 
organisation established a broad network of branches 
on several continents. There were also organisations 
to bring together Latvians in their new countries of 
residence. The Latvian National Council in Great Britain 
was established in 1950, as was the Latvian National 
Association in Canada. The American Latvian Association 
was established in 1951, as were the Latvian Association 
in Australia and New Zealand and the European Centre of 
the Latvian Liberation Committee. The South American 
Latvian Association was established in 1971. In 1956, the 
national organisations which had been established came 
together in the World Association of Free Latvians. All of 
the organisations fought to restore Latvia’s statehood and 
to ensure the survival of the Latvian nation (Bleiere, et al., 
2005, 385; Veigners, 2009, 527-560).
Latvian communities in the West had active cultural 
programmes, because many of the emigrants came 
from the cultural and intellectual elite of Latvia. Several 
thousand books were published in Latvian, including 
fiction, encyclopaedias and academic research. There 
were many periodicals, theatrical performances and 
song festivals. Of particular important for the émigré 
community was the newspaper Laiks (Time), which 
was established by Helmārs Rudzītis along with a 
book publishing house, «Grāmatas Draugs» (Friend 
of the Book), which published Latvian literature. The 
The story of writer Agate Nesaule, 1995 
«Gradually emigration opportunities opened up. England, Canada and Australia began admitting young single 
workers, mostly for jobs their own people did not want to do. Families were separated once again. My cousin 
Astrida, at age eighteen, went to Canada by herself, to work as maid. She married a young Latvian warehouse 
worker there a few moths later. Except for her Canadian employers, no one else attended her wedding at the 
register office, and she went back to washing dishes and making beds the following morning. Another cousin left 
to work in the coal mines in England.
When the United States opened its doors, it was again only to the most desirable workers, that is, the young 
and vigorous, those unencumbered by children, illness and old people. Ōmīte [granny], who had finally rejoined 
our family, was not allowed to emigrate with us, since America would admit only one dependent per worker. Once 
more Ōmīte urged everyone to go, saying she had had her life. [..]
The future in the camps looked meaningless and bleak [..].
Actually, no one used the word «emigration». People spoke of «continued exile,» which was what going to 
America meant. Most Latvians longed to return to Latvia, they daydreamed about the time when Latvia would 
once more be free of Russian occupation, and they mourned leaving Europe for another continent because that 
made the return to Latvia less likely. To this day «exile» rather then «emigration» is the prevailing word in American 
Latvian communities. [..]
The tensions in the camps became close to unbearable. Having to separate from family and friends yet again 
was part of the anxiety, and se were the various tests that we were undergoing, most often without being told 
the results. Reading and math ability, teeth, eyes, ears, skin and bodily cavities were checked and checked again, 
and again. A dark spot on a lung or partial deafness in one ear meant the person was condemned to the camps 
forever.
«We treated our horses with more dignity,» said Captain Vilciņš. [..]
In groups and individually, we were asked whether we knew that the United States was a democracy and 
whether we approved of democracy. We were asked whether we were insane, homosexual, alcoholic, criminal or 
immoral.
«Are any of you prostitutes here?» the sober-faced official at the head of the table asked a room full of 
people. Andrejs, a boy in Beate’s class, gave her and me such sharp nudge from behind that we exclaimed 
and jumped up startled, like eager volunteers. The official frowed at us, and my mother told us that we had 
disgraced ourselves. [..] Nothing about getting to America was a joking matter.»
Source: Nesaule, A. 1995. A Woman in Amber: Healing the Trauma of War and Exile. New York: Soho. P. 134-136.
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The story of Lina, born in 1931 and resident in the UK
«All those years you know  – 50 years. I think to begin with for many years we were all waiting for the 
independence to come and to go back. And now, as the independence came so late, we’re no longer planning 
to go back but we still feel as Latvian and now those people who take part in the Latvian community here, you 
know in the welfare work, all our funds go to Latvia now for education, for orphans, for big families, ill people or 
for pensions. So we send lots of funds over there now to help to rebuild the country. Also having a Latvia passport 
I feel I can take part in th e elections. I feel that I want to be a part of that as well. I have always voted in Britain 
too, so it’s a bit of both.»
Source: McDowell, L. 2005 Hard Labour: The Forgotten Voices of Latvian Migrant Volunteer Workers. London: UCL Press, p. 186.
Box 
2.8
cornerstone for the national consciousness and physical 
survival of Latvians in the West was culture, memories 
and narratives about the flourishing Latvian state.
Cultural contacts with Soviet Latvia began to 
emerge in the 1960s, and over the next several decades, 
increasing numbers of Latvians visited their relatives in 
Latvia (Bleiere, et  al., 2005, 384-3888; McDowell, 168-
194). A number of emigrants could boast of individual 
achievements and public recognition in their new 
countries of residence. Distinguished in their fields were 
engineer Jānis Upatnieks, chemist Andrejs Dravnieks, 
film cameraman Vilis Lapenieks, Jr., painter Jānis Annuss, 
Brigadier General Vilmārs Kukainis, geologist Aleksis 
Dreimanis, Baltic studies specialist Velta Rūķe-Draviņa, 
ballet dancer Jānis Piķeris, architect Gunārs Birkerts, 
astronomer Dainis Draviņš, psychologist Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga, historian Andrejs Plakans, economist Juris 
Vīksniņš, actress Laila Robiņa, javelin thrower Jānis 
Stendzenieks, swimmer Jānis Konrāds, judo master 
Teodors Boronovskis, discus thrower Juris Pūce, speed 
skater Silvija Burka, chess player Edmars Mednis, 
volleyball player Aldis Bērziņš, swimmer Mariona 
Aizpore, beauty queen Mārīte Ozere («Miss USA 1963»), 
and many others (Veigners, 2009, 527-560). There were 
also adventurous Latvians who became known for their 
eccentricities and their challenging of destiny  – Edvards 
Liedskalniņš, who created the Coral Castle in Florida, 
crocodile hunter Arvīds Blūmentāls, and a few others (see 
Stavro; Blūmentāls and Ziedonis).
People in Latvia perceived Western compatriots 
as successful people who were living in a much better 
society, enjoyed greater material benefits, and had 
political freedoms, freedom of speech, and the ability 
to travel freely all around the world. For some people in 
Latvia, life outside of Latvia was seen as being much more 
valuable than staying in the motherland.
The Baltic Germans who departed from Latvia 
in 1939 also maintained an ethnic community and a 
sense of belonging to the Baltic States after World War 
II. In 1963, there were 42,800 Baltic Germans in West 
Germany, 10,200 in East Germany, and several thousand 
in the United States, Sweden and Australia. They set 
up several regional research, religious, cultural and 
historical research, welfare and sports organisations, 
and they published a monthly journal, Baltische Briefe. As 
tensions between the West and the USSR eased, Baltic 
Germans, too, began to form cultural contacts with their 
motherland (Dribins and Spārītis, 78-79, 206-211).
When Latvia regained its independence, there were 
expectations that those Latvians who had become 
refugees at the end of World War II would return to 
Latvia. That did not happen, however, and only a few 
thousand Western Latvians moved to the country. There 
were several reasons for this. People who left Latvia in 
1944/1945 as children or adolescents were too old to start 
life anew in a different country, while second and third-
generation exiles had deep roots in the places where they 
were born, grew up, were educated, formed families and 
established careers. Since 1991, Western Latvians have 
had to redefine their collective and individual identity, 
because they are no longer exiles from a motherland that 
was annexed by a hostile regime (Plakans, 2011, 409-410).
Migration in Soviet Latvia
The Soviet regime did not allow people to travel 
abroad freely, and very few people left for the West 
during the existence of Soviet Latvia. Emigration 
permits were given only to a few people, and mostly for 
purposes of rejoining families. There were those who 
sought to flee from Soviet Latvia. This was a very risky 
piece of business, because the Soviet border was very 
strictly guarded, and those who were caught were often 
sentenced to death by the Soviet authorities because 
of «treason against the motherland.» During the 1950s, 
several people successfully fled to Sweden in fishing 
boats. Between 1951 and 1953, five fishing ships fled 
to Sweden with their entire crews. There were others 
who tried to get abroad by hiding in the coal bunkers or 
drinking water reservoirs of ships. The size of the KGB unit 
in Soviet Latvia was increased in the late 1950s to prevent 
such escapes, and those who worked in fishing and the 
shipping industry were controlled much more strictly. 
There were some people who travelled to the West as 
tourists or on business and asked for political refuge. 
Among them were the physician and author Lilija Zariņa, 
mechanics professor Arturs Dumpis, television laboratory 
director Jānis Maulāns, and journalist and KGB officer 
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The thoughts of fisherman Kārlis Strazds, who fled from Latvia to Sweden in June 1952
«I had not thought about or prepared for fleeing to Sweden, but when I saw the big difference between 
the two countries that were so close to one another,   I felt that I had won. I won not just in material terms by 
achieving incomparably better living conditions, but also, and mostly, in terms of gaining freedom. There are 
no spies here at work, in restaurants and on the streets. Here the government does bug phone calls or monitor 
those with whom you meet. I can speak and act freely, I can join any political movement I wish, and I can travel 
around to see the world. My comrades with whom I escaped to Sweden are also more than satisfied with this 
shift in life.»
Source: Strazds, K. 2008. Es nāku no dzimtenes. Latvijā 1945–1952. Rīga: Daugava. P. 236.
Box 
2.9
Imants Lešinskis. As the number of people who fled 
abroad increased, the Soviet KGB prepared a list of the so-
called traitors against the motherland in 1969 for internal 
use. The list that was published in 1979 had 89 refugees 
from Latvia, including 67 Latvians (Strods, 2008, 120-127). 
Most of those who fled during the Soviet period were not 
political dissidents or cultural workers. They simply took 
a practical approach to life and wanted to improve the 
welfare of their lives (Strods 2008a, 74).
Most emigrants from Latvia during the Soviet era 
were Jews. Their emigration from the USSR began in 
the late 1950s, when it first became possible to cross 
the country’s border. Emigration increased after Israel’s 
victory in the Six Day War and, particularly, after a trial 
in Leningrad in 1970 in which defendants were Jews 
who had allegedly tried to hijack an airplane to leave 
the country (Gitelyman, 234-235, 248-255). Several Jews 
from Riga were among them. The Soviet authorities 
hindered the emigration of Jews in many ways, rejecting 
visa requests, demanding money for rejecting Soviet 
citizenship, or demanding that would-be émigrés pay 
compensation for the cost of their education in the Soviet 
Union. Between 1968 and 1980, despite all of this, 13,153 
Soviet Latvian Jews moved to Israel or the West – 35.8% 
of all of the Jews who lived in the Latvian SSR at that time. 
Another 16,000 Jews or so emigrated by 1989, mostly to 
Israel (Dribins, 2001, 144). The Soviet Union concluded 
agreements with other countries on working together to 
reunify families, and this allowed Poles and Germans from 
Latvia to emigrate, as well (Strods, 2008, 122).
Soviet Latvia was a popular destination for migrants 
from other Soviet republics because it was a westerly 
republic and provided a comparatively higher standard of 
living than was the case elsewhere in the USSR. The result 
of this was that migration to Latvia was massive. Between 
1944 and 1949, some 400,000 people moved to the 
Latvian SSR from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Most were 
fleeing the destruction that had been caused by the war 
and the Soviet economy, and they were simply looking 
for better lives. Latvia was comparatively much less 
devastated than proximate areas of Russia were. Basically 
these people can be described as economic refugees. 
The result of all of this was that by the beginning of 1950, 
Soviet Latvia’s population was bigger than it had been in 
1940 – by 57,500 souls (Mežgailis and Zvidriņš, 81). Among 
many Latvians, the illegal arrival of all of these migrants 
during the post-war era and the fact that many of them 
took over the homes of people who had been deported 
strengthened ideas about the unlawful and amoral 
nature of the occupant regime (Ķīlis, 123-124).
During the 1970s and 1980s, migration represented 
two-thirds of population growth in Latvia. The 
first attempt to stem the tide occurred during the 
latter half of the 1950s, when the so-called National 
Communists attempted to do so. They failed, however, 
their movement was destroyed, and new waves of 
migration began. According to demographer Pēteris 
Zvidriņš, «there were periods of time during which the 
relative indicators of increased migration were among 
the highest in the world» (Zvidriņš, 210-2011). A total 
of four million people moved to Latvia between 1951 
and 1990, while 1.82  million left the country. The overall 
migration balance during the Soviet occupation involved 
941,000  people (Mežgailis, 12-13). The authorities of the 
regime explained that immigration was needed because 
of the constantly increasing need for workers and of the 
low natural growth rate in the population. Extensive 
development of industry meant a constant need for 
new workers. During the 1980s, those who arrived in the 
Latvian SSR came not just from other republics of the 
Soviet Union, but also from other countries entirely. Data 
show that on January 1, 1990, more than 2,300 foreign 
citizens were working in Latvia. Among them, there were 
1,300 Polish citizens who worked in the construction 
field (mostly in terms of restoration work done in Old 
Riga), 800 citizens of Vietnam (the light manufacturing 
industries and the wood processing sector), 150 citizens 
of Yugoslavia (reconstructing a factory in Zasulauks), and 
80 citizens of Finland (reconstructing the Riga Dairy Plant) 
(Krūmiņš, 40).
There were several causes for major migration: 
1) Soviet policies aimed at Sovietising Latvia and ensuring 
that it was closely linked to the USSR by using migrants; 
2)  Forced «Socialist industrialisation» which was an 
extensive process and required an endless new supply 
of workers; 3) Many military institutions from which 
demobilised military personnel remained in Latvia, with 
officers relieved of their duty from the Red Army being 
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allowed to remain for life in Riga and other cities; 4) Initial 
living space created by the death of people during World 
War II, by the repressions which were organised by the 
Soviets and the Nazis, and by the flow of refugees to the 
West; 5) Historical traditions of ethnic tolerance and co-
existence (Bleiere, et  al., 2005, 378). Sociological studies 
conducted in the 1970s show that the main reason why 
people of working age wanted to move to Latvia was that 
they wanted better living conditions, wanted jobs in their 
area of specialisation, and knew that Latvia was better 
supplied with consumer goods (Riekstiņš, 2004, 9).
The percentage of Latvians in the republic’s 
population shrank because of migration  – to a level 
of just 52.04% at the end of the occupation. There 
were fears in advance of the restoration of Latvia’s 
independence that ethnic Latvians might become a 
minority in their own country. The great influx of Russian 
speakers also weakened the positions of the Latvian 
language, with Russian dominating in governance, the 
public arena and many workplaces. The policies of the 
Latvian SSR were ones which allowed immigrants to 
improve their living conditions and to receive new and 
well-appointed flats in a comparatively short period of 
time. A 1989 census showed that 69% of families which 
had lived in Latvia for less than five years already had 
individual flats (all in all, 79% of families had such flats), 
while only 57% of Latvian families lived in individual 
apartments. This meant social discrimination against 
Latvians (Blūzma, 239). Demographer Pārsla Eglīte has 
written that «most of the colonists who were sent in 
by the totalitarian regime and who received economic 
support from that regime [..] could feel that they 
could dictate terms and ignore the local language, 
habits and morals. Under such circumstances, the 
relationship between Latvians and non-Latvians was 
not a relationship between two nations with equal 
rights; instead, it was a relationship between conquerors 
and those who were subordinate to them. This created 
the foundations for a society with two different 
communities, and it also created fertile soil for those 
who wish to provoke ethnic tensions» (Eglīte, 2003, 263). 
One of the most important public issues during the era 
of perestroika in Latvia was the need to halt the endless 
torrent of migrants. In 1989, the government of the 
A declaration from the Soviet Latvian State Planning Committee to the Council of 
Ministers of the Latvian SSR on the consequences of halting migration. February 1, 1989
«Among the possible consequences of a halt to the mechanical increase in the number of residents in the 
Latvian SSR, according to some of the ministries and institutions in our republic, include harsher problems with 
labour shortages, which supposedly will lead to a decrease in manufacturing output, including in the area of 
consumer goods, to a lack of capital investments in construction organisations, etc. [..]
Unlimited migration did not ensure the much more complete provision of consumer goods to local residents 
and did not ensure the construction of sufficient numbers of social infrastructure objects, first of all in terms 
of housing. Thus, for example, the city of Riga still has not returned to the pre-war level when it comes to the 
amount of housing floor space per resident of the city.
Given all of this, we believe that a focus on attracting an uninterrupted and unlimited flow of workers does not 
promote the positive resolution of problems related to socioeconomic development; on the contrary, it reduces 
the interest of companies and organisations in intensifying manufacturing and in implementing the achievements 
of scientific and technical progress.»
Source: Riekstiņš, J. (ed.) 2004. Migranti Latvijā. 1944–1989. Dokumenti. Rīga: Latvijas Valsts arhīvs. P. 72-73.
Box 
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Migration in the Latvian SSR
(,000 individuals)
Years Immigration Emigration Migration balance
1944/45-1950 ~440
1951-1960 639.9 459.8 180.0
1961-1970 476.9 335.9 141.1
1971-1980 548.6 428.2 120.4
1981-1990 506.6 423.9 82.6
Source: Central Statistic Board of Latvia
Box 
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Latvian SSR approved a plan to interrupt the unjustified 
increase in migration (Riekstiņš, 2004, 74-80).
There was also active migration of people within the 
boundaries of the Latvian SSR during the Soviet period. 
This was because the Soviet regime confiscated land and 
homes, there were new models for the economy and for 
the labour force, and people had weaker links to their 
birthplace and community. Many moved house to avoid 
Soviet repressions. Urbanisation led people to move from 
the countryside to cities and towns. At the end of the 
Soviet era, 69% of the republic’s residents lived in urban 
areas (Bleiere, 2005, 382).
Fairly few Latvians voluntarily moved beyond the 
borders of their republic. A 1959 census in the Soviet 
Union found that 7.3% of Latvians were living outside 
of Latvia. By 1989, the percentage was down to 4.9% 
(Kabuzan, 131). Among those who left their motherland 
for a certain period of time were those who took part in 
compulsory military service in the Soviet armed forces, 
young people studying at universities in Moscow, 
Leningrad and elsewhere, as well as those young people 
who took part in the process of «conquering untouched 
territories» or of working for Komsomol «construction 
shock groups.» Data show that people most often moved 
to Moscow, the Krasnoyarsk District, the Irkutsk District 
and the Tyumen District. There were also those who 
pursued their professional careers in the Russian SSR and 
other Soviet republics – singer Irma Jaunzeme, conductor 
Arvīds Jansons, ballet dancer Māris Liepa, chess player 
Arvīds Ģipslis, etc. (Veigners, 2009, a 568-579).
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the relevant 
migration processes ground to a halt, and an entirely new 
phase began in Latvia’s migration history.
***
The history of migration in Latvia has been a dramatic 
process – one which has had an effect on the identity of 
the country’s residents. Emigration to the West was seen 
as a positive phenomenon thanks to the comparatively 
higher level of welfare among those who went into exile, 
and this produced ever new illusions about welfare and 
achievements in the West. The great political and military 
cataclysms of the 20th century, however, established 
and maintained a sense of insecurity about Latvia, as 
did the forced displacement of people at the hands of 
the two totalitarian regimes and the migration policies 
of the Soviet Union. Many people did not believe that 
Latvia could ever be a country with an acceptable level 
of welfare. The sense of belonging to Latvia relates to a 
stable and secure country and/or to a country which has 
become fragile over the course of history. This facilitates 
decisions among people to leave the country so as to 
achieve welfare and stability as quickly as possible.
Main conclusions. Main missions
Main conclusions
The people of Latvia have voluntarily or involuntarily left their country over the past centuries because of 
political economic instability, as well as because of the system implemented by totalitarian regimes. For a long 
time, Latvia has been a country which has been unable to guarantee security, inviolability of private property, 
observation of human rights and stable cultural values for its residents.
Main missions
If the aim is to reduce the desire of local residents to emigrate, there must be policies which will convince 
people that Latvian can ensure sustainable security, as well as political, economic and cultural stability  – 
something which will enhance their trust in the Latvian state. 
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Rapid political and economic changes in the wake of 
the restoration of Latvia’s independence were followed 
by economic restructuring, structural unemployment, 
as well as a rapid decline in income for the majority of 
the country’s residents. These factors have served to 
encourage economic emigration to a very substantial 
degree. The flow of migrants was enhanced by Latvia’s 
accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004. At that 
time, the citizens of Latvia became citizens of the EU, and 
they won the opportunity to look for jobs in other EU 
member states.1 Rapid economic growth after Latvia’s 
accession to the EU reduced emigration, but only until 
2008, when an economic decline began and many local 
residents decided to move away from the country. There 
are no official data about the scope of emigration, but 
the latest calculations indicate that in 2009 and 2010, 
approximately 30,000 people left Latvia each year to find 
work elsewhere.2 A World Bank report on remittances 
paid to countries of origin in 2011 indicated that 12.2% 
of all of Latvia’s residents were living abroad  – 272,400 
people in all. The World Bank said that they send USD 643 
million a year to Latvia, adding that this is of importance 
for the country’s economic development (World Bank, 
2011, 158).
The increasing flow of emigration and the fact that 
demographic forecasts are not favourable in terms 
of Latvia’s development mean that it is important to 
study the sense of belonging which emerges among 
emigrants. The sense of belonging to their host country 
and their country of origin will have much to do with 
the future choices of Latvian residents  – returning to 
their motherland or remaining in emigration. How 
does emigration change the relationship between 
individuals and their countries of origin? Analysis of 
emigration processes and studies of identity at the level 
of individuals help to answer such questions. Studies of 
how a sense of belonging emerges make it possible to 
1 The agreement on the accession to the EU of the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary stated that the old EU 
member states were allowed to set out a transition period 
before they would open their labour markets to citizens from 
the new member states. Ireland, Great Britain and Sweden 
opened their labour markets on May 1, 2004. Spain, Portugal, 
Finland and Greece followed on May 1, 2006, Italy opened 
its market on July 27, 2006, the Netherlands did so on May 1, 
2007, Luxembourg followed suit on November 1, 2007, France 
opened its market on July 1, 2008, and Germany did the same 
on May 1, 2011. 
2 See Hugh, E. «Latvia: The Demographic Price of Procrastina-
tion», 28 July 2010. See http://www.creditwritedowns.
com/2010/07/latvia-the-demographic-price-of-procrastina-
tion.html.
understand more deeply the changes which occur in a 
society that is dynamic and mutable.
Professor Ulf Hedetoft at Copenhagen University has 
pointed to four aspects in analysing identity  – the ones 
which reveal a multidimensional view of how a sense of 
belonging emerges: (i) The source of belonging; (ii) The 
sense of belonging which comes from a sense of socio-
psychological well being, social memory, and a sense 
of belonging to a specific location; (iii) The structuring 
and institutionalisation of belonging; (iv) The mutable 
nature of belonging (Hedetoft, 2004, 24-25). Hedetoft 
argues that all of these aspects are important in the 
establishment and strengthening of belonging. For 
instance, the source of belonging is closely linked to a 
feeling of belonging, whether it is positive or negative. 
The emergence of a strong sense of belonging often 
serves as a reason for wanting to strengthen that 
belonging by institutionalising it  – obtaining citizenship, 
for instance. At the same time, however, belonging can be 
mutable and situative, as well as dependent on changing 
circumstances and competition with other identities.
Life in Latvia and emigration can both be seen as 
sources for the emergence of an identity. One’s living 
space, as a source of belonging, is multi-dimensional, 
because it has everything to do with why the individual 
emigrated, the experiences which the individual has, and 
prospects and opportunities in the specific place and the 
host country. Most studies which have been focused on 
the reasons and decisions of emigration have been linked 
primarily to the issue of socioeconomic circumstances. 
In Latvia’s case, however, emigration has been linked to 
broader changes in the post-Soviet Latvia and its society, 
as well as with the emotions which these changes have 
brought about. People decided to emigrate at a time 
when the Latvian economy was being restructured from 
a planned socialist economy to a market economy. This 
meant that individual welfare depended on the situation 
which people had in the labour market and their ability to 
consume goods and services, as well as, on the contrary, 
the ability to be in demand in the market because of 
the individual’s skills, talents and knowledge. And yet 
the trends of economic development in Latvia over the 
past few decades have led to radical differences in the 
development of urban centres and the country’s regions, 
as well as increasing inequality and poverty in society. 
This has substantially hindered the ability of people to 
do things which can ensure their welfare under new 
socio-economic circumstances, and in many cases this 
has caused disappointment in that which is happening in 
Latvia. Under such circumstances, a decision to emigrate 
has increasingly often been based on a growing sense of 
2.2. Emigration and identity
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responsibility toward oneself and one’s loved ones at a 
time when reliance on the state in terms of ensuring the 
necessary level of welfare has not yielded the expected 
result.
Although the lives of Latvian émigrés are linked to 
life in Latvia in certain respects, they also tend to have 
closer links to their new host country. Latvian migration 
researcher Aija Lulle has studied Latvian émigrés on the 
island of Guernsey, and she has argued that in terms of 
their everyday thinking, émigrés see Latvia and their new 
host country alongside one another, and both countries 
determine the way in which individuals see themselves 
(Lulle, 2010). New forms of belonging among émigrés 
emerged via interaction among memories, future plans, 
experiences, feelings and opportunities when living 
in Latvia and in the new host country. Stories told by 
émigrés in Ireland and England point to this interaction 
very vividly, indeed, because new forms of belonging 
in emigration emerge both directly and indirectly, 
comparing living situations in the new host country to 
those back home in Latvia. The stories told by émigrés 
reveal several dichotomies upon which new forms of 
belonging in emigration are based.
Dichotomies of new forms of 
belonging 
The dichotomies of new forms of belonging include 
two mutually exclusive social phenomena which are 
seen as being thematically important in the narratives of 
émigrés when they talk about their decision to emigrate. 
These narratives are related to decisions about emigrating 
and returning home, as well as to the context for such 
decisions  – life in Latvia and the new host country. 
In conceptual terms, these dichotomies exclude one 
another, but in reality, both opposite poles often work 
alongside one another. In this case, dichotomies are ideal 
types. The positive side of dichotomies is essential for 
the welfare of individuals, but the stories which émigrés 
tell reveal this side as incomplete and non-existent when 
living in Latvia. All of the dichotomies  – social justice/
injustice, trust/distrust, opportunities/limitations to be 
a consumer, the state’s care/lack of care for its residents, 
security/insecurity, instrumentality/emotionality, the 
fatherland as a piece of land or the state – must be viewed 
in tandem, because they often influence one another.
Social justice/injustice
Social injustice and, particularly, distributive justice 
or just distribution of benefits among the residents 
of a country or a community  – these refer to one of the 
dichotomies which are important when one thinks 
about the emergence of new forms of belonging among 
émigrés. One of the principles of justice defined by the 
American political philosopher John Rawls states that 
all members of a society which is characterised by social 
and economic inequality must have better opportunities 
which can be achieved. The dominance of market 
principles in various areas of public life in Latvia since 
the restoration of its independence has had a serious 
effect on social justice, because it has created polarisation 
between the winners and the losers in this process 
(Smith, Stenning, Willis, 2008, 1). Stories from émigrés 
show that life under Latvia’s socio-economic conditions 
led them to feel like losers, while lives in new host 
countries allow them to feel equal with other residents 
of the relevant country. Professor Loretta Capeheart 
and Professor Dragan Milovanovic from Northeastern 
Illinois University have argued that when there are 
constant limitations on social justice, the value of social 
justice is denigrated in society, and this, in turn, means 
to a certain extent that the development of the people 
is denied, there are motivations to oppose the situation 
as such (Capeheart and Milovanovic, 2007, 4). People feel 
internal conflicts which lead them to be dissatisfied with 
themselves; they find it necessary to seek belonging in a 
situation which supports the existence of the self which is 
not in conflict with itself. This internal conflict is reflected 
in the stories which émigrés tell:
«The Saeima has the beautiful statement that the 
law is meant for everyone, but why are some people 
more equal than others? There are those who imagine 
that they can ignore rules about the sand dune zone, 
and I don’t know whether those of us who lived for 
50 years under the Communist regime have seen 
nothing and find that all of a sudden we have to grab 
everything. I don’t know what the situation is in other 
countries, but the situation in ours is completely 
absurd. It is uncontrollable. First of all, people have no 
financial means, they cannot become rich in a single 
day. I, for instance, support those people who earn a 
living with their brain and their inventions.» (Female, 
48, five months in England)
«If I could earn as much money as I earn here, then 
I would go home, but I cannot earn as much money 
in Latvia as I do here. In that case I would have to be... 
Typically, there are gaps in all things in Latvia. If you 
don’t know anyone, you will not get anywhere, and 
that annoys me. Here there are open competitions for 
jobs – you go and fight, and then you get somewhere, 
right? That is what I lacked in Latvia.» (Female, 29, five 
years in England)
The experience of émigrés in new host countries has 
created the feeling that they see extensive and equal 
opportunities with local residents in terms of achieving 
better life opportunities in various areas of public life 
such as employment and education.
Trust/distrust
The statements made by émigrés include an explicit 
discourse of distrust. This is seen in contacts with fellow 
residents and civil servants in Latvia, as well as in terms 
of attitudes toward Latvia as such. Distrust in the state 
is often explained as a legacy from the Soviet era, but 
researchers have also pointed to the links between 
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economic equality and trust, as well as between the 
effectiveness of institutions and trust (Kornai, Rothstein, 
Rose-Ackerman, 2005, 5). The stories told by respondents 
indirectly indicate that equality and social justice are 
more visible in the new host country, and that promotes 
trust in that country. Respondents in England, for 
instance, say that there is greater justice in tax policies 
and the health care system, communications between 
residents and civil servants are orderly, and that helps to 
establish mutual trust. The statements from the émigrés 
show that relationships which are full of trust at various 
levels of social life are important when establishing new 
forms of belonging:
«For some reason, we always want to blame 
someone, mostly blame our government, because 
the overall impression is that they only think about 
themselves, their position and their pockets, not 
about the mortal people of the country. That is my 
impression. It used to be my impression, and it is still 
my impression. They have not changed, but exactly the 
opposite situation exists here  – they think about the 
people and not about their seats or their pockets. That 
is my impression.» (Female, 48, five months in England)
«On the TVNET portal, there is a headline to show 
that MPs believe that public transportation tickets 
cost 20 santīms. How are you supposed to trust such 
people if the price has been different for such a long 
time? How on earth can you believe in all of that?!» 
(Female, 27, 1.5 months in England)
«There have been various offers – ring or send mail 
[an official letter to a civil servant in England]. It is not 
hopelessly lost. In Latvia, it seems that it is lost. The 
only way to achieve something is to meet eye-to-eye 
and insist on a meeting. Here [in England], you get a 
letter which says that they received your documents, 
and it will take two, three or four weeks to respond. If 
no response is received in four weeks, then please ring 
this number. The letters do not disappear. In Latvia, I 
think, someone just sticks the letter in a desk drawer.» 
(Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)
«When it comes to work, for instance, I get a new 
job, there is a Latvian who is already working there, 
he does not see you as a compatriot, he bosses you 
around in terms of what you are supposed to do, and it 
gets almost to the point of cursing. Latvians are not the 
very best people.» (Male, 51, three years in England)
Opportunities/limitations on being a consumer
Opportunities to consume products and receive 
services not just for entertainment and leisure, but also 
for vital everyday needs are one reason why people are 
positive about their lives in the new host countries. In 
Latvia, the freedom of an individual as a consumer under 
free market conditions is often limited very substantially 
because of low wages, unemployment, comparatively 
high costs of living. At the same time, the new neo-
liberal market economy that was developed in Latvia 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union involves the idea 
that individuals themselves must choose how to provide 
for themselves and their families. Residents of the 
country are expected to be consumers who consume 
goods and services, as opposed to citizens who have 
the right to a specific level of state aid (Nash, 2010, 142). 
Sociology Professor George Ritzer at the University of 
Maryland has made reference to the ideas of the Polish 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman and has emphasized the 
concept of the «dangerous consumer». The point is that 
a person or a group is dangerous if there is insufficient 
consumption, thus endangering the consumer society 
(Ritzer, Goodman, 2001, 410). This seal of a «dangerous 
consumer» creates a certain amount of tension among 
those individuals who lack the resources that are needed 
to become a fully valuable participant in the market. The 
limitations do not, however, reduce the desire among 
individuals to obtain the goods and services that are 
offered in the market. In other words, people want to be 
part of the consumer culture. Wages in those countries to 
which people have emigrated allow them to be a part of 
the consumer culture. Among Latvian émigrés, that is an 
important factor in deciding to move abroad:
«Of course, that is what happened – it was a mass 
process [of lending]. Perhaps you do not believe in 
it and are shaken up by it, but you visit someone or 
meet with friends or acquaintances and tell them 
about what you bought yesterday. You tell them 
that you took out a loan, so there are no problems. 
Maybe I can do the same thing? At the end of the day, 
of course, you have only yourself to blame.» (Male, 
34 years, 1.5 years in England)
«Let’s say that I go to the store and see something 
that I can buy. It is not the same as in Latvia, where 
you look at the thing, you drool about it a little bit, 
and then you turn around and leave. And if I allow 
myself to buy something in that system, then I will 
go hungry for the entire month. That’s not the case 
here.» (Female, 48, five years in England)
«The wage, of course, is the main thing. Even the 
minimum wage here in England is four times higher 
than in Latvia. Even if you earn the minimum wage, you 
can afford a lot more here than you could with Latvia’s 
minimum wage.» (Male, 27, 1.5 months in England)
A state which cares for people/A state which does 
not care
50 years of experience with Socialism still affects 
the views of society and individuals to a certain extent 
in terms of what the relations between a state and its 
citizens should be. Professor Juris Dreifelds at Brock 
University, when writing about Latvia, has argued that 
it is very difficult in a short period of time to change the 
«dependency on the caretaker state» (Dreifelds, 1996), 
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and instead accept a new situation which speaks to 
an individual’s autonomous responsibility for himself 
or herself. The newly obtained freedoms have been 
unknown in everyday practice, and they speak to 
excessive individual responsibility. On the one hand, 
society appears not to be ready for this and expects 
greater support and care from the state when it comes to 
people. On the other hand, the fact of emigration shows 
that people have undertaken such «responsibility» and 
that they have accepted a certain level of autonomy and 
the ability to change things in terms of their situation and 
their welfare (Ķešāne, 2011). Although there are evident 
signs of autonomy in the behaviour of individuals, the 
stories told by respondents include certain nostalgia 
for a country which cares for its citizens, as opposed 
to leaving them alone under market circumstances 
and competition. The new host country, according to 
respondents, fulfils the function of the caretaker state:
«The first thing is that my children have an 
ensured life and future. That is the basic reason why 
we are here. It is the basic reason why I am here, 
because I have five kids to think about. That is the 
foundation. I saw how much social institutions are 
forthcoming toward children and families here. Take 
the doctor, for instance, or the dentist – when a child 
is treated, you do not have to pay anything. Because 
I have children, I have an NHS card for the doctor. 
Operations are free, repair of my teeth is free, I get all 
kinds of help.» (Female, 48, five years in London)
«I came here to work, I have a job, and I do not 
look at the situation with much more depth. Damn 
it, I came to another country, and they can give me 
something [work in this case] which Latvia cannot 
provide;what else can I desire, how can I say that 
maybe something irritates me here.» (Male, 34, 
1.5 years in England)
The desire among émigrés for the ‘helping hand’ of 
national and local governments is even seen in stories 
about everyday situations such as the need to put up 
street signs so as to make it easier for people to make 
their way around:
«Yes, it seems that London is even larger, but 
when I come to Rīga, I cannot understand in which 
direction I am supposed to go. Here the transport 
system is different. You take a map, you find out 
where you live, and off you go, because it’s clear 
where things are. It’s immediately clear. In Rīga, 
I’m always in a state of chaos. I don’t know in which 
direction I’m supposed to go or where things are.» 
(Female, 48, five years in England).
The stories of respondents show that in the formation 
of new forms of belonging towards the state this feeling 
that besides individual’s self responsibility over oneself 
there is also responsibility of the state towards its citizens 
is pretty important.
Security/insecurity
Consequential of the previous dichotomy is the 
dichotomy which emphasizes significance of the security/
insecurity dialectics in the quest for the new forms of 
belonging. The life in the new host country provides 
both economic and social security which in Latvia in 
general or at the time of migration decision seemed to 
be lacking. Observations, experience and feelings of 
respondents, when living in the host country, seems to 
guarantee the state of security and stability in the long 
term perspective: 
«I wouldn’t say that I really like it here, not at all.
So why are you here?
I think that it’s because of the stability which 
is here. I think that if it disappears, then things will 
change.» (Female, 39 seven years in England)
«I believe that the thing that is most missing in 
Latvia is a sense of security. You can fight and fight, 
and if you see that there is meaning to what you are 
doing, then there is a result, but if you don’t see that 
meaning and have a family, then it is terrible. If you 
have a family, then you all but end up in depression. 
It’s dreadful.» (Female, 27, 1.5 months in England)
Interestingly, there are respondents who compare 
this feeling of safety, provided by the host country’s 
economic situation and particularly its national economy 
structure, with the life in the Soviet times. Among 
respondents this feeling of security is created by the 
awareness that there are many enterprises or factories at 
which each family member can find a job:
«Yes, but there are opportunities, opportunities. 
You perhaps have to wait for three or four weeks. The 
seasons of the year are also important, but there are 
opportunities. All that you have to do is want to work, 
but I can almost say that I feel a sense of guarantees of 
the same type [in England] that existed back then [in 
Soviet times]. Mama had a job, so did dad.» (Male, 34, 
1.5 years in England)
Instrumentality/emotions
In writing about the emergence of identities among 
émigrés, the Greek socio-anthropologist Ioanna Laliotou 
has argued that of essence in this is the meaning of 
feelings, desires and imagination, because the agency 
of the individual is not just rational (Laliotou, 2004, 9). 
In the beginning it is mentioned that emotions have 
an important role in the formation of new forms of 
belonging for each of the dichotomies. By underlining 
this dichotomy emotions are emphasized as a separate 
analytical category. Firstly, emotions are meaningful in the 
stories of respondents, since they mirror disappointment 
and sadness related to the exit from Latvia:
«I think that Latvia is very beautiful. [..] Not as a 
state, yes. I would say that I had never thought that 
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we would be forced to leave our country in this way. 
[..] For a long time I was such a patriot of Latvia. I didn’t 
want to leave even though my friends were calling me 
to come to Dublin when times were still good there. 
Eventually, though, I got sick of the situation. [..] It’s a 
painful issue, because I never imagined that I might 
go to England to clean hotel rooms [begins to weep].» 
(Female, 48 years, five months in England)
Secondly, emotions in the decision to leave and 
return unfold as an opposite to instrumentality. In the 
narratives of emigrants, when making a decision about 
the place to live, often instrumental thinking prevails 
over the emotional one. Important role in this decision is 
given to such existential issues as work, income and social 
guarantees:
 «It’s hard to say whether you want it or not, you 
want to go visiting, but the primary thing is to have 
something to eat and somewhere to sleep. Having 
something to eat is the primary thing, right? What 
can you do? You have love for your motherland, but if 
there is nothing to eat at home, then that is not good. 
Whether you want it or not, I don’t know – I suppose 
that the disappointment is so great. If someone were 
to tell me that [..] the road back would not be fast or 
easy... I don’t know what guarantees and promises 
would be needed to get me to run right back home. I 
don’t know.» (Male, 34, 1.5 years in England)
These statements are in line with observations from 
other researchers to say that links of belonging are 
different in qualitative terms when speaking about a host 
country and a country of origin (Gustafson, 2005). People 
usually form a sense of belonging in their host country 
on the basis of instrumental or practical considerations, 
while the sense of belonging toward the country of 
origin is more based on emotions (Gustafson, 2005, 7). 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that with respect to the 
country of origin just emotional ties develop, though 
they certainly dominate over instrumental ties. Opposite 
situation develops with respect to the relationship with 
the new host country. It is of importance to note that 
influence of emigration over belonging is not symmetrical, 
meaning that weakening of belonging towards the 
country of origin does not necessarily multiply belonging 
towards the host country, since both belongings are 
qualitatively different.
The things said by some respondents indirectly reveal 
that practical considerations about emigration eventually 
reduce the importance of emotional attitudes toward the 
country of origin if emigration actually occurs:
«The first time I flew to Latvia was after eight 
months or so. [..] When I got out of the plane, I 
breathed the air as I had never done before in my life. 
I felt that the air was so very fresh. I had tears in my 
eyes, you see, a very peculiar feeling. That was only 
the first time, though. Now, however, I have been 
in Latvia, I was there in the autumn, but then I came 
back, got out of the plane and thought ‘Wow, I’m 
home. How nice!’» (Female, 48, five years in England)
«Of course, they [the respondent’s children, who 
now live in England] come to visit, and everything 
seems peachy, but then you sit down and think about 
coming home and finding that you don’t have any milk 
or bread, you had nothing, and then you decide that at 
the very end of the day, it is better here. Still, it is nice 
to go for a visit.» (Female, 48, five years in England).
A country/the state
The country/state dichotomy emphasizing the 
belonging to a particular country or a particular state in 
the formation of new identities is closely related to the 
instrumentality/emotions dichotomy. Emigree narratives 
often reveal longing after Latvia as a country with clean 
and beautiful nature as well as longing after activities 
rooted in Latvia’s nature. Belonging to the new host 
country, in contrast, is related to the socio-economic 
situation of the host country:
«Life here is a life of work. There is not much 
relaxation here. In Latvia you have the Summer 
Solstice. The environment is better, the water is 
cleaner. Here everyone swims in swimming pools. If 
you go to swim in the river, people wonder who the 
person is who is swimming in the river. Here I think 
that when you get out of the water, you break out in 
a rash. There [in Latvia], everything is cleaner. People 
pump sap out of trees for juice in the spring, for 
instance. I asked a British person why they don’t do 
that, and he said that it was a ‘dirty’ process. I asked: 
‘What’s dirty about it? It cleans you from the inside, 
it ferments and is wonderful.’ No, they just buy some 
lemonade, and they’re not interested in drawing sap 
from a tree.» (Male, 51, three years in England)
«I think that Latvia is very beautiful.
You mean as a piece of land?
No, as a country. I tell you, I had never thought 
that we would be forced to leave our own country in 
this way.» (Female, 48, five months in England)
«You know what I miss from Latvia? The forest! I 
miss my flowerbeds at home. [..] I love flowers, and it 
is hard for me to live without land.» (Female, 48, five 
years in England)
Institutionalisation of belonging
Citizenship
It may seem that the flow of labour force out of Latvia 
is a new phenomenon, and so it is too early to talk about 
the institutionalisation of new senses of belonging. 
However, émigrés who have become citizens of their new 
host country say things to show that institutionalisation of 
belonging is already happening, and it is largely linked to 
Migration: Past and Present
 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MOBILITY AND CAPABILITY 75
the sense of belonging and to the dimension of emotions 
on the one hand, but also practical considerations on 
the other. Residency status and citizenship status in 
the new host country are related to a greater sense of 
stability and security; for example, citizenship in the 
new host country gives the émigré the same rights and 
freedoms as local residents have, and that means broader 
opportunities in various areas of public life. The stories 
of émigrés also show, however, that it is not easy to give 
up Latvian citizenship, and that has more to do with the 
dimension of emotions, while the sense of belonging 
in the new country of residence has more to do with the 
instrumental dimension (Gustafson, 2005).
«The last dilemma was very, very difficult  – 
I had to go and turn in my Latvian passport. In 
psychological terms it was a bit difficult when I first 
decided that I would seek [British] citizenship and sent 
in the application form. I was very convinced in all of 
that, but when I had to take the oath of citizenship, I 
started to think. Perhaps that would not be the case 
if Latvia were to permit double citizenship. Of course, 
that would be the case. Or maybe it would not be the 
case, because if you have lived here for a long time, 
then you think about guarantees of some kind, about 
everything else. [..] I surely do not want to find myself 
in a situation in which one fine day someone tells me 
thank you, you need a visa now or you have to go 
home.» (Female, 39, seven years in England)
«We are permanent residents, everything is open 
for us here, and the only question is about getting a 
British passport. We’ll think about it. If you change 
jobs, if you want a more prestigious place to work, 
then all the doors are open if you are a permanent 
resident. If not, then people look at you oddly.» 
(Female, 49, five years in England)
Professor Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, a social sciences 
specialist at Harvard, has argued that in the global world 
of the present day, senses of belonging relate to human 
rights and various civil rights (see Delanty, 2001). At the 
same time, however, the statements and experience 
of émigrés show that the decision related to achieving 
citizenship or permanent residency in a new country 
of residence means making a choice between two 
qualitatively different things – emotions and practical or 
instrumental considerations. On the one hand, people 
can be longing for their motherland, for people with a 
similar mentality, for Latvia’s environment and for their 
homes. On the other hand, when people choose to 
institutionalise their sense of belonging in the new host 
country , preference is given to practical considerations.
Culture and language
Institutionalisation of belonging often relates to 
various cultural activities such as choir singing, folk 
dancing and holiday celebrations. It is evident that 
émigrés are engaging in cultural activities that are 
typical of Latvia, but this is something which émigrés 
discuss quite seldom. They also say that comparatively 
few people are interested in getting involved in such 
activities. There are émigré organisations in Great 
Britain and Ireland which organise various cultural and 
entertainment events such as choir singing, folk dancing, 
and theatrical performances. It is not clear, however, 
whether the desire to sing in a choir or to dance folk 
dances relates to a desire to preserve a Latvian identity, 
as opposed to the individual’s simple desire to sing and 
dance or to meet and make friends with others who have 
the same interests.
«Yes, we have a choir at our Latvian organisation, 
as well as the folk dance ensemble Jampadracis. We 
are establishing a theatrical troupe, though only two 
people have signed up so far. As I said, it is hard for 
Latvians to do things together, they prefer to hide 
in their own little caves.» (Female, 34, seven years in 
Ireland)
«Everything is in place here in Ireland, everything 
seems to be happening. The unique element of 
national pride is Riverdance, there are all kinds of 
concerts and exhibitions. [..] I miss Latvian things, 
though. In Latvia I cared nothing for folklore and folk 
songs, but here I have become a Latvian. [..] I think 
that I have become a Latvian here, and I need to get 
back to Latvia.» (Female, 34, seven years in Ireland)
Opportunities for the children of émigrés to receive 
an education in their native language is also a way to 
maintain a sense of belonging toward Latvia on the basis 
of the Latvian language. There are Latvian schools both 
in Ireland and in England to which parents can send their 
kids a few times a month to strengthen Latvian language 
skills and to learn about Latvian culture and traditions. 
The statements from émigrés, however, show that not 
all parents are familiar with these opportunities. There 
are also those who are not interested in sending their 
children to Latvian schools while abroad.
«There are Russian schools [in London], but no 
Latvian ones. There are such schools in Ireland, yes, 
but not in England. Sometimes we agree to have 
children write a little essay so that there is at least 
something in all of this. It’s easier for him to speak 
English than Latvian. I don’t feel it myself, but when 
we were in Latvia, people said that he speaks with an 
accent.» (Female, 48, five years in England)
Conclusion
There are different explanations of the content 
of national identity in the scholarly literature. In the 
introduction to this publication, it was noted that 
researchers differentiate various dimensions of national 
identity  – the psychological, cultural, ethnic, historical, 
territorial, political, legal and economic dimension (see, 
e.g., Smith 1991, 15; Guibernau, 2007). When analyzing 
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emigration as a source of belonging in the framework 
of dichotomies it can be seen that identity, on the one 
hand, is closely related to the dimension of feelings, 
emotions and psychological factors, but, on the other 
hand, with the civic and economic dimension, where the 
latter also has an influence over the formers. Emotional 
belonging also is often expressed as a series of negative 
associations with Latvia, because the socioeconomic 
limitations which people felt there left them with a sense 
of resentment and humiliation. Opportunities to be an 
economically active citizen, to provide for the self and 
to prove oneself and a sense that in the case of need the 
caring hand of the state will be present are important 
factors which determine in which country to be. Professor 
Nikolas Rose and Professor Peter Miller from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science have written 
that «transformation in identity should not be studied 
at the level of culture, or solely in terms of the history 
of ideas about the self. A genealogy of identity must 
address the practices that act upon human beings and 
human conduct in specific domains of existence, and 
the systems of thoughts that underpin these practices 
and are embodied within them» (Rose, Miller, 2008, 174). 
Also new neoliberal order or market orthodoxy, which 
has developed in Latvia after the collapse of the Soviet 
union carries the idea that an individual is responsible 
for oneself in various areas of life, including labor market. 
As noted in the introduction, a conference held in Riga 
in 1998 to discuss the political nation and ethnic policies 
focused on the importance and role of an active and 
responsible citizen in the functioning of a democratic 
country. However, the socioeconomic circumstances as 
defined by the chosen path of the political economy of 
Latvia has been limiting to the agency of an individual in 
order to support the idea of self-responsible individual, 
while emigration has been a way to enforce this self-
responsibility (Ķešāne, 2011).
All of the elements which appear in dichotomies 
as important circumstances for the establishment of a 
new sense of belonging  – social justice/injustice, trust/
distrust, opportunities/limitations to be a consumer, 
the state’s care/lack of care for its residents, security/
insecurity, instrumentality/emotionality, a country/ the 
state  – demonstrate the social and economic dimension 
as an important component in belonging to a state. This 
is very important in the context of Latvia’s development 
as a state and a nation. At the same time, however, public 
discourse in Latvia often names history, culture and 
language, as opposed to welfare, as the most important 
elements in the shaping of national identity. Statements 
among émigrés show very clearly that these elements are 
not enough to strengthen a sense of belonging to Latvia 
to the point where émigrés become convinced that they 
must return to the country. Without a powerful social, 
economic and civil dimension, national identity cannot 
be competitive with other identities that are available 
in our globalised world  – those which determine the 
mutability of belonging and identity. If the abilities of 
the individual are not systematically limited and if the 
individual has welfare, feels secure and stable and is 
needed in the community, then the individual wants to 
belong to that community and assist in its growth.
Major conclusions. Major tasks
Major conclusions
Without a powerful social, economic and civil dimension, national identity cannot be competitive with other 
identities that are available in our globalised world  – those which determine the mutability of belonging and 
identity. If the abilities of the individual are not systematically limited and if the individual has welfare, feels secure 
and stable and is needed in the community, then the individual wants to belong to that community and assist in 
its growth. 
Major tasks
There must be powerful discourse in the public arena about the positive experience of émigrés who return 
home and about opportunities to ensure welfare in life here in Latvia.
At the level of national policy, there must be a competitive educational system which is harmonised with the 
main directions of economic development in the country, thus motivating young people to live, learn and work 
in Latvia.
Those who shape and implement economic, welfare-related and social policies must take into account the 
principles of political responsibility and legal confidence, as this is a key prerequisite for establishing or renewing 
public trust in the political system, also facilitating civic participation and a stronger sense of belonging to the 
state.
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2.3. the changing face 
of Latvian emigration, 
2000-20101
Introduction1
In a historical perspective, a decade is very brief. 
However, the patterns of selection of the Baltic emigrants 
have changed several times during the first decade of the 
21st century. These changes concern the main reasons for 
emigration, the most popular destinations, as well as the 
profile of emigrants and their plans.
Starting with 2005 and especially with 2009, the 
number of emigrants reached such a level which puts 
under threat reproduction of Latvian population, 
economic development and sustainability of the social 
security system. Thus, notwithstanding some positive 
side effects of emigration, it has become a serious 
obstacle to the human development in Latvia. 
This section begins with a brief description of the 
history of emigration trends shaped by development 
of economic and institutional factors in Latvia and in 
potential host countries. The recent history of emigration 
from the Baltic countries can be divided into three 
episodes: (i) the pre-accession period (which we loosely 
designate as 2000-2003, although it includes also the 
first four months of 2004); (ii) the post-accession period 
of economic growth, to which we refer as to 2004-2008 
(although the crisis hit Latvia in the last quarter of 
2008, its effect on emigration appears only in the data 
of 2009-2010); (iii) The crisis period, 2009-2010. Our 
description (a qualitative story rather than a quantitative 
report) is linked to the economic theory of migration and, 
where necessary, refers to the literature on migration 
processes in Latvia and Europe. We will put forward some 
hypotheses about the nature of the emigration flows in 
each of the periods. 
Later on, we will test these hypotheses during the 
quantitative analysis of migration processes and the 
migrants’ profiling. The main data source used for this 
purpose is representative population survey «NI: Place, 
Capability, and Migration. 2010» commissioned by the 
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia in the 
framework of the State Research Programme «National 
Identity»; we refer to this survey as the «NI: PCM. 2010» 
survey hereafter. 1,009 persons aged 18 to 74 have 
been interviewed during this survey in December 2010 
and January 2011. We will use sections of this survey 
1 The author thanks DNB Bank and research centre SKDS for the 
dataset of the survey «DNB NORD Latvia’s Barometer No. 35. 
February 2011», the Latvian Ministry of Welfare for datasets 
of the surveys conducted in the framework of the ESF funded 
National Programme «Labour Market Studies» (2005-2007), 
and Marcis Trapencieris for the dataset of the population 
survey conducted in July 2008 by SPI.
devoted to: (i) respondent’s work and life experience 
abroad during the last 10 years; (ii) respondent’s family 
members and close relatives who emigrated between 
2000 and 2010 and lived abroad during the survey period 
(this gives us a representative sample of 471 emigrants, 
with information on their gender, age, education, 
year of emigration, host country, main activity, living 
arrangements and plans to return within five years 
or within six months.); (iii) respondent’s emigration 
intentions (respondents older than 65 years have been 
excluded when analysing these intentions)2. 
Furthermore, we are going to provide realistic 
estimates of the net outflow of Latvian population 
during 2000-2010 (by period and main destinations). For 
this purpose we use data from several sources: (i)  the 
receiving countries’ data on population with Latvian 
background (citizenship and/or country of birth), as 
well as on immigration and emigration of persons with 
Latvian background, provided by Eurostat, OECD, and 
national statistical offices of selected European countries; 
(ii)  data on allocation of social security numbers to 
Latvian nationals in Ireland and the United Kingdom; 
(iii)  data on the number or recent return migrants in 
Latvia, obtained from various population surveys; 
(iv)  data provided by Statistics Latvia on net migration 
from Latvia to countries outside EU and OECD. Resulting 
estimates differ dramatically from the official data of 
Statistics Latvia (as of August 2011), exceeding those by a 
factor of 6 to 7.
When testing the hypotheses on emigration patterns, 
the results based on the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data on 
emigrants and return migrants will be compared with the 
results by Hazans and Philips (2010), based on different 
kind of data (the Labour Force Surveys 2002-2007). 
Furthermore, the findings on emigration intentions from 
the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey will be complemented by 
findings from the «DnB NORD Latvia’s Barometer No. 35. 
February 2011» survey («DnB NORD» survey hereafter) 
devoted to emigration issues. This supports robustness of 
our conclusions. Moreover, combining the data from the 
two surveys provides an in-depth insight on the further 
2 It is worth mentioning that information on emigration 
experience of respondents of the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey 
and their close relatives during the period between 2000 
and 2010 is especially valuable, taking into account that the 
Population Census of 2011 will not be able to provide an 
accurate information about this period, because the Census 
questionnaire asked about living abroad after 1989 (rather 
than after 2000; plausibly, the question has been copied 
from the Population Census of 2000); by requesting «too 
much», the Census questionnaire undermined respondents’ 
motivation to answer this question.
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development of Latvian emigration, because the «NI: 
PCM. 2010» survey includes information on concreteness 
of emigration plans and refers to the near future, whereas 
DnB NORD survey explores the reasons why people are 
going to leave Latvia. In the course of the analysis, data 
of several earlier surveys (conducted in 2005-2008) will be 
also used for comparison.
Economic theory of migration:  
the basics
According to the human capital model of migration 
decisions (Sjaastad 1962; Borjas 1987, 1999), an individual 
(or a family) decides whether to move by comparing 
expected (over the planning period) benefits and 
cost associated with migration. In order to assess [net] 
benefits, one should account for all factors that can 
affect the quality of life in the home country and in 
the potential host country: job finding and job losing 
probabilities, expected earnings, legal status, career 
prospects, working and living conditions, generosity 
of social security system, social and cultural norms, 
perceived life prospects for children, etc. These factors 
can interact with each other in a variety of ways. For 
instance, attractiveness of long-term migration is 
significantly undermined if, in the case of job loss in 
the host country, the immigrant has to apply for a work 
permit repeatedly. The same is true if employment 
protection and/or unemployment assistance legislation 
in the host country does not cover the immigrants to the 
same extent as native workers. 
The determinants of migration flows are often 
subdivided into two groups: push factors are related to 
negative (undesired) circumstances in the country of 
origin, whereas pull factors are those which make the 
potential host countries attractive (Lee, 1966). A factor 
can play both roles either simultaneously (for instance, 
in 2009-2010, high unemployment in Latvia was a push 
factor, but low unemployment in Norway was a pull factor) 
or depending on circumstances (for instance, the wage 
level is a pull factor for professionals who earn 600  Lats 
(€ 854) per month in Latvia but can earn three to five times 
more abroad, while it is a push factor for those whose 
earnings in Latvia are not sufficient to support their family). 
The costs of migration, in turn, include monetary and 
effort costs and can be subdivided into the following 
categories: (i) costs related to acquiring the necessary 
information and job search costs; (ii) transportation costs; 
(iii) costs of maintaining contact with the country of 
origin; (iv) psychological costs related to missing people 
and the environment one has left behind, uncertainty 
associated with life in the new country, and adaptation to 
the new reality. 
This framework will help us to understand the 
individuals’ migration decisions, as well as the 
characteristics which drive emigrants’ self-selection, in 
other words, which groups have higher propensity to 
emigrate in a specific situation. Let us explain this point 
with an example comparing individuals with different 
family status. Other things equal, psychological costs 
of emigration are lower for a person living alone than 
for somebody living with a partner and/or children, but 
plans to move alone (at least initially). On the other hand, 
emigration together with the whole family implies higher 
transportation and adaptation costs. Furthermore, if the 
partner has a good job in the home country and limited 
possibilities to find such a job abroad, expected net 
benefits from migration can be much lower for the family 
than for a single mover. Hence, in usual circumstances, 
the model predicts that single persons are more likely 
to move. On the other hand, if during an economic crisis 
the income fall is especially painful for many families with 
children, these families will be ready to accept substantial 
psychological costs and, probably, will demonstrate a 
higher propensity to emigrate than single persons.
The pre-accession wave:  
personal initiative and effort
Between 2000 and 2003, Latvia featured rather high 
unemployment (above 10% according to the Labour 
Force Survey data), combined with very low wages: 
average earnings in the public sector (at purchasing 
power parity) was well below earnings of an unskilled 
worker in the UK, Germany or the Nordic countries1. 
Therefore many people in Latvia were dissatisfied 
with their material well-being and were considering 
permanent or temporary emigration as a solution to their 
problems. According to a survey of economically active 
population conducted in 2000 (see Rose, 2000: 34-35 or 
Hazans, 2003: Table 3.3.), 8% of ethnic Latvians and 25% 
of their minority counterparts said that they (or some 
family member) would like to work abroad [at least] for 
some years when their country enters the EU; moreover, 
4% of Latvians and 9% of non-Latvians were ready to 
emigrate permanently. Higher propensity to emigrate 
among non-Latvians can be explained by the fact that 
their labour market situation at that time was, on average, 
worse than that of titular population (Hazans, 2010, 2011), 
as well as by relatively weaker sense of belonging to 
Latvia (see Section 1.2 in this Report). These data imply 
that in year 2000, about 15% of economically active 
population of Latvia were willing to work abroad, and 
half of them were considering permanent emigration. 
According to the same survey, another 25% of the 
labour force considered emigration as a possibility. Thus, 
emigration potential was rather big already at that time.
Actual emigration rates were of course much lower2. 
Emigration potential was restricted not only by hopes 
on better life in Latvia (in 2000-2003, unemployment 
1 Hazans (2003, Tables A4.1–A4.4) provides a detailed comparison 
of earnings.
2 As shown in Box 2.16 below, by the end of 2010, 30 to 50 
thousand persons, who left Latvia in 2000 – 2003, were living 
abroad. On the other hand, in the first quarter of 2003, 6.6% 
of users of Internet portal «Delfi» were working abroad (for 
a foreign employer) according to an online survey (Hazans, 
2003). Taking into account that the total number of «Delfi» 
users was estimated between 192 and 388 thousand persons 
(Hazans, 2003, Notes to Table 3.2), this corresponds to 12 to 26 
thousand labour emigrants. 
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was slowly but steadily decreasing and earnings were 
growing faster than consumer prices), but also by 
institutional environment which was not favourable for 
economic migration and by very high migration costs. 
Both residence and work permits were necessary unless 
one was ready to take on the risk of illegal immigration 
and/or employment. Latvian non-citizens, in addition, 
needed visas to enter most EU member states. Looking 
for a job abroad was a lot more difficult and expensive 
than it is nowadays. International phone calls from Latvia 
were very expensive (and, believe it or not, there was 
no Skype available...). The internet was slow, expensive 
and of limited access. Flights were fairly expensive, too. 
Moreover, there were no convenient wide-coverage 
sources of information on vacancies and living and 
working conditions abroad such as the EURES portal1 
developed after 2004, where this information is even 
presented in Latvian.
 The services of private recruitment firms were 
expensive and often associated with high risk of fraud. 
In an online survey conducted in Latvia in 2003, among 
2,100 respondents who said that after EU accession they 
would be ready to work in another EU country, 89% 
would move only with a work contract in hand, and 
only 20% considered a contract with a licensed Latvian 
recruitment firm as a sufficient guarantee (Hazans 2003: 
Tables A2.12, A2.13).
In sum, economic emigration in the pre-accession 
period was restricted by rather high de facto thresholds 
with respect to own-initiative, access to information, and 
willingness to accept risk. In such a situation, relatively 
lower emigration costs were associated with a high level 
of initiative, professional or at least private contacts in 
potential host countries, good foreign language and IT 
skills, and opportunities to use the internet for private 
purposes at the workplace. Clearly, all these attributes are 
more often found among university graduates. 
Emigrants’ choice of host country was also probably 
affected by cost considerations: while some tried to 
minimize information and adaptation costs by using 
social networks associated with previous emigration and 
immigration waves to/from the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Sweden and Germany, as well Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus, others were oriented towards relatively new 
directions, mainly the United Kingdom and Ireland (which 
combined lower language barriers than other EU countries 
with being much closer than other English-speaking 
countries), but also other countries of the «Old Europe». 
The above discussion leads to the following 
expectations about the pre-accession emigration wave:
(H1) Theoretical considerations suggest that in 
2000-2003, economic emigrants from Latvia featured: 
(a)  a higher than average proportion of tertiary educated 
persons;
(b)  a higher than average proportion of ethnic minorities;
(c)  a high degree of geographical diversification.
1 EURES  – The European Job Mobility Portal, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/eures/ 
The post-accession emigration 
(before the crisis):  
Institutional and market factors
During Latvia’s first five years within the EU (before 
the effect of the crisis on migration patterns became 
apparent) the migration flows were shaped mainly 
by two factors: (i) gradual implementation of the free 
movement of labour within the EU (see Brucker et al. 
2009, Table 2.1); (ii) economic growth in Latvia as well as 
in the potential host countries.
Economic growth in the old Europe resulted in 
an increased demand for labour, thus enhancing 
expected gains of the potential economic emigrants and 
stimulating migration. On the other hand, due to strong 
economic growth in Latvia, unemployment rate was 
falling while real wages were growing, thus gradually 
reducing expected gains from emigration. As the result 
motivation to move abroad was falling, whilst motivation 
to return among recent emigrants was on the rise. 
See Hazans and Philips (2010, Section 7) for a detailed 
discussion of emigration impact on Latvia’s labour market 
and economy in 2004-2007. 
Introduction of the free movement of labour lowered 
both the monetary and the non-monetary costs of 
job search abroad and migration, thus stimulating 
emigration. By contrast with relatively slow changes in 
Latvia’s labour market, the institutional changes had an 
almost immediate effect. Since May 1, 2004, citizens of 
Latvia and other new member states could compete for 
jobs in Ireland, the UK and Sweden on equal terms with 
natives2. This reduced psychological and adaptation costs 
of migration, as well as the risk of failed labour migration. 
At the same time, European Mobility Portal and 
consultants of European Employment Services (EURES) 
started to work in Latvia (and elsewhere in Europe). 
EURES consultants provided about 10,000 consultations 
in 2004-2005, followed by 12,000 in 2006-2007. This 
substantially reduced potential emigrants’ information 
and job search costs. 
Migration-friendly institutional changes boosted 
demand for international transportation and tele-
communication services. This resulted in a strong growth 
of the cheap segment of the passenger and cargo 
transportation market across Europe (including Latvia of 
course), causing air and land transportation costs, as well 
as international phone call tariffs to fall; communication 
costs were also reduced by increased coverage and speed 
of internet connections. This, in turn, further reduced 
both job search costs and direct costs of migration. As 
other side effects of the EU provisions for free movement 
of labour one can mention Latvian diasporas in Ireland, 
the UK, Sweden, Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Rich 
social infrastructure (including printed and electronic 
media) within these diasporas (see SKDS, 2006; Hazans 
2 In Ireland and in the UK, citizens of the new member states 
need to register to obtain living and working permits; 
however, if the documents are in order, the permits are 
guaranteed without any specific prerequisites (Brucker et al., 
2009, Table 2.1).
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and Philips, 2010: Section 10) also helped to reduce both 
the risk of «failed emigration» and information, job search 
and psychic costs of migration. 
Several factors contributed to further decline in 
emigration costs and related risks. First, because of 
ongoing emigration and return migration, potential 
emigrants could increasingly rely on relatives and friends 
as a source of information about work abroad (this is 
known as social network or migrant network effect). 
Second, a number of countries (Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain; in part also Norway) opened their 
labour markets in 2006; the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
followed in 2007; (see Brucker et al. (2009: Table 2.1) for 
details. 
As the result of these developments, the threshold 
for potential emigrants with respect to own-initiative 
and risk taking was not as high as before EU accession. 
Hence, in 2004-2008 emigrants’ self-selection in terms 
of human capital was driven not so much by individuals’ 
comparative advantage in terms of [falling] migration 
costs, but mainly by expected gains in terms of income 
and working conditions. These gains were, on average, 
greater for persons with secondary or lower education. 
For instance, in 2005 tertiary educated employees in 
Latvia earned 54% (76%) more than otherwise similar 
workers with secondary (below secondary) education 
(Hazans, 2007: p.18 and Figure 2.1). On the other hand, 
40% to 50% of tertiary educated Latvian migrant workers 
abroad in 2004-2007 held jobs which did not require a 
higher education (Hazans and Philips 2010: Figure 7) and 
hence could not earn much more than other emigrants 
from Latvia1. 
The effect of ethnicity and citizenship on the 
propensity to emigrate has also changed. Due to strong 
economic growth and labour shortages caused by 
emigration (see, for example, Hazans and Philips 2010: 
Section 7 and Figure 12), as well as gradual improvements 
in language skills among minorities (Hazans 2010: 
Figure  3; Hazans 2011: Tables 8.8 and 8.9), the labour 
market position of ethnic minorities in 2004-2007 
steadily improved: economic activity and employment 
rates among Non-Latvians were growing faster than 
among Latvians, thus reducing ethnic employment gap 
(which disappeared completely by 2007, see Hazans, 
2010, 2011). In addition, a substantial part of the minority 
population – those without Latvian citizenship – was not 
covered by the legal provisions on free movement of 
labour2. 
To sum up, theoretical considerations suggest 
the following expectations about the post-accession 
emigration wave:
1 Brucker et al. (2009, Tables 6.7 and 6.8) show that in 
2004-2007 returns to schooling for post-accession immigrants 
from new member states in the United Kingdom were quite 
low: just 2 per cent per year of schooling Moreover, 82 per 
cent of tertiary educated representatives of this group 
worked in medium- or low-skilled jobs.
2 Indirectly – via spouses who held Latvian citizenship, as well 
as via social networks – new migration possibilities emerged 
also for non-citizens. Nevertheless, their relative position in 
comparison to citizens worsened.
(H2) Between 2004 and 2008, in comparison with the 
pre-accession period,
(a)  the rate of economic emigration from Latvia 
substantially increased due to introduction of free 
movement of labour within EU, decreasing migration 
costs and social network effect; 
(b)  migration flows to a large extent re-directed towards 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden; 
(c)  the proportion of tertiary educated persons among 
emigrants decreased and became lower than similar 
proportion among [adult] population of Latvia;
(d)  the proportion of non-Latvians (especially non-
citizens) among emigrants declined.
In addition,
(e)  In the second half of the period, the intensity of 
emigration declined due to strong economic growth 
in Latvia.
 
It is worth noting that validity of hypotheses (a), (b) 
and (e) have been confirmed in previous studies (Hazans, 
2009; Hazans and Philips, 2010; Brucker et al., 2009) and 
is now well known. Hypotheses (c) and (d) have been 
earlier confirmed (using Latvian Labour Force Survey 
data) with respect to guest workers who worked abroad 
while still being considered as household members in 
Latvia (Hazans, 2009: 9, 14; Hazans and Philips, 2010: 
Figures 3 and 11); here we provide a broader evidence. 
Another important feature (which could not be 
envisaged based on theoretical considerations alone) of 
this emigration wave is its mixed nature: while migration 
was to a large extent short-term and/or cyclical (Krišjāne 
et al., 2007: 57, 61, 76-77, 87; European Commission, 2008: 
121; Hazans and Philips, 2010: Section 6, Figures 9 and 
10), Latvian diasporas abroad were steadily growing. 
According to Eurostat population statistics summarised 
by Fic et al. (2011: Table 3.1), between end of 2000 and 
end of 2009, the number of Latvian nationals in EU-15 
countries increased from 14 to 80 thousand; almost 90% 
of this increase occurred after EU accession (see Boxes 
2.16 and 2.20 below for data covering all destinations and 
a larger time span).
The crisis-driven wave (2009-2010): 
Lost jobs and lost hopes. 
The economic crisis which started at the end of 
2008, in a short time left jobless a segment of Latvian 
population. In the second quarter of 2008, just slightly 
more than 6% of economically active males and females 
were jobseekers, but a year later this rate more than 
tripled among males and more than doubled among 
females. Moreover, by the end of 2009, unemployment 
rate had reached 25% among males and 16% among 
females3. Only one out of three jobseekers received 
unemployment benefit; furthermore, benefit recipients 
with less than 20 years of social insurance record (which 
was the case for most of potential emigrants) faced the 
3 Latvian Labour Force Survey data, 2009/Q4 and 2010/Q1 
average.
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prospect that the benefit will be reduced to just 40 lats 
(57 euro) per month. Those who were lucky to keep their 
jobs experienced earnings cuts, usually by 25% to 30%. 
The psychological shock was no less painful: a large 
proportion of people of active age (including those 
who managed to keep their jobs), which until then were 
quite sure about their successful future career and life in 
Latvia, could not be as sure anymore. 
In order to assess propensity to emigrate during 
the crisis by socio-economic group, let us look at the 
differences in employment and unemployment rates 
depending on ethnicity, citizenship and education 
before and during the crisis (Box 2.14). It appears that 
unemployment was a particularly strong push factor 
with respect to persons without higher education (even 
more as long as those without secondary education 
are concerned), as well as with respect to non-Latvians 
without Latvian citizenship. 
While Western Europe was also hit by the crisis, it was 
still possible to find a job there, although not as easily as 
before (hence, the role of diasporas and informal social 
networks increased). Unemployment rate was very low 
(three to four per cent) in Norway, the Netherlands and 
Austria, while it was modest (about eight per cent) in the 
UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Finland (European 
Commission, 2010: Table 24). During 2009-2010, the 
vacancy rate (i.e. the number of vacancies relative to the 
sum of vacancies and occupied posts) in these countries 
was five to eight times higher than the one observed in 
Latvia (European Commission, 2010: Chart 6). Moreover, 
across old Europe nominal earnings continued to 
grow, while real earnings did not decline (European 
Commission, 2011: Graphs I.1.8, III.A3.5). Thus, expected 
gains from emigration in terms of employment and 
earnings have increased in comparison with the pre-
crisis period. 
Plausibly, the issue of social protection, previously 
ignored by successful people, has become even 
more important. In contrast with the UK, Ireland, 
the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands, 
where a worker with a sufficient contribution record 
and earnings between 67% and 100% of the average 
receives (in benefits) about 70% of previous net earnings 
even in the case of long-term unemployment, in Latvia 
already after 9 months of unemployment (and for those 
younger than 35 and others with less than 20 years of 
contribution record  – even after 6 months), income 
replacement rate is just about 40% even when social 
assistance and housing benefits, if any, are accounted 
for (European Commission, 2011: Graph II.2.4). Moreover, 
Latvian child benefits (8  lats, or €11.5 per month) are 
negligible in comparison with those paid, for every child 
younger than 16 years, in the old Europe (e.g. €140 per 
month in Ireland and £20.3/£13.4 per week for the first/
next child in the UK1).
Due to all the factors mentioned above, emigration 
started to emerge as a real option in minds of even 
those Latvian residents who had not considered such a 
1 See http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_
welfare_payments/; http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/childbenefit/. Data 
accessed on August 15, 2011 and refer to year 2011. 
Employment and unemployment rates of working age population by educational 
attainment, ethnicity and citizenship, 2008-2010, %
Education level  
(population aged 15-64)
Ethnicity and citizenship  
(population aged 18-64)  
Tertiary Secondary Below secondary Latvian
Minority 
(LV citizens)
Minority 
(other)
Employment a
2008 c 86.9 74.5 37.1 74.2 71.3 70.7
2009 c 82.3 64.6 29.4 66.8 63.2 58.4
2010 c 80.6 61.5 28.4
2010/12-2011/02 d 64.4 65.5 52.8
Unemployment b
2008 c 4.2 7.7 14.6 6.4 8.7 11.3
2009 c 8.4 18.7 31.4 15.1 18.1 23.6
2010 c 10.5 20.4 32.3
2010/12-2011/02 d 19.2 20.5 32.5
Notes.  a  Employment rate is defined as proportion of employed population in total population (in a particular 
age group). b  Unemployment rate is defined as proportion of jobseekers in economically active population (in a 
particular age group).  c  Labour Force Survey results.  d Average of the results obtained from «NI: PCM. 2010» and 
«DnB NORD» surveys. 
Sources: c – Eurostat; d – calculation with survey data.
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possibility before. This category consists of two groups: 
(i) individuals who are inherently not very mobile but 
just did see another way out of trouble1; (ii) persons who 
were not satisfied with the development in Latvia and 
with their own prospects here. In the latter group, one 
can expect to find a higher-than-average proportion of 
university graduates because people who have opted to 
invest in higher education are usually future-oriented. 
As far as propensity to emigrate among persons with 
less than secondary education is concerned, the 
direction of change is theoretically ambiguous a priori. 
On one hand, representatives of this group suffered 
more than others from crisis-triggered unemployment 
(see Box 2.14); on the other hand, in crisis time it is 
difficult for them to compete for jobs abroad with 
graduates of secondary school one of the reasons being 
poor language skills). 
There are two reasons why one should expect ethnic 
non-Latvians to be over-represented among the post-
crisis emigrants (in fact, among both above mentioned 
groups). First, the proportion of workers who lost their 
jobs during the crisis was higher among non-Latvians 
(Hazans, 2010: Table 1), resulting in re-emerging of a 
significant ethnic employment gap, especially wide 
among university graduates (Hazans, 2010: Figures 6 
and 7; see also Box 2.14 above. Second, in July 2009, the 
government adopted (despite objections by employers’ 
associations) new Cabinet of Ministers Regulations on 
state language proficiency requirements, which have 
substantially extended the list of occupations (both 
in private and public sectors), which require certified 
Latvian language skills at intermediate or advanced 
level. Given that the previous regulations have been 
perceived by most workers (Latvians and non-Latvians 
alike) as adequate or in some cases even too strict 
(Hazans, 2010: 151–153), non-Latvians saw this as a 
step undermining labour market position of minority 
workers and, in a wider context, signalling radicalisation 
of language policies and ethno politics in general. Such 
1 As one user of Latvian news portal Delfi put it in his comment: 
«To many, working abroad is the only way to survive – to earn 
money to pay back one’s debt, to educate one’s children and 
to support one’s parents, whom our government does not 
envisage pensions which would ensure more or less normal 
existence» (Delfi Aculiecinieks 2010: To>>Esmu, 30.11.2010). 
a signal of course works as an additional push factor 
increasing inclination to emigrate among non-Latvians. 
Taking into account that non-citizens of Latvia are not 
covered by EU provisions for free mobility of labour, 
one should expect the largest increase in propensity 
to emigrate among non-Latvians holding Latvian 
citizenship.
To sum up, in the beginning of 2009 one could expect 
(as formulated in Hazans, 2009) both intensification of 
emigration and changes in emigrants’ structure and 
motivation:
(H3) In 2009-2010, in comparison with the pre-crisis 
period:
(a)  the intensity of emigration from Latvia increased;
(b)  migration flows have further diversified; share of 
Ireland, heavily hit by the crisis, declined, while 
shares of other (also non-European) destinations 
increased;
(c)  the role of push factors (especially unemployment 
and wage cuts, but also lack of prospects, loss of 
hopes and uncertainty of Latvia’s development path) 
in shaping  migration flows increased; moreover, 
the role of host country’s social protection system 
increased among pull factors;
(d) migrants are much more oriented towards long-term 
or permanent emigration and more often move as 
whole families;
(e) the proportion of the highly educated among 
emigrants increased significantly and exceeded 
corresponding proportion among the persons who 
stayed;
(f) the proportion of individuals oriented towards self-
employment or own business among emigrants 
increased;
(g)  the proportion of ethnic minorities (especially those 
holding Latvian citizenship) among emigrants 
increased.
Some of these hypotheses are supported by an 
interesting account of the changes in the profile of 
potential emigrants from Latvia (EURES clients) based on 
the daily records of EURES consultants summarized by 
the former EURES manager in Latvia Žanna Ribakova and 
presented in Box 2.15.
Changes in the profile of EURES clients in Latvia, 2004-2010
2004-2007 2008-2010
Planning to move alone Planning to move with family
Looking for temporary, low-skilled job Looking for permanent, skilled job
Minimal knowledge of foreign languages Better knowledge of foreign languages, higher qualifications
Planning to return Interested in legal employment and social security
Source: Ribakova (2009).
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How many people have left Latvia 
during a decade? 
As recently as in September 2011, official Latvian 
statistics claimed that net emigration from Latvia during 
2000-2010 amounted to just 33 thousand persons (LR CSP, 
2011a), which is obviously very far from reality. To arrive at 
a realistic estimate, we have used destination countries’ 
statistics on population and on bilateral migration flows 
by citizenship and/or country of birth, provided by 
Eurostat, OECD and national statistical offices (in cases 
when year 2010 data were not available, conservative 
extrapolation has been used); in addition, we have 
used data on allocation of social security numbers 
(SSN hereafter) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. By 
combining these data with Statistics Latvia data on 
migration flows between Latvia and countries outside 
EU and OECD, two well-documented estimates of net 
outflow of Latvian population during 2000-2010 (141 
and 169  thousand, respectively) and by sub-periods: 
24-31 thousand in 2000-2003, 68 thousand in 2004-2008 
and 48-70 thousand in 2009-2010 (see Box 2.16). Due 
to data limitations, both estimates do not ensure full 
coverage of movers who were Latvia’s permanent 
residents but did not hold Latvian citizenship or were 
born outside Latvia; those who stay in the host country 
less than 6 months are also not covered in most cases. 
The first (minimal) estimate with respect to EU and OECD 
countries is based on data about increase of the number 
of Latvian citizens (and/or persons born in Latvia) among 
population of these countries (rather than on migration 
flows); in the case of the United Kingdom these data were 
available only as estimates from the UK Labour Force 
Survey, and we have corrected them (within confidence 
intervals) taking into account SSN allocation. 
The second (conservative) estimate makes use 
of EU and OECD countries’ data on immigration and 
emigration of Latvian citizens (and/or persons born in 
Latvia), but with some corrections. First, in cases of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland immigration data have 
been replaced with SSN allocation data. Second, for the 
2004-2008 period, net inflow from Latvia into countries 
of the EU, as well as Norway and Switzerland, has been 
estimated at 60% of the gross inflow, consistent with the 
estimates of the number of return migrants based on the 
Latvian Labour Force Survey data (Hazans and Philips 
2010), as well as on various population surveys. This 
correction was necessary because during this period of 
predominantly short-term and circulatory migration (see 
above) many of the emigrants returned to Latvia, but only 
a small part of them were registered by partner countries’ 
emigration statistics (which is generally well-known to 
be less accurate than immigration statistics). Third, the 
resulting estimates of net emigration for 2000-2003 and 
for 2004-2008 have been adjusted upwards by 10%, 
to account for incomplete coverage of Latvian non-
citizens and persons born outside Latvia in the receiving 
countries’ statistics, as well as for undocumented 
migration. On the other hand, during 2009-2010 return 
migration to Latvia was less intensive, therefore the 
receiving countries’ statistics for this period were used «as 
is» (i.e., uncorrected and without the 10% adjustment of 
the net emigration). 
To sum up, both the minimal and the conservative 
estimates are well documented and quite cautious. We 
consider the highest of the two (169 thousand emigrants) 
to be closer to realty. For each of the three periods we 
also break down the estimates of net emigration by 
main groups of destinations (see Box 2.20). Furthermore, 
the realistic expert estimate (200  thousand emigrants, 
including 80 thousand during 2009-2010) adjusts the 
conservative estimate upwards, assuming that the 
number of emigrants not covered by the receiving 
countries’ statistics substantially exceeds those 10% 
which have been added to the 2000-2003 and 2004-2008 
results in the conservative estimate, and conducting not 
so conservative extrapolation in cases when year 2010 
data were missing. This estimate, which exceeds the 
official data at the time of writing by a factor of more 
than six, we consider the most plausible. Finally, the 
high expert estimate (total net outflow 250 thousand 
persons during 2000-2010) takes into account that 
the year 2011 Census data yielded just 1,880 thousand 
directly collected records (Statistics Latvia 2012), which 
is 335  thousand less than the previously published 
population figure on March 31, 2011 (http://www.csb.gov.
lv/en/statistikas-temas/population-key-indicators-30624.
html, accessed on August 15, 2011). 
It is worth noting that since publication of the 
Latvian version of this report, our preferred estimate of 
emigration (200 thousand) has been cited in Weisbrot 
and Ray (2011) and IMF (2011). Moreover, the preliminary 
Census results (released on January 18, 2012, four 
months after our estimate was first published) report 
net emigration of 190 thousand persons between the 
Censuses of 2000 and 2011.
Emigrants’ profile and its changes 
over time
Box 2.16 presents the statistical portrait of adult 
emigrants at the end of 2010; the portrait is based on data 
provided by respondents of the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey 
about their family members and close relatives who left 
Latvia in 2000-2010 (and were living abroad during the 
survey). The emigrants are broken down in three groups 
by year of leaving. For comparison, Box 2.16. presents the 
profiles of stayers – residents of Latvia, who during the last 
decade have not lived abroad three or more months at a 
time, as well as of those with such experience who were 
living in Latvia during the survey. The representatives 
of the latter category are [loosely] referred to as return 
migrants, although many of them have not spent abroad a 
sufficiently long time to be included in partner countries’ 
population or migration statistics.
Gender and age structure
According to survey data (see Box 2.16), in terms 
of gender distribution emigrants who left Latvia in 
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Net emigration from Latvia (2000-2010) and emigrants’ profile at the end of 2010
Emigrants (by year of leaving) Latvia’s population, end of 2010
2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2010 2000-2010 All Aged 18-35
Aged 
36-54
Aged 
55+
Emigration estimates Net outflow (1,000 persons) Number (1,000 persons)
Minimal (documented) a 24.4 68.0 48.2 140.6 2122.2 501.2 605.4 646.0
Conservative (documented) b 30.6 68.3 70.2 169.2 2093.6 482.7 597.6 645.1
Realistic expert estimate c 40.0 80.0 80.0 200.0 2062.8 462.7 589.3 644.1
High expert estimate c 50.0 100.0 100.0 250.0 2012.8 430.3 575.7 642.6
% distribution d % distribution e
Emigrants (by year of leaving) Stayers
Return 
migrants f2000-2003 2004-2008 2009-2010 2000-2010 Aged like emigrants
Aged 
18–74 
Males 46.5 45.2 39.9 42.8 47.1 45.7 61.3
Females 53.5 54.9 60.1 57.2 52.9 54.4 38.7
Age
18-24 6.9 23.4 32.7 22.6 22.6 13.8 20.0
25-34 54.3 48.1 38.8 44.9 44.9 17.8 37.6
35-44 29.7 18.3 17.9 19.6 19.6 18.0 22.8
45-54 7.2 8.3 9.3 8.5 8.5 19.9 12.8
55-74 1.9 1.9 1.4 3.2 3.2 30.6 6.7
Level of education
Below secondary 5.3 5.4 4.6 6.0 13.5 13.9 11.6
Secondary 53.8 70.6 59.9 61.8 63.6 64.8 70.2
Tertiary 32.0 21.5 27.0 24.2 22.9 21.4 18.1
Unknown 8.9 2.5 8.6 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Selectivity index of university graduates (at the time of leaving)
Against all stayers aged 18-60 0.36 0.03 0.14
Main occupation
Wage earner 55.2 84.8 79.9 78.3 59.6 50.5 59.4
Self-employed or employer 0.0 1.8 3.6 2.1 3.8 3.8 6.2
Student 1.7 6.2 5.7 5.0 12.1 7.2 6.6
Unemployed 0.0 0.6 1.5 0.9 16.3 14.5 16.9
Other or N/A g 43.1 6.7 9.3 13.7 8.2 24.0 10.9
Sources: a Conservative documented estimates based on Eurostat, receiving countries’ and OECD population and/or migration 
statistics by citizenship and/or country of birth; net emigration from Latvia to countries outside EU and OECD is reported as 
in Statistics Latvia online database.  b Similar to a, but inflows into Ireland and the UK are estimated using data on allocation of 
social security numbers, while data on outflows from the EEA countries have been corrected using Latvian LFS data, as well 
as data on return migrants from various population surveys. In particular, for 2004-2008, return migration from EEA countries 
is estimated to be 40% of gross inflows from Latvia to these countries during this period.  c  – expert estimates based on b 
and accounting for the gaps in receiving countries’ statistics (Latvian non-citizens are likely not to be fully captured by the 
statistics «by citizenship»; emigrants who are Latvian citizens or non-citizens but were born outside Latvia, typically in former 
Soviet Union, are not captured by the statistics «by country of birth»; emigrants which have not officially registered in the host 
country are not covered (the «realistic» estimates is the most plausible one; the «high» estimate, is however also consistent 
with the fact that during the 2011 Population Census, data on just 1.88 million persons have been collected directly, while 188 
thousand have been added from registers on questionable grounds (see Statistics Latvia, 2012).  d Emigrants’ distribution is 
based on information provided by their close relatives in Latvia; it is not clear to what extent it describes also emigrants who 
do not have such relatives. For 12% of emigrants, exact time of leaving is not known; they are accounted for in column «2000-
2010», although not shown separately. e Calculation with the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data (the age structure is not corrected). 
Notes.  f Return migrants – persons who between 2000 and 2010 spent three months or more abroad at a time but lived in 
Latvia during the survey.  g «Other» include housekeepers, pensioners and other economically inactive persons, while option 
«NA» refers only to emigrants.
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2000-2008 are quite similar to stayers, but during the 
crisis years proportion of females among emigrants has 
reached 60% (this is confirmed also by EU countries’ 
statistics on immigrants from Latvia). Overall, among 
adult emigrants who left Latvia during the first decade 
of the 21st century females account for 57%, which 
exceeds their proportion among stayers; this put at risk 
the reproductive potential of Latvian population. This 
finding, however, should be interpreted with caution 
because the latest available demographic data on 
immigrants from Latvia in the EU countries suggest that 
majority of them are males. 
Furthermore, 60% of return migrants are males. 
This proportion is clearly higher than the share of males 
among emigrants according to either of the two sources 
mentioned above, suggesting that male emigrants are 
more likely to return than their female counterparts. 
A much larger risk for Latvia’s demographic prospects 
is related to emigrants’ age structure. By the end of 2010, 
two thirds of emigrants were younger than 35; this is 
more than twice as high as the share of this age group 
among stayers. Persons aged 35-44 are proportionally 
represented among emigrants, while just one out of ten 
emigrants is older than 54 years. Return migrants are, on 
average, slightly older than emigrants but much younger 
than stayers. 
Education
By the end of 2010, the proportion of university 
graduates among emigrants (24%) was somewhat 
higher than the same proportion among stayers (21%). 
The proportions of medium- and low-educated among 
emigrants are similar to the ones found among stayers: 
about two-thirds have secondary education, whereas 
one-seventh have not attained this level (we assume that 
those 8% of emigrants, whose relatives were unaware 
of their educational attainment, are less likely to have 
secondary than lower education, and unlikely to have 
a university degree). However, when each of the three 
emigration waves is compared to stayers, emigrants 
clearly appear to be better educated. Both among those 
who moved before EU enlargement and among the crisis-
driven emigrants, one finds a much higher proportion of 
university graduates and lower or equal share of persons 
without secondary education than among stayers. On the 
other hand, those who moved in 2004-2008 feature the 
same proportion of university graduates as stayers but a 
higher share of secondary-educated and a lower share of 
those without secondary education. Among the return 
migrants, in turn, one finds slightly lower shares of both 
low-educated and university graduates, while 70% hold 
secondary education. 
These findings support the previously stated 
hypotheses (H1)-(a), (H2)-(c) and (H3)-(e) about the 
dynamics of propensity to emigrate among tertiary 
educated Latvia’s residents. This becomes even more 
obvious when only emigrants older than 21 years are 
considered (note that this group includes all but two 
tertiary educated emigrants in our sample): among 
pre-accession emigrants, the proportion of university 
graduates is 31%, in the post-accession period this 
proportion falls to 24%, but rises again to reach 32% 
among those who left Latvia in 2009-2010 (Box 2.17). 
Emigrants from Latvia (aged 22+) by completed education at the end of 2010, 
depending on the time of moving, ethnicity, citizenship and the host country
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Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.
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Box 2.17. presents also the differences between 
educational profiles of emigrants depending on their 
ethnicity, citizenship and the host country. The largest 
proportion of university graduates is found among 
emigrants reported by non-Latvians holding Latvian 
citizenship. This is well in line with two already mentioned 
circumstances: relatively low employment rate among 
tertiary-educated non-Latvians and restrictions faced 
by Latvian non-citizens in EU labour markets. When 
emigrants hosted by different countries are compared, 
the lowest proportion of university graduates is found in 
Ireland.
To test thoroughly the hypotheses (H1)-(a), (H2)-(c) and 
(H3)-(e) about the changes over time in the propensity 
to emigrate among tertiary educated Latvia’s residents, 
one need to compare the proportions of university 
graduates among adult emigrants and stayers at the time 
of moving1. For this purpose we use selectivity index SI 
(see Box 2.18). According to results reported in Box 2.17, 
both in the pre-accession period and (to a smaller extent) 
during the crisis, university graduates were significantly 
1 To estimate this proportion among emigrants, we proceed 
as follows. Emigrants, which did not have tertiary education 
by 2010, obviously could not have it at the time of moving. 
Almost all tertiary educated emigrants in our sample left 
Latvia being at least 22 years old; we assume them to 
receive their first degree by then,  – unlike four individuals 
who moved being between 18 and 20 years. Remaining 
eight tertiary educated emigrants cannot affect the results 
significantly.
overrepresented among emigrants in comparison 
with stayers aged 18 to 60 (virtually all adult emigrants 
belong to this age group), while this was not the case 
for emigrants who left Latvia during the boom years 
2004-2008. 
Labour market status and occupation
A striking feature of emigrants’ situation in the 
host countries’ labour market status is extremely high 
employment rate: at least 87% among those who left 
Latvia in 2004-2008 and at least 84% among the crisis 
period emigrants (actual level can be even higher given 
that information on labour market status is missing for 
7–9% of emigrants belonging to these two waves). For 
comparison, among stayers aged 18 to 74 just 54% were 
employed at the end of 2010, while among stayers in the 
emigrants’ age 63% were working. As far as emigrants 
who left Latvia before 2004 are concerned, for 43% of 
them information on employment is not available, so 
one cannot measure accurately the employment level 
of this group, but it is surely higher than among the 
stayers. Noteworthy, also return migrants in Latvia feature 
a higher employment rate (about 66%) than persons 
without foreign experience. 
The proportion of self-employed and entrepreneurs 
among the crisis period emigrants doubled in 
comparison with the previous period, thus confirming 
the hypothesis (H3)-(f). On the other hand, one finds 
Selectivity index
Selectivity index allows for comparison of the proportions of some demographic group D (e. g., university 
graduates) within the sub-population of interest (hereafter, M) and within the rest of population (or some other 
sub-population, usually called «the reference group»), denoted S. Hereafter, we assume M and S to consist of 
emigrants and stayers, respectively (in our context, stayers are permanent residents of Latvia, which during the 
period under consideration have not lived abroad)1. To calculate the selectivity index SI, one has to find the 
ratio of proportions of D among emigrants and stayers: R = DM /DS. Situation when R > 1 (respectively, R < 1), 
is commonly referred to in the literature as «emigrants are positively (respectively, negatively) selected» with 
respect to belonging to group D (e.g. having completed tertiary education), although in fact we are talking about 
self-selection (rather than selection) here. It is convenient to transform R in such a way that: 
If the proportion of D among emigrants is larger (respectively, smaller) than among stayers, then the value of 
SI is positive (respectively, negative).
This can be achieved by subtracting from R unity, as in Kaczmarczyk et al. (2010). Here we use another 
approach and define the selectivity index as follows: 
SI = ln (R) = ln (DM /DS).
The advantage of this measure is that in cases when DM /DS  = k and DM /DS  = 1/k, SI has equal absolute values 
but opposite signs: e.g., +0.69 and -0.69 if k = 2 (for comparison, formula SI = R – 1 would give values +1 and -0.5). 
Likewise, if the proportion of D among emigrants is 1.5 times larger (respectively, smaller) than among stayers, 
then SI = 0.41 (respectively, -0.41).
Noteworthy, when studying emigrants' self-selection mechanism, one can compare SI values across 
demographic groups, countries and time periods. On the other hand, only statistically significant (and not too 
small) differences are interpretable.
1 Of course both M and S can be further narrowed down, e.g. by restricting age or by including only economically active 
individuals.
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more self-employed and entrepreneurs among return 
migrants than among individuals without foreign 
experience: 6% vs. 4%. 
Even under the most radical (and unlikely) assumption 
that all emigrants whose occupation was not reported 
by their relatives in Latvia are unemployed, during the 
crisis emigrants of the last two waves feature a much 
lower unemployment level than the one observed in 
Latvia. To sum up, emigrants’ labour market outcomes are 
significantly better than that of stayers. 
Box 2.19 provides a more detailed breakdown of 
Latvian emigrants by main activity abroad (depending on 
education, host country and time of leaving Latvia). On 
average, only 26% of emigrants hold a paid job in which 
they to a large extent use their qualifications (education), 
even if in a different profession. This proportion is 
higher (and the incidence of brain waste smaller) in the 
continental EU15, where it reaches 36%, than in other 
host countries. The lowest rate of using one’s qualification 
(19%) is found among emigrants living in Ireland and 
countries outside the old Europe (USA, Canada, Russia, 
Ukraine, etc.). Tertiary educated emigrants are more likely 
to use their qualification than those with a secondary or 
lower education. Those who emigrated during the crisis 
were less choosy with respect to job abroad: just 23% of 
them use their qualification, whereas this is the case for 
29% of the previous wave’s emigrants (the difference is 
statistically significant).
Geography
Box 2.20 compares host countries’ administrative data 
and «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data on the geographical 
composition of Latvian emigration flows before and 
after accession, as well as during the economic crisis. 
Both sources confirm the hypotheses (H1)-(c,) (H2)-(b) and 
(H3)-(b) about the changes in this composition over time. 
With respect to the 2004-2008 and 2009-2010 periods, 
the data from the survey date are well in line with the 
administrative ones (which, in turn, are of course not 
perfect). With respect to the pre-accession period, the 
emigrants who moved to countries outside EEA (mainly, 
the CIS, USA and Canada) are under-represented in survey 
data  – plausibly, because many of them have not left 
close relatives in Latvia.
The «NI: PCM. 2010» module about household 
members and close relatives living abroad asked, 
among other, with whom the emigrants live together. 
Respondents from Zemgale and Latgale reported 
that more than a half of their relatives (56% and 59%, 
respectively) live with a spouse or a partner (Box 2.21). 
This suggests that people from these two regions more 
Emigrants’ main activity abroad at the end of 2010,  
by educational attainment, host country and time of leaving Latvia
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Proportion of adult emigrants living abroad with a spouse/partner, by region of origin
Riga Riga vicinity Vidzeme Kurzeme Zemgale Latgale
38.2% 28.0% 38.3% 29.7% 56.4% 58.8%
Notes: The region of origin is identified approximately as the region of residence of the relative who provided the information 
about the emigrant.
Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data. 
Box 
2.21
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often move with the whole family. In other regions the 
proportion of relatives living abroad with a partner is 
much smaller: 28% to 38% (Box 2.21).
Will the emigrants ever come back? 
Given Latvia’s deteriorating demographic situation 
the emigrants’ intentions to return are extremely 
important. Box 2.22 summarizes information on Latvian 
emigrants’ plans to return, as reported by their family 
members or close relatives during the «NI: PCM. 2010» 
survey». On average, 8% of emigrants plan (or rather 
plan than not) to return within six months. In a longer 
perspective (within five years) about 20% of emigrants 
assume the possibility of returning. These findings are 
in striking contrast with the situation observed five 
years earlier, when two-thirds of emigrants who left 
Latvia in 2004-2005 were planning to return within two 
years, most of them (almost half of all emigrants) even 
within one year (Hazans and Philips 2010: Figure 9). 
In fact, in 2002-2007, more than half of Latvian guest-
workers returned home within a year, according to the 
Latvian LFS (Hazans 2009: p.19; Hazans and Philips 2010: 
Figure 10). This comparison supports hypothesis H3 (d) 
that during the crisis Latvian emigrants are to a much 
larger extent oriented towards long-term or permanent 
emigration. 
From the ethnicity and citizenship perspective, 
non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship feature 
the smallest propensity to return: just 8% within five 
years, see Box  2.22. Tertiary and secondary educated 
Latvian emigrants are more likely to return than their 
counterparts without a secondary education. When 
different host countries are compared, it appears that 
Latvian ex-pats in Ireland feature the smallest propensity 
to return within five years (Box 2.22). 
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The likelihood of returning sharply declines as the 
duration of stay abroad increases. Thus, among those who 
left Latvia less than a year ago, one-fifth plan to return 
within six months, and more than one-third assume the 
possibility of returning within five years. By comparison, 
these proportions fall to 3% and 15%, respectively, among 
emigrants who stay abroad between three and five years.
These findings, of course, do not exclude that more 
emigrants will return to Latvia when reaching the 
retirement age (with a pension earned abroad). Such a 
Latvian emigrants’ plans to return within 6 months and within 5 years, by ethnicity 
and citizenship, educational attainment, host country and duration of stay abroad, 
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2.22
Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (1)
«Many will return home – not now and not in 10 years. [They] will return, when dignified pensions will be earned in 
the host countries and housing credits will be paid back to banks, to have a home one can return to.» (Esmu, 30.11.2010.)
«I have earned a pension, now will go home and play a rich uncle. In my rural municipality with such a pension I will 
be the man number one.» (Ansis, 30.11.2010. 13:09)
«..A big part [of the emigrants] acts and will act like this. I am among them  – in principle, the pension has been 
earned, although it is far away yet, but in LV circumstances it would be sufficient also today :-). All 3 children have 
completed their schooling, they live their own life, and at this age one does want to rush around the world unless one 
really likes it :-). As I don’t plan to stay «there» forever, I rent out my apartment [in Latvia], so some money goes into my 
account, I can enjoy life and take on a casual job from time to time :-)» (Repatriants, 30.11.2010. 14:42)
Source: Delfi Aculiecinieks, 2010
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possibility has been mentioned by many participants 
(not just from Ireland) of online discussion «Ireland’s 
Latvians, will you leave Ireland?» (Delfi Aculiecinieks (Delfi 
Eyewitness), 2010) at the end of 2010, see Box 2.23.
While return of wealthy pensioners won’t solve 
Latvia’s demographic problems, it at least will stimulate 
the domestic market. 
Apart from (undoubtedly, important) purely econo-
mic considerations, uncertainty, lack of fair rules of the 
game and the general quality of life in Latvia are often 
mentioned among the reasons why emigrants don’t plan 
to return in the near future (Box 2.24).
Development of migration networks 
and experience of return migrants 
As shown in Box 2.25, among population aged 18 to 
65 the proportion of individuals who have some relative 
or friend with foreign work experience has reached 
75% already at the end of 2005 and increased to 82% 
by the beginning of 2011. Both at the end of 2006 and 
in the middle of 2008, 15% of working age individuals 
could obtain information about work abroad from 
recent (of the last two years) experience of their own 
or a close relative. Moreover, at the end of 2010, 28% of 
respondents indicated that some of their close relatives 
worked abroad during the survey (rather than in the past), 
and 10% had own foreign work experience (including 9% 
during the last five years). 
These data confirm emergence of powerful migration 
social networks. This, as noted above, information 
and job search costs for potential emigrants, as well as 
psychic and adaptation costs of migration significantly 
reduced. Another (possibly, even more important) 
conclusion from information summarised in Box 2.25 is 
that during the recent years work abroad has become an 
integral part of Latvian national identity. 
Let us now look at how return migrants assess their 
foreign experience. The «NI: PCM. 2010» survey has 
identified 89 respondents who have spent abroad at least 
three months (in one visit) during the last ten years but 
have returned to Latvia. Box 2.26 presents information on 
the impact of foreign experience on various life domains 
(health, family, etc.) of the returnees, according to their 
own assessment.
In general, one finds that return migrants’ opinions 
about the impact of the time spent abroad on their life 
are mostly positive.
Majority (60%) of these respondents report a 
positive effect of the time spent outside Latvia on their 
health. A more detailed analysis (not reflected in Box 
2.26) shows that positive impact on health more often 
is reported by females (65%) and persons with higher 
education (71%).
Likewise, 64% of respondents think that the time 
spent abroad has positively affected their relationships 
with family members. Also in this case a positive opinion 
is more often expressed by females (78%) and persons 
Emigrants about reasons for emigration and about return to Latvia (2) 
«..It is already a year since I am living in Norway, and every day I am thinking about home. I wanted to come back 
in July, but I learned that I am pregnant and was forced to stay, because in Latvia there will be no benefit. My son has 
started in school here, and my husband is glad that I will be around, but I fall deeper into depression every day. Why does 
home, with all its hopelessness, pull me back so strongly? – I am unable to explain...» (Norge, 30.11.2010.)
«Will I leave Ireland in the near future?  – A «difficult» question... especially when you are already rooted here, 
accumulate possessions and have a secure job, where no one monitors or regulates you – you can do what you consider 
of primary importance. [..] But there is one but... the years pass by, and thinking about future I recognise, that in the 
best part of my working life it does not make sense to expose myself to uncertainty and fragmentation. Therefore I stay 
in Ireland and accumulate my working years here... and, if something unexpected happens, then social assistance is 
guaranteed for me until I find my next «niche».» (hika, 06.12.2010.)
«I live in the UK and I am not going to return to Latvia. Why should I sell my skills for a nothing, if here I can sell them 
for a normal remuneration?» (Gladiators, 30.11.2010. 20:06)
«..I have graduated from university and was lucky to find an interesting and well-paid job. I am afraid to return to LV 
for three reasons. First, there are no possibilities to develop ones career, in Latvia one’s connections determine everything, 
and I don’t respect such rules of the game. [..], what should I do there, especially with a Russian name and surname? 
Second, social security is so poor and the further the poorer, I can’t afford to pay taxes to a state which is unable to 
allocate them effectively. I better help my parents myself and know where the money goes...» (Manasdomas 07.12.2010. 
16:12)
«When it will be veeeeery bad in Ireland, even then it won’t be comparable to Latvia. This is a completely different 
life. You don’t understand how bad the life your are living is.» (oto, 30.11.2010.)
Source: Delfi Aculiecinieks, 2010
Box 
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with higher education (70%), as well as respondents aged 
45 to 54 years (84%). 
A positive assessment of the impact of the time spent 
outside Latvia on material well-being is shared by 73% 
of return migrants, and the answers do not differ much 
across demographic groups. Only 8% have reported a 
negative impact. 
A vast majority of respondents (82%) say that time 
spent abroad has positively affected their self-confidence, 
while an opposite opinion is expressed by merely 7%. 
Also in this question, no significant differences are found 
between the answers of various groups. 
The survey also asks to assess the effect of the time 
spent outside Latvia on one’s professional skills. Again, 
Foreign work experience of Latvia’s population, their relatives and friends, %
Survey 
period
The respondent has worked 
abroad (return migrants)
The respondent has worked abroad 
or some of his/her family members 
or close relatives are working or 
have worked abroad
The respondent has worked 
abroad or some of his/her  
relatives or friends are working 
or have worked abroad
Any time, 
anywhere
In the 
EEA f 
After 
01.01.2004
Any time, 
anywhere
In the 
EEA f 
After  
01.01.2004 Any time
After 
01.01.2004
2005/Q4- 
2006/Q1a 9.0 7.2 20.5 15.5 6.7
 g – 10.0 h 75.1 72.2
2006/Q4- 
2007/Q1b 5.0 14.6
2008/07 c 3.3 (after 01.07.2006)
15.7 (after 
01.07.2006)
2010/10-
20011/01d
9.9 (after 
01.01.2000)
9.0 (after 
01.01.2006)
33.1 (after 
01.01.2000)
31.5 (during the 
survey: 27.8)
20011/02e 82.3
Notes. a Survey conducted for the project «Geographical Mobility of Labour Force» of the ESF funded National Programme of 
Labour Market Studies. It does not cover relatives who have worked abroad but returned. b Survey conducted for the project 
«Specific Problems of Labour Market of Latvia and its Regions» of the ESF funded National Programme of Labour Market Studies. 
  c Survey conducted by SPI. d «NI: PCM. 2010» survey. It does not cover relatives who have worked abroad but returned.  f The 
EU countries, Norway and Switzerland e «DnB NORD Latvian barometer» Nr. 35.  g Excluding own experience (due to lack of 
information on the time period).  h Author estimate.  
Source: Calculations with survey data.
Box 
2.25
Return migrants’ assessment of the impact of the time spent abroad  
on various life domains, %
  Positive Both positive and negative Negative Difficult to tell No impact
Health 60.4 14.9 12.1 2.3 10.3
Family relationship 63.6 14.7 3.5 5.7 12.5
Material well-being 73.3 14.4 7.8 1.2 3.4
Self-confidence 82.0 3.2 6.8 3.3 4.7
Professional skills 69.4 10.9 2.1 3.3 14.2
Latvian or Russian language 
(the non-native one) skills 44.3 11.8 5.3 4.7 34.0
English language skills 69.1 10.4 8.3 2.2 10.0
Other foreign language skills 33.1 13.9 12.5 9.2 31.3
Source: Calculations with «NI: PCM. 2010» survey data.
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most respondents (69%) see this effect as positive, 
whereas a negative effect is reported by just 2% (see Box 
2.26 for details). This effect is more often seen as positive 
by young respondents, while respondent’s education 
level does not play a significant role.
The effect of the foreign experience on Latvian 
or Russian (the non-native one) language skills is less 
pronounced but very interesting. A positive effect 
is reported by 44% respondents, one-third have not 
felt any impact, while a negative assessment is very 
rare (see Box  2.26 for details). In this case the impact 
differs depending on the main language used in the 
respondents’ family: among the Latvian-speakers, 51% 
of responses are positive, whereas among the Russian-
speakers this proportion is just 37%. In other words, 
half of the Latvian-speakers and almost two-fifths of 
the Russian-speakers think that the foreign experience 
helped them to improve skills in the second language.
Expectedly, the time spent abroad had a positive 
impact on English language skills of most (69%) 
respondents. More often than others an improvement 
in their English language proficiency report young 
respondents: 83% of the 18 to 24 year olds and 77% of 
the 25 to 34 year olds. In this question, the respondent’s 
education level also matters: Among those with basic 
education just 50% report a positive effect, whereas 
among respondents with secondary (respectively, tertiary) 
education this proportion is 70% (respectively, 77%).
With respect to other foreign language skills, the 
negative assessment of foreign experience is more 
pronounced (13%) than in the case of English, yet the 
positive assessment prevails (33%).
As noticed when discussing Box 2.14 above, return 
migrants feature a higher employment level than 
population without foreign experience; however, 
econometric analysis (omitted here) proves that this 
difference can be explained by the differences in age and 
gender distributions of the two groups.
Box 2.27 sheds some light on the question whether 
foreign work experience helps to earn more in Latvia. 
For this purpose, we look at personal after-tax income 
of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 
2010, depending on their (and their family members’) 
post-accession foreign work experience. Among those 
respondents who did not have family members working 
abroad during the survey, those with own foreign work 
experience have, on average, a 18% higher income than 
those without such an experience (306 vs. 261 lats per 
month). On the other hand, among respondents who did 
have a family member working abroad during the survey 
(and, therefore, were likely to receive remittances), return 
migrants’ average income exceeds average income of 
individuals without recent foreign work experience by 
25% (383 vs. 306 lats per month). Comparing median 
rather than average income of these groups does not 
change the results qualitatively. Econometric analysis 
(details omitted) confirms that also after controlling for 
education level, age, gender, region and family members 
working abroad, employed return migrants collect a 13% 
higher income than their counterparts employed without 
post-accession foreign work experience; moreover this 
difference is due to foreign experience rather than to 
productivity difference between return migrants and 
other workers. A similar result based on data of year 2007 
is found in Hazans (2008).
In sum, both the respondents’ opinions and their 
labour market outcomes suggest that the effect of 
foreign work experience on various life domains of return 
migrants has been positive most of the time.
Emigration intentions
This section explores emigration intentions of Latvia’s 
residents aged 18-65 in the period between December 
2010 and February 2011, after more than two years of 
recession, accompanied by a powerful emigration wave. 
Personal after-tax income of individuals employed in Latvia in the second half of 2010, 
by own and family members’ foreign work experience
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The results are broken down by respondents’ education 
level, main occupation (status), ethnicity, citizenship, 
region, type of settlement and foreign experience. 
The «NI: PCM. 2010» survey includes a question 
whether the respondent plans to move from Latvia in the 
near future in order to improve his [family] material well-
being. Those who answered «Yes» or «I do not exclude 
such a possibility» are categorized as potential emigrants; 
the former group is further referred to as having concrete 
plans.
To analyse reasons for emigration, we use the 
question «Do you plan to live and work abroad?» from 
the «DnB NORD» survey; positive answers were supposed 
to be supplied together with one or several reasons from 
the given list. We divide the potential emigrants into two 
categories. The first one includes those who mention one 
of the following economic reasons (no jobs available in 
Latvia; no possibility to earn a living in Latvia; elsewhere 
one can earn much more; better social protection abroad), 
possibly together with one or more other (non-economic) 
reasons. The second category includes those who did 
not mention any of the economic reasons, but plan 
emigration only for non-economic reasons – one or the few 
of the following: possibility to see the world, to get new 
impressions, to meet new friends; education and career 
possibilities; no future in Latvia; does not like what is 
going on in Latvia; does not like the political environment; 
wants to live in a stable country; influence of other people.
Note that estimated total emigration potential is 
somewhat larger according to the «DnB NORD» survey. 
This is because in this survey the question on emigration 
intentions is not restricted to economic emigration and 
refers to plans in general rather than to plans regarding 
the near future.
Gender and age
As far as respondents’ gender and age are concerned, 
we find expected results  – there is more potential 
movers among males and young individuals. Among 
males, 30% are potential emigrants: about 10% of males 
plan to leave Latvia in the near future, while another 
20% do not exclude such a possibility (Box 2.28, right). 
The proportion of potential movers among females is 
smaller  – about 23%. According to «DnB NORD» survey 
(whish does not refer to «the near future»), this difference 
is less pronounced: 33% males and 28% females plan 
to leave Latvia. Both males and females more often 
mention economic reasons for moving abroad; however, 
the proportion of those driven only by non-economic 
reasons is higher among female potential emigrants 
(Box 2.28, left).
When different age groups are compared, the 
highest proportions of those with concrete plans to leave 
Latvia in the near future are found among those aged 
18 to 24 years (16%) and 25 to 34 years (15%). Both the 
proportion of those who plan to leave Latvia in the near 
future and the proportion of those who do not exclude 
such a possibility decreases with age (Box 2.28, right). 
Relative importance of economic reasons for emigration 
decreases with age, while the proportion potential 
movers driven only by non-economic reasons increases.
Overall, in December 2010  – January 2011, 9% of 
population aged 18 to 65 planned to leave Latvia in the 
Emigration intentions of Latvia’s residents, by gender and age group,  
2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65
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Emigration intentions of Latvia’s residents, by education and main occupation,  
2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65 
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near future and another 17% did not exclude such a 
possibility, together making a 26% large group of potential 
emigrants. On the other hand, in February 2011, 20% of the 
same population admitted plans to emigrate for economic 
(or economic and other) reasons, while another 10% – only 
for non-economic reasons, thus raising the proportion of 
potential movers to 31% (note that in this case the plans do 
not necessarily refer to the near future).
It is important to notice that two-thirds of those who 
plan to move abroad in the near future are younger than 
35, whereas the proportion of this age group among 
stayers aged 18 to 65 is less than one-third. Hence, 
implementation of the above-mentioned emigration 
plans will substantially speed-up aging of Latvia’s society.
Education and main occupation
According to the «NI: PCM. 2010» survey, the highest 
propensity to emigrate in the near future is found among 
the population with a secondary education: 28 per cent 
of them are potential movers, including 10 per cent 
with concrete plans. The other two groups are not far 
behind, however: 25 % those with less than secondary 
education and 22 % of the highly-educated are potential 
emigrants, in both cases including 7 % with concrete 
plans (Box 2.29, right).
Larger differences between the skilled groups are 
observed with respect to reasons for emigration (Box 2.29, 
left). We divide the reasons into two categories: economic 
reasons (no jobs available in Latvia; no possibility to 
earn a living in Latvia; elsewhere one can earn much 
more; better social protection abroad) and non-
economic reasons (possibility to see the world, to get 
new impressions, to meet new friends; education and 
career possibilities; no future in Latvia; does not like 
what is going on in Latvia; does not like the political 
environment; wants to live in a stable country; influence 
of other people). Respondents could indicate more than 
one reasons. Note that total emigration potential is 
somewhat larger according to the left panel of Box  2.29 
than is found in the right panel. This is because the 
survey question used in the left panel is not restricted to 
economic emigration and refers to plans in general rather 
than to plans regarding the near future. 
The proportion of those who plan to move abroad 
for economic (and maybe other) reasons decreases with 
education level: from 29 per cent among respondents 
with a basic education to 13 per cent among university 
graduates. By contrast, the proportion of those who plan 
emigration only for non-economic reasons increases from 
8 per cent among the low-educated to 14 per cent among 
respondents with a tertiary education.
From an occupational perspective, the highest 
propensity to emigrate in the near future is found 
among students: more than a half of them are potential 
emigrants, including 18 per cent with concrete plans 
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(Box  2.29, right). A smaller yet significant propensity 
to emigrate is found among the unemployed, manual 
workers and non-manual workers, with between 23 and 
30 per cent potential emigrants, including between 7 
and 12 per cent with concrete plans (Box 2.29, right). On 
average, one-third of potential movers mention only non-
economic reasons for emigration; the only occupational 
group in which most potential movers do not mention 
any economic reasons for their plans, is that of non-
manual workers (Box 2.29, left).
Noteworthy, very high propensity to emigrate (37% 
overall, including almost 9% with concrete plans) is found 
among persons with unfinished higher education whose 
main occupation is not studies (this result is not shown in 
Box 2.29).
The unemployed are more often inclined to leave 
Latvia due to economic or economic and non-economic 
reasons (this is the case for 35% of all jobseekers) than 
only for non-economic reasons (8%). A similar situation is 
found among manual workers (20% and 7%, respectively). 
Among non-manual workers, on the other hand, 15% 
plan to leave Latvia only for non-economic reasons, 
while 12% mention economic reasons. Noteworthy, total 
emigration potential is equally large (27%) among both 
manual and non-manual workers (Box 2.29, left).
Selectivity charts provide a convenient way to show 
to what extent various population groups are over- 
or under-represented among potential emigrants (in 
comparison with stayers). Box 2.30 presents such  charts, 
for various education levels and occupation categories, 
in according to the «DnB NORD» survey (left) and the «NI: 
VMR. 2010» survey (right). Recall that each of the surveys 
identifies two categories of potential emigrants (by 
reasons and by concreteness of plans, respectively), and 
each category is presented by a polygon whose vertices 
correspond to population groups; another polygon 
presents all potential emigrants together. The distance 
between a particular vertex and the zero line (black 
dotted line in Box 2.30) equals the selectivity index (see 
Box 2.18) of the corresponding population group: if that 
is positive (respectively, negative), the vertex is outside 
(respectively, inside) the zero line. The further outside 
the line is a vertex, the larger is the extent (ratio) to which 
the proportion of the corresponding group among 
movers exceeds such a proportion among stayers. If these 
proportion is equal, the vertex is located on the zero 
line. The centre of the selectivity chart does not have an 
interpretation, this is just a reference point.
As one can see in Box 2.30, the proportion of students 
in all categories of movers is much higher than among 
stayers. Although in a less pronounced way, this is the 
case also for the unemployed, but with exception of 
the category «movers for only non-economic reasons», 
where the unemployed are represented proportionally. 
Individuals with higher education are under-represented 
among those planning to leave Latvia in the near future 
Selectivity index of some socio-economic groups with respect to  
motivation and concreteness of emigration plans, 2010/12-2011/02
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(especially among those with concrete plans), as well as 
among potential emigrants driven by economic reasons. 
On the other hand, among those who plan to move 
abroad only for non-economic reasons, the proportions 
of tertiary-educated and non-manual workers are larger, 
but the proportions of manual workers and individuals 
with just basic education  – smaller than among stayers. 
Persons with basic education are over-represented 
among movers driven by economic reasons, as well as 
among all potential (not necessarily in the near future) 
emigrants. 
The ethnic factor
Ethnicity and citizenship are important determinants 
of migration intentions. The highest propensity to 
emigrate in the near future is found among non-Latvians 
with Latvian citizenship: one-third of them are potential 
emigrants, compared with one-quarter among ethnic 
Latvians. Non-Latvians without Latvian citizenship 
feature the smallest propensity to emigrate: only one-
fifth of them plan to leave Latvia or do not exclude such 
a possibility (Box 2.31, right). Recall that the latter group is 
not covered by the legal provisions on free movement of 
labour within the EU, which reduces expected gains from 
migration. On average, 28% of non-Latvians are potential 
emigrants.
The same pattern is found when emigration plans 
regarding either the near or distant future (and for any 
reason) are considered: 37% of non-Latvians with Latvian 
citizenship are potential emigrants in this wider sense, 
followed by ethnic Latvians with 29% and minority non-
citizens with 26% (Box 2.31, left).
In comparison with the results based on surveys 
conducted in 2005-2007 (see Hazans and Philips, 2010: 
Table 2, cols [6-10]), these findings support the above 
stated hypothesis H3 (g) about the increase of the 
proportion of minorities (especially those holding Latvian 
citizenship) among emigrants during the crisis. 
It is worth noting, however, that the proportions 
of potential emigrants with concrete plans differ very 
little across the ethnic groups, and this time the highest 
rate (10%) is found among ethnic Latvians, followed by 
minority non-citizens (9%) and minority-citizens (8%), 
see Box 2.31, right. However, ethnic Latvians and non-
Latvians differ in terms of motivation for emigration: 
among Latvians, 39% of potential emigrants mentioned 
only non-economic reasons, whereas among non-
Latvians this proportion was just 28%. 
Regional disparities
Region of residence is an important determinant 
of migration intentions. As shown above, the two 
surveys we are using («NI: PCM. 2010» and «DnB NORD») 
produce similar findings about the effects of age, gender, 
education, occupation, ethnicity and citizenship on 
emigration plans. Unfortunately, this is not the case with 
regions (especially as far as Vidzeme and Kurzeme regions 
are concerned). This is because the sample size in each of 
these surveys (about 1,000 respondents) is not sufficient 
to ensure representativity at the regional level. Some 
municipalities were covered in one of the surveys but 
not in the other or have substantially different weights 
in the two samples. Given that municipalities within the 
same region can differ strongly in terms of the level of 
economic development, this can lead to inconsistencies 
between the two surveys at the regional level. 
To ensure validity of the results at the regional level, 
we present emigration potential as the average result 
Emigration intentions of Latvia’s residents, by ethnicity and citizenship,  
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of the two surveys, without distinguishing potential 
emigrants by reason or by certainty of plans (this is a 
legitimate approach, given similar question wording 
and a short time interval between the surveys). As 
shown in Box 2.32, in three of the five regions (Vidzeme, 
Riga region and Latgale) the [relative] emigration 
potential at the beginning of 2011 was virtually identical: 
30% to 31% of population aged 18 to 65 considered 
emigration; in Kurzeme this proportion was 26%, but in 
Zemgale – 19%. 
The role of social networks and foreign experience
Informal channels of obtaining information  – social 
networks and own experience – have a significant role in 
shaping emigration plans. Moreover, the more recent is 
experience and the closer to the person is the provider of 
information, the larger possibility of emigration. Box 2.3 
illustrates.
Among individuals (aged 18 to 65) who do not have 
relatives or friends with a foreign work experience (and 
of course do not have such an experience themselves) 
Emigration intentions of Latvia’s residents, by region,  
2010/12-2011/02, population aged 18-65 
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just 14% are potentials emigrants (Box 2.33, left). Among 
persons without a foreign work experience during the 
last 10 years, who do not have relatives (but may have 
friends) with such an experience, already 18% plan 
to move abroad in the near future or do not exclude 
such a possibility (Box 2.33, right). Among individuals 
who have a relative or friends with a foreign work 
experience in the past (respectively, working abroad 
during the survey), 31% (respectively, 37%) plan to move 
abroad (Box 2.33, left); moreover, for someone who has 
a relative with a foreign work experience within last 
10 years, there is a 30% likelihood to plan emigration in 
the near future or to admit such a possibility (Box 2.33, 
right). Finally, 43% of the return migrants plan to move 
abroad again in the near future and another 23% admit 
such a possibility.
The wealthy also pack their bags
A priori, one can think that the highest propensity 
to move abroad is found among those who have the 
largest difficulties to make ends meet in Latvia, i.e. 
among the low-income population, while the wealthy 
feature the lowest incidence of emigration plans Box 
2.34 presents the proportion of potential movers by 
quintiles of household per capita income. As income 
increases from low to middle, the proportion of potential 
movers with concrete plans in the near future indeed 
declines from 11% to 5%, but then it increases again to 
8% and 7% among persons with middle-high and high 
income (Box  2.34, right). There is virtually no difference 
in propensity to move abroad in the near future between 
low-middle and middle-high income groups.
On the other hand, among individuals from the three 
lowest income quintiles, 22% to 25% plan emigration for 
economic (and maybe other) reasons, whereas within 
two highest quintiles this proportion is just 14% to 
16%. Overall propensity to move (for whatever reason) 
among persons with middle-high and high income is 
just slightly lower than among others: 26% vs. 29% to 
33%. This suggests that income level has a significant yet 
not decisive impact on emigration intentions of Latvia’s 
population.
Multifactor analysis of emigration 
intentions
In order to gain in-depth understanding of motivation 
and concreteness of emigration intentions of various 
population groups, we use econometric models, 
which explain impact of gender, age, family status, 
completed education level, ethnicity and citizenship, 
main occupation, region and degree of urbanisation on 
individual’s emigration plans. The main results of this 
analysis are summarised in Box 2.35.
Other things equal, females and males without under-
age children1 do not differ much in terms of propensity 
to emigrate, although probability to plan moving abroad 
in the near future is by 2.6 percentage points larger for a 
female than for otherwise similar male. By contrast, when 
a female with children is compared to an otherwise similar 
male with children, female’s probability to plan emigration 
1 Hereafter, «with children» means that in respondent’s family 
there is at least one child younger than 18 years who lives 
together with the respondent. Otherwise the respondent is 
referred to as «without children».
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in the near future or in general is by 5.5 to 6  percentage 
points smaller, probability to plan emigration due to 
economic reasons – by 9 percentage points smaller, while 
probability to plan emigration due to only non-economic 
reasons – by 3 percentage points larger1. 
1 These results are obtained by adding up the effects from rows 
«Female» and «Female with children».
Presence of children in the family significantly 
increases males’ propensity to emigrate due to economic 
reasons, while for females this effect is negative with 
respect to concrete plans in the near future but is not 
significant with respect to emigration in general or due 
to only non-economic reasons (note that for females the 
children’s effect in each of the five columns of Box  2.35 
Impact of demographic factors and occupation on emigration plans 
Percentage points
 
Do you plan to move from 
Latvia in the near future to 
improve your/family material 
well-being?
Do you plan to live and work abroad?
Yes Yes or Do not Exclude
Yes  
(for any 
reason)
Yes, for economic 
(and maybe 
other) reasons
Yes, only for 
non-economic 
reasons
Proportion of positive answers 9.1% 26.2% 30.8% 20.4% 10.4%
Factors
Gender and family  
Female  2.6**  -3.0 -1.2  0.7 -1.5
Married or lives with a partner  1.3  -7.0*** -2.6 -0.7 -2.9
Lives with children  3.6**  8.0***  4.6  7.8*** -3.6
Female with children -8.1***  -6.4* -5.1* -9.6***  4.9**
Age (vs. 55–65)
18-24 22.9*** 33.0*** 34.5*** 33.4***  2.2
25-34 23.0*** 32.4*** 30.4*** 25.6***  8.0**
35-44 17.0*** 20.9*** 22.8*** 19.2***  6.3**
45-54 11.4*** 14.1*** 13.2*** 13.2***  2.6
Education (vs. secondary)
Below secondary  -6.0***  -7.1** -3.4  -1.9 -1.9
Tertiary  -2.7  -2.5  2.3  -3.0  4.3***
Ethnicity & citizenship (vs. Latvian)
Non-Latvian, LV citizen  -2.0  7.3***  7.4***  8.3*** -0.5
Non-Latvian, non-citizen  2.6*  2.4  0.9  6.7** -6.4***
Main occupation (vs. wage earners)
Unemployed  4.8***  6.0** 14.9*** 14.3***  -1.1
Student  1.7  6.8 19.4***  6.3 11.1***
Other  1.1 -10.7***  1.4  2.0  -0.8
Monthly household income per capita, LVL (vs. 121-160)
Up to 80  5.4**  -1.9 -2.3  -5.1*  3.2
81-120  4.3**  1.8  1.5  -4.5  8.0***
161-200  3.3  1.8 -1.1  -8.8***  9.3***
>200  1.3  -3.3 -4.4  -7.8**  5.2**
NA  4.3*  -0.3  0.5  -9.3*** 11.2***
Other controls 5 regions and 3 urbanisation levels ( indicator variables)
N observations 869 869 868 868 868
Notes: *, **, *** – estimates significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Calculations with survey data: The first two columns – «DnB NORD Latvia’s barometer Nr. 35»; the last three columns – 
«NI: PCM. 2010» survey.
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can be obtained by adding up the effects from the rows 
«Lives with children» and «Female with children»). This 
supports hypothesis (H3)-(d) that after the crisis the 
potential emigrants are oriented towards long-term or 
permanent emigration and more often move as whole 
families.
While emigration intentions vary significantly by 
age group, it is worth noting that the 25 to 34 year olds 
have practically as strong propensity to emigrate as 
those aged 18 to 24: in comparison with the 55 to 65 year 
olds, other things equal, for both groups probability to 
plan emigration in the near future is by 23 percentage 
points larger, probability to plan emigration in general 
(without specifying the time)  – by 30 to 35 percentage 
points larger, but probability to plan emigration due to 
economic reasons – by 26 to 34 percentage points larger. 
For population aged 35 to 44 years, all above mentioned 
probabilities are by 6 to 11 percentage points smaller 
than for the 25 to 34 year olds, but for those aged 45 to 
54 years – by another 6 to 10 percentage points smaller. 
When the average probability for each model is taken 
into account (see row «Proportion of positive answers» in 
Box 2.35), it appears that the strongest age effects, which 
exceed the average prevalence of emigration plans by a 
factor of two-and-a-half, are related to concrete plans to 
move abroad in the near future. 
Noteworthy, the strongest propensity to emigrate 
only due to non-economic reasons is found within 
population aged 25 to 44 years. 
When other factors are controlled for, the difference 
between persons with secondary and tertiary education 
with respect to propensity to emigrate becomes 
insignificant, except for emigration only due to non-
economic reasons; in the latter case, university graduates 
feature a 4.3 larger probability. These findings once 
again support our hypothesis (H3)-(e) about a significant 
increase in the proportion of the highly educated among 
emigrants during crisis. 
On the other hand, for a person whose education 
is below secondary, probability to plan [economic] 
emigration in the near future is by 6 to 7 percentage 
points smaller than for an otherwise similar secondary-
educated person. This is despite the low-educated 
suffered more than others from the recession-triggered 
lay-offs (see Box 2.35). 
Non-Latvians with Latvian citizenship, in comparison 
with otherwise similar ethnic Latvians, feature by 7 to 
8 percentage points larger probability to plan or admit 
moving abroad in the near future; the same is true for 
the overall probability to emigrate (without specifying 
the time) and for the probability to plan emigration 
due to economic reasons. On the other hand, non-
Latvians without Latvian citizenship are not significantly 
different from Latvians with respect to the first two 
of the above-mentioned probabilities. However, 
probability to plan emigration due to economic 
reasons among non-citizens is by 7 percentage points 
larger than among ethnic Latvians, other things equal. 
This, in turn, is partly offset by a 6 percentage points 
smaller probability to plan emigration only due to non-
economic reasons. Finally, among non-Latvians with 
Latvian citizenship the propensity to move abroad only 
due to non-economic reasons is the same as among 
otherwise similar Latvians. 
While findings reported in the previous paragraph 
indicate that non-citizens are less inclined to emigrate 
than otherwise similar Non-Latvians with Latvian 
citizenship, results from the first column of Box 2.35 
are slightly different: other thing equal, probability to 
plan economic emigration in the near future for non-
citizens is, on average, by of two-and-a-half percentage 
points larger than for Latvians and by four-and-a-half 
percentage points larger than for minority citizens. 
Plausibly, this is explained by a difficult labour market 
situation of non-citizens (see Box 2.14). Overall, the 
results of econometric analysis support our hypothesis 
(H3)-(g) about changes in the role of ethnicity in the 
post-crisis period: propensity to emigrate has become 
larger among minority individuals than among Latvians, 
other things equal. 
The unemployed, in comparison with otherwise 
similar employed persons, much more often plan 
moving abroad in the near future, emigration in general 
(disregarding reason and without specifying the time) 
and emigration due to economic (and maybe other) 
reasons; the impressive size of this effect is demonstrated 
by the fact that the difference in probabilities between 
the unemployed and employed (respectively, 5, 15 
and 14 percentage points), in the two former cases is 
as large as a half of the average probability, but in the 
latter case  – even 70%. If those who admit a possibility 
to move abroad in the near future are also considered 
potential emigrants (along with those having specific 
plans), then the likelihood to belong to this group for an 
unemployed is by 6 percentage points larger than for an 
employed person, other things equal; this effect is also 
significant, although not as sizable in relative terms as 
the ones mentioned before. By contrast, with respect to 
plans to move abroad only for non-economic reasons, an 
unemployed person does not differ significantly from an 
otherwise similar employed individual.
Finally, students are much more oriented towards 
emigration only for non-economic reasons than those 
whose main activity is work (other things equal): the 
difference in probabilities (11 percentage points) exceeds 
the average probability of this outcome.
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Main findings. Most important tasks
Main findings 
In 2000  – 2010, Latvia has lost at least 170-200 thousand persons due to [mostly unregistered] emigration. 
Emigrants, as well as potential emigrants, are, on average, much younger than stayers, hence actual age structure 
of Latvia’s population substantially differs from the official one – Latvia’s society is much older than we used to 
think, and it is aging faster than each of us.  
Just 8% of emigrants plan (or rather plan than not) to return within six months. In a longer perspective (within 
five years) about 20% of emigrants admit a possibility of returning. In the time of economic crisis (2009-2010), 
the migration flows were to a much larger extent than before shaped by push factors (such as joblessness and 
wage cuts, as well as non-economic factors – loss of prospects, uncertainty and general dissatisfaction with the 
situation in Latvia). Noteworthy, the propensity to emigrate due to only non-economic reasons among citizens of 
Latvia does not depend on ethnicity and is larger than among non-citizens. Overall propensity to move abroad 
during the crisis is larger among non-Latvians (especially those holding Latvian citizenship). The proportion of 
the highly educated among emigrants increased significantly and exceeded corresponding proportion among 
stayers. Students are strongly over-represented among the potential emigrants. The brain drain risk becomes 
considerable.
 the most important tasks 
First, the state should introduce a praxis of expert assessment of any significant policy changes, especially in 
such fields as education, employment, health care, taxes and benefits, in order to exclude risks that these changes 
increase motivation to emigrate among large groups of population. 
Second, state and municipalities should engage in strengthening the links with the emigrants. This would 
be both the right thing to do from the moral standpoint and a strategically justified course of action from the 
perspective of human development. Most likely, it will not return home those emigrants, which do not plan it 
themselves. However, in the longer perspective such a praxis will facilitate return migration and expand Latvia’s 
«virtual borders». One might define the «national identity» in many ways, but whatever the definition, all of us – 
stayers and movers – still are to a large extent one nation: the people of Latvia. Negative effects of emigration will 
be smaller, if this will remain the case. 
Third, at the EU level Latvia together with other new member states should actively promote creation of a 
mechanism which should compensate the countries of origin of the migrants for the loss of human capital, labour 
force and reproductive potential.
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When Latvia joined the European Union (hereafter 
EU) one of the stated aims was to provide social 
assistance and services for families. The families with 
children were defined in political documents as high-
risk families for social exclusion (LM, 2003, 20-5). 
However, the welfare and wellbeing of these families 
and children has not improved despite the existence of 
various types of social assistance and support services. 
Data shows that families with children are still one of 
the main groups at risk of poverty and social exclusion 
(see Box  2.37). Simultaneously, to a great extent these 
families with children are among those social groups 
who are most affected by economic crises. Thus 
breadwinners in the families often have to make radical 
decisions such as looking for a work abroad with an aim 
to improve the material wellbeing of their families.
From the beginning of the new millennium until 
2008 Latvia experienced rapid economic growth that 
offered people opportunities for work out of wider 
variety of vacancies. Then an economic recession began, 
unemployment soared, and many people decided to 
go abroad. General estimates indicate that between 
2004 and 2008 was around 76,000 people from Latvia 
emigrated to Great Britain and Ireland, and another 4,000 
emigrated to other countries in the European Economic 
Zone (hereafter EEZ). In 2009 were 15,385 emigrated 
to Great Britain (Indans, 2010, 4). The free movement of 
people in the common EU labour market offered flexible 
employment policies, e.g., terminated job agreements, 
seasonal work, etc. Evidence from the recent studies 
shows that decision to emigrate is higher among those 
who are exposed to socioeconomic unfavourable living 
conditions with weaker family ties. On the one hand, 
they appear to have a weaker social capital and sense 
of belonging to their families and homes. On the other 
hand, it is considered easier for them to adapt to new 
circumstances abroad (see Broka 2011).
The modern family today is characterised by 
intensive mobility. With an aim to improve the living 
conditions it is possible to move from a poorer region 
to more developed one, from the countryside to a city, 
from a small town to the capital, or from one country to 
another. Emigration for welfare purpose often creates 
challenges and risks both for those who migrate and 
those staying behind. The families are facing additional 
burdens, particularly in the early stage of migration 
when socioeconomic conditions are underprivileged 
(see Parreñas, 2005; Borjas and Bratsberg, February 
1996). Thus emerging labour migration from Latvia has 
affected social security of families and children left-
behind. Statistical data demonstrates that Custody 
court informed local social service agencies about 
2,061 (2,237 in 2010) socioeconomically disadvantaged 
families where 3,661 (3,851 in 2010) children were 
living in insecurity and vulnerability (LR LM VBTAI, 
2010b, 2011). These are those families who were in 
need for social assistance and support. In 2011 there 
were 8 101 children in total living out of family care 
separately from their parents; and for 450 (373 in 2010) 
children their grandparents were assigned to perform 
the guardianship. While for another 245 (238 in 2010) 
children the guardianship was performed by other 
relatives (of total 846 in 2011 and 798 in 2010 new 
children out of family care) (LR LM VBTAI 2010a, 2011). 
The current socioeconomic situation, living conditions 
and political awareness are significant determinants 
2.4. the Social Security 
of Latvian Families 
in age of Economic Migration
Families with children: A group at risk of poverty and social exclusion
In 2010, 38.1% of Latvian population were at risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurobarometer, February 
2010; Eurostat, 2011a).    The largest social group who obtained the poor person status in 2010 were children in 
Latvia (39 500 in January and 62 420 in October) (see Meiere 2010, 17). The poverty risk index for households with 
dependent children has increased from 18.5% to 22.7% during the recent years from 2004 to 2009. Particularly 
single-parent households with children (40%), and two parent households with three or more children (38.8%) are 
the main group being at risk of poverty. In comparison, two-parent families with one child (17.5%) or two children 
(18.4%) are among those experiencing lower poverty risks in their households (LR CSB, 2009). These objectionable 
data signifies the identity of poor families who are emerging in Latvia.   Families finding themselves entrapped by 
poverty are also facing the higher risks for social exclusion. Hence the most vulnerable group are those excluded 
by targeted social policies and assistance increasing their human security and development potential. The longer 
time they are experiencing poverty and vulnerability, the harder it is to escape from it.
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influencing parental emigration strategies and well-
being of children left-behind.
The on-going migration process has established 
«transnational families». These are the families living 
some or most of the time separated from each other, yet 
hold together and creating something that can be seen 
as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely ‘family 
hood’, across national borders (see Bryceson and Vuorela, 
2002, 3). This household type and family unit has become 
more common in Latvia. In the recent years, the number 
of children with one or both parents working abroad is 
increasing. While in May were estimated 4,123 children 
living with parents working abroad (391 with both 
parents and 3,732 with one parent working abroad), in 
September the number increased by 13.5% (559 children). 
At the beginning of the 2010/2011 school year there 
were 3,449 children with parents working abroad (see 
Box  2.38). Share of children whose parents are working 
abroad of population density shows that the largest 
number are living in Vidzeme (440) and Latgale (409) 
regions (LR IZM data). Transnational families and parents 
often are organizing the family relations and care for their 
children left-behind over time and space. 
Due to the fact that the number of people moving 
abroad is increasing, the Regulations of the Cabinet 
of Ministers No. 655 with developed common plan for 
2006-2009 was aimed to improve the current situation 
and reduce social exclusion of children left-behind by 
their migrating parents (Regulations of the Cabinet 
of Ministers/ Ministru Kabinets, entry into force on 
August 30, 2006 No. 655). However, the will to expand 
and provide support to families and children in urgent 
situations was abolished by the ministry of welfare 
arguing that previously mentioned policy-planning 
document is no longer on agenda due to the fact that the 
date has expired (LR Ministry of Welfare 2010). Another 
essential policy document, «The State Family Policy 
guidelines for 2011-2017» has prioritized several items in 
regard to children whose parents are working abroad: 
development of methodological guidelines for custody 
courts aiming to empower the international co-operation 
in protecting the rights of the child; provide teaching 
assistance for students at ‘drop-out’ risk; and enhance 
the psychological assistance in educational and child care 
process (LR MK, 2011). In turn, the LR Ministry of Welfare 
in its developed plan for action has addressed only the 
wellbeing of the children lacking the sufficient care and 
general support (LR LM nd., 15). Box 2.39 illustrates a 
situation when both parents are working abroad and 
other family members are taking care of the children.
Similar stories are often told in many places of Latvia. 
Parents are leaving and someone else has to care for 
their children. In such situation, custody court and social 
institutions on local level are involved in the process. 
Case study indicates that child is commonly the one who 
has no ‘voice’ and has to adapt to new circumstances. 
Children are not asked whether they are accepting 
the situation. Caregivers enter the families with new 
demands, rules and apply their experience that may 
be different from the ones the child has. As caregivers 
they do not perform their natural role; instead, they are 
substituting their parents. Relationship between children 
and parents may weaken over a longer period of time. 
Older children take the adult responsibilities and roles 
in terms of caring for younger children, cleaning house 
and preparing meals. Education becomes a secondary 
priority for those teenagers who have to take care of their 
homes. The social security of the family is endangered 
and often children are left on their own. The hardest time 
for children is in the early stage of economic migration. 
While children continue to live in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged circumstances, parents living abroad have 
access to different social guarantees and welfare in their 
new country of destination. They are able to maintain 
their material needs more easily (see Parreñas, 2005; 
Broka, 2009).
Broka has found that most common is that the 
children from one migrating parent families stay with 
mothers. Some children stay with their grandparents 
and very few stay with more distant relatives, friends 
or acquaintances (Karičerta, 2006, 2009). It is worth to 
mention that increasing number of children are left with 
guardians or other caregivers who are not members of 
their family in Latvia. Authorities at custody court say 
The number of school-age children whose parents are working abroad
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that children often are without lawful guardianship, or 
left-behind by the parents (an interview with custody 
court authority, 2011; Broka 2009). However, for the more 
precise evaluation there is a need for the latest statistics 
about this phenomenon, not completely recognized 
yet. In 2009 were 2,300 families who did not ensure the 
appropriate care and development of 3,916 children in 
Latvia (LR LM VBTAI, 2009b).
Why there is a need to address the 
well being of children’s well-being in 
transnational families?
Transnational families are becoming more and more 
common in Latvia and this signifies new challenges 
for them. Transnational families are experiencing the 
change and transformation of the social relationships 
in the family. The role of women and particular role 
of mother is changing. Distance often has a negative 
effect on relationships between family members. Social 
exclusion and divorced families are becoming more 
common. These processes have a essential effect on the 
socialisation of children, as well as partnerships between 
parents in caring for and supervising their children. In 
interviews, one parent said that he «left behind a small 
child, but [upon returning] I encountered an adult.» 
People feel that they have lost control and authority as 
parents. Parents who leave Latvia provide their children 
with material support and hope that this will make up 
for the absence of emotional care (Broka, 2009). Despite 
this, there is the risk that when material support and 
emotional support are not in balance, there can be 
negative results for the children in the long term. When 
parents decide to move abroad to deal with the material 
situation of their families and leave the children behind, 
the primary issue is the psycho-social and emotional 
feelings of the child, not the issue of material support.
Also of vital importance is the child’s age. There 
is a close correlation between age and the ability of 
children to adapt to new circumstances in the sense that 
the older the child, the easier it is for parents to prepare 
them for the departure of their parents (explaining and 
reaching agreement on distanced care organisations and 
principles). This is necessary to avoid negative influence 
on ongoing family life. Before parents leave, it is valuable 
to contact a psychologist and a social worker so that if 
the family faces needs while the parents are gone, they 
already have contacts with these specialists. That makes 
Increasing welfare – but at whose expense?
Inga (47) has three daughters – Liene (5), Aija (10) and Liga (16). She has been unemployed for a long time. 
Supportive authorities at the local State Employment Agency (NVA) have told her about an opportunity to go for 
the seasonal work to England from February until November. There is not enough time to handle all formalities 
and documentation. Inga asks her mother from the countryside to come and to take care of her children. Two 
weeks later she leaves for work abroad.
Aija and Liga understand that mother have to travel abroad thus being able to earn more money, pay for the 
rent and other household payments. They appreciate it. They will no longer have to pinch’ pennies for survival. 
Liene, in turn, is happy for her birthday party because she knows that there will be a cake and presents. The 
grandmother is willing to help her daughter and becomes an active caregiver for three grandchildren.
Later in May, the local education board realises that Liga has missed school without any excuse and that the 
grades of Liene and Aija have worsened. Information about the situation of the family is sent over to the local 
social services and the custody court. The court discovers that the mother did not ensured lawful guardianship 
for her children – the grandmother is not authorised guardian for the children, and she has not been assessed.
The custody court authorities and the social workers visit the family. Aija says that since her mother went for 
work abroad she is feeling badly. Liga adds that the relationship with grandmother is hard. Grandmother does 
not allow her to meet her friends, often shouts at Liene when she has not cleaned up things after herself or 
something else went wrong. The girls are not allowed to make phone calls or go anywhere. Aija claims that her 
grades have worsened because she often has a headache and stomach ache. She says that the grandmother hits 
her younger sisters. The girls are not speaking with mother, as calls abroad are expensive. For the most they are 
talking about school. The grandmother denies what the children have said. She admits that it is not easy for her 
to deal with three children. She also says that the money sent by her daughter are enough for the basic needs.
The custody court determines that the father of the three girls is also abroad and has not taken any part in 
care for the children for a long time. The children have no legal representation and thus the issue of establishing 
guardianship arises. Information is requested to make sure that the grandmother is a suitable guardian. The social 
service has developed a social rehabilitation plan and work with the family has begun. A psychologist helps 
the grandmother to select and implement the most appropriate child rearing methods. A guardian is appointed 
for the children and the family is under the watchful eye of the relevant institutions. The appointment of the 
guardian does not eliminate the mother’s parental rights but the social services do take steps to remove the right 
of parentage from the father.
Box 
2.39
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Main conclusions and messages
Main conclusions
The economic labour migration has enhanced the development of transnational family model in Latvia. 
Increasing numbers of children left-behind have parents living and working abroad. Hence these families and 
children are the subjects of social insecurity. Divided by borders families are experiencing lower living conditions 
and facing higher risks for social exclusion, particularly in the early stage of migration. These migrating families 
have weaker social networks to Latvia and are more open for labour migration and social security. 
Messages
New social, welfare and family policies in Latvia shall address the well-being and social security of transnational 
families divided by borders, particularly taking into consideration the well-being of children left-behind.
There is a need to increase the knowledge and understanding about migration patterns and its impact on 
established relationship between parents and children left-behind that is balancing between material, moral and 
emotional care. Thus targeted national and local policies shall increase the responsibility of parents going abroad 
and support children left-behind. 
Shared responsibility between the state and society shall be included in social, economical and psychological 
security policy framework in Latvia. 
At EU level Latvia together with other new member states shall be active in development of ‘translocal’ 
protecting mechanisms that may relatively compensate the loss of human capital and ‘brain drain’. 
Box 
2.40
it easier for the caregiver and for the child to adapt to 
changing social circumstances. Parents must clearly 
understand that economic gains (improved welfare and 
material conditions) do not compensate for the emotional 
losses, which the family feels – the younger the child, the 
more powerful the sense of loss. Finally, the family must 
decide on how long a period their children will be able to 
spend without their parents. It is important to understand 
that the longer the children are left without their 
parents, the harder it will be for them to learn about the 
traditional model of a family and to absorb life experience 
from their parents (Lialiugene, Rupshene, November 
2008; Broka, 2009).
The state shall ensure the child such protection and 
care as is necessary for his or her well-being. Thus if 
parents cannot provide moral and material care for their 
children the state and other assistance of the public 
authorities have responsibility to ensure particular care 
of children left without a family and to those without 
adequate support (UN, 1989; Eurochild, 2008-2010). 
The Latvian law on social services and social protection 
states that families facing social problems and in need 
have the right to state protection. A special protection 
is also intended for children without the care of their 
parents.1 However, the status of children left-behind by 
migrating parents has not been defined as a precondition 
when children are without the care of their parents. 
Therefore, the children left-behind are not subjects to 
preventive social assistance and support provided by 
the state and local authorities. In the future perspective 
the social welfare, health and education policies shall 
identify vulnerability and ensure social security for all 
families with children in need. The well-being of families 
in the future can be guaranteed by the social welfare, 
employment policies and practices today. The social 
security of families and children depend on human 
and social capital, living conditions, the prevailing 
socioeconomic situation, and political responsibility for 
that situation.
1 Article 33.1, 33.12, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 of the law.
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Regional identity represents a sense of belonging to 
the region or place where a person lives. In the context 
of human development, it is important to determine 
the way in which regional identity influences the 
capability of various social agents. In this context, we 
can pose a series of questions such as how important 
is regional identity in contemporary society, how local 
governments, activists and other social agents come 
together to defend their interests and resolve common 
problems in specific territories or places. What are the 
individual strategies which people establish to ensure 
their own welfare?
This chapter of the report will review regional identity 
and the way in which it emerges, looking at how the 
territorial belonging of people has been influenced by 
administrative and territorial reforms (ATR), what local 
govern ments have done in establishing and implement-
ing developmental strategies, and what is done by other, 
local social agents (businesspeople, other employers, 
local action groups, etc.).
Latvia is a small country. It can be crossed in just a 
few hours’ time, and travellers may not even notice the 
things which people feel to be important differences 
in their everyday lives in terms of making one location 
more attractive while ensuring that another location 
is abandoned even if it was once actively populated. 
There are a number of important administrative and 
territorial centres  – cities which emerged in places 
which have been settled for millennia – which today are 
semi-abandoned and with dusty and potholed streets. 
Elsewhere, a small workers’ estate has been turned into a 
well-appointed town over the course of several decades. 
Can the attractiveness of a place be assessed on the basis 
of kilometres of paved roads, the number of hospitals, 
schools, registered companies, etc., or the age and 
gender proportions of the location’s population?
introduction
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What makes a place unique and attractive for 
residents? What, on the contrary, ensures that a place 
will be abandoned and weary? Are we dealing with an 
attractive landscape, cubic metres of easily available 
natural resources, or the memory of our ancestors? Is the 
issue good traffic links and modern communications, 
convenient shopping opportunities and lots of 
jobs? Perhaps we are considering a developed social 
infrastructure or the people who live in the location?
A place comes back to life when it becomes 
important to residents who allow it to turn from an 
anonymous and amorphous part of the Universe into 
a place where social reality is actively formed. The 
environment in which we live is not a passive object 
of social life. It actively participates in the formation of 
human knowledge, experience and behaviour, and that is 
a process which begins in early childhood. The 2004/2005 
Report on Human Development focused on the concept 
of regional identity, finding that a sense of belonging to 
Latvia and to a specific place of residence are of equal 
importance (Zobena, 2005). The concept of regional1 
identity merges the aspects of a region (place) and a 
social community. Explanations of collective identity 
usually involve the question of the groups in society 
to which the individual feels a sense of belonging. The 
concept of regional identity underlines belonging to 
nearby communities  – families, kinships, colleagues, 
neighbours, etc., also thinking about the location which 
the individual perceives as a recognisable place in which 
his or her daily life is spent.
In traditional communities, belonging to a social 
community and a place coincide  – the community 
populates a specific territory, has common values, 
traditions, etc. (culture), and is limited in terms of social 
and spatial mobility. People inherit ways of earning 
a living and careers from their ancestors, and their 
relations with others are substantially influenced by 
the reputation (social status) of the relevant family. This 
1 The concept of a region is broadly used in the public 
arena and in various areas of science. Like many other 
frequently used concepts, this one has several definitions, 
understandings and explanations, and it is difficult to find 
common ground among them all. In recent times, the words 
«region» and «regional» have often been used to describe 
the periphery or countryside, separating Rīga as the centre of 
the country from the rest of Latvia. It has to be said, however, 
that this is not a proper way to use the concept of a «region,» 
and it is not in line with regional policy positions or scholarly 
conclusions in regional research studies. In this text, we are 
using the word «region» mostly from the perspective of a 
sense of belonging to a place, applying it not just to cultural 
or historical planning regions, but also to places to which 
social communities feel a sense of belonging.
remains true over the course of several generations. 
In communities of farmers, spatial mobility is limited 
by links to the land which is farmed. The scope and 
practices of spatial belonging among individuals today 
are changing very rapidly. Jobs, provision of services, 
involvement in networks and communities at various 
levels and everyday movement models are very diverse, 
indeed. Sometimes there are neighbours who have 
not ever visited anyplace further than the nearest small 
town, work for their neighbours, shop at the local store 
and find that watching television is their most important 
form of entertainment. Alongside them there may be 
true citizens of the world who travel all around the 
world for business purposes, go shopping in Western 
Europe, and holiday in Egypt or Turkey. We can see that 
«links to a place» can be very diverse  – whether limited 
to the nearby surroundings or develop to the global 
scope. At the same time, however, people who live in a 
single territory usually feel a sense of belonging to very 
different communities, and they are familiar with spaces 
of various sizes.
Sedentarists or nomads?2
Latvians are often presented in the Latvian mass 
media as sedentarists who can be compared to people 
who have an unstable sense of a place and are more 
likely to be seen as nomads. Nomads cannot integrate 
into established social structures, there is a great distance 
between them and territorial communities, they care 
little for the development of the territorial community, 
and they are constantly looking for a better place to live. 
Territorial mobility is a prerequisite, however, for the 
more dynamic development of individuals and societies. 
Territorial mobility allows individuals to gain new 
knowledge, also allowing societies to ensure the transfer 
of knowledge. This means that it is necessary to actualise 
the fairly classical dilemma – intensive territorial mobility 
can promote the development of a society, but it can also 
create conflicts which hinder that development.
Social groups can have different or even diametrically 
opposite perceptions about a place. Links to a place 
ensure a sense of security and welfare, making it easier 
to demarcate borders between groups and to preserve 
collective memories. It is important for members of a 
territorial community to establish common identities. 
A sense of a place and one’s roots are the foundation 
2 Sociologist Aivars Tabuns has written about sedentarism, 
using various words in Latvian which are antonyms to the 
concept of being a nomad.
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for a sense of stability. The self and a place are not 
independent phenomena, they overlap. The questions 
«Who am I?» and «Where am I?» cannot be separated, 
because places form social identity (Tabuns, 2007).
Places bring people together, but this proximity 
does not always create a sense of community. The 
most powerful type of a sense of place is existentially 
internal  – the place is rich with meanings, even without 
considered and purposeful reflections. A place can be 
perceived without passion, and it can simply be seen 
as a background for events and activities. In that case 
people feel a split of sorts between themselves and the 
place where they are, and they feel no piety toward that 
place. People who identify themselves with a different 
territorial community may typically experience alienation 
and distancing from people and the place where they are 
forced to be (the person feels separate from «his or her» 
own space; the current place of residence is perceived 
as unpleasant or oppressive). Some people, however, 
characteristically have a sense that is existentially 
external – they are alienated from all places. Such people 
are never truly at home, and they know nothing about an 
emotional link or a sense of belonging to a specific place 
(Relph, 1976).
A sense of place is of particular importance today 
because time is substantially speeding up in the present-
day world. This means that a place can enhance a sense 
of stability and succession among individuals, linking 
yesterday to today and history to the future. A place can 
be a source of pride or humiliation. A place is similar to 
a language – they overlap, in fact, and they both are key 
prerequisites for social links among people.
Statistics show that migration indicators have 
been quite high in Latvia ever since 1863. There were 
particularly intensive migration processes in Latvia 
after World War II (with 7.2 million long-term migrants 
between 1951 and 19901). The migration rate declined a 
bit after 1991, but against the background of Latvia’s total 
population it remained quite intensive. Between 1991 and 
2010, the CSP registered 1.2 million long-term migrants, 
and it must be taken into account that these data are 
fairly incomplete when it comes to those who have 
moved abroad. Sociologists have not done much analysis 
of people who move from one place to another in the 
country, even though such migration is quite substantial. 
For instance, 476,000 residents moved from one place 
1 Data from the Central Statistical Board (CSP), as calculated by 
Aivars Tabuns. This number speaks to those who immigrated 
to Latvia or emigrated from it, as well as those who changed 
their registered place of residence within Latvia. According to 
the CSP methodology, «long-term migration among residents 
represents the move of residents from one administrative 
territory to another with the purpose of changing their 
permanent place of residence at least for one year. Migration 
within cities or districts also includes people who migrate 
within the boundaries of the state but among various 
administrative territories. A person who moves from one 
place to another within a single city, parish or administrative 
district is not included in migration statistics.» See http://data.
csb.gov.lv/DATABASE/Iedzsoc/Ikgad%E7jie%20statistikas%20
dati/Iedz%EEvot%E2ji%20E%20Migr%E2cija/IE010lv.htm. 
Viewed 5 July 2011.
to another in Latvia between 2001 and 2010 (CSP). 
Demographers use the concept of «long-term migration» 
to characterise these processes.
Statistical data at this time do not make it possible 
to assess the proportion of sedentarists (people who 
still live at their birthplace) in Latvia, but there was a 
sociological study conducted in the mid-1990s which 
showed that approximately one-third of respondents 
were living at the same place where they were born 
(International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 1995). 
The amplitude in this regard varies very essentially 
among different countries, ranging from 61% or so of 
Italians, 49% of Spaniards, 48% of Slovakians and 46% of 
Bulgarians on one end of the scale to 3% of Americans, 
6% of New Zealanders, 11% of Swedes, and 18% of Dutch 
people (ISSP, 1995). It has to be taken into account that 
there is a high proportion of single-family homes in 
the countries that are in the latter group, with strong 
traditions related to the self-governance of territorial 
communities which ensure self-regulation therein. It also 
has to be noted that most people in Latvia at this time 
have lived at the same place for more than a decade, 
and sociological data suggest that they have taken deep 
root in those residences over the course of that period 
of time.
How can relations between a person 
and a place be described, and why is 
that important?
Of essential importance in the study of identity is not 
just national identity and one’s belonging to a national 
community, but also a series of other important issues: 
How strong are regional identities and under what 
circumstances do they emerge, what are the territorial 
attitudes of residents, and how much do they feel a sense 
of belonging to territories and places of various sizes  – 
the state, region, city, parish, neighbourhood or home 
(Anderson, 1983; DeGraaf, 2009; Paasi, 1991)?
A place is not just a spatial, territorial, geographic 
or cartographic phenomenon. a place is a populated 
territory which is in a specific location in comparison 
to other places. it involves a physical infrastructure 
(buildings, roads, parks, industrial and agricultural 
territories, etc.), and there are everyday trajectories 
in terms of where people go and where they spend 
time. also of importance is the meaning which people 
attach to a place (Gieryn, 2000). A place can be of various 
sizes  – a home, a neighbourhood, a region or a place of 
residence (Gieryn, 2000; Cresswell, 2004). When thinking 
about identity, a particularly important element of a 
place is the meaning that is attached to it. Also important 
are territorial attitudes  – links between an individual 
and a place, as well as the relevant sense of emotional 
belonging. All of this has an effect on the individual’s 
territorial behaviour.
Human behaviour and attitudes in relation to various 
aspects of territorial planning and development are 
often surprising in that the foundation for such activities 
does not always have obvious and rational economic 
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justification. There are often very different aspects  – 
community relations, the dynamics of the individual’s 
social networks, as well as the ideas which people have 
about their place of residence, other people who live 
there, and other places that have emerged as the result 
of diverse social and territorial experiences.
British researchers have conducted studies about 
the co-operation and conflicts of various interest 
groups when it comes to the development of rural 
territories. They have concluded that various groups 
that are involved in rural development (farmers, people 
from the middle class who live in the countryside but 
work in cities) have very different ideas about the values 
of a place and about the way in which they see the 
development of their place of residence. Some people 
prefer the landscape, environmental quality, peace and 
security that are traditionally linked to idyllic rural life, 
while others emphasise the use of local resources for 
business or agricultural or industrial manufacturing 
(e.g., Marsdenetal, 1993). These are not always rationally 
formulated interests. Often they represent territorial 
attitudes  – a sense of belonging to a place, feelings 
about the place, the identity of the place, as well as 
various functional aspects of homes, the sense of a 
home, communities, the quality of the surrounding 
environment, and the structure of opportunities in the 
place. All of this leads to different experiences with 
places – ones which affect views and activities in relation 
to various aspects of territorial development.
Similar problems exist with projects aimed at the 
regeneration of areas around cities when it comes 
to the construction or reconstruction of buildings and 
infrastructural objects which improve the quality of life 
in rural areas (meeting houses, sports facilities, etc.). It 
is often the case that people who live in rural or urban 
areas have critical attitudes toward developmental and 
restoration projects elaborated by the planners (DeGraaf, 
2009). One reason for this may be that such processes lead 
to substantial changes to one’s accustomed environment. 
The building of new housing will attract other groups 
of residents to the place. These people often represent 
not just different lifestyles, but also different values 
and ideas about the place’s development. For instance, 
when degraded urban districts are regenerated, the 
environment changes, properties become more valuable, 
and the composition of the local population changes 
as poorer people are forced out of their accustomed 
environment. In rural areas, in turn, agricultural or 
industrial manufacturing could be attractive to those who 
live in the area, own land and are interested in earning 
income. Opponents of such «productive» initiatives aimed 
at rural development may include those for whom the 
countryside is meant for recreation. Of key importance 
here is the issue of whether these regeneration projects 
are initiated and supported by the local community or 
whether their implementation has begun with a decision 
«from above» and without any thought given to the 
desires and needs of local residents. In the latter case, it 
is more likely that a well-intended regeneration project 
or construction of infrastructure will not achieve the goal 
of improving the quality of life of local residents. That, 
in turn, means that people will not develop a sense of 
belonging to the improved place.
Territorial attitudes which represent the ideas and 
approaches which people take to their place of residence 
and other places can be reviewed in the context of 
three broader groups of attitudes: 1) an emotional 
sense of belonging to a territory and various social 
communities; 2) Senses of belonging that are based on 
experience and identity (a sense of place and identity), 
as well as; 3) Functional links to a place which relate to 
the structure of opportunities therein  – opportunities 
to ensure the conditions that are necessary for a 
subjectively and objectively good life, as well as the level 
of satisfaction with the opportunities which the place of 
residence offers. The structure of opportunities at a place 
and the sense of emotional belonging are both important 
when thinking about territorial choices such as choosing 
or changing one’s place of residence.
How do places, related attitudes and 
the territorial behaviour of individuals 
change?
Territorial attitudes and identification to a specific 
place are mostly shaped by everyday experiences, 
but such experiences and everyday events in life are 
affected by organisers of regional policies at the state, 
regional and local government level. This applies to 
planners of territorial development, architects, and those 
who establish brands for territories (Gieryn, 2000). The 
place is also and equally shaped by various events and 
communications processes which strengthen identity 
(city festivals, the design of the urban area), support or 
lack thereof for infrastructure projects (roads, cultural 
centres, restoration of sports facilities, etc.), promotion 
of the various services that are available on an everyday 
basis (public transportation services), and the activities of 
local residents.
In places where people have convenient and 
simple access to jobs, as well as a diversity of high-
quality everyday, social, public, cultural, entertainment 
and leisure time opportunities, it is very likely that 
local residents will have positive territorial attitudes. 
Environmental psychology is an area in which specialists 
tend to discuss satisfaction with a place and the ability 
of the place to correspond to the needs of people in 
a structural sense (Gustafson, 2006; Giuliani, 2003). 
Successful territorial planning (the location, links 
to other places, etc.) enable people to do things to 
ensure and enhance their welfare, while bad roads and 
transportation opportunities which limit the availability 
of jobs, educational and other services encourage people 
to leave the area, and those who can move to another 
location do so.
There have been various territorial and demographic 
processes in Latvia over the past decade that have 
fundamentally changed the places and communities in 
which people live in terms of scope and the availability 
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of services. These factors include an aging population, 
people moving from the countryside to cities or abroad, 
the economic crisis, as well as the administrative and 
territorial reforms. The size of the rural population 
is shrinking, these processes mean that the range of 
everyday services which people require is narrowing, 
and as the number of people of working age declines, 
provision of the social infrastructure that is necessary 
for a high-quality living environment becomes more 
expensive. How can places be shaped so as to 
encourage a sense of belonging and linkage to a 
specific place under such circumstances? What are 
the demands of local residents toward the territory 
in which they want to live? Of importance here is the 
functional side of a sense of belonging. Research (e.g., 
Stedman, 2002) shows that it is more possible to influence 
a person’s territorial mobility than it is to affect other 
elements of identity and senses of belonging which relate 
to territorial attitudes.
The system of administrative and territorial reforms 
has set up new territorial units  – administrative districts, 
which are very diverse in size. The administrative districts 
in many cases involve areas from the former system 
of territorial districts which have little or no cultural, 
historical and functional links amongst themselves; 
there are also administrative districts which do not have 
a real centre. Some administrative districts are very 
small, with just two or three parishes, while others are 
approximately of the same size as the former district. In 
thinking about these new administrative districts, there 
are several dimensions that are of particular importance 
when it comes to development plans for them. What are 
the habits of people and the ability of people to find 
jobs and receive services in these new administrative 
districts? Do the everyday processes of individual occur 
inside a single administrative district or not? are there 
differences among administrative districts? if so, what 
are they?
Main conclusions. The main task
Main conclusions
A sense of belonging to a place (regional identity) is an important element in the identity of many people, and 
so in the context of the development of the nation, it is important to find out how regional identity influences the 
ability of various social agents to act.
There are many different scopes and practices related to spatial belonging for individuals today. The behaviour 
and territorial attitudes of individuals and groups are of key importance in terms of various issues which have to 
do with territorial planning and development.
the main task
When it comes to human development in terms of improving the standard of living of individuals and their 
ability to find jobs, we must take into account the social, territorial and demographic processes which have 
occurred in Latvia over the last decade (an aging population, people moving from the countryside to cities or 
abroad, the economic crisis, as well as the country’s system of administrative and territorial reforms). These have 
fundamentally changed the scope of places and communities, as well as the availability of services.
Box 
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Elements shaping linkage to a place
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Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would 
like to live, please tick those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence» (the given answers are presented in 
percentages. All respondents, n=1009. Respondents were allowed to choose multiple responses, which is why the total sum is 
above 100%.
Source: «NI: Place, Capability, Migration». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010/2011
Box 
3.2
3.2. «Close Links Keep You Here 
in a Certain Way»4 – 
Links to a Place and Factors 
and types therein
This section of the Report describes links to a place 
of residence, thinking about the elements which shape 
belonging and linkage to a place and are important for 
people who live at places of various levels of urbanisation. 
Do the elements of linkage differ from place to place? A 
sense of belonging and linkage to a place characterises 
the individual’s structure of opportunities in the place of 
residence  – available jobs, educational opportunities, a 
range of services, as well as human needs, demands and 
lifestyles. The issue is how to classify different places in 
accordance with these elements of linkage when it comes 
to establishing various types of linkage. Data from the 
national research programme «National Identity» have 
been used to study this issue, focusing on a 2011 national 
survey («NI: Place, Capability, Migration»).1
1 The text is from a poem by the Latvian poet Auseklis.
Linkage to a place of residence:  
A general description
The following question was posed to respondents to 
find out what shapes a functional sense of belonging and 
linkage to a place: «In thinking about the city or rural area 
in which you live and about the kind of place where you 
would like to leave, please tell us which of the following 
elements link you to your current place of residence.» 
Respondents were given a list of answers, as well as an 
opportunity to write in their own answer. They were free 
to choose as many different answers as they wished (see 
Box 3.2).
The «NI: Place, Capability, Migration» study found 
that the elements mentioned by respondents most often 
were their home (79%) and the proximity of families 
and relatives (76%)  – these are the two things which 
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shape a sense of home. Two-fifths spoke about their 
surrounding area (43%) and a secure and peaceful living 
environment (42%). various services were cited a bit 
less often as elements which linked respondents to their 
place of residence  – a good public transportation and 
roads network, as well as everyday services (39% and 
36%). Other services were mentioned less often  – one 
fifth of respondents pointed to the quality of Internet and 
telephone services (23%), one-seventh (13%) focused on 
the availability of a high level of quality in education, one-
eleventh (9%) plumped for the quality of the work of the 
relevant local government, while 8% mentioned social aid 
from the local government.
One-third of respondents said that community 
activities were important  – surrounding people and 
neighbours (35%), cultural life (20%), and social life in the 
area (15%).
One-quarter of residents said that they feel a sense 
of belonging to their current place of residence because 
they can earn a living there (27%), while one-fifth spoke 
of opportunities to shape their jobs and careers (21%). 
Working people were more likely to mention earning 
opportunities as an element of belonging than non-
working people were (36% and 14%). Similarly, work 
and career opportunities linked working people to a 
place three times more often than they did in terms 
of non-working people (30% as opposed to 9%). 
Opportunities to earn a living were also mentioned as 
one of the necessary elements in terms of the location 
where people were planning to move (an average of 
33%, with this being the case more often with working 
people (39%) than non-working people (25%)). In other 
words, opportunities to find work and earn a living are 
not the main element which links a person to a place of 
residence, but for two-fifths or working people and one-
quarter of non-working people, the potential to earn a 
living differentiates the existing place of residence from 
the desirable one.
A description of linkage and the use 
of various services on the basis of the 
level of urbanisation in the place of 
residence
Riga, other towns and rural districts are populated 
areas with different population numbers, different 
structures of settlement, and various opportunities to 
receive services. There is reason to think, therefore, that 
the sense of belonging among local residents to these 
places will also be diverse (see Box 3.3).
People in Riga, other towns and rural areas were 
equally likely to say that the proximity of families and 
relatives were a factor which linked them to their place of 
residence. In discussing services and public life, however, 
the elements of linkage differed. Everyday services, public 
transportation, roads, the Internet, communications, the 
availability of education, opportunities to earn a living, 
cultural and social life  – all of these more commonly 
linked residents of Riga to their place of residence than 
was the case among people in other towns and in the 
countryside.
One’s home, its surroundings, the local landscape, a 
peaceful and secure living environment and neighbours – 
these are more likely to be elements of linkage for rural 
residents and less so for people in other towns and in 
Riga. In comparing the structures of linkage, we see 
certain contradictions between people in Riga and in 
rural territories, while residents of other towns are 
partly similar to rural residents in that they attach more 
importance to the environment, their surroundings and a 
secure and peaceful living environment; they are less likely 
to be linked to a place because of earning opportunities, 
cultural and social life and a high-quality education.
Habits related to the consumption of work, studies 
and various services often relate to linkage to a place 
and the extent to which the structure of opportunities in 
that place satisfy the needs of people. Where do people 
study, work and use various services? the survey shows 
that most people in Latvia work where they live (94% of 
employed people in Riga, 82% in other towns, and 62% 
in the countryside). One-fifth of rural residents (22%) 
work in a different parish or town in their administrative 
district, while 85% of people in other towns and 85% 
of employed rural residents work within their own 
administrative district. Most survey respondents (63%) 
said that it does not take them more than half an hour to 
get to work.
The authors have analysed employment, shopping, 
banking services, medical services, everyday services 
and others, as well as education, the frequency of 
attending cultural events, etc., at various places, finding 
that people in Riga and other towns are more active in 
using various services. What is more, they are more likely 
to have done so at their place of residence. By contrast, 
rural residents more often went to other places in the 
administrative district, to Riga, or to another location in 
Latvia. People in Riga and other towns have used various 
everyday services at their place of residence two times 
more often than rural residents (88% in Riga, 80% in other 
towns, 40% in the countryside). For rural residents, such 
services have been available in other towns or parishes 
within the territory of the administrative district (27%).
Linkage to a place:  
Types of linkage among various 
groups of respondents
Linkage to a place makes it possible not only to 
characterise the type of place that it is, but also to 
describe what people expect from it. What kinds of 
groups of people find that similar things attract them 
to a place of residence? What kinds of types of linkage 
are there, and how common are they? Based on the 
elements cited in the survey in relation to elements which 
link people to a place, the authors identified groups of 
respondents who gave similar answers. This made it 
possible to divide the respondents up into four different 
groups (see Box 3.4).
PART 3
114 LATVIA. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010/2011
A sense of belonging: Elements which shape it at various places of residence
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Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would 
like to live, please check those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence.» (Respondents were allowed to 
choose multiple responses, which is why the total sum is above 100%.
Source: «NI: Place, Capability, Migration». Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010/2011
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Is it possible to anticipate and forecast types of 
linkage to a place of residence on the basis of the 
individual’s social and demographic characteristics? In 
other words, if we are aware of the respondent’s age, 
gender, level of income, etc., can we determine the 
type of place where that person would wish to live? The 
regression model1 indicates that to a certain extent, 
structural characteristics such as social and demographic 
descriptions are of importance, but the prognoses are 
not sufficiently precise. Among socio-demographic 
indicators that can be used to forecast types of linkage 
are the region in which the respondent lives, the level of 
1 Multinomial logistic regression. 
urbanisation in that region, the amount of time that the 
person has spent living in the location (10 years or longer), 
and the age and family status of the respondent. All of 
these determine needs and desires. Also of significance 
are household income and employment status.
Linkage to a place: Type, emotional 
belonging to territorial and social 
communities, the ability to act
Is a functional linkage to a place related to emotional 
belonging? People with different types of functional 
linkage to a place of residence differ in statistically 
Linkage to a place of residence: Type and characterisation thereof
Element of linkage Description of linkage
The place where one 
has one’s family and 
home
This element linked two-fifths (41%) of respondents, with people speaking only of their 
home in 68% of cases and people discussing the proximity of family members and relatives 
in 65% of cases. Other elements related to their place of residence are less important to 
them, because in most cases respondents cited only three elements of linkage. This type 
of linkage is equally common among various age and gender groups, as well as in terms of 
educational levels, the ethnicity of respondents, and the type of residence in which they 
lived. In statistical terms, these elements were cited rather more often in Latgale (53%) than 
in the Riga region (35%), and the same was more true among people who had lived in the 
specific location for less than 10 years (48%), as well as among those people who refused 
to state their level of income per household member (48%). The elements were mentioned 
less often by people with a high level of income (LVL 221 and above).
The place where 
there is concentrated 
access to services, 
transport, 
communications, 
jobs, education, 
cultural events and 
opportunities for 
social life
15% of respondents spoke of this. In addition to family and housing issues (81% and 
89%), they feel linkage to everyday services (76%), a good network of roads and public 
transport services (75%), the quality of Internet and telephone communications (46%), a 
opportunity to earn a living (51%), opportunities related to work and one’s career (44%), as 
well as the quality of educational processes (26%). Less common in terms of linkage were 
the surrounding people and neighbours (8%), as well as the local environment, nature and 
landscape (10%). On average, each respondent cited six elements of linkage. This was more 
common among people in Riga and those in other towns, among working people who said 
that they work in Riga, and among people with a high level or medium-low level of income.
The quality of the 
living environment 
(the «idyllic 
countryside»)
This was an issue addressed by one-fifth (21%) of respondents. They talked of family and 
their home (88% and 84%), a secure and peaceful environment (71%), the beauty of the 
surrounding nature and landscape (67%), surrounding people and neighbours (53%), and, 
less often, work and career opportunities to earn a living (14%), cultural and social life (12%), 
a good road and public transportation network (9% and 7%), and Internet and telephone 
services (2%). On average, each person cited five elements of linkage. This type of linkage 
is more common among rural residents outside the Riga metropolitan area, unemployed 
people, as well as people with low or medium income. Working people who talked about 
this form of linkage were more likely to have jobs at their own place of residence or in their 
own administrative district. 
A high-quality living 
environment and 
a well-integrated 
network of 
public transport, 
communications and 
everyday services 
(«idyllic suburbs or 
small towns»)
This element was cited by nearly one-quarter (23%) of respondents. They spoke of the 
proximity of family and relatives (82%), their homes (89%), the surrounding nature and 
landscape (87%), a secure and peaceful living environment (73%), a good network of roads 
and public transport (87%), the quality of Internet and telephone communications (67%), 
the availability of everyday services (57%), and cultural and social life (38% and 25%). Each 
person, on average, mentioned seven elements of linkage. This was more common among 
people who have lived at a place of residence for more than 10 years, those who have 
medium-high and high levels of income, and those who live in the metropolitan Riga area or 
in Zemgale. Working people were more likely to work at their place of residence or in Riga.
Note: The question was as follows: «In thinking about the city or parish where you live now and the kind of place where you would 
like to live, please tick those items which currently link you to your existing place of residence.» Respondents were given 16 answers 
and could choose all of the appropriate ones. The establishment of the types was based on the results of cluster analysis.
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Linkage to a place of residence – type, emotional sense of belonging, evaluation of 
other aspects of life
Type of location Linkage to place  – type, emotional belonging to territorial/social communities, ability to act
The place where one has 
one’s family and home, 41%
A lower sense of belonging to all territorial and social communities, a lower 
evaluation about the ability to affect local government members on issues which 
have to do with the place of residence, less satisfaction with life in general, less 
trust in other people.
The place where 
opportunities are 
concentrated, 15%
A higher sense of emotional belonging to the city or parish in which one lives, 
more satisfaction with life as such, greater trust in people as such, but a lower 
sense of belonging to the immediate neighbourhood and to residents of the 
relevant town or parish.
«The idyllic countryside», 21%
Rural residents who feel a sense of belonging to their immediate environs and 
residents therein, but do not trust people as such very much and have a low 
assessment of their own capabilities in terms of local politics.
«Idyllic suburbs or small 
towns», 23%
A higher sense of belonging to one’s environs and their residents, as well as to 
the city or parish; more importance attached to an ability to live in Latvia and 
in the specific town or parish; a higher evaluation of one’s ability to affect local 
government issues related to the place of residence, more satisfaction with life as 
such, and more trust in other people.
Box 
3.5
important terms when it comes to the emotional sense of 
belonging to the neighbourhood, parish, district, Latvia 
and other residents in the territory.
Respondents whose linkage to a place of residence is 
characterised by the structure of various opportunities 
are more likely to feel emotional linkage to the location. 
They are more satisfied with life as such, and they think 
more highly about their ability to defend their interests in 
the resolution of various issues which relate to events at 
their place of residence (Box 3.5).
It can be concluded here that two-fifths of 
respondents (41%) are only linked to family and home. 
They have less emotional linkage and less belief that 
they can affect political life in any way. One-fifth of 
respondents have a high level of emotional belonging to 
the relevant territory and its residents while also having 
a comparatively low level of trust and belief in their own 
abilities to affect things.
What might be the desirable place of 
residence in Latvia?
The experience which people have with places of 
residence is of importance in establishing territorial 
attitudes and activities (e.g., migration). Experience with 
a specific type of residence (countryside, town, proximity 
of a large city, etc.) determines what people consider to 
be valuable and what they would like to preserve in their 
living environment if they were to move elsewhere. This 
experience also characterises the undesirable elements 
of a place of residence which the individual would like 
to change by moving to a different location. Does the 
type of linkage to a place of residence influence visions 
about one’s most desirable place of residence in Latvia 
and, if so, how does it do so?
A description of the desirable place 
of residence
Linkage to a place of residence and a sense of 
emotional belonging will not always be a sufficient 
reason for someone to stay at his or her existing place of 
residence, as opposed to moving elsewhere. In order to 
determine the essential elements which people consider 
when thinking about the place where they would most 
like to live, the researchers asked about the five elements 
that would be most important to respondents when 
selecting a place of residence in Latvia. The question: «In 
thinking about the town or parish where you live right 
now and the place where you would like to live, please 
choose the five aspects of a place of residence that 
would be most important to you in selecting a place of 
residence in Latvia.»
In thinking about the ideal place of residence and 
describing their experience with their current place of 
residence, two-thirds of respondents (65%) said that the 
most important thing for them would be their home, 
while more than one-half spoke of the proximity of 
families and relatives (55%). One-third (33%) said that it 
would be important to earn a living or to find a job and 
develop a career (29%). Working people mentioned these 
factors nearly two times more than people without jobs 
(39% of working people and 25% of unemployed people 
spoke of earning a living, while 38% of working people 
and 18% of unemployed respondents discussed a job 
and career opportunities). A similar percentage (32%) 
spoke of a secure and peaceful environment for life, the 
surrounding nature and landscape (31%), a good network 
of roads and public transport (30%), and everyday services 
(27%). For one-tenth (10%), the quality of Internet and 
telephone communications would be important, and the 
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same percentage spoke about the availability of a high-
quality education. Neighbours would be of importance 
to one-fifth of respondents (19%), while one-eighth think 
about cultural life (12%), one-eleventh plump for social life 
(9%), and even fewer respondents think about the quality 
of the relevant local government’s operations (6%), as well 
as social aid from the local government. 6% said that they 
would have trouble in selecting the five major factors, 
while 1% said that they could not even think about those 
things which should be in place.
Main conclusions. The main mission
Main conclusions
Data from the NI: Place, Capability, Migration study show that the most important functional elements in terms 
of creating a sense of belonging or linkage to a place in Latvia are homes and the proximity of families and 
relatives. Next on the list is the availability of services, along with various aspects of the local community (good 
neighbours, cultural and social life). Opportunities to make living are only in the fourth place.
Although opportunities to find work and earn a living are not the main element to link people to a place of 
residence, potential earning opportunities do lead many people in Latvia (two-fifths of working people and one-
quarter of unemployed people) to differentiate between their existing place of residence and their desired place 
of residence.
Analysis of the survey data makes it possible to distinguish among four different types of linkages to a place. 
For some respondents, the most important factor of linkage is family and home, for others it is concentrated 
opportunities at the specific location (services, transport, communications, jobs, education, cultural and 
social life), for the third group, the essential issue is the quality of the surrounding environment (the «idyllic 
countryside»  – fresh air, the proximity of nature, healthy food, etc.), and finally there are those who focus 
on demands for a high-quality living environment that has an integrated network of public transportation, 
communications and everyday services (the «idyllic suburbs or small towns»).
the main mission
Human development in Latvia’s regions very much depends on the attraction of human capital. In thinking 
about this, it must be understood that a complex approach must be taken to the quality of life in regions, and 
particularly in rural areas. That is because the types of linkage between individuals and places are most diverse, 
and they are based on sets of various factors.
Box 
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How can places be made attractive for people? 
There are no factors which unquestionably guarantee 
the linkage between people and a specific place or, 
on the contrary, complete abandonment of the place. 
People are very flexible in adapting everyday plans to 
mutable circumstances, and things which are seen as 
shortcomings in one situation are turned into advantages 
in another one. Luckily, not all people who are ambitious 
and energetic abandon regions that are seen as backward 
to increase the population of a central location or to seek 
fortune in far-off lands.
EU policy documents increasingly are speaking 
not of «regional disparities,» but instead of «regional 
diversity.» This shift in accents reflects essential 
changes in the discourse which relates to rural and 
regional development. The need to even out regional 
development policies so that backward regions can 
achieve the level of more developed ones is being 
replaced by the understanding that each region has a 
unique path for development, taking into account its 
unique resources and opportunities and establishing 
individual developmental strategies. Without ignoring 
regional uniqueness, it is a serious challenge to 
create foundations for the successful development 
of the nation in Latvia so as to offer people equal 
opportunities for development, as well as to unleash 
the capacities of various social agents in pursuit of their 
goals (endogenous development). This is because the 
contemporary world offers extensive opportunities for 
anyone to select his or her place of residence, area of 
employment, and other conditions related to human 
lives.
Administrative and territorial reform 
(ATR)
ATR was implemented on July 1, 2009, and it 
substantially changed Latvia’s administrative and 
territorial structure. This particularly brought up the 
issue of how to strike a balance between the territorial 
belonging of the individual and various individual 
practices related to spatial mobility on the one hand  – 
how far people must travel to get to work, to handle 
everyday tasks or to satisfy cultural or other needs, how 
extensive is the space which people see as recognisable 
and understood in terms of everyday activity, etc.  – and 
territorial organisation of the relevant local governments 
on the other hand. The previous administrative and 
territorial structure was inherited form the area of 
Socialism, and local governments were little more than 
a formality when it came to the prevailing political 
system. Local governments could not become true and 
responsible managers in their territories. They were 
not effective territorial units for regional development, 
because in terms of population numbers, area and 
budgets, parishes were simply too small as territorial 
units.
Globalisation of social life and, particularly, the 
development of modern technologies have facilitated 
the emergence of very diverse models of everyday 
movement. There are people who travel along several 
hundreds of kilometres every day to get to work and 
back home, and there are also those with very limited 
spatial trajectories (something which is influenced by 
the availability of personal and public transportation). 
People have very different abilities to earn a living, go 
shopping, visit a doctor, etc. It is also true that not all 
local governments have equal abilities to provide local 
residents with social services.
Latvia’s administrative and territorial structure at this 
time is very much heterogeneous. Once administrative 
and territorial reforms were completed, territories 
were most diverse in terms of the development of local 
infrastructure. There is much diversity in this regard. 
There are territories related to former districts in which 
the network of social and transport infrastructure was 
fairly well developed in the past. Other administrative 
districts have irregular spatial configuration and no 
distinct centre. Fragmented road networks are seen 
there. There are also largish towns which used to be 
district centres and are now administrative districts 
with comparatively high levels of welfare. Some of 
the new administrative districts cover nearly all of the 
relevant former district, the existing social and transport 
infrastructure can be used, and the centre of the 
administrative district is the same as that of the former 
district (examples include the Alūksne, Talsi and Jelgava 
administrative districts). Other new administrative 
districts such as the Cibla, Beverīna and Tērvete 
administrative districts are small and without distinct 
centres, some are not compact (the Rauna Administrative 
District), and others have centres that are not easily 
accessible because roads are in poor condition, etc.
It may very well be that the map of administrative 
districts will undergo fundamental changes in the near 
future, because it is expected that there will soon be 
a discussion about second-level local governments. 
The situation is made all the more complex by the 
concentration of residents in the Riga metropolitan area, 
depopulation, and an aging population, which makes 
more expensive and, in many cases, makes impossible 
the provision of social services in the nearby proximity 
3.3. in Search for 
Local Government Strategies 
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Parishes merging into administrative districts:  
The example of the Aizpute Administrative District
The process of administrative and territorial reforms led to the merger of the town of Aizpute and the Cīrava, 
Kalvene, Kazdanga, Laža and Aizpute parishes to establish the Aizpute Administrative District. It is one of the eight 
administrative districts in the former Liepāja District, and along with the Grobiņa Administrative District, it is the 
second largest administrative district in terms of population numbers.
An administrative district as a unified living space: Unifying elements and different elements
The town of Aizpute was the central town in its pre-war district and, for a short time, the central town in the 
post-war district. In 1962 it was declared to be one of several towns in the Liepāja District, but it is basically a 
natural centre for the surrounding territories. A bit more than 10,000 people live in the new administrative district. 
Most of them live in the town of Aizpute itself.
There are elements in the cultural life of the administrative district which help to facilitate the emergence of 
a unified identity. There is a local television station which produces several stories each week. The administrative 
district also has its own newspaper. When decisions are taken, however, the interests of individual parishes often 
dominate. Education is an area in which this is true. The results of a survey of the population show that people 
have little information about what is happening in neighbouring parishes. Some parishes are not sufficiently 
involved in the life of the administrative district because of ongoing problems with public transportation.
In 2011, with the support of the ESF, the Aizpute Administrative District drafted a developmental programme 
for the period between 2012 and 2018. Researchers and students from the University of Latvia’s Faculty of Social 
Sciences who were part of the State Research Programme «National Identity’s» «National Identity and Capability» 
project conducted a study to monitor the development of the programme. Which areas in which a common 
vision is most needed for the administrative district? In the case of the Aizpute Administrative District, the focus 
is on the development of business and education.
In search for a common vision in business: Tourism, agriculture, industry, or something else?
The administrative district has long-standing traditions of entrepreneurship. There are companies engaging 
in agriculture, food processing, the metal industry, road building and light industry (sewing). Businesspeople and 
members of the district’s local government believe that a common developmental vision will make it easier to 
understand which sectors will be seen as priorities and will receive support, the point being that it is not possible 
to offer the same level of support to all sectors. Representatives of the administrative district say that a unifying 
element is tourism and the relevant services – the district’s tourism development programme is meant for all of 
the relevant parishes, and it could serve as an integrative element which involves everyone.
The development of educational services: Availability of services, competitiveness, specialisation
Optimisation of educational networks has led to much passion in many parts of Latvia. One of the goals in 
establishing administrative districts was to optimise expenditures related to governance and provision of services. 
Education is one area in which there have been substantial reforms, and educational planning is one of the most 
important jobs for administrative districts in that each parish wants to keep its own school.
There are 15 educational institutions in the Aizpute Administrative District at this time. Local residents believe 
that schools are of great importance in parish life, and no school has been closed since the establishment of the 
district. All of the preschools, elementary schools, high schools and art and music schools have been preserved, as 
have the local high school, vocational school and correspondence course high school. A sports school is available 
in partnership with the Grobiņa Administrative District, and thought is currently being given to the establishment 
of a sports school in the Aizpute Administrative District, as well. Leaders of the local government are also 
thinking about taking over management of a trade high school in Cīrava so as to provide extensive educational 
opportunities throughout the district. Educational institutions hope to limit competition over students in the 
region  – something which always happens as student numbers decline. They are putting together specialised 
programmes and supporting the ongoing education and requalification of teachers.
Human resources are certainly the central problem for developing the Latvian state and its population. That 
is particularly true in rural territories and small towns, where a Catch-22 situation emerges  – the fewer people, 
the higher infrastructural costs, and the worse the development of infrastructure, the harder it is to maintain (let 
alone increase) population numbers. Provision of goods and services becomes economically inefficient, ambitious 
people depart, and those who stay behind have no ideas or opportunities for entrepreneurship. The provision of 
the health care and education services that are of such importance in national development falls under threat, 
and it is harder and harder for people simply to earn a living.
What to do if the situation is becoming worse and the resources that are available to address it are shrinking? In 
many places local governments, NGOs and local activists are coming together in search of solutions. An example 
of successful partnership is described in the «National Identity and Social Human Security» project of the State 
Research Programme «National Identity».
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of people’s residences (high-quality medical services, 
education, etc.).
The new administrative districts are by no means 
homogeneous in terms of size and population numbers. 
Former infrastructural networks have been broken, 
and new ones have not been put in place. For instance, 
traffic to the former district centre is in good shape, while 
there are no roads leading to the new administrative 
district centre. Many new administrative district centres 
are more or less a formality, because they cannot offer 
important social services. Local residents still feel and 
are functionally more linked to former district centres 
or other larger towns that are easily accessible. The 
results of administrative and territorial reforms is that 
in many cases, territories which do not have functional 
links among them, have found themselves in a new 
administrative structure – the new administrative district.
Administrative and territorial reforms did not resolve 
many problems with regional development, instead 
making the situation even more complicated. The 
reforms are not complete, because the initial intention of 
setting up second-level local governments after parishes 
merged into administrative districts remains unclear, and 
the matter has been postponed to the unknown future. 
The structure of local governments has also undergone 
substantial changes since the reforms, and intensive work 
is being done at this time to revise administrative district 
developmental strategies to reflect the changes that have 
occurred.
Adapt or Transform?
Because the territorial structure of Latvia changed 
as a result of the administrative and territorial reforms, 
intensive work is being done at present in Latvia on 
territorial development planning and developmental 
strategies. These are important local government 
planning documents. The new developmental strategies 
are supposed to address many problems such as the 
fact that much money is still being spent on the basis of 
out-of-date developmental documents. One example 
involves the so-called LEADER projects of the Rural 
Development Programme 2007-2013, with parishes in 
the Vecumnieki Administrative District still being divided 
up in accordance with the situation which existed before 
the reforms. Development and planning specialists, as 
well as other highly qualified specialists, are in short 
supply. The cost of infrastructure development and 
use is unacceptably high, and many local government 
employees see the maintenance of the infrastructure to 
be the most important thing of all, failing to think about 
the fact that the capability of social objects and the 
existing infrastructure are no longer in line with shrinking 
population numbers. A responsible local development 
strategy is a foundation for successful and sustainable 
human development in Latvia’s regions.
Researchers from the Latvian Agricultural University 
(LLU) studied the socio-economic development 
strategies of Latvia’s local governments and concluded 
A coalition of social NGOs in Valmiera – support for the local government
A coalition of NGOs that deal with social issues has been working successfully in Valmiera town. The main 
reason for its establishment was to ensure more structured dialogue with the local government, as well as to 
come up with unified NGO views with respect to issues that the local government was considering. Some 20 
organisations took part, and it was the Valmiera NGO Support Centre which initiated the establishment of the 
coalition. The public organisation «Strategy» was established with financing from the Soros Foundation Latvia. 
Similar centres operate elsewhere in Latvia (see http://www.nvo.lv/files/NVO_atbalsta_centri.pdf ). The coalition 
currently includes some 10 active organisations, and the Valmiera Administrative District Fund (VNF) basically 
serves as the umbrella organisation for them.
Thanks to the exchange of information and work in the coalition, social NGOs in Valmiera have implemented 
several joint projects, and they have been more sensible in managing the availability of facilities and other 
resources. For instance, the VNF shares its charitable warehouse facilities with the Valmiera Committee of the 
Red Cross, because that is of greater economic benefit. Facilities are shared by the «Valmiera City Pensioners» 
organisation, the Diabetes Association, and the Valmiera Association of the Politically Repressed. The organisations 
work together to support a day care centre for pensioners. The «Valdardze Centre» is an organisation which offers 
social rehabilitation services to children who have suffered violence and to non-violent people who accompany 
them. The centre works together with the Christian Mercy Centre, which offers a soup kitchen. Another important 
example of co-operation in recent times is the granting of local government facilities to four social NGOs – the 
«Opportunity Bridge» organisation, which offers day care and work to different ability individuals, the VNF, the 
Valmiera Committee of the Red Cross, and the Valmiera Association of Different Ability Children and Adolescents, 
«Little Sun.» «We could implement this project between ourselves and the local government only because we 
established a coalition and could agree on a partnership in the use of the facilities,» says one NGO activist.
The coalition has helped the growth of social NGOs by encouraging a spirit of positive competition among 
them. That encourages organisations to keep up with one another and to develop their own work on the basis of 
things which others are doing.
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that even small and peripheral local governments have 
accumulated experience with positive changes. This was 
confirmed via interviews that were conducted in 2010 
by the authors of the «National Identity and Capability» 
project that was part of the State Research Programme 
«National Identity». The local governments were all 
in northern Latvia  – Aloja, Ainaži, Limbaži, Mazsalaca, 
Rūjiena, Salacgrīva, Staicele, and Valmiera.
Latvia’s regions are dominated by small and medium 
companies with limited numbers of jobs and low levels 
of specialisation. These are companies which operate in 
traditional sectors such as wood processing, processing 
of dairy and agricultural projects, the tourism sector, 
etc. Among the leading employers in Latvia’s regions, 
particularly during the circumstances of the economic 
crisis, have been local government institutions, because 
many private businesses have been forced to halt 
operations.
There are partnerships between local governments 
and companies which relate to market economy circum-
stances. The financial resources of local governments are 
directly proportional to the level of economic develop-
ment. The more successful local companies, the wealthier 
are local residents and companies. They pay more taxes 
to the local government, so local government revenues 
are higher. One duty for local governments is to facilitate 
employment levels. The higher the level of economic 
development in a local government territory, the lower 
the level of unemployment. This means that market 
economy circumstances force local governments to be 
interested in shaping independent economic policies 
which are aimed at supporting local business operations 
and additional investments (Vanags, Vilka, 2005). Current 
circumstances, however, mean that local governments 
have limited budget resources, and so they do not have 
much freedom in this area. Still, local governments 
actively take part in projects financed by the EU’s 
Structural Funds to improve infrastructural objects such 
as roads, water systems, heating systems, buildings 
that need renovation, etc. When local governments 
commission jobs related to construction, reconstruction 
or attracting investments, this supports companies 
and create jobs in a way which can seriously affect the 
business environment and stimulate economic growth:
«The local government has deepened and 
reconstructed breakwaters, and it has built a pier for 
fishermen, as agreed with them and with developers 
of yachts. We invested LVL 1 million of European 
money, and right now we see approximately 
LVL  3  million in private investments in the yachting 
and leisure sector.» (Salacgrīva)
Another interesting success story comes from the 
town of Rūjiena, where a company from Japan bought 
homemade products:
«The Japanese made one of the most productive 
offers related to business or, more precisely, to support 
for individual manufacturers. Rūjiena has people who 
make goods of linen, carve wooden spoons or make 
necklaces. The shop in Japan sells the products which 
the local government has bought.» (Rūjiena)
There are some administrative districts in which 
manufacturing is less common. Auce, for instance, 
is making use of innovative technologies and highly 
qualified workers to develop metal processing, while 
people in Viļāni and Salacgrīva are using renewable 
energy resources:
«A successful example is the Tehnika Auce metal 
processing company, which employs some 80 people. 
It uses new and innovative technologies, and it 
ensures added value to the products. I have seen how 
the company trains employees to cut out details and 
engage in various other operations.» (Auce)
«The situation for small towns is gradually 
becoming better. Viļāni will have its own niche. There 
is interest among investors, and manufacturing 
in areas such as renewable energy is gradually 
undergoing rebirth.» (Viļāni)
Local government representatives say that economic 
development is most facilitated by a proper social 
infrastructure, including a network of railroads and roads. 
The development of Smiltene, for instance, is substantially 
facilitated by the fact that 12 roads cross in the town. Six 
roads cross in Cesvaine. In many administrative districts, 
businesspeople have been successful in preserving, 
restructuring and developing Soviet-era manufacturing 
facilities.
When asked about factors which hindered develop-
ment before and after the crisis, local government officials 
and specialists speak to labour shortages, a lack of 
territories, and ill considered tax policies in the country:
«Those taxes or discounts give us nothing. In Auce, 
for instance, the real estate tax is around LVL 20,000. 
Fine, let’s reduce it by LVL 2,000, 3,000 or 5,000  – 
that is the money which I got from the businessman 
anyway. We can only bring order to the environment 
in which we have our educational and cultural 
systems.» (Ķusis, Krūzmētra, Bite, 2008)
«The state really should improve the tax system 
so that businesspeople do not have to lose all of their 
money. If the business is not a huge monster but is 
a small or medium enterprise which pays all of its 
taxes honestly, then its owners might just as well sink 
into the swamp. This is something that is very sad, 
indeed.» (Ape)
The local governments of administrative districts 
are fairly well aware of their role in facilitating business 
operations, and they make use of their resources and 
strategies to facilitate the development of their territories:
•	 Tax relief for those companies in whose develop-
ment the local government is particularly interested;
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•	 Land for companies – sometimes granted for free 
or sold for a lower price;
•	 Local government financing for business develop-
ment in areas such as road repair, bridge building, 
improvements to water and sewage systems, 
provision of public transportation services, etc.);
•	 Projects aimed at reducing water and air pollution;
•	 Simplification of administrative procedures in 
relation to permits, licenses and other documents;
•	 Improvements to infrastructure to create an 
attractive environment for businesses.
Local governments have made active use of these 
opportunities, but they do not make it possible to 
attract larger investors in an effective way, because 
administrative district resources are simply insufficient 
to support the development of a truly large enterprise. 
Locals, in turn, cannot make use of such opportunities, 
because they are usually taking their first insecure steps 
in entrepreneurship without any experience in the 
relevant area and with limited financial opportunities. 
What is more, the law limits the ability of local 
governments to become involved in business operations.
Co-operation among local 
governments
Partnerships among Latvia’s local governments 
are becoming ever more important in dealing with 
common problems. Administrative and territorial reforms 
represented a certain turning point in this. Second-
level district councils were eliminated, and so local 
governments had to agree on taking over various objects 
such as sports complexes or building boards. Such 
partnerships have not lasted too long so far, but there is 
reason to believe that they are a foundation for ongoing 
mutual trust and co-operation.
The study that was conducted by the National 
Identity research project «National Identity and 
Capability» in 2010/2011 involved interviews with local 
government employees. Asked about forms of co-
operation, local government representatives most often 
mentioned mutual payments related to educational 
services, orphanages and old age homes. Not all experts, 
however, agreed that this is a form of co-operation 
among local governments. They believe that evidence of 
co-operation is instead provided by jointly established 
institutions. The problem is that there are few such 
solutions in Latvia, and experts say that the main reason 
for that is difficulty in dividing up responsibility and in 
dealing with complex financing procedures.
An important area of local government co-operation 
in recent years has been involvement in joint projects 
aimed at obtaining financing from EU funds. Interviews 
with local government leaders show that these projects 
mostly have to do with culture, sports and education. 
Local governments exchange information and engage 
in joint projects in relation to EU-financed projects. 
Some local governments have implemented long-term 
solutions such as business incubators in the context 
of joint projects. This can be seen as a foundation for 
ongoing co-operation among local governments.
Another opportunity that is offered by the law 
and is used by local governments is merging local 
governments into non-governmental organisations. The 
Latvian Association of Local Governments (LPS) is the 
organisation with the longest experience in defending 
the interests of local governments, and its staff say that 
it is a unique organisation in that it brings together all of 
Latvia’s local government. Local governments from the 
LPS have also merged into smaller organisations aimed 
at dealing with specific governments. Examples include 
the Association of Coastline Local Governments, the 
Association of Local Governments in Small Administrative 
Districts, etc.
If relations among local governments are analysed 
in a broader context, then it has to be said that they are 
not making adequate use of potential for partnership. 
Local government staff are more likely to speak about 
competition and limiting themselves from others  – 
something which is based on the desire to offer all 
services in the regular territory and to avoid co-operation 
with neighbouring local governments even though that 
might be more advantageous. All of this is based on a 
procedure that was established during the Soviet era  – 
making use of vertical links (contacts with the relevant 
government ministries and parties), distribution of 
finances in accordance with the principle of ministries, 
and the desire of governmental institutions to get rid 
of any horizontal relationships. This means that co-
operation among Latvian local governments at this 
time is still aimed at short-term goals, and they do not 
yet fully appreciate the economic and social benefits 
of co-operation. Local government experts say that it is 
essential and timely to speak about local government co-
operation, emphasising good practices in this are so as to 
strengthen the capacities of Latvia’s local governments.
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The main conclusions. Major tasks
the main conclusions
Administrative and territorial reforms (ATR) have substantially changed Latvia’s administrative and territorial 
system, but they have not fully resolved many fundamental problems related to human capital in regions. Not all 
of the new administrative districts are the same when it comes to their size and their population numbers. Not 
all local governments can attract residents in a sustainable way by offering a high-quality living environment and 
an effective network of social infrastructure. It is too early to make final judgments about ATR, because only one 
year has passed during which local governments are adapting to the new situation and seeking out new models 
for their activities. 
Administrative district governments are looking for new strategies, are consolidating their resources 
in their district (e.g., by working with local governments), and becoming involved in partnerships with other 
administrative districts so as to avoid the competition and isolation that are promoted by the well-rooted trend 
of making use of vertical links (contacts with the relevant government ministries and parties), distribution of 
finances in accordance with the principle of ministries, and the desire of governmental institutions to get rid of 
any horizontal relationships. 
Major tasks
Second-level local governments are needed for the consistent implementation of ATR in terms of territorial 
approaches and the ability to overcome sectoral crumbling in the area of regional development. The distribution 
of functions and governance resources among governance levels of various kinds must be assessed.
Taxes and subsidies must be used to stimulate new businesses and the creation of new jobs in areas which 
receive special support. Local governments must have the right to receive a segment of corporate tax revenues 
from the relevant local government so that the money can be used to maintain and establish infrastructure 
(roads, engineering and technical networks, business incubators). At this time, local governments have limited 
opportunities and resources in terms of creating an environment which is favourable for businesses.
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New survival strategies and co-operation models are 
being sought not just by local governments, but also by 
local businesspeople, employers and employees who are 
the most important social agents in the economic life 
of administrative districts. ATR and the economic crisis 
have been the most important factors in changing the 
situation, creating new opportunities, expanding areas 
of operations, and creating new risks. In this section of 
the paper, let us look at various individual and collective 
strategies related to capability.
«Groundbreakers»: Risks and 
capability in the labour market
Opportunities to earn a living and develop a 
professional career are an important component in any 
person’s life, and so opportunities for a businessperson 
or employee to earn money near his or her place 
of residence are an important prerequisite for the 
development of the nation in the country’s regions.
Risks in the labour market represent a challenge, 
an opportunity and a barrier. The presence of risks 
in the labour market is evidenced by the insolvency 
of employers, an end to business operations, as well 
as problems with employees such as unemployment 
rates and migration. When risks in the labour market 
are encountered, there must be capability for both 
employers and employees to overcome them. Capability 
in the labour market can be manifested as new 
business operations or as a change in existing ones. For 
employees, that may mean having to seek out, obtain or 
hold on to a job, or it can mean learning a new profession 
with all of the relevant skills, talents and knowledge. Each 
person establishes his or her own strategy on the basis of 
existing capacities and ideas. The capability of employers, 
in turn, can be manifested as the launching of new 
businesses, entering new sectors, or learning about new 
methods and forms of co-operation.
Both employers and employees face risks which are 
relatively new in Latvia’s labour market. This means that 
there is a lack of experience from previous generations 
as to how to overcome these risks. There is also a lack of 
public mechanisms aimed at reducing the level of risks.
Data from several studies conducted by the University 
of Latvia’s Faculty of Social Sciences (SZF) and the Advanced 
Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI)1 show that 
1 The study «Polycentric Development of Regions» (2009), 
commissioned by the Latvian Council of Science, the study 
«Sustainable Development of Cities and Regions» (2008), and the 
study «Proposals on Drafting Policies for Latvia’s Cities» (2009), 
commissioned by the National Regional Development Agency.
employers in regions outside of Riga emphasise the 
need to take risks, to choose new sectors, and to change 
relations with employees who want to ensure long-
time operations. An additional risk for employers in 
regions outside of Riga is insufficient capability among 
businesspeople, as well as a shortage of businesspeople 
as such. This makes it more difficult to compete with 
others not only at the international, but also at the local 
level.
In interviews, employers from the private sector 
emphasise the idea that elements of risk are mandatory 
when it comes to launching new businesses. This is full of 
risks. Private employers are most emotional in evaluating 
this, emphasising the need to take decisions and the joy 
which is experienced when something is achieved:
«There was a great deal of risk. Basically we 
mortgaged everything or practically everything that 
had been registered in the Land Book. We took out 
a loan from the Mortgage Bank, and theoretically 
the interest rate is not too high, but the payments 
are very substantial. The truth is, however, that we 
managed to crawl through the needle’s eye. When we 
look back at what happened back then, it really does 
seem that we crawled through the needle’s eye.» 
(Businessman in Vidzeme)
Another risk may be the business environment 
in which companies can face harsh and threatening 
activities on the part of competitors (Business sharks didn’t 
like us», one businessman said). At the same time, nearly 
all of the private businesspeople in the countryside and 
in small towns say that there is too little competition, 
adding that the lack of opportunities for co-operation 
creates new risks for the sector in which there are few 
companies. True, that does not apply to retailing, where 
there is very much competition, indeed.
Public sector employers also encounter risks. The 
two main risks are implementation of political decisions 
about mergers or the organisation of local government 
work, as well as the consequences of policies which 
seem to centralise local governments and the country’s 
regions. In some cases the managers and employees 
of institutions may face a loss of their jobs because 
the institution is being closed down. In other cases, 
employees are replaced because of a process of 
restructuring. Risks also have to do with demographic 
threats such as depopulation, and that has been 
admitted by representatives of various sectors such 
as wood processing and management of educational 
institutions.
3.4. individual Strategies at Capability: 
Challenges and Risks
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The things which were inherited from the socialist 
management system hinder the implementation of 
effective business support strategies. The same is true 
of the distribution of responsibilities among various 
sectors  – something that is changed. There can also be 
a lack of co-ordination among the institutions which 
supervise the various sectors. Supervision of sectors 
does not take into account regional divisions and local 
opportunities and does not encourage co-operation in 
terms of dividing up financing and writing up new laws. 
This means that there is a certain amount of «dependence 
on the trail» at the level of organised structures 
(DiMaggio, Powell, 2003).
Overcoming risks is a confirmation of capability 
among employers in various regions of Latvia. This 
can be based on the use of experience gained from the 
socialist society (personal acquaintanceship with the 
leaders of state and local government institutions, as 
well as making use of the lack of information and weak 
defence of interests among employees in terms of 
setting working hours and salaries). This is more to be 
seen as «dependence on the trail,» because skills and 
talents related to the previous socio-economic system, 
as opposed to looking for new techniques aimed at 
encouraging capability.
«Dependence on the trail» is also something which 
applies to some of the potential employees in Latvia’s 
regions, because they have taken root in survival 
strategies and are not prepared to engage in long-lasting 
and targeted activities aimed at establishing market 
relationships.
At the same time, employers in Latvia’s region 
«break up the trails» but changing previous statuses, 
relationships with employees, and the relevant sector 
in terms of establishing new products and working with 
scientists and among the employers themselves (e.g., 
fish nurseries in the Alūksne Administrative District or 
establishing a co-operative among processors of fruit at 
home in the Dobele Administrative District).
When employers in the regional public sector are 
rooted into traditions, dynasties and relatives, that 
can be seen both as a positive and negative factor in 
terms of establishing and maintaining labour market 
relationships. Local roots create stability and encourage 
labour market activities at the local level, but some 
public sector employers are also prepared to adapt to 
the new socio-economic situation in the labour market 
by changing the sector in which they work, their job, or 
their career path. This indicates that they can «break 
up the path.» This means capability in overcoming the 
social barriers and limitations which hinder adaptation 
to new circumstances in the labour market or readiness 
to change one’s status (becoming an employer instead of 
an employee), one’s sector (transferring from agriculture 
to retailing), or learning new skills (fundamentals of 
biological farming). Those who «break up the path» 
can be labour market agents (both employers and 
employees) who adapt to the labour market situation 
and are prepared to seek out new areas of professional 
activity and careers in Latvia’s society.
Local action groups: Let’s all take 
responsibility for our district’s 
development!
A place is based not just on the surrounding 
landscape, the regional policies of the country or the 
efforts of the local government, but also by people 
who live in that place. Endogenous development based 
on local initiatives that involve self-mobilisation in 
formulating developmental goals and then achieving 
them on the basis of available resources  – that is one of 
the most important and fundamental principles of the 
European Union’s regional development policies. The 
ability to establish a capable community in pursuit of the 
relevant administrative district’s developmental goals 
will set out foundations for sustainable development of 
the relevant place. Local action groups are the nucleus 
for the responsibility and capability of the surrounding 
community.
Local action groups are to be seen as unique commu-
nities1 which focus on rural development. Communities 
are an important element in a social structure, bringing 
together people who live in one or more geographic 
territories, but have common interests, socioeconomic or 
other problems, lifestyles, beliefs and identities. Everyday 
lives of people occur in groups and communities, and 
communities characteristically have district social 
network structures. A community means more than just 
spending time together at a single location or complying 
to specific criteria. Key elements in communities include a 
common identity, a common sense of place, relationships 
among people, the local environment, the local culture, 
and the capability of the community. At the level of 
communities, capability means that the community must 
be able to mobilise the resources and opportunities that 
are at its disposal, also acting in a very vigorous, targeted 
and corresponding way to achieve the goals that have 
been set out.
Local action groups are an important factor in 
mobilising local resources. They represent groups of local 
organisations and rural residents who act in a specific 
rural territory with a population of between 5,000 and 
65,000 people. Such groups represent the interests of the 
relevant territory and deal with rural development issues 
at the local level. Another key element in local action 
groups is equal partnership at the level of organisational 
decisions making. This means that when the issue 
is an integrated rural development strategy and its 
approval and implementation, all representatives of local 
governments, the business work, local developmental 
organisations, and groups of residents must take part in 
the process (LR ZM).
1 Such groups are very heterogeneous in terms of territory, 
ranging from former districts and ending with the single 
Ādaži Administrative District. This means that one can only 
conditionally speak of the residents of the relevant territory 
as a community. In this case, communities which engage in 
practices are made up of people who are involved in local 
action groups.
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At present there are 40 local action groups in 
Latvia which have received funding from the European 
Agriculture Fund for Rural Development. That funding is 
aimed at implementing local developmental strategies. 
24 of these groups relate to the fishing industry, and they 
have received support from the European Fishing Fund 
for the same purpose.
The 40 local action groups cover nearly all of Latvia, 
apart from the capital city of Riga and other major towns 
such as Daugavpils, Jelgava, Jēkabpils, Jūrmala, Liepāja, 
Rēzekne, Valmiera, Ventspils, Cēsis, Ogre, Salaspils, Talsi 
and Tukums, as well as the Garkalne Administrative 
District. Even if a local action group is registered in 
a larger town, the work of that group still applies to 
communities in the countryside or in small towns. This 
means that the relevant principles ensure the prevention 
of the centralisation of resources in major centres – in the 
large towns which, in the context of the new territorial 
division, are often seen as a threatening competitor by 
people who live in the countryside.
Local action groups were initially established to 
facilitate the absorption of funds from the EU’s Structural 
Funds and particularly the LEADER programme. An 
institution was created which was legally registered. 
Its main function is to successfully integrate rural 
communities in making use of the opportunities which 
relate to EU financing. This meant the provision of 
information about open project tenders, consultations in 
grant writing, as well as the evaluation of the final option 
of applications and the identification of those projects 
that would be forwarded to the Rural Support Service 
(LAD), which would then decide on which projects 
would receive financing. Projects related to the LEADER 
programme have had a direct and indirect influence 
on rural development, and this influence has been so 
broad that it not just brings greater order to the rural 
environment and creates new jobs, but also attracts new 
service users to the relevant territories (tourists, users of 
public catering and accommodation services, lovers of 
active recreation, etc.). Also positive is the fact that this 
project leads to the improvement and restructuring of 
the existing tourism infrastructure. Latvia’s countryside 
already has a fairly extensive but homogeneous offer 
to tourists, but LAP-supported projects help to bring 
greater order to the tourism sector, as well as further 
development of the quality and diversity of services that 
are provided. This is seen not so much in numbers as in 
the increased diversity of tourism offers that are focused 
on various groups of consumers (offering recreation to 
families with children, groups of schoolchildren, etc., as 
opposed to handling corporate events or weddings). 
There are new networks among tourism service providers 
in a single territory, and co-operation with owners of 
accommodations makes it possible to offer a diverse 
range of opportunities related to leisure and recreation.
People often do not use LEADER-related opportu-
nities, because application for project financing is time-
consuming, and there are problems with finding the 
necessary co-financing. Local government co-financing 
is a positive thing. Even though the available co-financing 
is not substantial, target groups related to the LEADER 
programme (young businesspeople and people who 
wish to launch a business) do not find it easy to obtain 
even small sums of money. Preparation of the project 
itself also demands certain resources which are then not 
included in the applicable costs (e.g., when documents 
are prepared, people have to visit various government 
institutions with regional affiliates that are often located 
in different towns). Sometimes institutions order people 
to visit them so as to sign documents, make information 
more precise, etc., but these instructions are not always 
justified in that they mean extra expenditures for the 
applicants. Still, these problems do not keep many 
ambitious people from applying for project financing and 
then implementing the projects, thus ensuring benefits 
not just for themselves, but also for the entire community.
The welfare trap: A new identity for 
poor people
Not all individual and collective survival strategies 
are equally successful in the long term. Some may lead 
people into a trap from which it is not easy to escape. The 
so-called «welfare trap» is a very good example of such 
risky strategies. Unemployment benefit payments, for 
instance, mean that the state and its local governments 
indirectly lead those people who are more passive and 
irresponsible to face a dead end from which it is very 
difficult to escape.
The welfare trap
Unemployed people and those without substantial 
savings or other unregistered income must approach 
local government social services to receive various social 
aid and services. This process has been discussed in 
the press, and various institutions have compiled data 
in relation to it. The number of social aid recipients in 
Riga, for instance, increased by 34% during the first five 
months of 2011 in comparison to the same period in 2010. 
Aid of various kinds was received by 64,112 people in Riga 
during that period of time (the Riga City Council’s Welfare 
Department). According to Latvia’s Welfare Ministry, 
the number of people receiving aid aimed at ensuring 
guaranteed minimal revenues in 2010 grew from 28,800 
at the beginning of the year to 69,000 people at the 
end of the year (Latvian Welfare Ministry, 2011b). There 
were some 300,000 people (including children and old-
age pensioners) who received various types of income-
based social aid from local governments in 2010 (Welfare 
Ministry, 2011a).
The question here is whether the social aid that 
is provided by Latvia’s local governments in terms of 
subsidies and services create material and other types 
of stimuli which create the so-called welfare trap. The 
minimal welfare trap represents a situation in which 
it is more advantageous for individuals to continue to 
receive social aid than it is to look for a job or for other 
sources of income. Those who are in this welfare trap for 
a long time suffer reduced individual capability and face 
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The unemployment trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)
Country/organisation 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Latvia 88.0 88.0 87.0 85.0 87.0
Estonia 64.0 64.0 63.0 63.0 62.0
Lithuania 81.0 79.0 80.0 82.0 86.0
EU 27 74.84 85.74 74.90 74.61 75.32
Source: EUROSTAT, 2011 b
Box 
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stigmatisation which keeps the individual from joining 
or rejoining the labour market. This welfare trap creates 
additional burdens for state and local government 
budgets in that more money has to be spent on various 
subsidies and services.
There are two indicators used in scholarly research 
and statistics to identify the welfare trap  – the 
unemployment trap and the poverty trap that is often 
known, too, as the low wage trap. The Latvian Central 
Statistical Board defines the unemployment trap as 
follows: «The indicators shows the percentage of gross 
income growth that is lost when paying labour-related 
taxes and no longer receiving subsidies or receiving 
less in the way of subsidies in a situation in which the 
unemployed person returns to the labour market» 
(Central Statistical Board, 2010). Box 3.10 shows EUROSTAT 
data related to the unemployment trap in Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania and the 27 member states of the EU. The data 
have been calculated in relation to childless people who, 
upon returning to the labour market, are paid 67% of the 
average wage in the relevant country.
Although the registered level of unemployment level 
has declined gradually in Latvia over the past year, the 
risk of falling into the welfare trap has not been reduced. 
The highest level of unemployment was registered in 
March 2010 (17.3%), and in April 2011 it was down to 
13.9% (NVA, 2011c). Despite this positive trend, it has to 
be noted that during the last quarter of 2010, 37.8% of 
all registered unemployed people had been jobless for 
more than a year, and the largest percentage of such 
individuals found in Latgale (46.7%) (NVA, 2011b). The 
latest data about April 2011 show that the proportion of 
people suffering long-term unemployment has increased 
a bit to 41.2% (NVA, 2011c). In other words, even though 
the level of registered unemployment has declined, there 
are still lots of people who cannot find a job for a long 
period of time.
State Employment Service (NVA) director Baiba 
Paševica said in an interview to the Baltic Business Service 
portal that 53% of unemployed people could not receive 
unemployment benefit payments in 2010 because 
mandatory social tax payments had not been made for 
them, or their period of employment was insufficient 
to qualify for such aid. In April 2010, only 20% of jobless 
people received unemployment benefit (LETA, 2011). 
This can partly be attributed to the aforementioned 
situation in which many people have been jobless for 
a long time. Among them there are those who received 
unemployment benefit for nine months, as specified by 
law, but did not receive it after that period had expired.
The low wage trap is another indicator of the welfare 
trap, showing the extent to which the social security 
and aid system facilitates or hinders the ability of those 
people who receive low wages to return to the job 
market. The Central Statistical Board defines the low 
wage trap thus: «This indicator shows the percentage of 
gross income growth that is lost by paying higher labour 
taxes, not receiving subsidies or receiving them at a lower 
level at a time when the employed person’s gross wage 
increases» (CSP, 2010). Other factors which must be taken 
into account when calculating this indicator include GMI 
support, housing support, state support for families, as 
The low wage trap in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the EU 27 (%)
Country/organisation 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Latvia 48.0 52.0 58.0 81.0 92.0
Estonia 77.0 79.0 88.0 92.0 92.0
Lithuania 108.0 108.0 108.0 107.0 107.0
EU 27 57.78 60.06 57.50 57.05 59.84
Source: EUROSTAT, 2011 a
Box 
3.11
PART 3
128 LATVIA. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010/2011
The number of income-tested local government support payments in Latvia’s larger 
towns and administrative districts, 2010
Major cities, 
districts
People receiving 
income-tested local 
government aid
... adult and work-
capable persons 
among recipients
... among such recipients
Employed 
people
Unemployed 
people
People on  
child-rearing leave
Daugavpils 13,326 4,728 1,557 2,929 242
Jelgava 9,070 3,691 1,159 2,253 279
Jēkabpils 2,839 1,402 559 816 27
Jūrmala 4,387 2,296 649 1,488 159
Liepāja 14,710 5,738 2,263 3,099 376
Rēzekne 5,900 2,673 755 1,745 173
Riga 58,783 23,346 7,265 14,170 1,911
Valmiera 3,924 1,442 564 747 131
Ventspils 9,080 2,123 765 1,216 142
Districts 178,601 89,467 22,704 61,828 4,935
Total in Latvia 300,620 136,906 38,240 90,291 8,375
Source: Ministry of Welfare
Box 
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well as other income-based subsidies. Box 3.11 reflects 
the low wage trap in Latvia, its neighbouring countries, 
and the EU 27 as such. The indicator relates to a two-
parent family with two children in which there is one 
employed person who receives 33% of the average wage 
in the country.
Individuals in Latvia are far more likely to fall into the 
low wage trap than is the average likelihood in the EU. 
Trends show that this risk has increased over the past 
several years due to various factors such as higher taxes, 
lower wages, lower subsidy ceilings and repeal of various 
limitations (e.g., in relation to GMI aid).
When individuals find work, they no longer receive 
unemployment aid, and they often lose access to other 
types of social support such as GMI or housing aid. 
Losing one’s status as an unemployed person also means 
losing a considerable amount of income and other 
benefits, particularly among those who have a low level 
of education, a lack of work experience, and no hope of 
finding a well-paid job.
Not all social services and benefits can be calculated 
in monetary terms. This must be taken into account 
when analysing the motivation of unemployed people 
and social services. For instance, poor people are often 
allowed to visit doctors at no charge to themselves. 
Children from poor families can often receive a free 
lunch at school. This can have a favourable effect on the 
health of such individuals. Poor unemployed people can 
also save on heating services and transport expenditures 
which should be guaranteed for individuals when they 
find jobs and have to make do without social subsidies. 
The money that is saved can be spent on other needs  – 
food, entertainment, education, etc.
Many politicians, representatives of governance 
institutions and even experts in the field of employment 
do not sufficiently appreciate labour-related costs which 
unemployed people face when they accept a new job. 
The costs relate to public transport, additional clothing, 
meals and beverages, as well as various social events. 
Families with juvenile children must spend considerable 
amounts of money on day care or kindergarten 
services. All of these considerations are important when 
understanding the motivation of unemployed people 
and clients of social services and also understanding why 
people in Latvia face such a great risk of falling into the 
low wage trap.
Who is most likely to fall into  
the low wage trap?
There is no access to all-encompassing information 
about all recipients of social aid in Latvia. Local 
governments have established various types of support 
for different social groups and needs. No state or 
local government institution correlates the relevant 
information at this time. Detailed, but not completely 
precise information can be obtained with respect to 
so-called income-texted local government social aid 
(usually the aforementioned GMI and housing supports). 
Information from the Welfare Ministry shows that 
among such recipients, 42% are men, and 30% are 
underage people (Welfare Ministry, 2011a). More detailed 
information about recipients of income-texted support is 
found in Box 3.12.
Many recipients of income-tested aid are adults who 
are capable of work (approximately 45% of all recipients), 
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Main conclusions. Major tasks
Main conclusions
Unless an individual approach is found for each specific situation, state and local government aid related to 
unemployment can indirectly lead more passive and irresponsible people to face the unique dead end of the 
welfare trap from which it is very difficult to escape.
Major tasks
Local governments must have broader rights to specify procedures and amounts of social aid and services, 
taking into account the economic and social status of every individual and every family. The right of individuals 
to receive social aid must be more closely linked to various participatory obligations.
State and local government institutions must work more closely together when it comes to discussing and 
implementing decisions related to social policy. Duplication of subsidies and services must be prevented. There 
must be monitoring to see the way in which various taxes, subsidies and services affect the motivation and 
capability of individuals in the labour market.
The capability of individuals in regions could also be enhanced with the help of various small subsidies. In 
those cases where the job of an individual is far from home, the relevant local government could award discounts 
on public transportation by providing subsidies to transportation companies, doing so for a specific period of 
time. An additional stimulus to encourage individuals to return to the labour market would be the balanced and 
gradual reduction of subsidies over a longer period of time. Upon being offered a job, the individual and his or 
her family immediately loses a substantial amount of income from various subsidies.
Box 
3.13
but are unable to find work or do not earn sufficient 
wages from their jobs. Among such people who received 
income-tested aid in 2010, 28% were employed and 
66% were not. Some LVL 42 million were spent on such 
support in 2010 (Welfare Ministry, 2011a). There is another 
interesting fact here: Although the proportion of people 
in Riga is comparatively small (19.5%), such people have 
received a disproportionately large share of all aid (34.6% 
according to the author’s calculations). This may suggest 
that the local government in Riga is far more generous 
than are other local governments in Latvia.
Social service workers who were interviewed offered 
general descriptions of what they consider to be typical 
social service clients. It must be added that most of the 
respondents could not offer precise numbers concerning 
the structure of their clients. An employee of the social 
service department in Riga said that the database related 
to the administration of social aid and services which 
is used by social workers in Latvia is not appropriate to 
prepare statistical reports. That is a time-intensive and 
complicated job which must involve the designers of 
the database. This basically means that it is impossible to 
prepare daily reports.
The interviews led to an understanding of various 
groups of social service clients: 1) Mothers after child 
rearing leave; 2) Young people with no work experience 
or education; 3) Families with many children; 4) People 
of pre-retirement age; 5) Pensioners. The demographic 
structure of clients is very different among various local 
governments, which means that the range of social 
services and subsidies that are offered will also differ. 
A representative of social services in Salaspils said that he 
believes that approximately 50% of subsidies are received 
by families with minor children, while the other 50% go 
to adults. The person also said, however, that his local 
government has not conducted any detailed analysis of 
the structure of clients. A social services specialist in Riga, 
in turn, said that differences in the range of subsidies 
can be attributed to differing age structures among 
the residents of various local government territories. In 
the Riga suburb of Mārupe, for instance, there are many 
young families with children, which means that the 
relevant local government must establish the appropriate 
infrastructure and aid system. In the region of Latgale, in 
turn, local governments must provide more support for 
elderly people.
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The relationship between people and places can be 
assessed in various ways in modern-day society. There 
is no question, however, that regional identity or the 
lack thereof can fundamentally influence the strategies 
of individuals, communities and local governments. As 
territorial mobility increases, there are greater and greater 
differences in the model of relationships between people 
and places. There are those who have an alienated and 
passionless attitude toward places, but their neighbours 
may be people for whom a distinct regional identity is 
an important component of life. This identity emphasises 
one’s belonging to a community  – a family, dynasty, 
colleagues, neighbours, etc., as well as to the place in 
which the individual spends his or her daily life. Even 
when individuals do not feel that a sense of belonging 
to a place is an important component of their identity, 
the environment in which people live is not a passive 
object of social life. Instead, it takes active participation 
in forming one’s knowledge, experience and behaviours. 
Given that the link between people and their place of 
residence is established not just by rational motivations, 
but also by emotional ones, the role of regional identity 
in territorial development plans and practices cannot be 
ignored. Regional identity can be an important factor in 
mobilising the capability of individuals and communities 
alike, which means that it also helps to facilitate the 
development of the nation.
People are attracted to specific places not just 
because of a thicker layer of butter on their daily bread. 
This is seen in terms of regional development in Latvia 
since the restoration of the country’s independence. The 
lack of a strategic view vis-à-vis regional development 
that is focused on human development and the delayed 
and inconsistent administrative and territorial reforms 
that have been implemented have meant that many 
people in Latvia are left to their own. When the taking 
of strategic decisions at the national level is postponed, 
local governments, NGOs, communities and people 
establish their own survival strategies. Some of these 
have been successful and sustainable, while others have 
been risky and lead people into dead ends and traps. 
Thoughtless approaches toward the development of 
social infrastructure has led to the mass closing of rural 
schools and small subsidies, to an inability to provide 
social services to residents in peripheral locations and to 
an inability to restructure the economy effectively. The 
lack of leadership in the transfer to the market economy, 
in turn, has not just led to a decline in manufacturing 
output, but also to the emigration of many people in 
pursuit of work and a better life. Still, difficult experiences 
in survival have led people to learn how to make their 
lives in Latvia if they are hard-working and ambitious. 
These experiences also lead to consolidation between 
communities and local governments so that they truly 
become more responsible for the future of their region. 
That is a good foundation for successful development of 
the nation in the future.
Administrative and territorial reforms have particularly 
emphasised the issue of commensurability between 
the territorial linkage of individuals on the one hand 
and various subjective spatial mobility practices and 
territorial structuring of local governments on the other. 
The developmental strategies of local governments 
confirm significant capability in terms of mobilising various 
resources, achieving the stated goals and overcoming 
risks. Consistent movement toward strategic goals, lo-
operation among local governments in terms of common 
interests, private initiatives and mobilisation of resources in 
the NGO sector all serve to confirm the capability of local 
governments in terms of establishing responsible strategies 
in ensuring conditions for the development of the nation.
The ability to attract funding from the EU’s Structural 
Funds is a significant challenge for local governments, 
businesses and NGOs. The boundary between trivial use of 
resources and activities that are based on thoughtful long-
term developmental strategies can often be very fragile, 
indeed. Local action groups can be very good partners for 
local governments in which responsible people take part 
in developing local life.
Should people take the established path or «break 
it up?» This is something which relates to risks related 
to considered decisions, and it must be evaluated both 
by employers and employees. If local governments 
help residents to survive the depressive socioeconomic 
situation which prevails, they may unconsciously lead 
some residents into the welfare trap from which they 
will be unable to escape by themselves. Co-operation, 
networks, the search for partners and the mobilisation of 
resources that have not yet been put to full use – those are 
sustainable strategies for individuals, communities and 
local governments in terms of facilitating the development 
of the nation in Latvia.
Conclusion
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Main conclusions. Major tasks
Main conclusions
Seeking out new strategies during an economic crisis is a matter of survival. Individuals and communities 
automatically look for solutions to their social and economic problems. Some of these solutions open up new 
opportunities and are sustainable.
Many people in the regional labour market can find innovative solutions, break down ancient stereotypes, 
and establish successful enterprises. Local action groups, in turn, show that people can come together when 
problems need to be solved.
Thoughtless solutions related to social policy have created the risk that more passive residents may fall into 
the tricky welfare trap  – something which leads them to refuse active participation in the labour market and 
public life as such.
Major tasks
Instead of reactive social policy solutions, there must be proactive approaches to those who have found 
themselves in a crisis situation. This creates co-responsible recipients of social aid, thus encouraging them to take 
responsibility for their own lives. 
Box 
3.14
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technical information about the Survey Conducted 
Under the auspices of the National identity Programme, 
«National identity», «Ni: Dimensions. Historical Memory. 
LU SZF, 2010»
RESEARCH FIRM SKDS Research Centre
POPULATION Permanent residents of Latvia aged 18-74
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE 1,000 respondents (representative of the community at large)
ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE 1,004 respondents
SELECTION METHOD Stratified random sampling
METHOD OF STRATIFICATION Administrative territorial
SURVEY METHOD Direct interviews at the place of residence of respondents
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE All regions of Latvia (120 sampled locations)
TIME November 11-16, 2010
THE SAMPLE IN COMPARISON TO POPULATION STATISTICS
Number of respondents in 
sample (%) before weighting
Number of respondents in 
sample (%) after weighting
Official population data as of 
September 23, 2010
REGiON
Riga 32.8 31.8 31.8
Riga environs 17.6 17.4 17.4
Vidzeme 10.8 10.3 10.3
Kurzeme 11.7 13.1 13.1
Zemgale 12.9 12.4 12.4
Latgale 14.2 15.1 15.1
GENDER
Men 43.9 47.0 47.0
Women 56.1 53.0 53.0
NatiONaLitY
Latvians 58.2 57.7 57.7
Others 41.8 42.3 42.3
aGE
18-24 11.7 14.4 14.4
25-32 18.3 19.5 19.5
35-44 16.5 18.4 18.4
45-54 20.2 19.2 19.2
55-74 33.3 28.5 28.5
EMPLOYMENt StatUS
Employed 53.2 54.6
Not employed 46.8 45.4
EDUCatiON
Primary 12.5 12.6
Secondary, specialised 
secondary 66.1 66.5
Higher 21.4 20.9
CitiZENSHiP
Latvian citizens 82.6 83.0
Others 17.4 17.0
The data were weighted on the basis of region, nationality, gender and age. 
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technical information about the Survey Conducted 
Under the auspices of the National identity Programme, 
«National identity», «Ni: Location, Capability, Migration. 
LU SZF, 2010/2011»
RESEARCH FIRM SKDS Research Centre
POPULATION Permanent residents of Latvia aged 18-74
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE 1,000 respondents (representative of the community at large)
ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE 1,009 respondents
SELECTION METHOD Stratified random sampling
METHOD OF STRATIFICATION Administrative territorial
SURVEY METHOD Direct interviews at the place of residence of respondents
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE All regions of Latvia (120 sampled locations)
TIME December 14, 2010 to January 13, 2011 
THE SAMPLE IN COMPARISON TO POPULATION STATISTICS
Number of respondents in 
sample (%) before weighting
Number of respondents in 
sample (%) after weighting
Official population data as of 
September 23, 2010
REGiON
Riga 32.9 31.8 31.8
Riga environs 16.0 17.4 17.4
Vidzeme 9.9 10.3 10.3
Kurzeme 11.8 13.1 13.1
Zemgale 13.0 12.4 12.4
Latgale 16.5 15.1 15.1
GENDER
Men 45.8 47.0 47.0
Women 54.2 53.0 53.0
NatiONaLitY
Latvians 58.1 57.7 57.7
Others 41.9 42.3 42.3
AGE
18-24 13.2 14.4 14.4
25-32 19.6 19.5 19.5
35-44 18.4 18.4 18.4
45-54 19.9 19.2 19.2
55-74 28.8 28.5 28.5
EMPLOYMENt StatUS
Employed 55.6 55.4
Not employed 44.4 44.6
EDUCatiON
Primary 13.3 13.7
Secondary, specialised 
secondary 65.1 65.2
Higher 21.6 21.1
CitiZENSHiP
Latvian citizens 83.3 83.0
Others 16.7 17.0
The data were weighted on the basis of region, nationality, gender and age.
The survey was directed by Vineta Zeiferte.
The data were correlated by Liene Līvmane.
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tHE SaMPLE
A micromodel of the Latvian population
REGiON
Riga: The city of Riga
Riga environs: The Aloja, Ādaži, Babīte, Baldone, 
Carnikava, Engure, Garkalne, Ikšķile, Inčukalns, 
Jaunpils, Kandava, Krimulda, Ķegums, Ķekava, 
Lielvārde, Limbaži, Mālpils, Mārupe, Ogre, Olaine, 
Ropaži, Salacgrīva, Salaspils, Saulkrasti, Sēja, Sigulda, 
Stopiņi and Tukums administrative districts, plus the 
city of Jūrmala.
Vidzeme: The Alūksne, Amata, Ape, Beverīna, Burtnieki, 
Cesvaine, Cēsis, Ērgļi, Gulbene, Jaunpiebalga, Līgatne, 
Lubāna, Madona, Mazsalaca, Naukšēni, Pārgauja, 
Priekuļi, Rauna, Rūjiena, Smiltene, Strenči, Valka, 
Valmiera, Varakļāni and Vecpiebalga administrative 
districts, plus the city of Valmiera.
Kurzeme: The Aizpute, Alsunga, Brocēni, Dundaga, 
Durbe, Grobiņa, Liepāja, Nīca, Pāvilosta, Priekule, Roja, 
Rucava, Saldus, Skrunda, Talsi, Vaiņode and Ventspils 
administrative districts, plus the cities of Liepāja and 
Valmiera.
Zemgale: The Aizkraukle, Aknīste, Auce, Bauska, Dobele, 
Iecava, Jaunjelgava, Jelgava, Jēkabpils, Koknese, 
Krustpils, Nereta, Ozolnieki, Pļaviņas, Rundāle, 
Sala, Skrīveri, Tērvete, Vecumnieki and Viesīte 
administrative districts, plus the cities of Jelgava and 
Jēkabpils.
Latgale: The Aglona, Baltinava, Balvi, Cibla, Dagda, 
Daugavpils, Ilūkste, Kārsava, Krāslava, Līvāni, Ludza, 
Preiļi, Rēzekne, Riebiņi, Rugāji, Varkava, Viļaka, Viļāni 
and Zilupe administrative districts, plus the cities of 
Daugavpils and Rēzekne.
tYPE OF POPULatED aREa
Riga: The city of Riga
Other cities: Daugavpils, Liepāja, Jelgava, Ventspils, 
Rēzekne, Jūrmala, Valmiera, Jēkabpils, and others
The countryside: Parishes, single family farms
EDUCatiON
Primary: A primary or unfinished secondary or trade 
education
Secondary, specialised secondary: A general or special 
secondary education or an unfinished higher 
education
Higher: A respondent with a higher education
EMPLOYMENt SECtOR
Public sector: Respondents who work for state or local 
government institutions or companies with state or 
local government capital
Private sector: Respondents who work for companies 
with private capital
Not working: Homemakers, pensioners, schoolchildren, 
students, unemployed people
Others: People with occasional work, people who have 
salaried jobs at public organisations, as well as those 
respondents who cannot name a specific sector of 
employment.
BaSiC tYPE OF EMPLOYMENt
Manager: Higher or medium-level director, head of a 
company, firm, organisation or department, or a 
senior specialist at a company or institution
Specialist, civil servant: A civil servant or employee of 
a state or local government institution or a private 
company, a person who does not do physical work
Worker: An employee in industry, construction, 
agriculture, trade, the service sector or public dining 
services who does physical work
Farmer: A person who works at a farm which he owns
Individual work: Self-employed people, professional 
specialists (lawyers, doctors, etc.), company owners
Pensioner: A person who is retired and no longer works, 
as well as recipients of disability-based pensions
Schoolchild, student: A person who attends a full time 
educational institution
Homemaker: A person who lives at home and does not 
have a salaried job, including people who are on child 
care leave
Unemployed person: A person of working age who does 
not have a job
iNCOME
Income per family member, counting all revenues (wages, 
stipends, subsidies, pensions, etc.) after taxes, with 
income levels divided up into quintiles:
Low: Up to LVL 85
Medium low: LVL 81-125
Medium: LVL 126-160
Medium high: LVL 161-220
High: More than LVL 221
Explanation of terms
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appendices for Section 1
 A 1
 A 2
 A 3
A sense of territorial belonging depending on age 
(% in the age group, adding up the number of respondents claiming «very close links» or «close links» to the 
relevant territory, n = 1,004)
Age group Parish, neighbourhood City Region Latvia Russia Baltic States Europe
all 74.0 81.9 66.8 78.3 14.8 20.2 20.6
18-24 69.2 79.4 65.5 79.0 13.0 20.3 34.5
25-34 63.2 74.0 65.1 72.4 12.1 21.2 22.7
35-44 77.9 85.8 63.4 74.9 12.8 16.0 19.1
45-54 74.5 82.5 68.1 79.8 15.4 20.1 17.2
55-74 81.2 86.3 70.0 83.2 18.4 22.3 15.5
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward civic values depending on age 
(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying that they are «important» or «very important», 
n = 1,004)
Age group Observing laws, rules
Paying 
taxes
Being informed 
about public 
events
Voting in 
elections
Actively 
opposing 
corruption
Helping 
those with 
worse lives
Staying in 
Latvia during an 
economic crisis
all 87.1 77.0 75.8 75.3 70.4 62.7 39.5
18-24 82.6 73.1 70.2 75.5 72.1 65.6 28.5
25-34 86.2 67.4 73.4 74.8 72.9 59.8 35.0
35-44 89.4 77.6 72.8 76.3 69.4 56.0 33.1
45-54 87.6 76.9 78.7 73.3 71.5 62.1 42.1
55-74 88.2 85.1 80.1 76.4 67.9 67.7 50.7
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward civic values depending on levels of education 
(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying that they are «important» or «very important», 
n = 1,004)
Level of 
education
Obeying 
laws, rules
Paying 
taxes
Being informed 
about public 
events
Voting in 
elections
Actively 
opposing 
corruption
Helping 
those with 
worse lives
Staying in 
Latvia during an 
economic crisis
all 87.1 77.0 75.8 75.3 70.4 62.7 39.5
Elementar, 
incomplete 
secondary
82.2 62.6 67.8 64.7 66.7 63.2 34.8
Secondary 84.6 76.2 71.8 74.2 68.0 61.1 38.8
Specialised 
secondary 88.1 78.6 78.7 74.5 70.9 63.2 42.1
Higher 91.9 84.0 81.2 84.8 75.3 63.5 39.0
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 5
 A 6
 A 4
Active civic values depending on age 
(% of age group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Age group Corruption must be actively opposed Laws must be obeyed
Foreign residents must 
vote
all 87.3 85.9 71.2
18-24 89.5 82.4 69.0
25-34 78.9 75.6 67.3
35-44 93.5 87.7 74.6
45-54 86.6 88.4 71.6
55-74 88.5 91.9 72.5
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Active civic values depending on gender 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Gender Corruption must be actively opposed Laws must be obeyed
Foreign residents must 
vote
all 87.3 85.9 71.2
Men 87.7 82.7 68.8
Women 87.0 88.8 73.3
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Active civic values depending on levels of education 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of education Corruption must be actively opposed Laws must be obeyed
Foreign residents must 
vote
all 87.3 85.9 71.2
Elementary, incomplete 
secondary 87.6 79.1 70.5
Secondary 87.6 82.7 70.4
Specialised secondary 87.3 88.8 68.1
Higher 86.8 89.7 78.1
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 8
 A 9
 A 7
Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values depending on income levels 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of income* Respecting state flag Speaking state language Knowing national anthem
all 84.2 83.5 72.2
Low: < LVL 80 77.1 79.6 66.2
Medium low: LVL 81-120 76.4 79.3 65.2
Medium: LVL 121-150 90.3 92.6 71.6
Medium high: LVL 151-200 88.1 83.4 78.6
High: > LVL 200 84.9 87.0 78.8
* Here and elsewhere the level of income reflects the post-tax monthly income of families per family member.
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward ethnic nationalism values depending on plans to leave Latvia 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Plan to leave Latvia in near 
future Respecting state flag Speaking state language Knowing national anthem
all 84.2 83.5 72.2
Yes, I have such plans 83.2 73.6 62.2
I may depart 75.8 78.6 62.9
I have no such plans 87.3 87.0 76.9
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on gender 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Age
Every resident 
of Latvia must 
speak Latvian
I like the 
colours of the 
flag
Latvian 
language, culture 
are foundations 
for unity
I am deeply 
touched by 
the national 
anthem
People of other 
nationalities 
cannot belong 
to Latvia
I would prefer 
it if only 
Latvians lived 
in Latvia
all 84.7 80.9 71.8 58.5 29.8 28.8
Men 82.7 77.4 71.0 62.9 33.1 31.0
Women 86.4 84.0 72.5 64.3 26.9 26.9
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 12
 A 11
 A 10
Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on income levels 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Income level
Every resident 
of Latvia must 
speak Latvian
I like the 
colours of the 
flag
Latvian 
language, culture 
are foundations 
for unity
I am deeply 
touched by 
the national 
anthem
People of other 
nationalities 
cannot belong 
to Latvia
I would prefer 
it if only 
Latvians lived 
in Latvia
all 84.7 80.9 71.8 58.5 29.8 28.8
Low:  
< LVL 80 87.2 87.6 79.2 58.5 30.6 31.0
Medium low: 
LVL 81-120 84.7 81.0 67.5 56.4 25.5 31.1
Medium:  
LVL 121-150 88.5 85.8 74.7 69.9 27.6 27.1
Medium high: 
LVL 151-200 89.7 81.0 75.4 61.6 32.7 36.6
High:  
> LVL 200 90.5 83.6 70.4 54.5 35.4 22.2
Don’t know 78.1 75.8 68.8 56.4 28.5 26.6
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward ethnic and cultural values depending on plans to leave Latvia
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Have any of your 
family members, 
relatives or close 
friends moved 
abroad?
Every 
resident 
of Latvia 
must speak 
Latvian
I like the 
colours of 
the flag
Latvian 
language, 
culture are 
foundations 
for unity
I am deeply 
touched by 
the national 
anthem
People of other 
nationalities 
cannot belong 
to Latvia
I would prefer 
it if only 
Latvians lived 
in Latvia
all 84.7 80.9 71.8 58.5 29.8 28.8
Yes, family members 80.6 80.6 70.2 49.9 29.8 28.8
Yes, relatives 84.3 81.3 74.0 60.1 26.8 29.2
No 85.4 84.2 73.1 65.1 31.6 29.2
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Recognition of multiple cultures depending on nationality 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Nationality
It is very good that many 
nationalities have cultural 
associations in Latvia
The state must support the 
preservation of the cultures 
and traditions of various 
nationalities in Latvia
I like the fact that there 
are people of different 
nationalities in Latvia with 
different cultures
Latvians 72.9 65.0 51.8
Russians 89.1 87.7 85.8
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 14
 A 15
 A 13
Recognition of multiple cultures depending on gender 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Gender
It is very good that 
many nationalities have 
cultural associations in 
Latvia
The state must support the 
preservation of the cultures 
and traditions of various 
nationalities in Latvia
I like the fact that there 
are people of different 
nationalities in Latvia with 
different cultures
all 79.9 74.9 66.0
Men 79.0 73.5 63.9
Women 80.7 76.2 68.0
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Recognition of multiple cultures depending on income level 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Gender
It is very good that 
many nationalities have 
cultural associations in 
Latvia
The state must support the 
preservation of the cultures 
and traditions of various 
nationalities in Latvia
I like the fact that there 
are people of different 
nationalities in Latvia with 
different cultures
all 79.9 74.9 66.0
Low: < LVL 80 75.8 73.0 63.0
Medium low: LVL 81-120 76.8 69.3 58.9
Medium: LVL 121-150 89.2 79.8 71.9
Medium high: LVL 151-200 87.5 79.0 72.9
High: > LVL 200 87.3 81.9 68.3
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward global civic values depending on levels of education 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of education
A clean 
environment in 
the future
Respect for 
minorities
A clean 
environment in 
the world
Help for Haiti Human rights in the world
all 80.2 73.5 59.7 42.5 42.0
Elementary, incomplete 
secondary 74.2 67.3 52.4 37.3 34.3
Secondary 78.7 68.6 57.5 41.7 44.6
Specialised secondary 80.8 78.4 62.1 42.7 40.6
Higher 84.8 75.9 63.1 46.2 45.3
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 17
 A 16 Attitudes toward collective myths depending on levels of education 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» or «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of education
If Latvia, like Finland, had remained 
independent in 1940, then the 
standard of living of local residents 
would be much higher
It was only thanks to the 
nationalities of the USSR that Latvia 
achieved a high economic and 
cultural level
all 47.5 36.8
Elementary, incomplete secondary 45.2 29.2
Secondary 44.9 38.9
Specialised secondary 45.6 39.9
Higher 55.8 33.2
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Attitudes toward collective myths depending on income levels 
(% of each group, adding up the number of respondents saying «fully agree» and «mostly agree», n = 1,004)
Level of education
If Latvia, like Finland, had remained 
independent in 1940, then the 
standard of living of local residents 
would be much higher
It was only thanks to the 
nationalities of the USSR that Latvia 
achieved a high economic and 
cultural level
all 47.5 36.8
Low: < LVL 80 42.1 33.6
Medium low: LVL 80-120 40.8 33.6
Medium: LVL 121-150 44.3 38.8
Medium high: LVL 151-200 55.6 46.9
High: > LVL 200 57.2 36.2
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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 A 18
 A 19
Pride in the state depending on education 
(% of each group, n = 1,004)
Level of education Proud («very proud» and «mostly proud»)
Not proud («not particularly 
proud» and «not proud») Don’t know
all 59.9 30.7 9.4
Elementary, incomplete 
secondary 57.5 30.5 12.1
Secondary 59.5 29.2 11.3
Specialised secondary 57.8 34.0 8.2
Higher 65.5 27.4 7.1
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
Pride in the state depending on plans to leave Latvia 
(% of each group, n = 1,004)
Have any of your family 
members, relatives or close 
friends moved abroad?
Proud («very proud» and 
«mostly proud»)
Not proud («not 
particularly proud» and 
«not proud»)
Don’t know
Yes, family members 52.8 37.9 9.3
Yes, relatives 59.5 34.0 6.5
Yes, close friends 56.5 32.9 10.6
No 63.7 26.3 10.1
Source: National Identity. NI Dimensions. LU SZF, 2010.
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The Human Development Index (HDI) reflects the 
nation’s development in three major areas:
•	 Lifespan and health;
•	 Knowledge;
•	 The extent to which the standard of living satisfies 
human dignity.
The concept of human development will always be 
broader than these indicators. The Human Development 
Index does not present an all-encompassing image of 
the condition of human development. In order to gain 
a broader view of human development, the index must 
be supplemented with other important indicators in this 
regard.
This brief review of indicators related to human 
development is based on information from the Latvian 
Central Statistical Board (CSP) about 2009 and 2010, 
on data about the situation on June 1, 2011, and on 
information from individual surveys. Where necessary, 
the authors have also relied on information from govern-
ment ministries, relevant institutions and international 
organisations.
Health and lifespan
The declaration which was adopted 30 years ago at an 
international conference on primary health care in Alma 
Ata said that good health is a fundamental component in 
human welfare, as well as long-term economic and social 
development. The declaration states that «health for all» 
helps people to improve their quality of life, as well as 
peace and security in the world. People have always listed 
health as one of the main values of life along with jobs 
and income.
The following indicators are customarily used to 
evaluate the health of a nation: the fertility and mortality 
rate, natural population growth, infant mortality, as well 
as the expected lifespan of newborns.
During the period when the Report on Human 
Development has been published (from 1995 until 2010), 
health indicators have demonstrated a certain amount of 
progress (see Table T 1).
At the same time, it has to be said that the health 
of residents in Latvia in comparison to that of people 
in other European Union member states remains 
dissatisfactory. In 2008, for instance, the expected 
lifespan of newborns in Latvia was 6.9 years shorter than 
the average in the EU.
There is also a fundamental difference in the lifespan 
of men and women in Latvia – 9.6 years less for men than 
for women. The difference in the expected lifespan of 
men and women in Latvia is more than 1.5 times higher 
than is the average in the EU (5.9 years) (see Table T2).
The Latvian Health Ministry’s document on basic 
positions related to public health between 2011 and 2017 
contains the goal of extending the average lifespan of 
newborns to 71.1 years for men and 79.6 years for women. 
The plan is also to reduce differences in the lifespan of 
men and women and to ensure that people are as healthy 
as possible during their lives.
Mortality and lifespan data show that men who were 
60 in 2009 would, on average, live for another 16 years, 
while women of the same age would live for 22 years (the 
EU average is 20 and 24 years respectively).
Latvia’s population is continuing to shrink. In 2010, the 
rate of the reduction was larger than the previous year  – 
0.83% (0.572% in 2009). Since the beginning of 2000, the 
population has shrunk by more than 133,000 people. 
Migration among residents has been the main cause for this.
19,200 children were born in Latvia in 2010  – 2,500 
fewer than in 2009 (21,700).
Mortality data show that mortality increased in 2010 
in comparison to 2009 (30,000 in 2010, 29,900 in 2009). 
The mortality rate in 2010 exceeded the fertility rate by a 
factor of 1.6 (see Diagram T3).
The main causes of death in Latvia have not changed. 
The three most common causes of death were coronary 
diseases, tumours and external factors. Coronary diseases 
were the most common cause of death in 2009, with 
a Brief Review of 
Human Development indicators
2009/2010 
 T 1
Trends in major health indicators, 1995-2010
1995 2000 2005 2010
Fertility rate, number of newborns per 1,000 residents 8.7 8.5 9.3 8.5
Mortality, number of deaths per 1,000 residents 15.7 13.6 14.2 13.4
Infant mortality per 1,000 newborns 18.8 10.4 7.8 5.7
Expected lifespan of newborns, years 66.7 70.7 71.8 73.8
Appendices
 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MOBILITY AND CAPABILITY 143
16,100 people dying because of them (54% of all those 
who died). Tumours killed 6,000 people (20.2%) in 
2009  – men more than women. External causes (suicide, 
accidents, poisoning, traumas) killed 2,152 people in 2009 
(7.2%). Men die of external causes three times more than 
women do (see Diagram T4).
 T 2
 T 3
Average expected lifespan in EU member states, years
Year Men Women
EU-27 2007 76.1 82.0
Latvia 2010 68.8 78.4
Estonia 2009 69.8 80.1
Italy 2008 78.6 84.0
Lithuania 2009 67.5 78.6
Finland 2008 76.5 83.3
Spain 2008 78.0 84.3
Germany 2008 77.6 82.7
Sweden 2008 79.2 83.3
Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, as well as data from national statistical organisations 
The fertility and mortality rate per 1,000 residents, 1995-2000
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The situation with public health has not improved to 
any significant degree in recent years. Health indicators 
are among the lowest in Europe, and mortality rates are 
among the highest.
The aforementioned Health Ministry document lists 
four major goals: Reducing the incidence of disease and 
mortality from non-infectious diseases, improvements 
to the health care of mothers and children, reduction of 
traumas and mortality caused by external factors, and 
improving the accessibility of health care. The health care 
sector is cited as one of the country’s priorities, but the 
fact is that financing for the sector is not sufficient.
General government spending on health care 
compared to GDP in 2009, rose a bit in comparison to 
2008 (4.7% as against 4.6%). Government financing as a 
proportion of GDP, however, remains among the lowest in 
the EU – around 4%, as opposed to as much as 7% of GDP 
in other EU member states.
Education
Education is the most important prerequisite for 
the survival and development of a society. It is of key 
importance in the development of individuals and 
society at large. Latvia’s long-term goal when it comes 
to the development of the country’s education system 
is to create a knowledge-based society in which cultural, 
social and economic growth are based on a high 
intellectual level among the country’s residents. The 
government’s position on the development of education 
states that the goal is to ensure that each resident can 
obtain a high-quality lifelong education in terms of his 
or her individual interests and capacities, as well as of the 
country’s economic development needs.
People must have at least a secondary education if 
they are to participate actively in social and economic 
affairs (see Diagram T5).
Latvia’s National Development Plan for 2007-2013 
states that the main resource in achieving the level 
of public and individual development that is typical 
in developed countries is the level of knowledge and 
wisdom among local residents, as well as the skilful 
and targeted use of such knowledge and wisdom. An 
appropriate educational system is necessary to achieve 
these goals. Bringing greater order to the country’s 
network of schools is one of the most important issues in 
this regard.
Over the last two years, the Ministry of Education and 
Science has been reorganising the country’s education 
institutions, and the result was that the number of 
T 6
T 5
The number of general education schools at the beginning of the school year
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general education schools declined very rapidly during 
the 2010/2011 school year (see Diagram T6).
Over the past several years, Latvia has seen a decline 
in student numbers at general education schools, as well 
as in the number of teachers. During this school year, 
28,800 teachers are working in schools  – 600 more than 
during the previous year, even though since 2005/2006, 
the number of teachers has declined by 5,600.
During the 2010/2011 school year, there were 
858  general education schools with a total of 229,000 
students – 10,800 or 4.5% fewer than during the previous 
school years.
Latvia’s negative demographic situation has led to a 
decline in the number of elementary schools (Grades 1-9) 
students each year. During the last six years, the number 
of elementary school students has declined by 53,000 to 
174,700 this year. There are concerns about the reduced 
proportion of elementary school students in the relevant 
age group (7-15), even though elementary education is 
compulsory in Latvia. During the 2010/2011 school year, 
the proportion of such students in the age group shrank 
to 94.3% (as against 95.2% in 2009/2010).
During the last school year, 19,000 students obtained 
a general secondary education  – 107 fewer than during 
the previous school year. 58.9% of high school graduates 
entered higher education institutions after graduation. 
4.2% continued their education at professional 
education institutions, while 36.9% did not continue 
their studies at all.
There are 63 special education institutions in Latvia for 
children with physical and mental development problems. 
There are 1,591 special needs students, however, who 
have been integrated into general education institutions.
According to the State Educational Quality Service, 
11,300 students who are the age of compulsory 
education are not actually attending school this year. The 
proportion of people aged 18-24 who had not completed 
their secondary education and were not continuing with 
their education in 2009 was 13.9%. There can be all sorts 
of reasons for this, but socio-economic considerations are 
the most important ones.
Ensuring the availability of primary and secondary 
education is the main policy aspect aimed at reducing 
the proportion of young people who do not finish 
school. The goal is to ensure a precise count of those 
who should be attending school, preparing normative 
regulations which would set out a unified procedure 
whereby an educational institution informs parents, 
as well as local government and state institutions if a 
child does not attend school without an excuse, also 
providing assistance to young people who face the risk 
of social alienation or have problems with their learning 
capacities. The plan is to implement this programme in 
full by 2013.
According to an informational report from the 
Ministry of Education and Science (11 September 
2009), «improvements to the system of professional 
education involve a professional educational system 
which regulates itself and is in line with the needs of 
the state and its labour market  – one which ensures 
that local residents can learn general and professional 
knowledge and skills which are in line with their abilities 
and interests throughout their lives. This will be ensured 
by optimisation of the network of professional education 
institutions, as well as the content of education and 
financing for the educational system.»
Work is being done to ensure greater order in 
the system and content of professional education so 
as to ensure the more effective use of resources, to 
improve the quality of education and to make sure that 
the education system is in line with the needs of the 
labour market. This involves the closing or merger of 
small schools, the transfer of schools with insufficient 
numbers of students to local governments so that they 
can be merged with general education schools, the 
establishment of competence centres, the consolidation 
of educational programmes and the establishment of 
branches for schools. Funding from the European Union 
Structural Funds is being used to make professional 
education more attractive, as well as to engage in other 
activities which help to achieve the relevant strategic 
goals.
During the 2010/2011 school year, there are 35,800 
students in 83 professional educational institutions  – a 
decline of 893 students and two educational institutions 
in comparison to the previous year (see Diagram T7).
T 7
Trends in the number of students at professional educational institutions, 2000-2010
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During the past decade, the number of students at 
professional educational institutions has declined by 12,900.
Improvements to the system of higher education 
envisage reducing the lack of uniformity and improving 
the quality of study programmes, also facilitating the 
more rational and effective use of public financing and 
facilitating the availability of a higher education for 
students from poorer families.
There are 58 higher education institutions in Latvia. 
The number of students at such institutions, however, 
has been declining each year during the past five years. 
During the 2010/2011 academic year, there were 103,900 
students at Latvia’s universities and colleges  – 8,700 
fewer than during the previous year. The number of 
students admitted to universities declined from 31,500 in 
2009/2010 to 31,000 in 2010/2011. Last year 26,500 people 
graduated from institutions of higher education with an 
academic degree or qualifications.
Under the auspices of the EU 2020 strategy, Latvia has 
set out the goal of increasing the proportion of people 
aged 30-34 who have completed their higher education to 
34-36%, as against 30.1% in 2009. The average goal in the 
EU is 40%, with a level of 32.3% in 2009 (see Diagram T8).
One basic problem in higher education is to ensure its 
compatibility with the needs of the labour market and the 
national economy. It is still the case that inadequate numbers 
of graduates in the fields of engineering, manufact uring, 
processing and other technologies are graduating.
T 8
T 9
Trends in the number of students admitted to and graduated from universities and 
colleges, 2000-2010
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Most students in Latvia pursue degrees in the 
social sciences, commerce and the law (49.9%). 12.6% of 
students are enrolled in faculties which teach engineering, 
manufacturing and construction, while 5.5% are enrolled 
in faculties which teach the natural sciences, mathematics 
and information technologies.
The percentage of students whose tuition is covered 
by the state increased in the 2010/2011 academic year, 
but 66% of all students paid tuition themselves (see 
Diagram T9).
The main policy directions and projects aimed at 
increasing the number of people who have completed 
their higher education in Latvia include modernisation 
of higher education, modernisation of the material 
and technical basis of higher education institutions, an 
increase in the effectiveness of resource use, provision of 
equal opportunities to pursue a higher education, and 
improvements to the quality of studies and scholarly work.
The Ministry of Education has taken several steps to 
improve the export capacity of universities and to attract 
students and financial support from other countries. 
Former Education Minister Rolands Broks has said that 
there are plans to change the financing model for higher 
education and to evaluate educational programmes to 
examine their quality, the possibility that programmes 
may overlap, and the workload of academic staff.
The aforementioned goals in the area of education 
can be achieved if relevant financing is found. Educational 
institutions in Latvia receive funding from the national 
budget, local government budgets, the resources of 
individuals and legal entities, as well as foreign aid 
programmes (see Table T10).
Income
Income is an important aspect of the Human 
Development Index. Income allows people to access 
the important resources which are necessary for human 
development, expand the choices which people have, 
and are an important goal of government policy.
T 11
T 10
Household income, 2004-2009, lats per household member
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Financing for Education
General government spending on education,  
% of national budget
General government spending on education,  
% of GDP
2000 14.6 5.5
2001 16.0 5.4
2002 16.1 5.7
2003 15.8 5.5
2004 17.0 6.1
2005 15.7 5.6
2006 15.7 6.0
2007 16.1 5.8
2008 16.7 6.5
2009 15.0 6.6
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Latvia’s Poverty Risk Index increased from 19% in 
2004 to 21.4% in 2009, and this is one of the highest levels 
in the EU. The Poverty Risk Index speaks to the proportion 
of people who are under the threshold of a risk of poverty 
(LVL 160 a month in 2009).
Latvia’s EU 2020 goal is to reduce the Poverty Risk 
Index to 21% by 2020, which would mean that the risk of 
poverty would be eliminated for 121,000 residents.
One direction in pursuit of this goal is to reduce 
income inequality and to facilitate the ability of people 
who are poor or facing the risk of social alienation to 
take part in and enjoy equal opportunities in the labour 
market in an effective way.
Household income per household member in 2009 
declined by an average of 16% or LVL 40 a month. The 
average monthly income is at a level of LVL 214, which is 
lower than in 2007 (see Diagram T11).
There are still differences among Latvia’s various 
regions in terms of income differentiation. The highest 
income per household member was registered in Riga, 
while the lowest was registered in Latgale (see Table T12).
The risk of poverty increased in 2009 for several 
groups of residents, including young people up to the 
age of 24, as well as households with children. Divorced 
families and families with three or more children face a far 
greater risk of poverty than is the average.
As economically active household members 
have lost their jobs, there has been a reduction in the 
proportion of households in which wages are the 
main source of income. Wage income per household 
member declined by 24% or LVL 46 between 2008 and 
2009.
The average gross wage for working people in Latvia 
was LVL 445 in 2010, with a net wage of LVL 316. The 
average gross wage dropped by 3.5% in comparison 
to 2009. The reduction in the public sector was 6.8% 
(LVL 470), it was 8.2% (LVL 433) in the government sector 
as such, and 1.4% (LVL 427) in the private sector.
Latvia’s residents have become far more reliant on 
social aid as economic activities have narrowed. In 2008, 
19% of household income was based on social aid, but in 
2009 the proportion rose to 28% of income.
Data about purchasing power parity in terms of 
Latvia’s GDP show that on average, it is 52% of the EU-
27 level  – the second lowest indicator in the EU (see 
Diagram T13).
T 12
Household income per household member in Latvia’s statistical regions, 2008
Riga Riga environs Vidzeme Kurzeme Zemgale Latgale
2008 310 300 193 230 218 175
2009 261 231 183 191 188 160
2009 as % of 2008 84 77 95 83 86 91
Source: European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU SILC)
T 13
Per Capita GDP in EU Member States in Accordance With Purchasing Power Parity, 2009 
(EU 27 = 100)
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the Human Development index 
and Statistical tables
The first Human Development Index (HDI) was 
published in the 1990 Human Development Report, 
and ever since then it has been of much interest among 
politicians, journalists and scholars. There have always 
been discussions about the components of the HDI and 
about the way in which it is calculated. The way in which 
the HDI is calculated and the relevant indicators have 
been chosen has been improved and altered since 1990.
The 20th anniversary of the HDI rolled around in 2010, 
and after a study of criticisms and discussions about the 
calculation methods, the indicators upon which the index 
is based and the way in which the index is calculated 
were changed. More detailed information about 
these changes can be found at http://hdr.undp/org/en/
humandev/lets-talk-hd.
The HDI is a combined indicator which helps to 
evaluate long term progress in three major areas of 
human development  – education, health and income. 
The HDI clearly shows that development involves more 
than merely economic growth.
The following table shows how the method for 
calculating the HDI has changed over time.
Period
Indicators
Calculation method
Health Education Income
1990
Average 
expected 
lifespan of 
newborns
Proportion of literacy among people aged 25+ Real per capita GDP, PPP $ (log)
Arithmetic 
average
1991-1994 (2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults(1/3) Average years spent obtaining an education
Real per capita 
GDP, PPP $ 
(adapted)
1995-1998
(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults
(1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions 
at all levels
Real per capita 
GDP, PPP $ 
(adapted)
1999
(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults
(1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions 
at all levels
Real per capita 
GDP, PPP $ 
(adapted)
2000-2009
(2/3) Proportion of literate people among adults
(1/3) Proportion of attendees at educational institutions 
at all levels
Real per capita 
GDP, PPP $ (log)
2010
(2/3) Average years spent obtaining an education
(1/3) Expected number of years spend obtaining an 
education
Real per capita 
GNP, PPP $ (ln)
Geometric 
average
Until 2010, the HDI was calculated on the basis of a 
simple arithmetic average from indicators describing 
health, education and income. In 2010, the structure 
of three dimensions for the index was preserved, 
but new indicators were chosen for the segments of 
income and education, and the calculation method was 
changed from the arithmetic average to the geometric 
average. The arithmetic average method allows low 
achievements in one dimension to be compensated with 
high achievements in another. The geometric average 
method reduces the likelihood of replacing the various 
dimensions in the index with one another, and it offers a 
more adequate reflection of the actual situation.
The HDI that is in this year’s Human Development 
Report cannot be compared to indices from previous 
reports because of the differences in the calculation 
methodology.
Because of the changes in the HDI calculation method 
and indicators, we have republished Latvia’s HDI from the 
Human Development Report of 2010 in this report. The 
full text of the report can be found at http://hdr.undp/org/
en/reports/global/hdr2010.
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The internationally comparable data that are used 
to calculate the HDI come from the following sources of 
information: per capita gross national product from the 
World Development Indicator database of the World Bank 
(2010); the average amount of time spent in education 
and the expected amount of time spent in education 
from the UNESCO Statistical Institute database; and the 
expected lifespan of newborns from the 2008 revised 
report of the UNDESA Global Resident Perspective 1950-
2050 (UNDESA, 2009).
Information in the Human Development Report 2010 
shows that Latvia’s HDI rose from 0.651 to 0.769 between 
1980 and 2010, placing it in 48th place among 169 
countries in the world. More detailed information about 
this can be found at http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/
explanations/LVA.pdf.
Tables of indicators related to human development 
have been prepared in accordance with the indicators 
of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). There are 
18 statistical tables featuring the main aspects of human 
development. The tables reflect the most important 
indicators in describing social processes related to health, 
education, the environment, employment, etc. The 
source of information is data from the Central Statistical 
Board (CSP), supplemented as necessary with data 
from government ministries and institutions, as well as 
international organisations.
The statistical information in the tables is based on 
international methodologies. Since 1995, some of the 
indicators in the tables have been redefined, with new 
methodologies and classifications. Information has been 
reviewed, and data have accordingly been adjusted for 
the entire period. The data tables also use data from 
random cohort studies conducted by the CSP and other 
institutions. Information in the tables is current as of 
June 1, 2011.
A characterisation of human development
Expected lifespan 
of newborns, years
Maternal mortality
Residents per 
physician
Attendees at all 
levels of education, 
% of those 
 aged 7-23
Higher education students,  
% of those aged 19-23
Per capita GDP, PPP1
Per 100,000 
newborns
Number of 
incidents
Total Women
1995 66.7 – – 294 70.8 26.6 – –
1996 69.3 40 8 283 75.9 37.8 45.5 –
1997 70.0 42 8 288 78.8 43.3 51.7 –
1998 69.9 43 8 301 81.5 50.7 63.5 –
1999 70.4 41 8 296 84.4 56.2 72.7 –
2000 70.7 25 5 291 87.8 63.2 79.6 7,000
2001 70.7 25 5 303 89.5 67.0 84.0 7,700
2002 71.1 5 1 294 90.5 69.7 87.8 8,400
2003 71.4 14 3 294 91.7 71.9 91.3 9,000
2004 72.1 10 2 287 92.5 72.2 93.1 9,900
2005 71.8 5 1 278 91.8 70.5 90.9 10,900
2006 71.3 14 3 274 90.4 68.6 89.3 12,200
2007 71.2 26 6 283 89.7 68.8 90.4 13,900
2008 72.7 13 3 269 89.5 68.4 88.9 14,100
2009 73.4 46 10 282 87.6 62.4 79.8 12,200
2010 73.8 21 4  280 86.7 58.7  73.1 –
1  Source: European Union Statistical Bureau homepage: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables
The Human Development Index: Latvia
Ranking in HDR 2010
Human Development 
Index
Expected lifespan of 
newborns, years
Average no. of years in 
education
Expected no. of years in 
education
Real per capita GNP (PPP 
2008 $)
2010 48 0.769 73.0 10.4 15.4 12,944
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Undesirable phenomena
Unemployed people 
as % of economically 
active residents
Residents aged 
25-64 with at least 
secondary education, 
%1
Proportion in income 
between 20% of 
richest and 20% of 
poorest residents2
Annual inflation rate 
in comparison to 
previous year, %
Deaths in traffic 
accidents per 100,000 
residents
Divorces as % of 
marriages
Children born out 
of wedlock, % of all 
children
1995 6.6 … … 125.0 25 70.6 29.9
1996 7.2 … … 117.6 22 62.8 33.1
1997 7.0 … … 108.4 22 63.0 34.8
1998 9.2 82.6 … 104.7 26 64.4 37.1
1999 9.1 83.5 … 102.4 25 63.9 39.1
2000 7.8 83.2 5.5 102.6 25 66.6 40.3
2001 7.7 79.6 … 102.5 22 62.0 42.1
2002 8.5 82.2 … 101.9 22 61.1 43.1
2003 8.6 83.2 … 102.9 21 48.3 44.2
2004 8.5 84.6 … 106.2 22 50.8 45.3
2005 7.4 84.5 6.7 106.7 19 50.6 44.6
2006 6.5 84.5 7.9 106.5 18 49.6 43.4
2007 4.9 85.0 6.3 110.1 18 47.8 43.0
2008 7.0 85.8 7.3 115.4 14 48.0 43.1
2009 16.0 86.8 7.3 103.5 11 51.4 43.5
2010 14.3 88.4 6.9 98.9 10 53.1 44.1
1  Source: European Union Statistical Bureau homepage: 
http://eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
2  Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau homepage, «Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions»: 
http://epp/eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
Undesirable phenomena (continued)
Suicides per 100,000 residents
Per capita CO
2
 emissions, 
kg per resident1
Per capita NO
x
 emissions 
from stationary sources, 
kg per resident1Men Women
1995 72.0 14.9 15.3 3.2
1996 65.3 13.4 18.3 3.5
1997 62.8 13.9 13.9 3.9
1998 61.0 12.5 13.2 3.8
1999 53.9 13.3 9.8 3.4
2000 56.5 11.9 5.1 3.5
2001 52.2 11.2 3.8 3.7
2002 48.5 11.9 3.3 4.0
2003 45.1 9.7 2.6 4.4
2004 42.8 8.5 2.0 3.8
2005 42.0 9.6 1.4 4.2
2006 38.7 6.6 0.9 4.6
2007 34.1 7.7 0.8 4.6
2008 40.9 8.2 0.5 3.2
2009 40.0 8.2 0.5 3.2
2010  36.2  5.1  1.5 3.8
Source: Information from the Latvian Environmental Geological and Meteorological Centre
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Differences between men and women (women as % versus men)
Anticipated 
lifespan of 
newborns
Number of 
residents (year’s 
end)
Students in 
secondary education 
programmes
Graduates completing 
secondary education 
programmes at highest level
Higher education 
students (19-23)
Employed 
people1
Unemployed 
people
Average wage, 
national level
1995 120.3 116.9 108.0 120.1 155.2 – 109.7 78.3
1996 118.3 117.0 103.5 – 149.7 92.0 120.8 78.5
1997 118.2 117.0 101.8 132.1 145.1 94.8 146.2 79.7
1998 117.9 117.0 101.0 124.1 146.4 92.7 141.1 79.3
1999 117.4 117.1 99.7 122.3 157.4 92.6 134.6 80.0
2000 117.0 117.1 98.1 100.3 152.5 96.2 136.1 78.6
2001 117.6 117.2 98.0 113.8 142.1 97.8 134.6  80.2
2002 117.4 117.3 97.1 111.7 138.8 96.0 142.2 81.5
2003 116.7 117.1 98.0 101.4 140.0 94.8 140.9 83.5
2004 115.1 117.0 100.5 111.0 144.3 95.0 143.6 84.4
2005 118.0 117.0 102.2 111.3 145.8 94.0 149.3 81.9
2006 116.6 117.1 104.0 111.9 152.7 94.5 155.7 82.4
2007 116.2 116.9 104.3 111.6 156.9 95.1 160.2 83.9
2008 115.9 116.8 102.1 111.2 154.3 96.7 108.1 84.8
2009 114.3 116.7 97.4 111.9 150.4 105.4 103.4 83.8
2010 114.0 116.6 94.6 109.4 144.3 106.9 118.5 81.5
Source: Labour force studies, 1996-2001, focusing on people aged 15+ and, after 2002, between 15 and 74 years old.
The condition of women
Expected 
lifespan of 
newborn, 
years
Average 
age of first 
marriage
Maternal mortality Girls aged 
11-18 in high 
school, %
High school 
graduates as % 
of all women 
aged 18
Higher education 
students as % of 
all women aged 
19-23
Proportion of 
women among 
employed 
people, %2
Proportion of 
women among 
managers, 
specialists, %2
Proportion 
of women 
among MPs, 
%
Of 100,000 
newborns
Number of 
cases
1995 73.1 23.3 – – – – – – – 83
1996 75.6 23.7 40 8 84.3 – 45.5 47.9 60.5 83
1997 75.9 24.1 42 8 85.9 85.4 51.7 48.7 60.5 83
1998 75.5 24.5 43 8 85.8 86.4 63.5 48.1 59.1 174
1999 76.2 24.7 41 8 86.9 91.4 72.7 48.1 58.4 174
2000 76.0 24.9 25 5 88.2 87.6 79.6 49.0 57.7 174
2001 76.6 24.9 25 5 89.0 96.1 84.0 49.4 59.1 174
2002 76.8 25.4 5 1 88.9 98.5 87.8 49.0 57.6 185
2003 76.9 25.4 14 3 90.5 82.2 91.3 48.7 57.5 185
2004 77.2 25.6 10 2 88.9 81.1 93.1 48.7 57.5 185
2005 77.4 26.0 5 1 92.4 77.1 90.9 48.4 58.5 185
2006 76.8 26.3 14 3 92.9 83.2 89.3 48.6 58.1 196
2007 76.5 26.4 26 6  90.61 82.9 89.1 48.8 60.3 196
2008 77.0 26.7 13  3 90.21 86.3 88.9 49.2 61.6 196
2009 78.1 27.1 46 10 91.31 81.6 79.8 51.3 60.3 196
2010 78.4 27.4 21 4  81.8 93.2 73.1 51.7 59.3 197
1  According to Cabinet of Ministers regulations on the classification of Latvia’s educational system (11 April 2006), the first phase of 
secondary education covers Grades 7-9 (13 to 15 year olds), while the second phase covers Grades 10-12 (16-18 year olds).
2  Labour force studies, 1996-2001, focusing on people aged 15+ and, after 2002, between 15 and 74 years old.
3  The results of a parliamentary election on 30 September 1995.
4  The results of a parliamentary election on 3 October 1998.
5  The results of a parliamentary election on 5 October 2002.
6  The results of a parliamentary election on 9 October 2006.
7  The results of a parliamentary election on 2 October 2010.
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Demographic indicators
Population, millions, 
end of year
Population increase, 
annual, %
Summary fertility 
coefficient
Proportion of 
dependents, %
Proportion aged 60+, 
%, end of year
Expected lifespan for 60 year olds
Men Women
1995 2.5 -1.2 1.27 43.1 19.3 14.2 19.3
1996 2.4 -1.0 1.18 42.3 19.7 14.8 21.2
1997 2.4 -1.0 1.13 42.2 20.1 14.2 21.3
1998 2.4 -0.9 1.11 41.0 20.5 14.3 20.9
1999 2.4 -0.7 1.18 40.6 21.0 14.1 21.5
2000 2.4 -0.7 1.24 41.1 21.5 14.8 21.3
2001 2.3 -0.8 1.21 39.7 21.9 15.4 21.5
2002 2.3 -0.6 1.23 39.2 22.1 15.1 21.8
2003 2.3 -0.5 1.29 37.6 22.1 15.1 21.5
2004 2.3 -0.6 1.24 37.2 22.2 15.9 21.6
2005 2.3 -0.5 1.31 36.1 22.1 15.0 21.8
2006 2.3 -0.6 1.35 35.6 22.1 15.0 21.5
2007 2.3 -0.5 1.41 34.4 22.1 15.3 21.1
2008 2.3 -0.4 1.40 33.8 22.3 15.6 21.7
2009 2.2 -0.6 1.32 34.0 22.6 16.1 22.0
2010 2.2 -0.8 1.18 34.2 22.9 16.1 22.0
Health care indicators
Mortality from coronary 
disease, % of all deaths
Mortality from malignant 
tumours, % of all deaths
Registered per capita 
alcohol consumption 
in litres1
Number of residents per 
physician
Health care spending as % 
of all government spending
Health care spending as 
% of GDP
1995 55.8 14.1 9.1 294 8.8 3.4
1996 55.5  16.0 8.4 283 8.3 3.1
1997 55.5  16.3 8.4 288 10 3.8
1998 55.5  16.4 8.9 301 10.2 4.1
1999 55.2  17.1 8.8 296 9.5 4.0
2000 55.5  17.3 8.4 291 10.5 3.9
2001 55.9  17.4 7.8 303 9.2 3.2
2002 56.0 17.4 8.5 294 10.3 3.7
2003 56.1 17.9 9.4 294 9.7 3.4
2004 55.9 18.2 8.9 287 9.8 3.5
2005 55.1 18.0 8.7 278 12 4.3
2006 53.6 18.2 9.5 274 12.8 4.9
2007 54.6 17.9 10.0 283 12 4.3
2008 53.3 19.8 10.8 269 11.8 4.6
2009 53.8 19.9 – 282 10.7 4.7
2010 54.2 20.1 – 280 – –
1  Estimate
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Education-related indicators
Students at all 
levels, % of those 
aged 7-23
Primary school 
students, % of 
those aged 7-15
Secondary school 
students, % of 
those aged 16-18
Higher education 
students, % of 
those aged 19-23
Higher education 
spending, % of 
all education 
spending
Average spending 
per student at 
state universities, 
LVL
General 
government 
spending on 
education, % of all 
spending
General 
government 
spending on 
education, % of 
GDP
1995 70.8 89.3 82.6 26.6 16.3 – 16.5 6.4
1996 75.9 91.4 86.3 37.8 18.7 – 14.6 5.4
1997 78.8 92.2 91.5 43.3 18.5 – 14.9 5.4
1998 81.5 92.4 94.6 50.7 91.7 – 16.3 6.5
1999 84.4 93.3 100.4 56.2 20.8 – 14.9 6.2
2000 87.8 96.5 100.00 63.2 22.7 970 14.6 5.5
2001 89.5 99.4 97.0 67.0 23.4 950 16 5.4
2002 90.5 101.0 96.1 69.7 24.1 1,014 15.8 5.5
2004 92.5 103.1 97.6 72.2 25.5 1,173 17 6.1
2005 91.2 103.4 98.7 70.5 27.6 1,657 15.7 5.6
2006 90.4 103.3 98.7 68.6 27.2 1,945 15.7 6.0
2007 89.75 103.2 99.4 68.8 26.7 1,917 16.1 5.8
2008 89.5 102.9 101.9 68.4 25.5 3,013 16.7 6.5
2009 87.6 101.9 109.3 62.4 – – 15 6.6
2010 86.7 99.9 106.6 58.6 – – – –
2010 86.7 99.9 106.6 58.6 
The intellectual potential of the nation
Scientists, technical workers 
per 1,000 residents
Spending on R&D projects, 
% of GDP
Secondary school graduates, % 
of those aged 18
Higher ed. graduates, % of 
those aged 23
Recipients of doctoral degree, 
% of all graduates
1995 2.1 0.52 74.9 21.7 –
1996 1.9 0.46 71.6 28.2 –
1997 1.8 0.43 73.6 30.9 0.3
1998 1.8 0.45 76.4 32.2 0.5
1999 1.8 0.40 81.2 33.2 0.5
2000 2.3 0.45 85.6 47.9 0.3
2001 2.3 0.41 887. 64.2 0.2
2002 2.3 0.42 80.2 58.9 0.3
2003 2.1 0.38 76.2 63.0 0.3
2004 2.9 0.42 76.0 71.2 0.4
2005 2.4 0.56 77.9 75.4 0.4
2006 2.8 0.70 82.5 71.1 0.4
2007 2.8 0.59 87.3 72.6 0.5
2008 2.9 0.61 81.5 66.2 0.6
2009 2.4 0.46 83.4 69.2 0.7
2010 2.4 0.50 – – 0.5
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Employment
Employed people,  
% of population1
Areas of employment, % of all employees1 Increase/decrease in wages of 
employed persons, %
Average weekly working 
hours1Agriculture Industry Services
1995 – – – – 21.7 –
1996 48.3 17 27 56 7.2 40.1
1997 50.6 21 26 53 12.3 41.2
1998 50.5 19 27 54 10.3 41.0
1999 49.6 17 26 57 5.4 41.2
2000 48.2 15 26 59 5.7 41.4
2001 49.2 15 26 59 6.1 41.3
2002 54.4 15 26 59 8.0 40.1
2003 55.4 14 27 59 10.9 40.0
2004 56.1 13 27 60 8.8 39.4
2005 57.1 12 26 62 17.0 40.0
2006 60.1 11 28 61 23.1 39.7
2007 62.0 10 28 62 32.0 39.2
2008 62.6 8 29 63 20.4 39.4
2009 55.2 9 24 67 -3.8 38.9
2010 53.1 9 24 67 -3.5 38.4
1  Labour force survey, persons aged 15+ between 1996 and 2001 and persons between 15 and 74 after 2002
Unemployment (end of year)
Number of unemployed 
people (,000)
Unemployment rate, % Unemployed young 
people (15-24), % of all 
unemployed
Spending on 
unemployment benefit, 
% of all state expenses1
Proportion of long-term 
(12 mo.+) unemployedTotal Among women
1995 83.2 6.6 7.0 20.2 1.7 25.5
1996 90.8 7.2 8.1 20.0 1.1 31.2
1997 84.9 7.0 8.5 18.1 1.1 38.1
1998 111.4 9.2 11.0 16.4 1.6 26.3
1999 109.5 9.1 10.7 14.8 1.6 31.1
2000 93.3 7.8 9.2 14.8 1.2 29.0
2001 91.6 7.7 9.0 14.6 1.0 26.6
2002 89.7 8.5 10.5 13.9 1.1 26.4
2003 90.6 8.6 10.5 13.2 1.1 26.1
2004 90.8 8.5 9.6 12.8 1.0 25.6
2005 78.5 7.4 8.8 14.0 1.2 26.2
2006 68.9 6.5 7.7 14.0 1.1 23.1
2007 52.3 4.9 5.8 12.9 0.9 18.0
2008 76.4 7.0 5.2 13.6 0.9 11.1
2009 179.2 16.0 5.1 14.5 2.5 13.5
2010 162.5 14.3 5.4 14.3 – 37.8
1  Beginning in 2007, this indicator has been calculated on the basis of the government function related to support for unemployed 
people, which includes spending on support payments for such people.
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Priorities in government spending
Defence spending, % of GDP Health care spending, % of GDP Education spending, % of GDP
1995 1.1 3.4 6.4
1996 1.0 3.1 5.4
1997 0.8 3.8 5.4
1998 0.8 4.1 6.5
1999 1.0 4.0 6.2
2000 0.9 3.9 5.5
2001 0.9 3.2 5.4
2002 1.1 3.7 5.7
2003 1.2 3.4 5.5
2004 1.3 3.5 6.1
2005 1.2 4.3 5.6
2006 1.5 4.9 6.0
2007 1.5 4.3 5.8
2008 1.5 4.6 6.5
2009 1.2 4.7 6.6
Environmental resources
Territory, ,000 km2
Persons per km2, end 
of year
Agricultural land, % of 
all land*
Forestland, % of all land
Reclaimed land, % of 
farmland
Annual per capita water 
consumption, m3 2
1995 64.6 38.2 39.3 44.6 – 183.3
1996 64.6 37.9 39.0 44.3 62.0 174.4
1997 64.6 37.5 39.0 44.9 62.0 166.1
1998 64.6 37.1 38.7 44.2 62.8 161.9
1999 64.6 36.9 38.5 44.2 62.9 143.2
2000 64.6 36.6 38.5 44.2 62.9 126.2
2011 64.6 36.3 385. 44.4 62.9 126.3
2002 64.6 36.1 38.4 44.5 62.9 127.6
2003 64.6 35.9 38.3 44.5 63.0 121.9
2004 64.6 35.7 38.2 44.9 63.1 113.9
2005 64.6 36.0 38.3 45.2 63.1 118.8
2006 64.6 35.0 38.1 45.4 63.3 103.8
2007 64.6 35.2 38.0 45.4 63.1 109.3
2008 64.6 35.2 37.8 45.5 61.51 1328
2009 64.6 35.0 37.7 45.7 – 198.7
2010 64.6 34.8 37.7 45.8 – –
1  Data from the State Land Service
2  Data from the Latvian Environmental, Geological and Meteorological Centre
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National income indicators
GDP, million LVL
Agricultural 
added value, % 
of GDP
Industrial 
added value, 
% of GDP
Services, % 
of GDP
Personal 
consumption, 
% of GDP
Gross domestic 
equity capital, % 
of GDP
Tax revenues, 
% of GDP
General 
government 
spending, % 
of GDP
Exports, % of 
GDP
Imports, % 
of GDP
1995 2,615.1 9 30 61 63.5 13.6 33.2 38.6 42.7 44.9
1996 3,129.2 8 28 64 68.5 16.4 30.8 36.9 46.8 54.3
1997 3,631.9 5 29 66 67.4 16.9 32.1 36.3 46.8 54.7
1998 3,971.2 4 28 68 46.9 24.7 33.7 40.2 47.2 59.6
1999 4,2650 4 25 71 63.1 23.0 32.0 41.8 40.4 49.6
2000 4,750.8 4 24 72 62.5 24.2 29.5 37.3 41.6 48.7
2001 5,219.9 4 23 72 62.6 24.9 28.5 34.6 41.6 51.1
2002 5,758.3 4 23 73 62.1 23.8 28.3 35.6 40.9 50.6
2003 6,392.8 4 22 74 62.4 24.4 28.5 34.8 42.1 54.6
2004 7,434.5 4 22 73 62.9 27.4 28.5 35.8 44.0 59.6
2005 9,059.1 4 22 75 62.5 30.6 29.0 35.6 47.8 62.2
2006 11,171.7 4 21 75 65.2 32.6 30.4 38.2 44.9 66.3
2007 14,779.8 3 22 75 62.3 33.7 30.5 35.9 42.3 62.4
2008 16,188.2 3 23 74 62.9 29.3 29.1 38.8 42.8 56.5
2009 13,082.8 3 21 76 61.6 21.4 26.6 44.2 43.9 45.4
2010 12,735.9 4 22 74 63.0 18.0 – 42.9 53.4 54.2
Trends in economic development
GDP growth/decrease (2000 
chained prices), %
Per capita GDP growth/drop 
(2000 chained prices), %
Inflation rate, % compared to 
previous year
Export growth, % of GDP 
(actual prices)
Budget surplus or deficit, % of 
GDP (actual prices
1995 – 0.5 125.0 – -1.6
1996 3.6 5.0 117.6 11.2 -0.4
1997 8.3 9.4 108.4 6.4 1.5
1998 4.8 5.7 104.7 4.4 0.0
1999 3.3 4.1 102.4 -3.1 -3.9
2000 6.9 7.7 102.6 5.4 -2.8
2001 8.0 8.9 102.5 3.7 -1.9
2002 6.5 7.2 101.9 3.2 -2.3
2003 7.2 7.8 102.9 5.3 -1.6
2004 8.7 9.3 106.2 7.8 -1.0
2005 10.6 11.2 106.7 11.8 -0.4
2006 12.2 12.8 106.5 6.1 -0.5
2007 10.0 10.6 110.1 8.4 -0.4
2008 -4.2 -3.8 115.4 4.2 -4.2
2009 -18.0 -17.6 103.5 -9.1 -9.6
2010 -0.3 0.4 98.9 8.3 -7.6
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Violence and crime*
Prisoners per 100,000 
residents
Juvenile criminals, % of all 
convicts
Registered rapes per 
100,000 residents
Drug-related crimes per 
100,000 residents
Intentional or attempted 
murder by men, per 100,000 
men
Registered rapes per 
100,000 women
1995 255.2 10.8 6.4 10.9 18.2 11.8
1996 253.7 11.9 5.3 14.7 18.4 9.8
1997 256.4 13.1 4.9 17.6 15.6 9.1
1998 242.7 13.0 3.4 16.1 16.7 6.4
1999 216.4 14.0 4.2 21.4 14.5 7.8
2000 209.4 14.2 5.6 27.6 12.0 10.5
2001 201.7 13.8 5.1 35.2 15.6 9.5
2002 199.0 14.2 4.5 27.0 13.4 8.7
2003 213.6 13.5 5.3 43.0 18.7 9.8
2004 215.5 13.5 13.81 49.8 14.5 25.61
2005 206.5 12.5 11.0 45.6 5.3 20.4
2006 208.5 13.5 5.4 43.6 6.1 9.9
2007 211.2 11.9 4.1 63.0 11.2 7.6
2008 220.3 10.0 4.4 11.1 6.0 8.2
2009 224.2 8.6 3.1 102.3 12.4 5.7
2010 212.1 7.8 3.5 97.8 3.9 6.6
1  Between January and July 2005, one criminal case related to rape involved the registration of another episode of a criminal offence.
*  A new version of the Criminal Procedure Law took effect on October 1, 2005, and it included a new system of registering criminal 
offences. Accordingly, the data are not comparable to previous years.
Welfare, poverty and social spending
Per capita GDP, PPP1
Industrial added value, 
% of GDP
Income proportion of 
20% richest and 20% 
poorest residents2
General government 
spending on social 
security, % of GDP
General government 
spending on education, 
% of GDP
General government 
spending on health care, 
% of GDP
1995 – 30 – 13.0 6.4 3.4
1996 – 28 – 13.4 5.4 3.1
1997 – 29 – 13.0 5.4 3.8
1998 – 28 – 14.3 6.5 4.1
1999 – 25 – 15.5 6.2 4.0
2000 7,000 24 5.5 13.1 5.5 3.9
2001 7.700 23 – 11.9 5.4 3.2
2002 8,400 23 – 11.4 5.7 3.7
2003 9,000 22 – 10.8 5.5 3.4
2004 9,900 22 – 10.4 6.1 3.5
2005 10,900 22 6.7 9.8 5.6 4.3
2006 12,200 21 7.9 9.5 6.0 4.9
2007 13,900 22 6.3 8.4 5.8 4.3
2008 14,100 23 7.3 9.5 6.5 4.6
2009 12,200 21 7.3 14.0 6.6 4.7
2010 – 22 6.9 – – –
1  Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau: 
http://epp/eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables
2  Data from the European Union Statistical Bureau, «Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions»: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
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Communications
Per capita cinema visits Per capita museum visitors
Copies of daily newspapers per 
100 residents
Published books per 100 
residents
Passenger cars per 100 
residents
1995 0.4 0.5 12.4 79.2 13.4
1996 0.4 0.5 9.2 80.0 15.5
1997 0.5 0.6 13.2 95.4 17.8
1998 0.6 0.6 12.6 107.7 20.1
1999 0.6 0.6 12.4 110.9 22.1
2000 0.6 0.6 8.3 107.3 23.5
2001 0.5 0.7 9.0 107.4 25.0
2002 0.5 0.7 9.4 108.1 26.6
2003 0.5 0.7 10.8 112.0 28.0
2004 0.7 0.8 10.9 112.0 29.7
2005 0.7 0.9 11.3 103.1 32.4
2006 0.9 0.9 10.8 106.1 36.0
2007 1.0 1.1 11.4 121.6 39.8
2008 1.0 11.1 11.6 126.0 41.3
2009 0.8 1.0 9.1 99.5 40.2
2010 – – 7.5 90.9 28.61
1 On December 30, 2009, a new norm was introduced in Cabinet of Ministers regulations on registration of motor vehicles – exclusion 
of a motor vehicle from the register.
Urbanisation
Urban residents, % of all residents (end 
of year)
Increase/decrease in urban residents 
each year
Residents of major cities, % of all urban 
residents (end of year)1
Residents in cities with more than 
40,000 residents, % of all residents 
(end of year)
1995 68.6 -1.4 76.0 52.2
1996 68.6 -1.0 75.9 52.1
1997 68.6 -10 75.9 51.8
1998 68.5 -1.0 75.9 51.8
1999 68.1 -1.3 75.8 51.6
2000 68.0 -0.9 75.8 51.5
2001 67.9 -0.9 75.8 51.4
2002 67.8 -0.7 75.7 51.3
2003 67.8 -0.5 75.6 51.3
2004 68.0 -0.4 75.6 51.4
2005 68.0 -0.5 75.6 51.4
2006 67.9 -0.6 75.6 51.4
2007 67.9 -0.6 75.5 51.2
2008 67.9 -0.6 75.4 51.1
2009 67.7 -0.7 75.4 51.0
2010 67.5 -1.3 75.5 51.0
1  Because Valmiera and Jēkabpils are major cities, the number of residents was recalculated. 
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